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Abstract
The thesis argues for the necessity and value of a two-way interaction between high-
level abstractions and rich historical narratives mediated by middle-range theories. 
The  basic  assumptions  of  critical  realism  are  used  to  derive  a  socio-technical 
metatheory which, in turn, structures the synthesis of specific substantive theories. 
The conceptual tools provided by the Multi-Level Perspective, Analytical Sociology 
and (Technological) Systems of Innovation frameworks guide the study of the cases. 
The  empirical  core  of  the  thesis  consists  of  detailed  histories  of  the  birth, 
development and decay of ten different personal computer production attempts in the 
Soviet Baltic states roughly between 1977 and 1992. In order to generalize from the 
historical narratives a novel analytical technique is developed and employed. The 
resulting  middle-range  theorization  locates  the  mechanisms  and  patterns  of  the 
evolution of these cases on three different levels of aggregation: intra-case, inter-case 
and  system-level.  Finally,  the  study makes  analytical  contributions  to  the  socio-
technical  metatheory  and  provides  philosophical  justifications  based  on  actual 
research practice for retaining the realist position.
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In the following pages the reader will find a history and analysis of various attempts 
to design and/or produce personal computers (PCs) in the three Soviet Baltic states—
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—roughly between 1977 and 1992. I will explain how 
and why each project came to be, how they evolved, experienced various setbacks 
and accelerations, and finally, how and why they were stopped, some more abruptly 
than others. In so doing I will cast light on the little-researched empirical domain of 
Soviet  (personal)  computing  while  also  aiming  to  make  methodological  and 
theoretical contributions.
To understand the choice of topic and focus of the research I have to dwell a little on 
my personal background. From 2005 to 2007 I, at the time a new master's student in 
media and communication studies at the University of Tartu, Estonia, was engaged in 
research on the theories of information society. While wading through the literature I 
also obtained some knowledge about the history of computing, at first largely as an 
unintended consequence. However, at one point I realized that the experience of the 
Soviet  Bloc  was  largely  neglected  in  these  accounts,  whether  historical  or 
sociological. Therefore, to continue my studies I decided to focus more on empirical 
research  and  to  study  the  history  of  computing  in  my  native  country,  Estonia, 
thinking that I could cover developments from the 1950s to the early 1990s. In line 
with my training I aimed not only to write a history but also to derive some more 
general statements from the narrative. In brief: to theorize it.
Unfortunately, searching the literature in the domains of mainstream sociology and 
media  and  communication  studies  revealed  something  frustrating:  although 
technologies were mentioned quite often in various writings there were only a few 
frameworks which actually tried to make them part and parcel of the theory. What 
seemed to be largely missing was a theorization of technology. Nevertheless various 
traces  and references  in  these  accounts  soon led  me  to the  field  of  Science  and 
Technology Studies (STS). What started as one year in London to learn about the 
5
field in more depth ended with my becoming a PhD student in STS in Edinburgh.
By that time I had already assembled some material about the school computer called 
Juku which was designed and produced in Soviet Estonia. During the course of the 
research I found that there had been other attempts to build computers in Estonia. At 
this  point  many  specific  questions  emerged.  Why  did  a  small  country  with  a 
population of about 1.5 million people and without a computer industry decide to 
take  up  such  projects  when  there  were  huge  industries  in  the  USSR devoted  to 
computer  production? What  part,  if  any,  did the school computerization initiative 
play in other Estonian attempts? Moreover, was the Estonian experience somewhat 
exceptional and if so, to what extent? Therefore I decided to re-focus my study on the 
comparison  of  various  attempts  at  PC-building  in  all  three  Baltic  countries, 
supposing that because of the shared historical experience of being incorporated into 
the Soviet Union the similarities between the three far outweighed the differences.
These are the data-driven aspects of the story. But my increasing familiarity with 
STS also shaped the project in important ways. Specifically, I began to observe some 
common traits seemingly shared by a large number of works in the field. An almost 
unequivocal  denial  of  technological  determinism was one  of  them—a case  well-
made and difficult to disagree with. Heavy reliance on case studies was another such 
trait. Rich, complex and interesting case descriptions could often be found. So far, so 
good. But there were six other traits  which in my opinion are more problematic: 
arguably three would characterize the 'constructivist' camp of STS (often represented 
in  journals  such  as  Science,  Technology,  &  Human  Values or  Social  Studies  of  
Science),  one  would  belong  to  the  more  pragmatic  innovation  and management-
oriented part of the community (e.g. Research Policy,  Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change) while two would seem to be shared by both. Below, I briefly describe 
each of these traits.
'Data first, theory second.' This idea highlights  an excessive focus on the varieties 
and  nuances  of  the  empirical  parts  of  case  studies.  Works  like  this  created  an 
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impression that most of the intellectual energy had been spent on story-telling and 
there was little left for framing the research with theoretical categories or provision 
of  middle-range  theoretical  results.  At  times  it  even  seemed that  the  theory was 
whatever happened to be sticking out once the story had been told. As a result good 
theoretical tools proved more difficult to find than I had initially presumed.
'Truth is in the detail.' Although not necessarily a consequence of the first trait, data-
oriented works quite often tended to be characterized by micro-level focus (small 
unit of analysis), narrow temporal range or both. Sometimes these choices relied on 
sophisticated  justifications  about  the  supremacy  of  'flat  ontology'  and  an 
accompanying  focus  on  the  'fluidity',  'contingency'  and  'complexity'  of  various 
interactions. However, analytical moves like these would make it very difficult to 
even raise some questions, e.g. about the long-range dynamics of highly aggregated 
socio-technical constellations. Where information society theories seemed to have 
the  courage  to  operate  on  macro-level  but  without  a  nuanced  vocabulary  for 
technology the situation seemed to be reversed for (constructivist) STS.
'Outstanding equals provocative equals obscure research.' No doubt that the first two 
qualities are definitely present in the best works. But not all that is provocative is 
necessarily  outstanding.  Moreover,  as  a  trained journalist  it  often  struck me  that 
many authors seemed to be grossly violating the principle of writing as simply as 
possible  (but  no  simpler,  of  course).  Instead,  many researchers  seemed  to  enjoy 
tremendously being cleverly confused about the exact meaning of their propositions. 
However,  on  closer  look  much  of  what  was  being  presented  and  described  as 
'interesting' research seemed to consist of loosely connected vague metaphors which
—when translated into more mundane language—turned out to be little more than 
relabelled concepts from existing domains of knowledge characterized by substantial 
logical gaps. Of course, in the first instance there was the troubling issue of choosing 
an interpretation because the fuzziness of such works enabled them to be read in 
multiple conflicting ways.
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'The more recent the better.'  The innovation and management-oriented part of the 
community often seemed to presume that analysis of the present was most valuable 
by default. The scarcity of historical studies focusing on periods other than recent 
decades seemed to indicate the adoption of a presentist attitude. That is, a belief that 
ongoing events are so unique that the analysis of the more distant past is unlikely to 
yield enough relevant theoretical knowledge. The explicit justification for why one 
should reject such studies outright proved difficult to find however.
'What happens between story-telling and theoretical models is magic.' I also noticed 
the general  lack of discussion when it  came to describing how the link between 
narratives and eventual general statements was forged. This was even characteristic 
of many truly outstanding works presenting interesting models and hypotheses. That 
is to say that although this exclusion might not necessarily imply a poor end product, 
it tends to leave an impression as if theorization was a completely mystical craft not 
subject to any kind of formalization beyond 'read-and-interpret'.
'One case study, one contribution.'  Admittedly this trait might be attributed to the 
current  system of  academic  knowledge production,  including strict  and relatively 
short word limits plus incentives to publish as many articles as possible. Nevertheless 
I was frequently disappointed by the chasm between the richness of case descriptions 
and  the  scarcity  of  theoretical  contributions.  Sometimes  there  were  only  a  few 
concepts, sometimes a few middle-range observations, sometimes the middle range 
was skipped altogether and the discussion proceeded straight to the towering heights 
of abstraction. In the extreme cases, the alleged theoretical contribution made me 
wonder whether the whole research journey could not have been substituted with a 
rigorous hour-long armchair theorizing session instead.
A cautionary note should be made here. These claims are not based on a systematic  
and rigorous literature review as the content analysis of the whole STS literature was 
beyond the  scope of  this  thesis.  Rather  they reflect  my impressions  of  recurring 
themes in various journals that tend to surface time and again in different disguises. 
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For  the  sake  of  brevity  I  have  also  omitted  references  to  specific  works  here. 
However, each theme is addressed in one way or another in different parts of the 
thesis in more detail: claims 1 and 3, having more to do with the grounds for omitting 
certain frameworks, belong to the chapter on theoretical critique (not included in this 
thesis, see below). Claims 2, 4 and 5 are addressed in different sections of chapter 4. 
This chapter, along with chapter 5, illustrate the sixth point. Of course, there is a 
danger  that  my reading of  STS has  been selective  and has  created  a  misleading 
picture of the domain: should this really turn out to be the case, at the very least these 
beliefs have provided some sensitizing inspirations. In what ways?
First, I do attempt to take seriously the need to rely on middle-range conceptual tools 
and  produce  middle-range  findings.  However,  I  also  acknowledge  that  all  such 
theories rely on higher-level presumptions which in turn rely on even higher-level 
ones. These issues can be and often are ignored in practice but it does not mean they 
can be escaped from. I would like to avoid a situation where a synthesis of middle-
range theories falls apart on closer inspection because it turns out to be based on 
different and incompatible ontological and/or epistemological presumptions.
Second, although detailed studies and micro-theories are indeed important, I do not 
think that STS's (implicit)  drive to  'micro-everything'  would be a useful  a priori  
stance. Instead I hold that analysis operating on multiple levels of aggregation can 
offer different and complementary results.
Third, I am willing to accept being 'boring' if that means a preference for borrowing 
from specialized  domains  of  knowledge and synthesizing  rather  than  reinventing 
more metaphors. Prior experience has shown me that the social sciences offer an 
array of solutions. The trick is to recognize them as such in relation to a specific 
problem. Therefore not only is the creation a form of art—so is drawing connections 
and making translations between different theories, so is synthesis. It often turns out 
in the process that such synthesis is far from straightforward and therefore many little 
theoretical  and  methodological  études  must  be  made.  In  doing  so,  I  will  try  to 
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substitute as clear writing as possible for 'interesting' obscurity although the word 
limit of the thesis means that occasionally the text will be quite dense.
Fourth, it is true that the events covered are relatively recent. However, they took 
place in a system economically, politically and culturally quite different from that of 
the West. This might raise the question about the significance and applicability of the 
findings. I would argue in turn that actually many theories derived from a capitalist 
empirical  basis  at  least  partly  operate  at  the  level  of  generality  in  which  the 
distinction between the two systems disappears. Thus it is not only possible to tailor 
the  latest  theoretical  vocabulary  to  the  analysis  of  historical  events  but  also  to 
enhance that very vocabulary as an end result. That is to say that I deem the ideas 
derived from middle-range analysis of socialist countries to be applicable to Western 
ones, although this thesis does not aim to test this claim directly.
Fifth, I believe that the analysis of historical narratives can be made more rigorous. 
This does not guarantee a remarkable result,  but the same is true for quantitative 
approaches which have nevertheless developed very strict methodological guidelines. 
By outlining the progression of the analysis  hopefully the choices  made and not 
made, the good and the questionable ones become more apparent.
Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, I do not wish to take the safe path of a single 
empirically-minded focus. Once again it is experience telling me that the research is 
akin to a journey in which bits  of knowledge from various  sources operating on 
multiple  levels  of abstraction intermingle.  One learns  considerably more on such 
journey than the focus on immediate close-to-data results would enable one to show. 
The justification of the relevance of the findings becomes more difficult but if the 
amount of actual substance thereby increases it is a trade-off that I am willing to 
make.
So how do I intend to put all this into practice? In my mind, the structure of the thesis 
is like a U-shaped curve in which the first half proceeds from more general to more 
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specific and the second half the other way round:
The first chapter focuses on frameworks operating on different levels of abstraction 
and  the  relations  between  them.  I  will  argue  that  it  is  possible  to  see  specific 
substantive theories as nested in socio-technical metatheory, which in turn is nested 
in philosophy. Beginning from critical realism as a philosophical foundation I will 
present  seven  metatheoretical  theses  that  in  my  opinion  could  represent  the 
historically crystallized lessons of STS. I will then employ the conceptual tools of 
Multi-Level Perspective on socio-technical transitions (Geels 2005a, Geels & Schot 
2010),  the  Desires-Beliefs-Opportunities  framework  from  analytical  sociology 
(Hedström 2005, Hedström & Bearman 2009a) and to a lesser extent (Technological) 
Systems of Innovation (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1995) to apply them to Soviet Baltic 
PC  construction  efforts.  To  my  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  time  that  analytical 
sociology has been applied to technological change.
The substantive theories themselves are used to offer explanations on three different 













1) What  explains  the  success  or  failure  of  each  PC  project?  What  are  the 
patterns  of  case  development?  What  are  the  respective  intra-case 
mechanisms?
2) How were the dominant lines of PCs established? What are the patterns of 
interaction  of  cases  in  each  country?  What  are  the  respective  inter-case 
mechanisms?
3) How did the Technological Systems of Innovation evolve in each country? 
What are the patterns of system-level development?
The  second  chapter  discusses  the  issues  of  proceeding  from conceptual  tools  to 
historical narratives. Various fields such as management studies, political  science, 
history and mainstream sociology have addressed the question in a manner the STS 
community  might  find  useful.  More  specifically,  I  will  elaborate  on  the 
methodological  criteria  of  critical  realist  study,  the  nature  of  process  theory, 
mechanismic  explanation,  case  study and  the  issues  pertaining  to  balancing  and 
evaluating different types of evidence.
Chapter  3  provides  empirical  flesh  for  the  theoretical  skeleton.  Honouring STS's 
strong traditions of in-depth narratives I will provide the histories of domestic PC 
design/production for each country. Since most of these were related to the Soviet 
school  computerization  initiative  in  mid-1980s  these  developments  will  also  be 
covered to some extent. As a result I will offer novel historical knowledge on the 
topic, which has been little-studied to date.
After a long descent the fourth chapter begins to climb up the ladder of abstraction. 
Starting  from  various  analytical  strategies  involved  in  generalization  from  the 
narratives and the identification of different outcomes of such a process I will then 
offer  an  analytical  technique  for  reaching  those  outcomes.  I  will  argue  that  this 
technique enables the avoidance of 'data asphyxiation' (Pettigrew 1990), a hazard for 
many 'bottom-up' analytical strategies. Most of the chapter illustrates the technique in 
practice. Content-wise, I will proceed from intra-case analysis to inter-case analysis 
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to system-level dynamics.
Chapter 5 illustrates the point that—provided enough attention is paid to the matter
—it  is  perfectly  possible  to  achieve  a  more  sophisticated  metatheory  and  an 
understanding of one's philosophical groundings by the end of the research journey. 
It does not imply that such generalizations need to be derived only from the historical 
narratives: these ideas can emerge from various sources and develop in parallel to the 
middle-range  analysis,  only  to  mature  by  the  very  end.  It  means  that  these 
developments did not (and logically could not) play their part in shaping the current 
empirical  analysis.  Their  function  is  different:  to  increase the potential  clarity of 
future works. I will reflect on the basic components of the metatheory, the distinction 
between different types of rules and their diffusion/evolution. I will also show how 
the  analysis  can  be  used  to  raise  a  number  of  critical  questions  about  the 
meaningfulness of retaining one's realist position. This issue will be addressed at the 
end of the chapter.
The reader well-versed in STS will no doubt notice the general lack of two 'native' 
theories, namely Social Construction of Technology and Actor-Network Theory. The 
reason is quite simple—I just think that the wholesale adoption of these frameworks 
creates more problems than it solves. The approach outlined in chapter 1 allows for 
more theoretical nuances, while also being able to take into account the sensitizing 
qualities of SCOT and ANT. The detailed analysis that led to these conclusions is 
found in the 'lost chapter'  which I have omitted because of the word limit of the 
thesis. This chapter is currently available online as a working paper (Kanger 2012).
The concluding chapter points out the greatest shortcomings of the work, discusses 
the  significance  of  the  findings,  relates  them  to  existing  theories  and  indicates 
possible future research avenues.
A final note of caution: the scope of the thesis means that it could offer interest to 
specialists from many fields. Ideally the following pages should not only speak to the 
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STS community but also to mainstream sociologists and historians of technology. 
This  means  that  different  readers  are  likely  to  focus  their  critiques  on  different 
aspects  depending  on  their  disciplinary  background.  Of  course,  such  specialized 
critique can be and often is most valuable. However,  I would also encourage the 
reader to try to assess the endeavour as an integrated interdisciplinary whole carrying 
the  message  that  it  is  possible,  desirable  and  useful  to  think  big  even  when 
researching small. In the long term there is a great deal to be gained from unleashing 
the full potential of one's cases.
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1. Theoretical framework
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for making sense of the empirical 
data. I aim to present a systematic, rigorous and clear path from the most general 
principles to substantive (middle-range) theories devised for a specific task. I will 
argue that more general principles act as vessels for lower-level claims, limiting their 
scope to some degree. However, in those vessels much flexibility remains for the 
researcher to pursue various ideas and explanations.
A brief discussion of the relations between philosophy, metatheory and substantive 
theories opens the chapter. This includes a justification of the necessity of such an 
agenda in the first place. Then some principles of critical realism will be presented, 
followed by an outline of a socio-technical metatheory. Finally, the conceptual tools 
of  Multi-level  Perspective  (on  socio-technical  transitions),  Desires-Beliefs-
Opportunities framework and (Technological) Systems of Innovation are argued to 
provide a good starting point for conceptualizing historical narratives.
1.1 Three levels of abstraction
The  starting  point  of  the  following  discussion  is  Giovanni  Sartori's  'ladder  of 
abstraction'. The basic idea is simple enough—taking an example, a red apple can be 
classified as a member of a set of red apples, a set of apples, or a set of fruits. To put  
it more formally:“We make a concept more abstract and more general by lessening  
its properties or attributes. Conversely, a concept is specified by the addition (or  
unfolding) of qualifications, i.e., by augmenting its attributes or properties” (1970: 
1041). In other words, if one wants to extend one's classification to more objects, one 
needs  to  reduce  the  properties  that  count  (e.g.  one  needs  to  give  up  the  colour 
specification in order to classify something as an apple).
I would argue that this idea can be applied to the social sciences in general. Consider 
the differences between the following claims: 1) security gates in a retail store help to 
reduce the number of thefts;  2) technology affects  human action; 3) entities with 
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differing causal powers exhibit influence on each other. Statements 2 and 3 can be 
characterized as more abstract versions of the first one. 'Technology' is a general term 
including  but  not  limited  to  security  gates;  entities,  in  turn,  include  but  are  not 
limited  to  technologies.  Abstractions  like  this  enable  us  to  spot  some  basic 
commonalities  between what  would  otherwise  seem widely different  phenomena. 
And  although  these  commonalities  might  be  far  too  abstract  to  have  a  direct 
application they nevertheless provide a structuring frame for more specific claims, 
thus potentially leading to a more coherent and explicit overall framework.
In principle the number of these levels of abstraction can be infinite.  In standard 
(sociological) practice, however, the usage of terms like philosophy, metatheory and 
middle-range theory seems to indicate that there are at least three domains taken to 
be sufficiently different  from each other.  I  understand philosophy as  a  discipline 
dealing  with  the  fundamental  categories  of  thought,  establishing  structured 
frameworks  of  Being  and  Knowing  on  the  highest  level  of  generalization  (e.g. 
Bhaskar's  critical  realism (1975)).  Metatheory  is  understood  as  a  general  theory 
aiming to establish the common vocabulary for a certain knowledge domain (e.g. 
Luhmann's theory of social systems (1995) as a special case of systems theory, but 
applicable to a range of widely differing social subsystems at the same time). I call 
the third specific substantive theories, defining them as sets of interrelated concepts 
aiming to describe,  explain and/or  predict  some natural  and/or  social  phenomena 
(e.g.  Geels's  Multi-level  Perspective  on  socio-technical  transitions  (2005a)).  The 
relations between the three are visualized in figure 1.1.
The nested circles serve to illustrate that while the domain of applicability decreases 
as  one  moves  from philosophy to  metatheory  to  specific  substantive  theory,  the 
number  of  specifications  and  distinctions  made  increases  at  the  same  time.1 
Philosophical  propositions  can  be  applied  to  the  widest  range  of  different 
circumstances, yet their abstract nature also means that when it comes to analysing 
1 This implies that the questions of the level of abstraction and the unit of analysis (micro to macro) 
should be kept separate. It  is possible to conceive highly general  and highly specific micro or 
macro theories (Brey 2003).
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specific  empirical  situations  they  remain  far  too  general,  losing  much  of  the 
information that could be usefully accounted for. While metatheory is more specific 
in some aspects, by setting the frame of reference for quite a wide domain it too 
suffers  from  losing  too  much  information  when  directly  applied  to  empirical 
phenomena.  The  specific  substantive  theories  are  the  ones  devised  for  analysing 
certain types of empirical phenomena and are therefore closest to the data.
Figure 1.1. Three levels of abstraction
The current study will be explicitly guided by all of these levels. However, one could 
question the meaningfulness of doing so. Specifically, one could ask what is to be 
gained  from such  an  effort?  Is  it  not  overkill  considering  the  specificity  of  the 
empirical problem? As a response I would stress three advantages of the approach: 
coherency check, increased sensitivity and transparency.
The first function served by higher-level abstractions is that they allow one to reflect 
on whether the synthesis of lower-level claims is logically consistent. My experience 
tells  me  that  with  the  help  of  more  general  theories  the  commonalities  and 






















tools help one to understand whether the compatibility of differences  is  logically 
necessary or not. Thus, the simultaneous application of Actor–Network Theory with 
its inscribed 'flat ontology' (e.g. Latour 2005) and the notion of multi-level social 
reality would quickly raise doubts about the fundamental compatibility between the 
two approaches.  One  the  other  hand,  the  difference  between  theories  like  Large 
Technical Systems (Hughes 1983) and Multi-level Perspective (Geels 2005a) seems 
to be mostly about research focuses and levels of aggregation (system-internal vs. 
niche-regime-landscape interplay, see below), having no built-in contradiction.
The  second  function  concerns  the  informative  value  of  higher-level  abstractions. 
That is, frameworks like this can sensitize the researcher to the aspects that his or her 
research does and does not but could or should cover. What I have in mind here are 
very basic issues. For example, the study about the impact of a certain technology on 
human  practices  excludes  many  analytical  questions  like  the  role  of  humans  in 
creating,  maintaining  and  diffusing  the  technology  or  the  co-evolution  of  social 
norms and technological artefacts. A sufficiently nuanced metatheory can illuminate 
for us the aspects such impact studies might have missed and at what cost. Simply 
put: seeing the big picture helps us to contextualize local theories.
And third,  laying cards on the table early on enables the readers to better  assess 
whether  the  stated  principles  are  in  fact  consistent  and whether  they differ  from 
actual research practice. Previous work with various theories has taught me that it 
can be dauntingly difficult to trace claims back to their premises. By positioning my 
research as thoroughly and explicitly as possible, I am trying to decrease the amount 
of required effort on the part of the reader.
At this point some important qualifications should be made. First, I do not want to 
claim  that  being  explicit  about  one's  philosophy  and  metatheory  is  a  necessary 
precondition of progress in STS (or in fact in any domain of knowledge). Excellent, 
interesting,  intriguing and substantial  results  can be and often are achieved while 
remaining wholly at a middle-range level. However, there is a certain risk: if one is 
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unable to specify one's presumptions one risks becoming enslaved by them. That 
might not only mean the lack of awareness of alternatives, but also the existence of 
unacknowledged logical contradictions. That this hazard has materialized quite often 
is  illustrated  by Wyatt  and Balmer's  criticism about  the  scarcity  of  middle-range 
theories in STS: “How can the author possibly think it reasonable to use concepts  
from completely different normative and epistemological  [and ontological, I would 
add]  traditions in the same case study?” (2007: 620). The advantages of the three-
level approach—coherency check and increased sensitivity—simply enable one to 
reduce this threat.
The  same  consideration  is  in  play  when  responding  to  possible  fears  that  the 
framework will be too rigid and exclusive, favouring one viewpoint and not letting 
the data speak for itself. And while it is indeed true that every choice manifests some 
preferences, this is equally true for every kind of research. A 'grounded' approach 
does  not  guarantee  success:  it  can  equally  well  lead  to  being  blinded  by  one's 
cognitive blinkers. Hence I prefer to adopt the stance of knowing and of risk being 
over-guided  by  existing  knowledge.  The  chosen  three-level  approach,  however, 
leaves much room for difference and disagreement. Moreover, even my preliminary 
middle-range theoretical  synthesis  found in section  1.4 only acts  as  a  sensitizing 
device that will be used to make more specific theoretical statements over the course 
of data analysis (chapter 4).
Third, although the space created by high-level abstractions is vast, it is not infinite. 
Therefore, from time to time, unexpected findings can create conditions in which the 
basic assumptions of higher-level frameworks become questionable. Thus, in a sense 
we are indeed free to choose our basic assumptions, but this does not mean that 1) 
the explanatory power of all foundational assumptions would be the same (hence the 
reason  for  choosing  some  and  not  others);  2)  we  should  not  revise  our  basic 
assumptions  on  the  basis  of  our  increased  understanding  of  the  world.  It  is  not 
incidental that some of the ideas to be discussed below emerged from backwards 
reasoning: Bhaskar (1975) analysed scientific experimentation in order to deduce the 
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nature of reality so that such an activity would make sense in the first place; Kroes 
(2010) used engineers'  descriptions of artefacts  to  theorize the dual nature of the 
latter.  True,  the  very  generality  of  high-level  frameworks  makes  them relatively 
immune to the results of substantive theories. But if such a situation nevertheless 
occurs, it is the philosophy that needs to be revised. In sum: instead of granting them 
immutability,  I  advocate  the  mutual  informing  of  philosophy,  metatheory  and 
substantive  theory,  while  acknowledging the  flexibility of  high-level  abstractions. 
Hopefully the potential and actual tensions can provide a fruitful impetus for an ever-
developing,  ever-nuanced  and  ever-cumulative  account  of  the  varieties  of  socio-
technical interaction.
Fourth, the scope of the endeavour means a lot of eclecticism: borrowing from many 
domains, making choices about what to include and to exclude, not exploring certain 
nuances to full extent and so on. Here I concur with Turner in that “eclecticism is far  
preferable to the current scholasticism in metatheorizing that, ironically, becomes  
highly parochial as scholars dare not tread outside the vocabulary or boundaries of  
a particular theory or intellectual tradition” (1990: 44–45). And while Turner wrote 
this more than 20 years ago, the challenge is still  the same: going beyond single 
approaches, uniting their strengths and discarding their weaknesses.
I have always imagined the proposed framework as an ironclad, water-resistant and 
rustproof Swiss cheese. From my favourable point of view, it is designed to be a 
logically consistent, seamless, massive integrated whole. Practically, however, it is 
bound to contain countless holes that specialists from different domains can criticize. 
But what must not be missed in the process is the value of the edifice as a whole, 
which provides an intellectual arena, a structured analytical toolkit that, by drawing 
connections between various levels of abstraction, demonstrates that one can be close 
to empirical data while not losing sight of grand ambitions and issues. That being 
said, the question of the ingredients now needs to be taken up.
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1.2 Level one: critical realist philosophy
The first  three principles are borrowed from the early version of critical  realism2 
(Bhaskar 1975, 1979) and have been formulated by Thomas Brante as follows:
1) There is a reality existing independently of our representations or awareness 
of it (ontological postulate); …
2) It  is  possible  to  achieve  knowledge  about  this  reality  (epistemological 
postulate);
3) All knowledge is fallible—and correctable (methodological postulate) (2001: 
172).
These propositions enable one to specify the position of the researcher and establish 
the meaningfulness of scientific enquiry, while being aware of the dangers it entails. 
First and foremost, they enable one to make a distinction about reality (or being) and 
claims about reality (statements about being). Thus it immediately becomes possible 
to ascribe causality to entities independent of anyone's perception (including that of 
the observer) and thereby to conceptualize some properties of the entities as non-
negotiable (that is not voluntaristically produced by the actors/observers). To take a 
morbid example from Mahner and Bunge (2001): if Jones took too much arsenic he 
would eventually die, independently of whether we are there to observe it or whether 
he himself is aware of the fact of his taking the poison. Nevertheless, when the act is 
observed we can ascribe the causal power to kill Jones to the arsenic and not our 
ideas about it.  (Of course, by stating it  one is indeed making a knowledge claim 
about what happened, but in doing so one has not produced the lethal capabilities of 
the poison itself.)
The third proposition serves to remind one that there is no necessary, simple and non-
negotiable correspondence between being and our statements about it: we can always 
under-estimate or over-estimate the properties of reality in our knowledge claims, 
and hence the latter are in the need of constant revision (e.g. if it turns out that Jones 
2 These principles are adopted as axioms and therefore will not be justified themselves to avoid 
infinite regress. However, I note the possibility that some other philosophical approaches might 
also agree with these postulates.
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actually took aspirin instead of arsenic, our estimation about the cause of death will 
have been wrong).
Considering these assumptions, one can distinguish between three domains from the 
viewpoint of the observer: 1) empirical—events and entities that are observed; 2) 
actual—events and entities that can be observed in principle but are not; 3) real—
mechanisms which give rise to events and causal powers of entities, which exist but 
can not necessarily be observed. For example, if someone changes his or her desire 
to study in the university after a failed attempt to get accepted, I would have a reason 
to suspect a 'sour grapes' mechanism at work. Alas, for obvious reasons it would be 
very  difficult  for  me  to  observe  it  directly.  Similarly,  a  biochemical  mechanism 
would explain the sequence of processes mediating the intake of arsenic and Jones's 
subsequent death. However, not every observer (say, a 12th century medic) would be 
able to detect and formulate it. Nevertheless, it does exist and exerts causal influence.
These  distinctions  have  further  implications:  1)  when  observing  empirical 
phenomena, usually we do not encounter a single mechanism but an interaction of 
several ones (a classic example is the falling of a leaf which is affected by gravity, 
winds, air friction etc., so it is not easy to infer the law of gravity from that particular  
occurrence), meaning that; 2) a number of mechanisms can exert influence on the 
eventual outcome, although we might (initially) only have indirect means of inferring 
their existence (e.g. theories, thought hypotheses etc.); 3) a single mechanism might 
not necessarily manifest itself in every situation because it might be neutralized by a 
number of others  (e.g.  a rational  behaviour of an individual might be abandoned 
under group pressure) or because it might not be realized at all, thus remaining a 
potentiality (just because I am not speaking aloud at the moment does not mean that I 
do not have the capability of doing so); 4) the same outcome may be realized by the 
interaction  of  different  types  of  mechanisms  (e.g.  market  equilibrium  can  be 
achieved through individual actors maximizing their preferences or it can be imposed 
by the government).
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Overall the position adopted here is one of a cautious optimist—a distinction is to be 
made  between  entities  and  ideas  about  these  entities,  although  it  is  also  being 
admitted that establishing the correspondence might turn out to be highly misleading. 
This stance enables one to avoid the ontic and epistemic fallacies—beliefs that there 
is either a one-way train from reality to our knowledge claims, or that the latter are 
completely arbitrary (Groff 2004: 19). Furthermore it sensitizes one to the complex 
relation between manifest events and underlying mechanisms.
However,  apart  from general  analytical  distinctions,  these  principles  tell  us  little 
about  the  kinds  of  entities  and  properties  to  be  observed,  their  interrelation  and 
interaction. They apply equally well to all scientific domains, excluding the more 
specific features of socio-technical (or more generally, socio-material) processes. The 
specification of these processes is already a metatheoretical task.
1.3 Level two: socio-technical metatheory3
This level  should be seen as an application of critical  realist  principles to  socio-
technical processes on the one hand, and as a set of principles common to any socio-
technical interaction on the other. As such they provide a structuring frame for the 
synthesis of specific substantive theories constituting the third level.
In brief, the metatheoretical theses are formulated as such:
4) The three basic causal forces implicated in any socio-technical process are 
actors, technologies and rules (causal force postulate).
5) These  causal  forces  shape  each  other  mutually  (causal  force  relations 
postulate).
6) When  characterized  by  a  certain  structure,  characteristic  mechanisms, 
boundaries and emergent properties, some sets of these causal forces can be 
conceptualized as systems or networks.4 The boundaries separate the system 
3 This section is a continuation to and extension of my previous work on socio-technical metatheory 
(Kanger 2009).
4 I sidestep the question of differences between systems and networks. For current purposes they are 
treated as synonyms. In further discussion I will use 'system' and 'network' to denote different  
levels  of  aggregation (see below and chapter  4).  See also Joerges  (1999a) for  the similarities 
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from its environment (systemicity postulate).
7) The systems/networks differ in their relative sizes (levels of aggregation) and 
can constitute nested hierarchies (systems of sub-systems of sub-sub-systems) 
in  which  each  new  level  shows  novel  emergent  properties  (micro–macro 
postulate).
8) These different systems/networks can interact. In cases of nested hierarchy 
(systems not sharing the same level of aggregation), the interaction is vertical. 
In cases of parallel systems/networks (sharing the same level of aggregation), 
the interaction is horizontal (system–system interaction postulate).
9) In  any  given  moment  of  time  the  processes  taking  place  in  the 
system/network are enabled/constrained by its conditions of action (i.e. socio-
technical structure),  which is itself  an outcome of a multitude of previous 
interactions (structure postulate).
10) In the course of a system/network–environment interaction, the actors draw 
on existing structure, transforming or reproducing it through their actions. As 
a result,  a co-evolution of all  entities occurs (basic interaction mechanism 
postulate).
I  will  now  explain  each  of  these  propositions  in  more  depth,  beginning  with 
definitions.  First,  an  actor  is  understood  as  anyone  to  whom  agency,  that  is  a 
capability  to  act,  can  be  ascribed.  In  other  words  an  actor  “is  an  entity  that  in  
principle has the means of formulating, taking and acting upon decisions” (Sibeon 
2004: 4). This definition also allows that actors can be either individual or collective 
(e.g.  organization,  state).  Technology is  generally understood as a  “configuration  
that works”  (Rip & Kemp 1998: 330). This is to say that technologies have dual 
nature  “because they are, on the one hand, physical structures that realise, on the  
other hand, functions, which refer to human intentionality  (Kroes 2010: 55). So in 
order to be characterized as a technology, the physical properties of an entity are not 
enough—it also needs to be complemented by functional properties (whether these 
are  ascribed by actors  or  observers).  Moreover,  there  is  no  one-way relationship 
between the use of these terms in Large Technical Systems literature.
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between the two: the same function can be realized in a number of ways and the 
physical structure of an entity shapes but does not determine what it can be used for, 
i.e.  it  has 'interpretative flexibility'  (Pinch & Bijker 1984).  Finally,  a rule can be 
defined as a tacit or explicit prescription which guides the enactment/ reproduction of 
social life and is manifested in patterns of practice (partly from Giddens 1984: 21).5 
A rule essentially simplifies complex human experience: instead of making the actor 
take into account all relevant aspects of every situation and decide on the appropriate 
action on each turn, it provides a cognitive short-cut instead (especially in conditions 
of increased uncertainty). As an actor is capable of decision-making without being 
conscious of it then it can be said that a rule can be tacit or internalized, although at 
any time a shift to an externalized state (and back) is possible in principle.
The above classification implies that the components of socio-technical interaction 
can be divided into two types—interactive and indifferent (Hacking 1999: 103–107)
—in which the first can be influenced by the descriptions about them and do the 
same to others (e.g. actors' practices can inform a theory which in turn can alter their 
subsequent behaviour) and the second cannot (a lamp does not start to glow brighter 
when you compliment it). Whereas the former are capable of 'formulating, taking and 
acting upon decisions', the latter are not. This is not to say that technologies or rules 
cannot affect our behaviour; it is to say, however, that they lack agency, a capacity to 
choose to act otherwise. Drawing on the synthesis of Frank Geels, the general ways 
in which these components interact are outlined in figure 1.2.
Two quick qualifications should be quickly made. First, the category of technologies 
and technical systems also includes material resources, as the postulated effect of the 
resources is similar to that of the technologies. And second, by including actors and 
organizations,  artefacts  and technical  systems,  rules  and rule  systems,  this  figure 
already hints at the micro–macro distinction. That is, in principle these interactions 
can  take  place  on  different  levels  of  aggregation,  from  single  individuals  and 
artefacts to worldwide socio-technical networks.
5 The reasons why I have excluded the finitist take on rules are discussed in chapter 5.
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Figure 1.2.  The mutual  shaping of  actors,  technologies and rules (adapted 
from Geels 2004: 903)
If technologies and rules are not able to exert agency, it follows that their causal 
significance  must  somehow  be  mediated  by  the  actor.  Even  when  the  exact 
mechanism is left unspecified, one can point out situations in which technologies do 
shape human behaviour, including inspiring of novel possibilities, stimulating of new 
desires, blocking the achievement of certain goals, and so on. The same goes for 
rules, which provide the repertoire of action in certain contexts. In the last instance, 
however, it is the actors who create, diffuse, use and modify technologies, and follow 
and transform the rules. Since agency also means the possibility of a choice, then 
specifying actors' material conditions and social norms is not enough to predict their 
behaviour. The capability of choice lies with the actor. Whether and for what reasons 
this choice is not always exercised is another question.
This  leaves  the  relationship  between  rules  and  technologies.  One  of  the  major 
insights of STS has been that preferred patterns of practice can also be 'encoded'  
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technologies.  For example,  unless one wants to  wreck one's  car, the speed bump 
enforces the rule that one should drive at low speed in residential areas. On the other 
hand, new technologies can disrupt existing conventions—for example, information 
technologies have facilitated the free flow of information to the extent that making 
people pay for various (digital) products has become difficult. Alternatively, various 
rules can be built around the possibilities of new technologies or existing material 
conditions: we may well  see the alleviation of copyright laws should widespread 
piracy continue to  be unstoppable,  or  impose  lower  speed limits  in  mountainous 
areas to prevent accidents.
Here a brief detour must be made. Namely, if actors and technologies both have a 
physical manifestation that makes it relatively easy to ascribe causal significance (but 
following the above definition, not necessarily agency!) to both of them, then the 
question about the ontological basis of rules is more problematic. Elder-Vass (2010a, 
ch. 6) has argued that rules and norms should not be seen as independent entities, but 
as causal powers of norm circles enforcing them. In other words, we follow rules and 
norms because of expected or actual sanctioning from a certain group should we fail 
to do so.
Wishing to avoid extended debate on the matter, I will briefly point out three counter-
examples  that  problematize  this  argument.  First,  one  could  imagine  individual-
specific rules (e.g. always tie your shoelaces with one hand) in which case, of course, 
the bearer of this property could not be a group. Second, Viskovatoff's suggestion 
that  “rules can be and often are followed without reflection, either out of habit—
simply because doing so has worked in the past—or out of simple time pressure”  
(1999: 499) indicates a possibility that certain rules become internalized to the extent 
that they continue to be followed even when no sanctioning group is or even could be 
nearby (e.g. provided the necessary equipment, some people would continue to hold 
a fork in the left and a knife in the right hand while eating even when stranded alone 
on an island). And third, we may adopt a rule simply because we feel it is beneficial,  
not out of fear of sanctioning (e.g. an agreement between parties on a shared industry 
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standard). That being said, however, I do agree that rules must have bearers: they 
cannot  be  conceptualized  as  independent  entities  but  are  always  anchored  in 
individuals or (usually) groups.
For current purposes, I find the main significance of the category of rules to lie in 
their difference-making abilities. That is, the presence or absence of a certain rule can 
make a difference to the action of the unit in focus. Yes, rules require a bearer. But is 
the combination of a potential bearer (actor) with an actual causal power (rule) that 
can make a difference to the outcome6.  And these properties are not fixed—their 
creation, diffusion and abandonment takes place over time. For these reasons I find 
the inclusion of rules as an intermediary category that increases the overall detail of 
the metatheory justified.
The third thesis adds another specification: namely, it might happen that some actors, 
rules and technologies become aligned to each other to constitute an interactive and 
interdependent whole in which a change in one component will influence others (e.g. 
introducing new legislation and enhanced surveillance techniques might affect the 
behaviour of the downloaders of illegal content and redress the balance of power 
between them and the producers).  These wholes can be conceptualized as socio-
technical  systems or  networks.  Most  simply put,  “a system is  a  complex  object  
whose parts or components are held together by bonds of some kind” (Bunge 2004: 
188), either material or social (conceptual). That is, a system consists of components 
and relations between them.
But what distinguishes a system from non-system is the fact that by joining together 
some entities it shows some novel qualities. These are called emergent properties, 
“properties  of  wholes  that  would  not  be  possessed  by  the  parts,  individually  or  
collectively, if they were not organized into this sort of whole”  (Elder-Vass 2007a: 
6 Strictly speaking even that might not be the case when someone mistakenly believes that a certain  
group follows certain rules and proactively adjusts their behaviour. More importantly, one could 
argue that since actors must always be  “present, irrespective of the outcome”  (Mahoney 2008: 
431), their causal significance is trivial when conceptualizing the impact of rules because it is the  
latter that make a substantial difference to the outcome.
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415).  Organization  is  a  simple  example:  its  members  behave  differently  as  they 
would individually, the tasks of the worker and the manager are aligned to each other 
and the actions of the members represent the organization as a whole. In this case it 
is  the  individual  members  plus  the  characteristic  relations  between  them  (e.g. 
division of labour) that define the entity with emergent properties.
But even when taking into account components, relations and emergent properties, 
something is still missing from the picture—the arrow of time, the processes. This is 
where the notion of causal mechanism reappears. “Causal mechanisms are processes  
that depend on interactions between the parts,  interactions that only occur when  
those parts are organized in the particular way that constitutes them into wholes that  
possess this emergent property” (Elder-Vass 2007a: 415). Hence a causal mechanism 
is a characteristic process of an entity by which the latter manifests some of its causal 
powers. In other words, the mechanism is the mediator of a statement “If A, then B”, 
stating  “how,  by  what  intermediate  steps,  a  certain  outcome follows from initial  
conditions” (Mayntz 2004: 241). But here one must also keep in mind that actual 
events might be (and, except for scientific experiments, usually are) the results of the 
interactions of a number of different causal mechanisms. Therefore it is useful to 
distinguish  between  an  overall  event  sequence  (everything  that  happens)  and 
mechanisms (a number of which interact and make up the event sequence).
Finally,  this  system  must  have  something  distinctive  that  makes  it  possible  to 
conceptualize it as a system in the first place, i.e. it must have boundaries separating 
it from its environment. Thus taken together, characteristic components, structure, 
processes, boundaries and emergent properties provide a minimal definition for a 
socio-technical  system or  a  network (figure 1.3).  Everything that  lies  outside the 
system  is  its  environment  (which,  of  course,  can  include  other  systems).  This 
definition implies that systems or networks are ubiquitous: there are various ways to 
determine  system  boundaries:  for  example,  by  certain  types  of  activities  (e.g. 
industrial sectors), geographical borders (e.g. states) or combinations of those (e.g. 
industrial  sector  in  a  state).  But  this  delineation  itself  is  not  decided  at  a 
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metatheoretical level, but is left for specific theories.
Figure 1.3. A socio-technical system/network
It follows quite naturally that these systems can be of varying sizes and they can 
form nested hierarchies. For example, a town can be seen as part of the region which 
can be seen as part  of the state  which can be seen as a part  of the international 
system. On the other hand, the wind electricity sector can be seen as part of green 
energy sector which can be seen as part of an electricity sector. In other words, what 
can be seen as a system on one level can be seen as a sub-system on another. It is  
also reasonable to presume that although there is a two-way interaction between the 
two, the relation is nevertheless asymmetrical (e.g. the state as a collective actor can 
usually shape the action of a single individual to a greater extent than the other way 
round). On the other hand, on a certain level of aggregation there might be systems 
that  interact  and/or  overlap  with  each  other  (e.g.  inter-firm competition  or  wars 
between  states).  The  difference  between  the  sizes  of  the  units  of  analysis  is 
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Figure 1.4. Horizontally and vertically interacting nested and parallel systems
How exactly one should stratify society is left open on a metatheoretical level. A 
number of different solutions have been offered. Commonly a distinction is made 
between micro, meso and macro levels. Brante (2001) has suggested five different 
levels  (individual,  interindividual,  institutional,  interinstitutional,  international), 
while  Geels  and  Schot  (2007:  402)  mention  six  (individual,  organizational 
subsystem, organizational  population,  organizational  field,  society,  world system). 
Nevertheless, although the number of levels can differ, the idea of nested or parallel 
systems remains relevant in each case.
A system cannot shape its subsystem while being simultaneously shaped by it unless 
there is some temporal sequence of interactions. The concept of structure is helpful 
here. It is defined as  “conditions-of-action” (Sibeon 2004: 54), that is a totality of 
entities and their prior interrelations that the system in focus is confronted with at a 
given moment of time. Following the second postulate, this embraces existing: 1) 
available material resources, technologies and technical systems (e.g. power grids); 
2) actors and the relationships between them (e.g. a newcomer must take into account 
the power of prevailing market incumbents); 3) rules to be considered (e.g. criminal 














to include 'rules and resources' (Giddens 1984: xxxi), provided that material, not only 
symbolic, resources also count (Sewell 1992).
In my view, the notion of structure does not only apply to the environment of the 
system, but also to the very constitution of the system itself (e.g. an organizational 
structure  inherited  from the  past  might  become an  obstacle  for  reorganizing  the 
company, the biological limits of humans' abilities for information processing affect 
the speed of innovation). Structure is what precedes action and shapes (enables and 
constrains)  it,  but  does  not  determine the  outcome: actors  always  have  room for 
limited improvisation in the conditions in which they find themselves and it is only 
through  their  actions  that  structure  can  be  reproduced  or  transformed.  Thus  in 
diachronic terms one can speak of 'structure → agency → structure' interplay. Note, 
however, that as a term signifying the social totality structure can be also used in a 
synchronic sense in which 'system + environment = structure'.7
To put it all together: by drawing on the structure, actors transform and reproduce it  
through their activities. As various processes and causal mechanisms interact, one is 
constantly  dealing  with  outcomes  arising  from  three  sources  (Sibeon  1999):  1) 
agency  causation—a  result  of  actors'  intentional  and  purposeful  activities;  2) 
structure  causation—causal  influence  of  the  components  of  structure;  3)  chance 
causation—an  unforeseen  and  unintended  consequences  of  action  and  various 
causally unrelated event conjunctions that contribute to the eventual outcome (that is, 
outcomes that cannot be attributed to neither the structural properties nor the actors' 
goals).  As a  result  both the  environment  and the  network/system can experience 
some change. Depending on the impact on the system, one can distinguish between 
morphogenetic and morphostatic processes (Buckley 1967: 58–59): the first changes 
7 Note that my use of 'structure' differs somewhat from that of Elder-Vass. He distinguishes between 
four  different  notions of  (social)  structure:  1)  structure-as-empirical-regularity;  2)  structure-as-
properties; 3) structure-as-relations; 4) structure-as-wholes (2010: 80-86). He advocates the last 
definition  and  chooses  two  specific  types  of  social  structures  –  normative  institutions  and 
organizations – to illustrate the viability of this approach. My use of the term is a bit more general  
in that 1) the notion explicitly includes both social and natural entities, and; 2) includes all kinds of 
social,  material  and socio-material  entities operating on various levels of ontological hierarchy 
which can systematically bias the focal entity (the object of analysis) towards certain courses of 
action, while; 3) not trying to specify all these entities and impacts before the analysis itself.
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the  system or  even calls  it  into  being,  and the  second sustains  it.  Both  of  these 
processes, however, may be either internal or external to the system; that is, one can 
speak  of  either  endogenous  or  exogenous  processes  that  contribute  to  the 
stability/change of the system in question.
Additionally, I would propose that the basic interaction mechanism able to capture 
what is going on between the start and end points of socio-technical development is 
co-evolution. The use of various similar terms like 'seamless web' (e.g. Hughes 1986, 
Bijker 1995), 'mutual shaping' (e.g. Williams 1997, Faulkner 2001), 'co-construction' 
(e.g.  Oudshoorn  &  Pinch  2003)  or  'co-production'  (Jasanoff  2004,  Bijker  2010) 
indicates that this view is at least implicitly shared by many STS scholars (although 
what is seen interacting might differ from case to case, e.g. gender and technology, or 
users  and  technology).  Generally,  “we  speak  of  co-evolution  if  the  interaction  
between different systems influences the dynamics of the individual systems, leading  
to irreversible patterns of change within each of the systems” (Rotmans & Loorbach 
2010: 118). Thus the term refers to a continuous interaction between various causal 
forces, various systems and various levels, in which the change in one challenges the 
other to react and respond. Note that this does not specify the course of development
—evolution does not have any pre-determined trajectory.  A technology can break 
through and become pervasive in society, or it might fail and disappear; in this sense 
the  interaction  mechanism  is  non-propositional.  In  all  cases,  however,  mutual 
shaping of constantly changing elements takes place and where one ends up is not 
where one started. The combination of structure, agency and chance means that there 
is  path  dependency,  to  be  sure,  but  also  creative  action  leading  to  intended and 
unintended  consequences,  which  in  turn  interact  in  various  ways  to  become 
conditions of action themselves for further developments.
Having devoted some space to discussing what the socio-technical metatheory is, 
some  attention  should  be  turned  to  what  it  is  not.  While  aiming  to  rewrite 
sociological metatheory Roger Sibeon (1999, 2004) has outlined four 'cardinal sins' 
of sociology: 1) reductionism—reducing all explanation to a single principle (e.g. 
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rational choice, patriarchy); 2) essentialism—making a priori presumptions about the 
“necessary  unitariness  or  homogeneity  of  social  phenomena”  (1999:  318)  (e.g. 
working class, black people); 3) reification—inappropriate attribution of agency to 
non-agentic  entities  (e.g.  structure);  4)  functional  teleology—explaining  social 
causes in terms of their outcomes (e.g. a fulfilment of a general social system need 
for reproduction as a cause for marriage). A successful metatheory should avoid these 
pitfalls  for  they lead to  well-known dead-ends of  sociology.  Therefore the above 
theorization should pass Sibeon's checks. Is this the case?
Things are quite easy with respect to functional teleology and reification. As I have 
not included a common goal as an integral part of the system/network definition, it 
follows that actors can indeed have varying motives for becoming interlinked with 
others and hence there is no assumption that they are necessarily thinking and acting 
for the good of the system as a whole. I have also argued that only actors can have 
agency—it  suffices  to  point  out  here  that  this  does  not  mean that  any group of 
individual actors can be called a collective actor.  Some of them might simply be 
statistical aggregates (e.g. all left-handed Slovenian women). Where agency can be 
ascribed  and  where  it  cannot  is  a  question  of  empirical  enquiry.  With  this 
qualification I have also dealt with the question of essentialism.
The problem of  reductionism is  probably most  significant  because  I  have  above 
indeed specified only one basic interaction mechanism. My grounds for this have 
sprung from analytic reasons—co-evolution seems to demand stating little beyond 
mutual interaction whereby the participating entities experience change in at least 
some parts of the constitution and the environment in which they find themselves. It 
is indeed only a little more than Heraclitus's 'you cannot step twice into the same 
river', but also hinting at the twin enabling/constraining nature of this interaction. In 
other words, it operates on so high a level of abstraction that it allows for countless 
specifications  about  the entities  undergoing co-evolution,  the conditions  in which 
they do so and different paths this development might take. However, maintaining 
some  caution  I  would  still  hypothesize  that  since  there  might  indeed  be  some 
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situations  in  which  some  other  hypothetical  mechanisms  that  cannot  be 
conceptualized  as  a  special  case  of  co-evolution  (contrary to  some,  e.g.  rational 
choice,  which  can  be  seen  simply as  an  interplay of  actors  in  the  conditions  of 
relatively stabilized rules and technologies) might do much better explanatory work, 
the  last  assumption  should  be  taken  with  a  grain  of  salt  and  hence  some  extra 
attention  should  be  turned  to  its  possible  theoretical  and/or  empirical  sources  of 
revision. Unless such a candidate is found, however, I would retain co-evolution as a 
basic interaction mechanism.
Therefore this metatheory has gone further than the above critical realist principles 
by  specifying  the  basic  ontology  that  all  socio-technical  processes  could 
hypothetically share.  However,  it  still  falls  victim to  Malerba's  remark about  co-
evolutionary approaches:“The challenge for research here is to go to a much finer  
analysis at both empirical and theoretical levels, and to move from the statement that  
everything  is  coevolving  with  everything  else  to  the  identification  of  what  is  
coevolving with what, how intense is this process and whether there is a bi-direction  
of causality” (2006: 18). To make sense of the historical narratives, more analytical 
tools of greater precision need to be found. In other words, it is time to explore the 
layer of specific substantive theories.
1.4 Level three: specific substantive theories
While the previous layers were so general that the empirical focus hardly mattered—
it  could  have  been  the  industrialization  of  the  West  or  the  implementation  of 
computer software in two French companies between 1996 and 1998—things change 
when specific substantive theories begin to be explored. The reason is simple: since 
the third-layer theories are designed for specific goals,  they might not be exactly 
suitable  for  every  research  effort  and  hence  need  to  be  rejected  altogether  or 
customized accordingly. Therefore three types of justifications are in order: assessing 
the  compatibility  of  employed  theories  1)  with  metatheoretical  assumptions—are 
these  theories  fundamentally  compatible  and  if  not,  (how)  can  the  situation  be 
remedied?  2)  between  themselves—how  do  different  theories  promise  to 
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complement each other? 3) with the current research goal—what to adopt, what to 
discard and what to modify? With these questions in mind I will first describe the 
Multi-Level Perspective on socio-technical transitions, Desires-Beliefs-Opportunities 
framework and some conceptual tools of the (Technological) Systems of Innovation 
approach. For various reasons (among which are the word limit and the goal to retain 
the clarity and focus of the text) I do not aim to provide an exhaustive overview of 
each  approach—rather,  only  the  aspects  of  each  framework  perceived  as  having 
direct relevance for the current research have been selected.
1.4.1 Multi-level Perspective (MLP)
Building on the general MLP (Rip & Kemp 1998) Frank Geels (2002, 2004, 2005a), 
has developed a novel way to analyse socio-technical transitions, that is large-scale 
shifts from one socio-technical system to another. In his initial formulation, MLP 
focused on explaining how such transitions  occur  and identifying the patterns of 
transitions and the mechanisms underlying them (2005a: 6). Later, various extensions 
have been made such as the typology of transition pathways (Geels & Schot 2007) or 
an outline of the inner dynamics of a part of the initial framework (e.g. niche-internal 
dynamics as discussed in Raven & Geels (2010)).
The  central  concepts  of  MLP are  regime,  niche  and  landscape.  Different  social 
groups share different regimes (e.g. policy, science) but these can become partially 
aligned to each other in a single socio-technical-regime (see figure 1.5) defined as 
“the  rule-set  or  grammar  embedded  in  a  complex  of  engineering  practices,  
production  process  technologies,  product  characteristics,  skills  and  procedures,  
ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems—all of  
them embedded in institutions and infrastructures” (Rip & Kemp 1998: 338). For 
example, in a transport regime, government regulations, car producers, users' habits, 
symbolic meanings of cars in a modern society etc. are adapted to each other. Still, 
suppliers are never in the full service of the government or the users, whereas the 
latter  are  never  fully  tailored  to  the  interests  of  car  manufacturers:  there  is  a 
combination  of  interdependence  and  partial  autonomy making  the  regime  'semi-
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coherent'  (Geels 2005a: 13). This example already hints at  the criticism made by 
Markard and Truffer (2008: 605) that the use of the term in Geels's own writings and 
in MLP literature as a whole has been inconsistent: sometimes only rules are claimed 
to define the regimes (hence the distinction between regimes and systems, e.g. Geels 
2004),  while  sometimes  actors  and  technologies  have  also  been  included.  I  will 
follow the second definition, seeing socio-technical regimes as interrelated sets of 
actors, technologies and rules.
Figure 1.5. Coordination between groups in a socio-technical regime (Geels 
2004: 905)
Although  the  actors  in  such  regimes  are  structured  by  pre-existing  expectations, 
technologies,  'rules  of  the  game'  etc.  their  activities  can  lead  to  gradual  and 
cumulative changes in technologies, rules, or the behaviours of other actors. In other 
words,  socio-technical  transition  is  a  co-evolutionary  process  in  which  mutual 
adaptation  in  multiple  dimensions  such  as  artefacts,  cultural  meanings,  industry 
structures, policies etc. continuously takes place.
This change is incremental in existing socio-technical regimes in which rules (e.g. 
search heuristics, lifestyles) are well-established, technologies 'mature' (e.g. a fully 
developed  road  infrastructure,  cars,  petrol  stations)  and  actors  are  embedded  in 
networks of mutual  expectations,  giving rise  to overall  stability,  lock-in and path 
dependence.  With  a  lack  of  major  internal/external  tensions,  the  regime  remains 













certain technological trajectory (e.g. faster computers with more memory).
While the regime constitutes the meso-level of MLP, novel solutions emerge on the 
micro-level,  in  the niches.  Compared with regimes,  actors in  niches  are  few,  the 
performance of technologies low, and rules in constant flux. The 'landscape' (macro-
level) on the other hand forms a context for both niche and regime actors, which are 
not able to influence the landscape itself (at least in the short term). The landscape 
includes various exogenous components (pre-existing technological infrastructures, 
wars, liberalization etc.) that can shape niche/regime activities. Together, landscape, 
regime  and  niche  form  a  nested  hierarchy  in  which  the  activities  are  usually 
increasingly stable and structured as one moves from micro-level to macro-level.
The socio-technical transition only occurs when processes on all three levels 'link up' 
(figure 1.6). For example, a landscape pressure such as climate change might create 
tensions  in  an  existing  transport  regime  (the  sustainability  of  petrol-based  cars 
becomes questioned), opening up a 'window of opportunity' for the wider diffusion of 
niche inventions (e.g. electric cars) which may or may not have matured yet (e.g. 
there might still be some uncertainty regarding the dominant design). However the 
breakthrough of a niche innovation can lead to further changes in the existing regime 
and subsequently in the landscape (e.g. electric car as a symbol of green modernity).
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Figure 1.6. Technological substitution pathway (Geels & Schot 2007: 401)
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Depending on the nature of landscape pressure (see table 1.1 for a typology), the 
states  of  niches/regimes and the  timing of  their  interactions,  transitions  can  take 
multiple  paths.  In  the  example  depicted  in  figure  1.6,  the  niches  have  become 
sufficiently matured when landscape pressure occurs, allowing for a relatively quick 
technological substitution of one socio-technical regime for another, e.g. a transition 
from sailing ships to  steam ships (Geels 2002).  Alternatively,  if  niche inventions 
have not matured, landscape pressure is followed by competition between various 
technologies until the emergence of a dominant design, e.g. a competition between 
bicycles, steam trams, electric trams, steamers, electric cars, petrol-based cars etc. as 
substitutes  for  a  horse-drawn  carriage  regime  (Geels  2005b).  If  the  landscape 
pressure is less intense, regime-internal actors have more time to adapt and so the 
transformation is more gradual, e.g. the transition from cesspools to integrated sewer 
systems (Geels  2006).  And with  a  lack  of  major  landscape  pressures  the  regime 
changes only incrementally, making it unlikely for the niches to break through at all.
Table 1.1. Typology of environmental disturbances (Suarez & Oliva 2005: 1022)
Frequency Amplitude Speed Scope Type of environmental change
Low Low Low Low Regular
High Low High Low Hyperturbulence
Low High High Low Specific shock
Low High Low Low Disruptive
Low High High High Avalanche
Finally,  during  the  overall  process  various  little  mechanisms  occur,  partially 
contributing  to  the  transition.  Geels  (2005a:  267–272)  named  sixteen  such 
mechanisms,  later  adding  another  eleven  (2006:  1079–1080).  Examples  of  these 
include: 1) the important role played by the government in creating and sustaining 
niches; 2) the role of visions and values which help to legitimize the technologies to 
ensure their wider diffusion; 3) the role of specialized social groups who advocate 
new technology and through such lobbying help to legitimize it; 4) strategic games 
between various market actors that may lead to speeding up or slowing down of the 
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process of innovation (e.g. adopting a collective wait-and-see attitude); 5) the same 
goes for various social struggles between enterprises, governments and users (e.g. 
technology is ready for mass production but it is delayed for various reasons). As can 
be seen,  these  'mechanisms'  are  rather  loosely worded,  often indicating only one 
activity and, by contrast with the analysis of the overall dynamics of transitions, have 
not been extensively developed.
1.4.2 Desires-Beliefs-Opportunities framework (DBO)
Led  by  Peter  Hedström  (Hedström  &  Swedberg  1996,  1998,  Hedström  2005, 
Hedström & Bearman 2009a), analytical sociology is a relatively recent movement 
characterized by four features (Hedström 2005: 1–6): 1) focus on explanation instead 
of  description  by specifying  various  causal  mechanisms  by which  various  social 
phenomena (e.g.  network  structures,  divorce  patterns,  residential  segregation)  are 
brought about (see Hedström & Bearman 2009a for various examples); 2) dissection 
and abstraction, that is a decomposition of complex totality into constitutive elements 
and an accompanying focus on those that are deemed to be most essential to the 
explanation, leaving other components aside; 3) aim to offer as clear, precise and 
fine-grained  analytical  distinctions  as  possible;  4)  focus  on  actions  and 
corresponding theories that enable us to understand the results of the interplay of 
various actors. Here I will only focus on the last part, leaving other issues for the 
following chapters.
The main action theory of analytical sociology is the DBO framework. It explains the 
actions  of  individuals  as  combinations  of  desires,  beliefs  and  opportunities, 
influencing each other. Hedström uses a simple example. The action of Mr Smith 
going out with an umbrella might be explained by his belief that it would rain today,  
his desire not to get wet, and an opportunity to take an umbrella to prevent this from 
happening. If any of these three had a contrary value, the action would not occur: Mr 
Smith might have an erroneous belief  that it  would not rain,  for some reason he 
would be happy to get wet or he would not have an opportunity to take an umbrella 
(2005: 39–40).
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The aim of the DBO framework is not to explain the behaviour of a single individual, 
however.  Instead  it  focuses  on  how  the  interactions  of  the  beliefs,  desires, 
opportunities and actions of individual actors lead to certain collective outcomes. For 
example, a bank run can be explained as a result of an underlying mechanism of self-
fulfilling  prophecy in  which  the  withdrawal  of  one  actor  leads  another  actor  to 
believe that the organization might indeed be on the verge of bankruptcy. Combined 
with  the  second actor's  desire  to  avoid  financial  losses,  this  mechanism leads  to 
another withdrawal, which in turn influences the beliefs of other actors. Figure 1.7 
depicts this example in DBO terms, where A stands for actions, D for desires and B 
for beliefs, while the subscripts denote different actors.8
Figure  1.7.  Self-fulfilling  prophecy (Hedström  2008:  327,  following  Merton 
1968)
Provided  that  the  characteristics  relevant  to  explaining  the  phenomena  can  be 
measured precisely enough, even very small differences in the composition of actors' 
desires, beliefs or opportunities can lead to very different outcomes. Hedström and 
Bearman  (2009b:  12–13)  use  Schelling's  (1978)  stylized  example  on  residential 
segregation as an example. This model consists of a lattice in which two groups, 
Whites and Grays, search for a living place. Each of the groups wants to live near at  
least some of their kind. Initial random distribution often leaves too few Whites and 
Grays together, prompting them to move elsewhere. But the migration of Whites into 
certain  areas  might  prompt  Grays  to  move  elsewhere  and  so  on.  As  a  result 
residential segregation can emerge as an unintended consequence. For example, if 
25% of Whites and Grays  want to live near their  own kind,  the moving process 









culminates in a neighbourhood where the proportion of the representatives of either 
groups living nearby is actually 55%. But with a slight change in preferences—from 
25% to 26%—the homogeneity of the neighbourhood rises to 73%. The lesson is that 
even seemingly very different collective outcomes can be caused by fairly similar 
underlying mechanisms and starting conditions.
1.4.3 Systems of Innovation (SI)
So far little has been said about the boundaries of the systems or networks in focus.  
Here it is useful to draw briefly upon the vocabulary of the Systems of Innovation 
(SI)  approach.  Most  generally such a  system is  defined as  “the  determinants  of  
innovation processes, i.e. all important economic, social, political, organizational,  
institutional, and other factors that influence the development, diffusion and use of  
innovations” (Edquist  2005:  182),  where  innovations  are  either  novel  products 
(product innovations) or novel ways of producing products (process innovations).
SI  understands  the  success  of  innovative  activities  as  a  result  of  interdependent 
evolution of organizations, institutions and technologies in a certain domain and/or 
locality ( Markard & Truffer 2008, Suurs & Hekkert 2009). The boundaries of such a 
system are determined by whether the interaction between the components is two-
way or one-way or, softening this criterion a little, at least 'relatively independent' 
from the environment (Markard & Truffer 2008: 601).
As  such,  one  can  define  a  System  of  Innovation  in  various  ways:  1)  on  a 
geographical basis as a national or regional SI (NSI or RSI), e.g.  “the network of  
institutions9 in  the  public  and  private  sectors  whose  activities  and  interactions  
initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman 1987: 1); 2) on the 
basis of an industrial sector (e.g. biotechnology, telecommunications) as a sectoral SI 
(SSI), e.g.  “a set of new and established products for specific uses and the set of  
agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production  
and sale of those products” (Malerba 2002: 250); 3) by a specific technological area 
9 Freeman's use of 'institutions' conflates actors and rules.
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(e.g. microcomputing, wind energy) as a technological SI (TSI), e.g.  “network of  
agents  operating  in  a  specific  economic/industrial  area  under  a  particular  
institutional infrastructure or a set of infrastructures and involved in the generation,  
diffusion  and  utilization  of  technology” (Carlsson  &  Stankiewicz  1995:  49). 
Depending  on  the  research  focus,  various  combinations  are  possible,  e.g.  a 
technological  SI  in  a  certain  country (TSI  in  NSI)  or  a  comparison of  different 
industrial  sectors  worldwide  (cross-national  SSIs).  Given the  nature  of  the  cases 
studied, for practical purposes this research uses 'systems of innovation' and 'socio-
technical regimes' interchangeably.
Figure 1.8. National, regional, sectoral and technological innovation systems 
(adapted from Markard & Truffer 2008: 600)
Carlsson  et al. (2002) have made further distinctions between three takes on TSI 
research (see figure 1.9): 1) technology as a knowledge field (T); 2) technology as a 









for customers (C). In each case the system is delineated in a different manner and so 
the relevant aspects to be studied also differ:  for example,  if  technology T4 as a 
knowledge field (e.g. mainframe computing) is taken as a starting point, the research 
would  include  studying  P2  and  P3  as  the  particular  products  into  which  it  is 
crystallized (e.g. ENIAC and Colossus) and the customer base would expand from 
C3 to C7, who use it for various purposes (e.g. codebreaking, calculating artillery 
firing tables etc.). However, the other means by which the customers seek to fulfil 
these goals (e.g. electromechanical calculators) would not be explored. Alternatively, 
one could focus on certain customers and the types of products they use for particular 
purposes, cutting across a variety of knowledge fields but not embracing any of them 
fully. The point is not to claim that one or another focus would be superior per se: it 
only serves to highlight how different analyses are likely to reveal different aspects 
of the systemic interaction.
Figure 1.9. Illustration of the three research focuses (Carlsson et al. 2002: 238)
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1.4.4 Towards research-specific application: assessing the three types  
of compatibility
Having presented a quick outline of each approach, I am now in a position to assess 
their  compatibility with metatheoretical  theses,  their  mutual  complementarity and 
their  importance  to  explaining  the  cases.  I  will  begin  with  the  assessment  of 
foundational compatibility.10
The correspondence of MLP to each metatheoretical thesis is as follows:
1) Causal force—has been borrowed from MLP itself.
2) Causal force interaction—same as point 1.
3) Systemicity—MLP's  empirical  focus  is  on  shifts  from one socio-technical 
system (or regime) to another.
4) Micro–macro—MLP conceptualizes niche, regime and landscape as nested 
hierarchies in which the influence of the latter on the former is asymmetrical. 
Also, the language of micro, meso and macro levels is used. However, when 
responding to the criticism that what is seen as a regime on one level might 
be viewed as a niche on another (e.g. wind power as a separate regime or a 
niche  in  the  context  of  electricity production  in  general)  (Berkhout  et  al. 
2004, Smith  et al. 2005), Geels and Schot (2007: 402) make a distinction 
between empirical and analytical levels. Namely, while they admit that levels 
are indeed empirically nested, they argue that one should first pick a level of 
interest (whether it is transport, bus transport, or long-distance bus transport) 
and only then apply analytical levels to it. MLP is said to operate on the level 
of organizational fields (ibid.), defining its lowest empirical boundary. So in 
effect  MLP employs  a  dual  micro–macro  distinction:  a  relational  analytic 
micro–macro definition nested in an absolute empirical one. Keeping that in 
mind, however, it is clear at the same time that MLP does acknowledge the 
overall micro–macro distinction.
10 Since I am only borrowing a few tools from the (Technological) Systems of Innovation (TSI)  
approach that help to delimit the system, I will only assess MLP and DBO here. The initial version 
of the chapter did include an analysis of the functions of TSI (Hekkert  et al. 2007, Bergek et al. 
2008). I concluded that, with some analytical clarification, the 'functional' vocabulary of TSI can 
be made compatible with the language of MLP.
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5) System–system interaction—as shown in figure 1.6, MLP is about the role of 
the interactions of different systems (and exogenous events) in explanations 
of transitions. In the initial version mainly vertical interactions were analysed. 
Later  works  (e.g.  Geels 2007a, Raven & Verbong 2007) have also turned 
attention to multi-regime interactions.
6) Structure—MLP is explicit about the enabling and constraining nature of the 
socio-technical structure that the actors draw upon (e.g. Geels & Schot 2010: 
30).
7) Basic interaction mechanism—Geels (2010) describes MLP as a crossover 
between evolutionism and interpretivism in which actors' choices, struggles, 
sense-making  activities  etc.  are  combined  with  evolutionary  theory.  Such 
focus has been stressed virtually from the beginning: the subtitle of Geels's 
book on transitions  (2005a)  states  that  its  analysis  is  co-evolutionary and 
socio-technical.
The correspondence with Sibeon's checks is as follows:
8) Reductionism—as substantive theories are issue-specific, following a single 
explanatory principle might be sometimes a perfectly valid strategy (whether 
it is appropriate or inappropriate in all cases is another matter, to be decided 
separately  in  each  instance).  As  an  overarching  argument,  however,  this 
critique is only relevant for metatheory.
9) Essentialism—MLP  does  not  presume  the  absolute  unity  of  niches  and 
regimes, describing the latter as 'semi-coherent'. However, it is the point of 
choosing such categories  in  the first  place that  the coherence within such 
units is higher than that between them.
10) Reification—MLP does not ascribe agency to non-agentic entities as defined 
above, although it allows for mutual shaping.
11) Functional  teleology—although  MLP makes  occasional  references  to  the 
functions of socio-technical systems it “does not assume that all actors work  
towards shared system goals, has no teleology, and no bias towards stability” 
(Geels 2010: 56).
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How does DBO measure up to these criteria?
1) Causal force—two components of DBO (desires and beliefs) focus on actor-
internal causation. The category of opportunities can include various other 
actors, rules and technologies, although DBO and analytical sociology have 
generally focused on the interactions of individual actors.
2) Causal force interaction—taking into account the above qualifications, DBO 
is in principle able to embrace such interactions.
3) Systemicity—despite Hedström's occasional criticism about critical realism 
and emergence (e.g. Hedström 2005: 70–74, Hedström & Bearman 2009b: 
13), Hedström (personal communication, 14.12.2010) has acknowledged that 
a rigorous explanation in terms of higher-level entities might be considered a 
temporarily satisfactory strategy. Moreover, at least one of the earlier works 
in  this  tradition  (Stinchcombe  1998)  explicitly  discusses  a  mechanism 
common to the operation of universities, corporations and states. I would thus 
argue that DBO theory is capable of pragmatically accepting the interactions 
between  higher-level  or  emergent  entities  such  as  organizations  or  socio-
technical networks.
4) Micro–macro—DBO aims to explain collective outcomes as direct results of 
individual actions; therefore it acknowledges at least a crude micro–macro 
distinction.  Its  somewhat  ambiguous  attitude  about  ontologically  stratified 
reality is noted above.
5) System–system interaction—considering the above qualifications, DBO can 
be applicable to these instances.
6) Structure—DBO appreciates the role of relations and relational structures in 
shaping individual preferences (e.g. Hedström & Bearman 2009b: 8).
7) Basic  interaction  mechanism—although  the  early  version  of  analytical 
sociology  (Hedström & Swedberg  1998)  was  inspired  by  rational  choice 
theory,  the  proponents  later  become  somewhat  disappointed  with  the 
limitations  of  this  framework  (e.g.  Hedström  2005:  60–66,  Hedström  & 
Bearman 2009b: 8). One could argue that as all elements of the framework 
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can  lead  to  changes  in  other  elements,  DBO  is  able  to  embrace  a  co-
evolutionary approach in the wide sense, as defined above.
8) Reductionism—the argument made for MLP also applies to DBO.
9) Essentialism—given  its  general  focus  on  individual  actors,  DBO  cannot 
favour the ascription of essential qualities to the types of entities discussed by 
Sibeon  (e.g.  class).  DBO  also  allows  for  frequent  changes  in  actors' 
preferences and behaviours.
10) Reification—see the previous point.
11) Functional teleology—DBO theory serves to highlight how social structures 
manifest on an individual level, how action is brought about and how various 
interactions lead to collective outcomes. In other words, it explicitly theorizes 
how macro-level conditions are related to micro-level behaviour, instead of 
simply deriving the latter from the observation of the former.
The comparison is briefly summarized in table 1.2.
I conclude that although so far the empirical focuses of both approaches have been 
quite different, and therefore they have not explicitly addressed each issue deemed 
relevant  by  the  above  metatheoretical  assumptions,  there  is  no  necessary 
contradiction between them. In principle,  MLP can be employed alongside DBO. 
The additional questions of how they complement each other and how they help to 
make sense of the empirical cases need to be answered next.
At  least  three  strengths  of  MLP  can  be  singled  out.  First,  although  MLP  as 
traditionally applied to socio-technical transitions operates on a relatively high level 
of aggregation, I think that its theoretical shell remains a powerful analytical tool 
even when detached from its  empirical  focus.  The notion  of  dynamic  models  in 
which the outcome emerges from the interactions of various levels is an idea that can 
be  extended  to  various  instances,  including  those  operating  on  lower  levels  of 
aggregation.  Second, MLP has been fine-tuned to focus on events from the start, 
making it highly suitable for making sense of historical developments. And third, it 
offers a theoretical vocabulary to distinguish between the patterns of occurrence of 
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similar events (e.g. transitions).
Table 1.2. MLP and DBO in metatheoretical context
Postulate MLP DBO
Entity Compatible by definition Although not directly 
conceptualized, the category of 
opportunities can include 
groups, technologies and rules
Entity–entity 
relations
Compatible by definition Compatible in principle
Systemicity Yes Sceptical in theory, able to 
accept pragmatically in practice
Micro–macro Yes, but also specifies the lower 
boundary of empirical 
applicability for theorizing 
transitions
Yes, although generally sceptical 








Yes Not directly addressed but 
hypothetically not exclusive
Reductionism Reductionist by definition, 
domain of applicability should 
be justified on a case-by-case 
basis
Reductionist by definition, 
domain of applicability should 
be justified on a case-by-case 
basis
Essentialism No (regimes conceptualized as 
semi-coherent)
No (actors' preferences are 
allowed to change)
Reification No No
Functional teleology No No
MLP is weaker when it comes to the conceptualization of underlying mechanisms: 
“While  patterns  are  outcomes,  mechanisms  produce  outcomes.  ...  Furthermore,  
patterns  typically  stretch  over  the  entire  process  of  system  innovation,  while  
mechanisms take place over  shorter time periods” (Geels 2005a: 6).  Making the 
distinction in such a manner does not allow us to see different transition patterns as 
variations of a single overarching mechanism (e.g. niche breakthrough). Instead MLP 
offers a list of shorter event sequences observed over the course of the transition, but 
does little to integrate them to the rest of the theory. Simply put, in MLP patterns and 
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mechanisms remain separate.11
In  the  DBO  framework,  mechanisms  and  collective  outcomes  are  much  more 
intimately related.  Small  differences  in  individual  preferences  can  result  in  quite 
different collective outcomes, even when the underlying mechanisms are identical. 
As  such,  analytical  sociology  is  attentive  to  working  from observed  patterns  to 
driving  mechanisms.  Second,  similar  to  MLP,  it  is  focused  on events  and  event 
sequences.  And  third,  whereas  MLP excludes  niche-internal  and  regime-internal 
activities  and focuses  on their  outcomes  instead  to  explain the  overall  transition, 
DBO enables us to take into account some aspects of actor-internal causation, that is,  
the effect of interaction on actors' desires and beliefs.
On the other hand, DBO framework as generally employed in analytical sociology 
tends to force itself into the straitjacket of structural individualism (see chapter 2), 
making  its  adherents  hesitant  about  the  theorization  of  larger  units  of  analysis. 
Additionally, it does not have a sophisticated vocabulary for conceptualizing material 
resources and technologies. Finally, it seems that, contrary to MLP, DBO has little to 
say  about  the  process  characteristics  of  the  mechanisms,  e.g.  the  speed  or  the 
perceived intensity of events. That is to say, the same mechanism can not only yield 
different outcomes, but can also realize these in different temporal patterns.
Systems of Innovation (SI) has traditionally relied on 'snapshot' analyses. Therefore a 
lot of attention has been paid to different ways of delimiting system boundaries and 
specifying research focuses, with accompanying implications. But only recently have 
SI  scholars  started  to  turn  more  attention  to  the  dynamics  of  (technological) 
innovation systems. For example Hekkert et al. (2007) and Bergek et al. (2008) have 
proposed typologies of functions (or activities) of TSIs. Later works (see Hekkert & 
11 Of  course,  over  the  years  MLP has  been  criticized  for  several  other  shortcomings  including 
functionalism,  teleology,  structuralism,  technological  determinism, descriptiveness  and  harmful 
policy implications (e.g. Berkhout et al. 2004, Smith et al. 2005, Genus & Coles 2008, Shove & 
Walker 2010). However, most of these criticisms are (at best) imprecise, have been addressed in 
more recent versions of the theory or are simply irrelevant for the current study (see Geels & Schot  
2007, Geels 2010, 2011, for various responses). I will return to the question of description and 
explanation in chapter 4.
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Negro 2009 for an overview) have identified some recurrent sequences of functions, 
but the overall system dynamics are found to be complex, lacking common patterns 
(ibid.:  591).  Therefore  at  present,  Technological  SI  (TSI)  does  not  offer  any 
theoretical  propositions  about  the  evolution  of  the  system  over  a  longer  period 
(making  it  different  from MLP,  in  which  the  overall  patterns  of  socio-technical 
transitions are present).  Based on a discussion in chapter 4,  I will  suggest in the 
concluding chapter that, paradoxically, a too nuanced typology might be the main 
culprit. For this reason I will exclude (T)SI's analytical tools for conceptualizing the 
dynamics  of  innovation  systems  from  my  own  analysis.  However,  it  will  be 
demonstrated in chapter 4 that the rest of the conceptual framework of (T)SI (see 
section 1.4.3) can be successfully integrated with MLP's analytical tools in order to 
derive  a  multi-level  model  of  the  transformation  of  (certain  types  of)  innovation 
systems.
So how to make the best of the strengths of each approach in the empirical analysis? 
Here I will briefly remind the reader of the research questions:
1) What  explains  the  success  or  failure  of  each  PC  project?  What  are  the 
patterns  of  case  development?  What  are  the  respective  intra-case 
mechanisms?
2) How were the dominant lines of PCs established? What are the patterns of 
interaction  of  cases  in  each  country?  What  are  the  respective  inter-case 
mechanisms?
3) How did the Technological Systems of Innovation evolve in each country? 
What are the patterns of system-level development?
The synthetic application of MLP and DBO to answer these questions means that the 
frameworks are to be extended in five different ways:
1) To my knowledge, the application of MLP and DBO to the Soviet context is 
novel. It is assumed that the conceptual vocabulary of both is applicable to 
these cases.
2) MLP's  notion  of  multiple  levels  is  detached  from its  empirical  focus  on 
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transitions.
3) DBO on the other hand is extended to embrace socio-technical developments.
4) In  order  to  answer  research  questions  1  and  2,  MLP is  extended  to  the 
explanation of the dynamics within and between socio-technical networks. In 
other words, it is applied on a lower level of aggregation than has been the 
case so far.
5) The reverse is true for DBO. It is assumed that the notion of goals (desires) 
and  beliefs  applies  to  entities  other  than  individuals  (e.g.  organizations). 
Therefore its application is extended to higher-level phenomena.
The wording of the above research questions indicates that the middle-range analysis 
actually operates on three different levels of aggregation (case-internal, between-case 
and system-level). The reason is my assumption that each angle would provide a 
different and complementary picture of the historical developments. The benefits of 
the above theoretical synthesis common to each level are that it enables one to 1) 
derive  dynamic  network–environment  models  (MLP);  2)  analyse  the  effect  of 
landscape  events  on  local  actors  (DBO);  3)  outline  underlying  mechanisms  and 
patterns of their realization (MLP and DBO).
On the lowest level of aggregation, the dynamics of each socio-technical network 
will  be analysed separately.  With the help of MLP and DBO I will  focus on the 
interplay  of  network-internal  processes  (formation,  expansion,  contraction, 
disintegration)  and  landscape  movements,  covering  the  development  of  each  PC 
project in all three countries, roughly from 1977 to 1992. Owing to the chosen time-
frame it will be possible to observe network-internal processes occurring in vastly 
different conditions, ranging from the 'normal' functioning of socialism to the role of 
possibilities created by Soviet economic and political reforms in mid-1980s to rapid, 
full-scale social transformation at the beginning of the 1990s. One would presume 
that in such conditions the preferences of various local actors involved in different 
networks changed substantially. I will attempt to detect whether these changes were 
indeed present, what shape they took and whether they had any commonalities. The 
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same roughly holds for the analysis on the next level of aggregation, for which the 
same tools will be used to focus on the patterns of interaction of different socio-
technical networks in conjunction with exogenous events.
But  the  cases  did  not  interact  all  the  time—many  developments  took  place  in 
parallel. Therefore the sole focus on the interactions between cases would still yield 
an incomplete picture of the overall dynamics. These could be better grasped if all  
cases  in  each  Baltic  country  were  conceptualized  as  regional  technological 
innovation systems (or socio-technical regimes) nested in a national one (the Soviet 
Union).  Such  a  move  aims  to  capture  the  process  of  system/regime-internal 
transformation  when  landscape  movements  gradually  gained  strength  and  each 
regional system gradually became decoupled from the Soviet Union, re-establishing 
links with the West. The focus is thus on system/regime–landscape dynamics, since 
existing  hardware  and  software  was  replaced  with  newer  technologies,  but  no 
fundamentally  different  technological  niche  challenging  the  existing  regime  was 
present. Analytically speaking then, I do not aim to theorize a shift from one system 
to another, but a transformation within a system.
As my research takes a product-specific focus it therefore does not address the whole 
field  of  (micro)computing  in  these  three  countries  (e.g.  various  controllers  for 
specialized  uses).  Neither  does  it  focus  on alternative technologies  by which  the 
actors' goals could have been fulfilled. The focus is only on those aspects that are 
directly  concerned  with  the  creation,  design,  production,  diffusion  and  use  of 
personal/micro/general-purpose  computers—i.e.  the  convergence  of  numerous 
technical, economical, political and cultural factors that shaped these processes. Thus 
it provides a product-centred view of the inner dynamics of technological innovation 
systems/socio-technical regimes in three neighbouring territories.
Likely the reader has noticed that I have largely abstained from making very precise 
theoretical  propositions  about  the  expected  dynamics  of  PC  development  in  the 
Soviet Baltic states. Instead I have united the selected components of MLP, DBO and 
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(T)SI simply to structure further enquiry. That is, so far the conceptual vocabulary 
has  been mainly employed  as  a  set  of  sensitizing  tools  for  making sense  of  the 
historical narratives. It  will  not remain so. By the end of the theory construction 
exercise outlined in chapter 4, much more specific propositions will be derived. This, 
however,  requires  discussing  some  methodological  questions  and,  of  course,  the 
narratives themselves.
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2. Approaching the data
This  chapter  will  tackle  various  methodological  issues  related  to  obtaining 
(historical) data. The overall aim is to reflect on the aspects often neglected in STS 
studies  to  date—for  example,  process  theory  or  mechanismic  explanation—thus 
providing  STS's  common  but  largely  implicit  practices  with  firm  analytical 
foundations. In so doing I will draw together a number of separate discussions from 
different  domains  of  knowledge—critical  realist  philosophy,  social  theory, 
management studies, political science, history—illustrating how they can sensitize 
one to various nuances of one's project. It also means that the stress of this chapter is  
more on methodology than on methods. The former is understood as a collection of 
general principles and techniques that guide the collection and/or analysis of data, 
whereas  the  latter  refers  to  a  single technique (e.g.  quantitative  methodology vs. 
factor analysis). 
I will start the discussion with Elder-Vass's 'method for social ontology' (2007b). The 
conclusions of this discussion imply that some points made in the previous chapter 
should be elaborated further. Thus I will clarify my position on the type of theorizing 
involved in the project and the nature of mechanismic explanation. The discussion of 
the merits and disadvantages of the case study approach follows. Finally,  specific 
techniques of data collection will be outlined, for which the issue of triangulation and 
the possibility of assembling valid historical knowledge warrant closer inspection.
2.1 Elder-Vass's seven requirements
Once the theoretical framework has been laid out,  how should one proceed from 
there? The problem, as always, is linking abstract concepts to data. If a critical realist 
philosophy is employed, one would expect this approach to have some ramifications 
for actual research. Elder-Vass has indeed suggested several criteria a critical realist 
study should follow. He argues that the researcher should identify:
1) “the particular types of entities that constitute the objects of the discipline;
2) the parts of each type of entity, and the sets of relations between them that are  
56
required to constitute them into this type of entity;
3) the emergent properties of each type of entity;
4) the mechanisms through which their parts, and the characteristic relations  
between them, produce the emergent properties of the wholes;
5) the morphogenetic causes that bring each type of entity into existence;
6) the morphostatic causes that sustain their existence;
7) and the ways that these sorts of entities, with these properties, interact to  
cause the events we seek to  explain in the discipline” (Elder-Vass 2007b: 
232).
On the lowest level of aggregation, the fundamental entity of interest would be a 
socio-technical  network.  This  is  constituted  by  various  actors  (e.g.  for  a  school 
computer  this  would  include  designers,  producers,  lobbyists,  schools,  decision-
makers  from  the  education  sector,  the  local  communist  party  and  planning 
committee, universities responsible for training the teachers and so on) using certain 
technologies  (e.g.  production  infrastructure,  available  components)  and following 
certain rules (e.g. central laws, user manuals). In practice this would mean focusing 
on the interactions of organizations that are fundamentally socio-technical—that is, 
the  reasons  for  establishing  inter-organizational  linkages  do  not  only  include 
involving more people but also machines, infrastructure, skills, know-how, access to 
better components and so on. Material and social causes both are implicated in the 
establishment of a socio-technical network (1).
The  relations  of  these  elements  can  be  various,  e.g.  the  linkage  of  technical 
components and devices into a PC, supplier–user relations, organizations involved, 
division of labour etc.,  with the precise configuration varying from case to case. 
There is no single way to constitute a socio-technical network (2).
The emergent property of the network is to produce, diffuse and use the PCs. Since 
the ability can also be attributed to single members of the network it raises a question 
whether one is really dealing with an emergent property here. The simple answer lies 
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in  the  linkages:  without  (potential)  users  the  producers  would  have  hardly  any 
incentive to build the prototype in the first  place;  likewise the users would have 
nothing to consume without the producers. The roles of designers,  producers and 
users are taken in relation to each other. Therefore the interdependence between the 
entities in bringing about the outcome does matter, and so the ability of the socio-
technical network as a whole can indeed be considered an emergent property, even if 
only  a  fleeting  one  (Elder-Vass  2005:  334)  that  is  likely  to  disappear  when 
environmental conditions change (3).
Various mechanisms then refer to different network-internal processes by which the 
network  manages  to  create,  diffuse  and  use  the  PCs  (4).  Morphogenetic  and 
morphostatic  causes  refer  to  both  network-internal  and  network-external  causes, 
which contribute to giving rise to or sustaining such a network (5 and 6). Finally, the 
interaction  of  different  actors,  technologies  and  rules  inside  the  network  in 
conjunction  with  environmental  dynamics  helps  to  explain  the  emergence, 
development and disintegration of these networks (7).
Things  are  quite  similar  with  the  second  level  of  aggregation.  Here  the  unit  of 
analysis is changed to the networks of socio-technical networks. The inner dynamics 
of  different  socio-technical  networks  would  be  black-boxed,  whereas  any factors 
beyond the particular networks of networks would be considered to belong to the 
environment. The goal becomes to explain the collective outcomes resulting from the 
interactions of separate socio-technical networks while also taking into account the 
environmental dynamics.
The  third  level  embraces  all  episodes  of  the  evolution  of  every  socio-technical 
network in a given region collectively. This does not only include explicitly observed 
interactions (e.g. competition), but also tacit influences (e.g. knowledge exchange) 
and parallel developments (e.g. networks developing in relative isolation in different 
functional niches). But the specific dynamics between socio-technical networks are 
excluded (similar to the previous level, which excluded network-internal processes) 
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in order to gain a clearer view about the pressures common to all cases in a certain 
locality and the general direction of the transformation. This level seems to differ 
from others  in  that  the  explanation  only  includes  changes  in  one  unit  (regional 
technological innovation system/socio-technical regime).
At this  point  the  discussion  requires  some clarifications.  First,  the  above criteria 
imply a considerable focus on processes. Therefore it might be asked what kind of 
theorizing is involved in such an approach, how it differs from the alternatives and 
what  its  strengths  (and  weaknesses)  are.  And  second,  it  still  remains  somewhat 
unclear whether and to what extent one could speak of mechanismic explanation in 
relation to each of the above level of aggregation. This also necessitates deciding on 
what is to be considered a mechanism proper. The two following sections will offer 
some answers.
2.2 Process theory
What type of work are many STS scholars implicitly doing when they engage in a 
'thick description'  to  uncover  dense,  detailed  and variegated  historical  narratives? 
Why are they doing it? What advantages does this research strategy entail? Mohr's 
often repeated distinction between 'variance' and 'process' theory (1982) provides a 
good starting point.
The main difference between these two types of theory can be captured in the form 
of following questions: 1) What are the antecedents or consequences of X? 2) How 
does X unfold over time? (Van de Ven & Engleman 2004: 355). To clarify further: 
“Whereas  variance  theories  provide  explanations  for  phenomena  in  terms  of  
relationships among dependent and independent variables (e.g., more of X and more  
of  Y  produce  more  of  Z),  process  theories  provide  explanations  in  terms  of  the  
sequence of events leading to an outcome (e.g., do A and then B to get C)” (Langley 
1999:  692).  These  approaches  are  contrasted  in  figure  2.1  using  an  example  of 
strategic change in an organization.
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Figure 2.1. Variance and process approaches (Langley 1999: 693)
It can be seen that variance theory attempts to use the attributes of certain entities to 
predict a change in another entity. In so doing it hypothesizes the process linking 
inputs to outputs. The path can be specified by adding more intervening variables, 
and sometimes the link between inputs and outputs can be intuitive enough for one to 
be certain of its  existence without further probing, but in any case the processes 
themselves  are  not  directly  observed.  They  remain  black-boxed.  Process  theory 
(Poole et al. 2000, Poole 2004), on the other hand, takes events as its basic units. It 
attempts to find recurrent patterns of events between a certain starting point and an 
eventual outcome. In this sense process theory is richer: its data can be simplified 
and  'variabilized',  but  not  the  other  way round.  This  richness  comes  at  a  price, 
however: usually fewer cases can be studied at once because the detection of event 
sequences  takes  much  time  and  places  a  heavy  interpretative  burden  on  the 
researcher.
But there is more to the advantages of process theories. Drawing on various accounts 
(Langley 1999, Poole et al. 2000, Poole 2004, Van de Ven & Engleman 2004, Van de 
Ven & Poole 2005) at least six different benefits can be highlighted:
1) Process theory is able to take into account the mutation of entities over time. 
That  is,  entities can merge (e.g.  uniting the efforts  of two separate  socio-
technical networks) or dissolve (e.g. the decision to abandon the project). As 
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a result, the entity one ends up with might not be the same one started with.
2) Time-ordering of certain events can make a difference to the outcome (e.g. if 
one seeks  government  funding before  research and development  activities 
and  fails  to  obtain  it  then  one  might  abandon  the  project  altogether. 
Conversely,  a working prototype might enhance the chances of getting the 
funding and thus contribute to the continuation of the project).
3) The duration  of  events  might  shape the  outcome (e.g.  persistent  lobbying 
might finally change the minds of the funding bodies).
4) The  co-occurrence  or  conjunction  of  certain  events  is  important  for 
explanation (e.g. if the efforts of certain socio-technical networks to get their 
PCs into mass production happen to coincide with the decision of central 
authorities to give more autonomy for union republics,  the projects  might 
have more chance in succeeding).
5) Process  theories  are  able  to  consider  the  parallel  running  of  events  (e.g. 
different  parts  of  the  network  might  engage  in  different  activities,  say 
knowledge production and lobbying, simultaneously).
6) Finally, process-based approaches can embrace the increasing and decreasing 
importance of causes over time (e.g. the conditions of the market economy 
might  become very important  during  the  course  of  the  development  of  a 
socio-technical  network  because  of  the  decline  of  the  USSR,  but  can  be 
negligible in the beginning).
Therefore, the process-centred approach is better-tuned to the interactive nature of 
socio-technical  processes  whereby  the  outcomes  of  certain  events  become  the 
conditions of the next ones and so on. It can thereby also explain why equifinality 
(different  starting points,  same outcome)  and multifinality (similar  starting point, 
different outcomes) occur.
Several authors (Emirbayer 1997, Cederman 2005, Latour 2005, Abbott 2007) have 
linked  event-based  approach  to  relationalist  or  non-essentialist  position  as  a 
seemingly logical consequence. Writes Andrew Abbott:  “[The relational approach] 
problematizes the very notion of an entity capable of action (the notion of agent),  
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viewing  entities  as  constant  by-products  of  repeated  action” and  it  “seeks  an 
explicitly processual understanding in which outcomes, actors, and relations are all  
endogenous” (2007:  10,  19).  The  idea  is  that  one  should  avoid  the  notion  of 
'essences' or 'substances' that define the agent in a rigid manner at all costs. Instead 
the ideas,  beliefs,  preferences  and identities  of  all  units  are  allowed to  fluctuate, 
making the task of the researcher to locate patterns of similar events.
In  my  view  this  link  is  dubious  for  many  reasons.  At  best  it  is  a  convenient 
methodological simplification to gain novel insights into data by focusing on events 
in  their  own right.  A slightly  worse  option  would  be  a  methodological  reversal 
(focusing on events determining entities/properties vs. entities/properties determining 
events)  because it  remains  unclear  what  exactly is  to  be achieved by this  move. 
However, in my opinion the worst choice would be to elevate this position into the 
status of an ontological creed. I will offer three arguments against this move.
First, although relationalists claim to do away with essentialism, it tends to creep in 
by the back door. Consider the claim that the goal of process theory is to find general 
patterns  assessed  by the  criterion  of  versatility,  i.e.  “the  degree  to  which  it  can  
encompass a broad domain of developmental patterns without modification of its  
essential character” (Poole et al. 2000: 43). In other words, process theory attempts 
to group different narratives together on the grounds of certain similarities they share 
(note the word 'essential'). How this differs from talking about entities with certain 
essential characteristics save for the referent (events) is difficult to say.
Second,  every researcher  is  confronted  with  the  fact  that  the  historical  narrative 
simply has to start somewhere. And as soon as the description of the context begins 
one has to introduce entities with certain properties, enabling or encouraging certain 
types of actions and constraining or discouraging others. It is likely that one would 
find some qualities of these entities to extend beyond particular observations (that is, 
independent of the meanings the particular observed actors ascribed to them) and to 
have decisive implications for the ways in which they can be related to other entities. 
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In  other  words,  there  is  a  logical  leap  between  allowing  'outcomes,  actors  and 
relations' to be endogenous to the analysis and equating this methodological move 
with the ontological statement that the observed processes would be fully responsible 
for all changes in entities, whereas the qualities of the latter would have no part to 
play in the shaping of the former. I would challenge the holder of this position to 
locate an instance in which the interactions between only the atoms of iron would 
produce cheese as a relational outcome.
And  third,  pinning  down  the  defining  characteristics  of  entities  is  indeed  an 
extremely  difficult  task—for  example,  after  decades  of  research  STS  still  lacks 
consensus about what constitutes its object of research, i.e. what is to be considered a 
technology. Moreover, when the properties of the entity keep changing over time, it  
is especially daunting to fix the qualities that distinguish it from others. On the other 
hand,  for  every  time-frame  of  observation  the  entities  are  bound  to  have  some 
qualities that do not change (e.g. I can be quite sure about the immutability of basic 
biological characteristics of human beings between 1977 and 1992, which would not 
be true if my research operated on an evolutionary time-scale). In my view, it  is  
exactly the ability to find enough of these enduring properties (so that the definition 
would not remain too wide) and to leave aside the volatile ones (so that the definition 
would  not  become too  narrow)  within  the  observed time-frame that  makes  such 
defining a true analytical craft, mastered by few.
The problem with abandoning this type of thinking and simply seeing everything as 
constituted  by  relations,  having  no  fixed  essential  or  substantial  qualities,  is 
undermined by its general applicability. That is, there is no reason why we could not 
extend the lack of 'essential' or 'substantial' characteristics to the very terms we use to 
frame the research—that is actors, events, relations and outcomes, to follow Abbott's 
quote. This quickly leads to an infinite regress of under-conceptualization, wherein 
the meaningfulness of using any terms could be equally contested. Studying anything 
at all would become impossible. The mere fact that in our research practice we do 
choose some framing terms,  draw limits  to  our  research  observations  and justify 
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them indicates that we are using some kind of definitions and classifications, if only 
implicitly. For a thorough relationalist this would constitute a logical contradiction. 
For a less thorough relationalist (and observers less allured by the position), this just 
encourages  bad  research  practice  expressed  as  indifference  towards  analytical 
clarification.  After  all,  if  everything  keeps  changing  then  why  bother  with 
determining what that everything is?
My own  position  is  more  modest,  assuming  that  1)  entities/properties  can  only 
manifest themselves through at least some minimal progression in time; 2) events 
depend on entities capable of exerting certain causal powers. All properties do not 
necessarily manifest themselves in events, but events do not solely determine the 
properties of entities (to avoid the above pitfalls). There is no necessary link between 
process-based research and ontological relationalism.
This  hints  at  the  potential  of  combining  variance  theory with  process  theory:  1) 
properties  are useful for establishing the starting point  of the historical  narrative, 
helping to narrow down the arena of choices; 2) events show which properties were 
actually manifested in the process and by whom, and how all  this influenced the 
outcome for the unit of analysis the researcher is concerned with. In the case of this 
research, it helps to explain how the domestic PC projects came to be, what kind of 
requirements had to be fulfilled so that they could emerge in the first place, how the 
socio-technical networks sought to  ensure their  success and how their  success or 
failure depended at least partly on other similar networks and contextual processes. 
This position allows constituent elements, relations and interactions to be included in 
the  explanation  without  logical  contradictions,  while  also  paying  attention  to 
potential and actual changes in many properties of the socio-technical networks (e.g. 
identities or preferences). In fact, this research is mostly about a change of identity:  
about the birth, growth, maturation, and decline of various socio-technical networks, 
networks of these networks and technological innovation systems.
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2.3 Mechanisms revisited
Mechanisms  were  frequently  mentioned  in  the  first  chapter;  mechanismic 
explanation,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not.  Therefore  one  may  well  wonder  what 
constitutes a satisfactory mechanism-based explanation, especially when the different 
frameworks of the theoretical synthesis maintain somewhat different ideas about the 
notion  of  the  mechanism in  the  first  place.  For  example,  I  quoted  Elder-Vass's 
definition of causal mechanism, “processes that depend on interactions between the  
parts, interactions that only occur when those parts are organized in the particular  
way that constitutes them into wholes that possess this emergent property”  (Elder-
Vass 2007a: 415). At the same time I also made a brief reference to Mayntz, who 
finds that “if a cause produces an effect without intermediate steps, no mechanism is  
involved,  and the  stated  relationship  even runs  the  danger  of  being  a  tautology  
(Kitschelt 2003). The term “mechanism” should therefore be reserved for processes  
involving  linked  activities  of  several  units  or  elements  and  not  applied  to  “unit  
acts”” (2004: 242). So when speaking about MLP's mechanisms, I referred to the 
role  of  visions  and  values  in  legitimizing  new  technologies  or  the  role  of  the 
government in creating niches. Yet I was also drawing on an author making a point 
that a mechanism should not consist of a single act. How can this contradiction be 
overcome?
In order to resolve this problem the term mechanism itself needs more reflection. 
Alas, even a preliminary glance at the literature reveals a swarm of definitions. For 
example,  Hedström and  Ylikoski  (2010)  outline  nine  different  versions,  whereas 
Gerring (2010) comes up with ten. Table 2.1 presents a selection of these.
As  can  be  seen,  different  definitions  entail  different  restrictions:  some  of  them 
require mechanisms to be unobservable, intentional, system-internal or micro-level. 
One definition, on the other hand, is very wide, requiring only the specification of a 
certain effect and a pathway or a process—according to that definition, in principle, 
any  event  sequence  could  classify  as  a  mechanism.  Therefore  let  me  pose  the 
question in this way: what is mechanismic explanation supposed to achieve?
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Table  2.1.  Selected  definitions  of  mechanism  (Stinchcombe  1991:  267, 
Mahoney 2001: 580, Mayntz 2004: 241, Gerring 2010: 1500-1501, Hedström & 
Ylikoski 2010: 51)
Author Definition Source
Bunge A mechanism is a process in a concrete system that 
is capable of bringing about or preventing some 
change in the system
Bunge 1997, 2004
Elster A mechanism explains by opening up the black box 
and showing the cogs and wheels of the internal 
machinery. A mechanism provides a continuous and 
contiguous chain of causal or intentional links 
between the explanans and the explanandum
Elster 1989
Gerring I A micro-level (microfoundational) explanation for a 
causal phenomenon
Gerring 2008, 2010
Gerring II The pathway or process by which an effect is 
produced
Gerring 2008, 2010
Hedström Mechanisms consist of entities (with their 
properties) and the activities that these entities 
engage in, either by themselves or in concert with 
other entities. These activities bring about change, 
and the type of change brought about depends on 
the properties of the entities and how the entities 
are organized spatially and temporally
Hedström 2005
Mahoney A causal mechanism is an unobserved entity that—
when activated—generates an outcome of interest
Mahoney 2001
Mayntz Causal generalizations about recurrent processes Mayntz 2004
Stinchcombe Bits of 'sometimes true theory' or 'model' that 
represent a causal process, that have some actual 
or possible empirical support separate from the 
larger theory in which it is a mechanism, and that 
generate increased precision, power, or elegance in 
the large-scale theories
Stinchcombe 1991
I would argue that from this point of view there are three features essential to the 
notion:  a  mechanism 1)  shortens  the  time-span between initial  conditions  A and 
outcome  B  by  specifying  a  recurrent  and  characteristic  sequence  of  processes 
between them (e.g. the steps by which a self-fulfilling prophecy can become true); 2) 
decomposes a collective outcome into an interaction between its composite entities 
(e.g.  number  of  individual  rational  choices  leading  to  market  equilibrium);  3) 
requires the stability of certain background conditions (otherwise it might not occur 
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in the first place, meaning that we would not be able to pick it up).  “A complete  
explanation of a social event would look like this: e = f(U, I, O)” (Brante 2001: 184), 
where I is the level of the event, U is the underlying level in terms of which the  
mechanismic explanation is offered and O refers to overlaying levels that frame the 
levels in explanatory focus.
Note that this wording does not require mechanismic explanation to entail the above 
restrictions. The focus is on the explanation of a higher-level outcome in terms of 
lower-level interactions. This also leads to the conclusion that it is appropriate to talk 
about 'unit  acts'  in mechanismic terms, but only when such an act is  itself  being 
explained by a certain mechanism. That is, a unit act 1) can be an outcome (event) of 
a mechanismic explanation in terms of the interaction of lower-level entities; 2) can 
constitute a part of the causal chain in a higher-level mechanismic explanation, but; 
3) cannot be considered a mechanism in its own right.
This  implies  a  possible  hierarchy  of  mechanisms  which  corresponds  to  critical 
realism's notion of ontologically stratified reality. Instances where explained events 
or outcomes act as building blocks for further explanations are not difficult to find. 
For example, Elder-Vass (2007c) synthesizes the views of Bourdieu and Archer on 
human agency to explain its emergence.  On the other hand, social  sciences offer 
virtually countless analyses of situations in which different individuals exert  their 
agency,  bringing  about  a  consequence  of  some sort  (sub-optimal  solution  to  the 
prisoner's  dilemma,  market  equilibrium,  self-fulfilling  prophecy,  formation  of  an 
enterprise  etc.).  Another  example  comes  from  MLP:  whereas  Raven  and  Geels 
(2010) focus on niche-internal processes to explain the emergence of a niche in terms 
of  a  cycle  of  variation,  selection  and  retention,  the  theory  of  socio-technical 
transitions excludes niche-internal processes and focuses on the interactions between 
the outcomes of  niche-internal  and regime-internal  processes  instead (figure 1.6). 
Thus  the  above  contradiction  between  different  takes  on  mechanisms  can  be 
reconceptualized as mere differences between explanatory focuses.
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But often the question is not about what is to be explained, but how far one should go 
with such an explanation. In other words, what level mechanisms should one employ 
in order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation? The position advocated by analytical 
sociology is that of structural individualism,  “a methodological doctrine according  
to which all social facts, their structure and change, are in principle explicable in  
terms of individuals, their properties, actions and relations to one another. It differs  
from  traditional  notions  of  methodological  individualism  …  by  emphasizing  the  
explanatory  importance  of  relations  and  relational  structures” (Hedström  & 
Bearman  2009b:  8).  Thus  the  importance  of  supra-individual  structures  is 
acknowledged, yet the ultimate aim is to offer an individual-level explanation.
Although commendable in its ambition, the pragmatic necessity of this doctrine in 
most cases remains questionable. Why? One reason has been suggested by Arthur 
Stinchcombe: “The theory of the mechanism in higher-level theory is often radically  
shorn  of  the  complexity  it  has  in  the  discipline  that  specializes  in  the  level  the  
mechanism comes  from,  especially  eliminating  small  but  theoretically  interesting  
effects, effects that are controlled by compensating mechanisms, or effects that are  
not systematic at the higher level” (1991: 384). Stinchcombe brings an example of 
the ability to compute internal transfer prices for interdivisional supplies transfers. 
While a majority of the population does not have enough mathematical training to 
perform these kinds of calculations, one can assume corporations usually tend to hire 
people who do have such training (presuming that such talent is sufficiently available 
for every enterprise). Yet another example is brought by Mayntz (2004), who refers 
to the analysis of bargaining processes between organizations. She finds that  “as 
long as it is possible to attribute actor quality to larger social units”  (2004: 248) 
explanation in terms of individuals is simply unnecessary. Thus in these cases the 
differences on an individual level are offset on an organizational one. Therefore by 
going down to the level of the individual one might end up in a world of fascinating 
and  intricate  mechanisms  which,  however,  have  a  negligible  impact  (if  any)  on 
higher-level  dynamics.  For  pragmatic  reasons  then,  the  explanation  in  terms  of 
individual actions should often be avoided.
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Mayntz  (2004:  246–252)  has  also  pointed  out  that  the  adoption  of  structural 
individualism has  led  to  a  certain  empirical  bias:  analytical  sociology's  greatest 
success  seems  to  have  been  achieved  when  interdependent  and  uncoordinated 
individual actions lead directly to an emergent macro-effect (e.g. spatial segregation). 
At the same time, the mechanisms of other types of entities (e.g. states) have not 
been much explored. One can draw an analogy with STS, in which the prevalence of 
micro-analysis has likely led to the dominance of certain types of results and the 
relative  neglect  of  others  (e.g.  the  relative  inability to  theorize  large-scale  socio-
technical entities and structures). Therefore I would welcome the 'in principle' part of 
structural  individualism,  but  empirically  turn  attention  to  higher-level  entities 
instead. I will return to this theme in chapter 4.
Finally, there are two criticisms made about mechanismic approaches that need to be 
addressed.  One  comes  from  George  and  Bennett  (2005:  7–8),  who  contrast 
mechanismic theories with middle-range theories, whereby the first is taken to focus 
on  a  single  mechanism  while  the  second  deals  with  recurrent  conjunctions  of 
mechanisms.  George and Bennett  prefer  the latter  to  the former because middle-
range theories are said to be less laboratory-like and better able to account for the 
context of the processes in focus. However, theoretically speaking a lot of 'laboratory 
work' might be desirable to isolate the mechanism from the flux of change in the first 
place, so as to be able to see how it might manifest itself in different environments. 
Moreover,  George  and  Bennett  seem  to  have  missed  the  opportunity  that 
configurations of causal mechanisms might constitute meta-mechanisms for higher-
level  outcomes  that  actualize  when certain  parameters  are  kept  constant.  In  fact, 
theoretically it might be always possible to come up with some stable background 
variables which provide context to whatever change we have in mind. The main 
difficulties  lie  in  determining  that  relevant  context  (what  is  stable?), detecting 
unique,  contributing  but  non-essential  causes  (since  many  events  might  be 
'overdetermined', see below) and deciding the operating level of mechanisms. For 
these reasons, arriving at stylized mechanisms is a formidable task and the actual 
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research process  likely involves  alternating between retroduction and retrodiction 
(Lawson 1997, Elder-Vass 2010): reasoning from observed patterns to underlying 
mechanisms, and vice versa.
Gerring (2010) accuses mechanismic approach of lacking in substantial novelty: after 
all, social sciences have been detecting the causal paths of various outcomes for a 
long time. However, he also acknowledges that mechanismic approach enables one 
to be more aware of the importance of causal pathways (ibid.: 1503). In my opinion 
it is precisely this point that justifies the endeavour: the terminology of mechanisms 
provides a kind of meta-language capable of uniting different process theories in a 
single framework. By following this logic it might be possible to re-read existing 
literature,  recognize  certain  models  or  event  sequences  as  formulations  of 
mechanisms and compile a taxonomy of them, thereby arriving at a larger degree of 
systemicity. Once again, it is the drawing of connections that potentially emerges as a 
valuable contribution.
With these questions out of the way it is time to turn to the research design itself. The 
following section is devoted to case study and its role in the current research.
2.4 Case study
Similar to a large number of STS works, this  thesis adopts a case-study approach, 
which is defined as a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to  
develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events”, 
wherein case refers to “an instance of a class of events” (George & Bennett 2005: 8, 
17). In other words, the approach aims at a close inspection of a small number of 
cases, taking into account the complexity of real-life interactions. Owing to its time-
consuming nature, it has to make a trade-off between the number of cases/statistical 
comparability and explanatory richness. “Case study researchers are more interested  
in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms  
through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those  
conditions and their outcomes arise” (ibid.: 31). On the other hand, closeness to the 
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data  means  that  the  events  connecting  initial  conditions  with  outcomes  can  be 
established  with  much  greater  certainty  (see  the  above  discussion  about  the 
differences between variance and process theories).
George and Bennett (2005: 75–76) distinguish between six different types of case 
studies:  1)  atheoretical/configurative  idiographic;  2)  disciplined  configurative;  3) 
heuristic; 4) theory testing; 5) plausibility probes; 6) 'building block'. Since the stress 
of this study is on developing more specific theoretical propositions using analytical 
tools presented in the first chapter,  types one and three—“good descriptions that  
might be used in subsequent studies for theory building, but by themselves, do not  
cumulate or contribute directly to the theory” and attempts to  “inductively identify  
new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms and causal paths” (ibid.: 75)—are the 
most relevant here.
The main reason for outlining the importance of these two types of case studies is 
that  in  my view  heuristic  case  studies  actually  require  atheoretical/configurative 
idiographic ones to be conducted first. It seems quite impossible to arrive at valid 
conclusions  without  having  established  a  solid  factual  basis  first  (see  the  next 
section): to ensure that the version of a historical narrative as written down by the 
researcher would be more likely than (at least some) other alternative explanations. 
The overdetermination of effects—the fact that the same outcome might have been 
achieved with fewer causes than was actually the case—justifies this stance. As noted 
by Gerring: “Indeed, it is often difficult to tell which of the many features of a given  
unit  are  typical  of  a  larger  set  of  units  (and  hence  fodder  for  generalizable  
inferences)  and  which  are  particular  to  the  unit  under  study.  The  appropriate  
response to such ambiguity is for the writer to report all facts and hypotheses that  
might be relevant – in short, to overreport” (2004: 346). This strategy also provides 
opportunities for secondary analysis: the same historical narrative can be read with 
different  theoretical  ideas  in  mind.  And finally,  one should not  exclude  aesthetic 
considerations: a well-written narrative is simply an interesting and engaging read on 
its own.
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In the previous chapter I presented three research questions that the current study 
aims  to  answer.  Noting  how  it  entails  operating  on  three  different  levels  of 
aggregation, the beginning of this chapter discussed their correspondence to Elder-
Vass's seven general criteria. Following the advice of George and Bennett (2005, ch. 
4) I will now specify further what constitutes a case, justify the case selection while 
noting possible biases and highlight the changes in outcomes to be explained.
The basic unit underlying the definition of all three levels of aggregation (intra-case, 
inter-case, system-level) is a socio-technical network formed around 'domestic PC 
production  attempts'  in  Soviet  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania.  By  'domestic 
production  attempt'  I  mean  that  the  countries  in  question  must  have  had  some 
involvement in at  least  the hardware production phase,  and that the goal of  each 
project was to produce machines beyond the particular prototype (this excludes the 
programming  of  novel  software  for  devices  produced  elsewhere  and  one-off, 
customized  hobbyist  designs).  I  equate  the  terms  'personal  computer'  and 
'microcomputer',  by  which  I  understand  small-scale,  general-purpose  computers 
directly  operated  by  users.  This  would  exclude  older-generation  devices 
(mainframes, mini-computers) as well as machines built for special purposes (e.g. 
programmable calculators, various controllers). The number of cases corresponding 
to these criteria (for which sufficient information could be found) was thus narrowed 
down to ten (three in Estonia, two in Latvia, five in Lithuania).
Corresponding to the distinction between atheoretical/configurative idiographic and 
heuristic case studies, the choice of cases can be justified in two ways—historically 
and theoretically. From the historical point of view it suffices to note that fairly little 
is  known about  Soviet  computing  to  date  and,  to  my knowledge,  no  systematic 
overview has been written. In that sense the cases serve well in contributing to the 
pool of historical knowledge about the history of Soviet personal computing.
Theoretically,  the  case  studies  serve  to  extend  dynamic  multi-level  perspective 
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theorizing  to  domains  other  than  socio-technical  transitions.  The  choice  of  the 
frameworks presented in the previous chapter was based on an assumption that the 
simultaneous  attention  to  dynamics  within  and  outside  socio-technical  networks, 
networks of such networks and innovation systems would result in more inclusive 
theoretical analyses and models. In addition, it was assumed that some results of the 
synthesis can also feed back to each framework separately (see the conclusion).
On different levels the selected cases offer distinct theoretical possibilities: 1) as the 
observed events took place from the 1970s to the 1990s (note: not for every case 
separately), it is possible to analyse the evolution of the projects in very different 
environmental  conditions.  (These include the 'normal'  functioning of the socialist 
system, specific reforms undertaken from the mid-1980s, mounting pressure, gradual 
loosening  and  eventual  disintegration  of  the  Soviet  system,  and  a  resulting 
tumultuous change from socialism/totalitarianism to  capitalism/democracy);  2)  on 
the level of networks of socio-technical networks it is possible to observe differences 
in local interactions after the occurrence of a specific landscape stimulus (central 
reform of school computerization); 3) finally,  at  the system-level it  is possible to 
compare the experience of three (seemingly) similar countries and to see whether the 
differences between them outweigh the similarities when it comes to conceptualizing 
the overall transformation process.
It has to be noted that the above selection suffers from two kinds of biases. First, it 
more  or  less  excludes  designs  which  were  realized  by  hobbyists,  usually  self-
assembled, not serially produced, and unofficially sold. For example,  all  over the 
Soviet Union, including the Baltic republics, various clones of Sinclair computers 
were built, some of which became more popular than others and hence diffused more 
widely than just a few machines. But even more fundamental is the bias towards 
more-or-less realized projects. Why this is so is easy to understand from a pragmatic 
point  of  view:  it  is  very  difficult  to  find  projects  which  were  only  briefly 
contemplated and then abandoned due to a severe gap between wants and resources. 
The issue with hobbyist computers is similar: the information about different designs 
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is  hard  to  come  by,  the  original  designer  is  often  unknown,  and  the  circle  of 
hobbyists loose and diffuse, making it very complicated to track down and map the 
exact structure and extent of the network. Therefore it must be kept in mind that the 
importance of various factors (or the factors themselves) outlined in chapter 4 may 
be somewhat different for excluded cases.
Finally,  the  studied  outcomes  for  socio-technical  networks  cover  a  range  from 
planning to prototype to trial batch to mass production. The explanatory focus of the 
middle  level  is  on  the  emergence  of  a  local  dominant  design  (for  a  particular 
functional niche, see chapter 4), while the system-level analysis aims to explain the 
transformation of the system. In the latter cases the outcomes for each country do not 
vary. A limitation of the study on the intra-case level must also be noted: owing to the 
time-frame of the research and resulting data insufficiency, only six cases (three from 
Estonia and three from Lithuania), were used in formulating theoretical propositions. 
All cases were included in the analysis of higher-level dynamics, however.
2.5 Selection, assemblage and triangulation: on the nature of historical 
sociology
The  choice  of  the  case  study approach  does  not  imply a  single  method  of  data 
collection: on the contrary, usually many different sources are required to constitute a 
sufficiently thorough understanding of the cases. Therefore the final section of this 
chapter will  address various types of evidence,  ways of obtaining and combining 
them  and  the  means  by  which  the  most  likely  historical  narratives  might  be 
constructed.
The recency of the events offers a chance to draw on a wider variety of sources than 
would often be the case for a historical study. I would group the data sources into 
three  categories,  presented  in  descending  order  of  importance:  the  first  group 
comprises  semi-structured  interviews  with  people  involved  in  the  projects;  the 
second  group  includes  various  written  materials  (documents,  archival  materials, 
popular and scientific articles, histories with different analytical focuses etc.);  the 
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third group is constituted by the physical artefacts themselves. Respective strengths 
and weaknesses of these data sources are summarized in table 2.2.
Table  2.2.  Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  different  sources  of  evidence 
(adapted from Yin 2009: 102, expanded by the author on the basis of Bryant 




Interviews • Targeted—focus directly on 
case study topics
• Insightful—provides 
perceived causal inferences 
and explanations
• Bias due to poorly articulated 
questions
• Response bias
• Inaccuracies due to poor recall
• Reflexivity—interviewee says 
what interviewer wants to hear
Documentation • Stable—can be reviewed 
repeatedly
• Unobtrusive—not created as a 
result of the case study
• Exact—contains exact names, 
dates, references, and details 
of an event
• Broad coverage—long span of 
time, many events, and many 
settings
• Retrievability—can be difficult to 
find
• Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete
• Reporting bias—reflects 
(unknown) bias of author




• [Same as for the 
documentation]
• Precise and usually 
quantitative
• [Same as for the documentation]




• Exact—gives critically 
assessed evidence about the 
events that the researcher is 
unable to cover in depth, 
including background 
information
• Selectivity—the presented 
events have been pre-selected 
by the author
• Bias—a danger to confuse the 
presentation of facts with 
author's interpretation of them
Physical 
artefacts
• Provide insight into technical 
conditions and operations of 
the time
• Can prompt new interview 
questions, can act as a 





Semi-structured interviews provide a good combination of focus and flexibility. They 
enable the researcher to get answers directly to the questions s/he is looking for, 
although  the  actual  wording  of  the  interview  questions  usually  differs  from 
researcher's  analytical  ones  (being  more  specific,  worded  without  the  theoretical 
jargon etc.). At the same time it leaves enough room of improvisation—the order of 
questions  can  be  switched,  some questions  dropped if  they do not  seem to  lead 
anywhere  (e.g.  the  respondent  explicitly  saying  that  he  or  she  does  not  know 
anything about a particular event), new probing questions invented on the spot etc. 
Interviews are especially suitable for teasing out the motives of participants, informal 
relations between them, reasons behind certain choices and developments—all the 
aspects not present in written materials or there only indirectly and thus requiring 
some inferences to be made.
It has to be noted here that although every case should be studied with the same 
research  questions  in  mind—what  George  and  Bennett  call  'structured  focused 
comparison' (2005, ch. 3)—this should not be taken to hold for each interview. The 
structure of each interview varies somewhat from interviewee to interviewee: for 
example, it would be pointless to ask the end user about the reasons behind design 
decisions made by the developers. In fact, only a few questions do make sense for 
every interviewee. However, even the specific interview questions are likely to be 
recurrent across cases. Therefore in the design phase a list of general questions was 
constructed for the cases as a whole, so that appropriate questions could be chosen 
and adapted for each interview.
In  addition  to  the  aforementioned  advantages,  interviewees  can  often  guide  the 
researcher to other important sources of evidence (including other actors, documents 
and artefacts). Combined with the fact that most of the key actors were still alive at  
the time of research, interviewing was chosen as a primary method.
At  the  same  time,  however,  interviews  are  not  without  disadvantages:  deficient 
research  questions  can  often  lead  to  one-sided  answers,  especially  when  the 
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interviewees themselves are  not observant  enough to notice them and correct  the 
interviewer. A reverse can also happen: an interviewee can tailor his or her responses 
according to  a  personal  agenda or  the  perceived interests  of  the  researcher.  And 
finally,  especially when it comes to specific dates and numbers, people's memories 
are  often  far  from perfect  and  any assessments  are  likely  to  differ  considerably 
between  actors.  A  telling  example  comes  from  the  work  on  Juku,  in  which 
interviewees' estimates of the number of computers provided for schools ranged from 
few dozens to hundreds to thousands. But according to a source written a few years 
after these events (Jürisson 1995) the actual amount was 2,500, which no interviewee 
was able to recall.
Examination of various documents and archival records can overcome some of the 
problems with interview data. Such sources can be consulted a number of times, can 
give  exact  details  about  certain  events  and,  in  the  best  case,  can  lead  to  the 
reformulation of interview questions or recasting of the narrative in different terms. 
However, the relevant documents might be difficult to locate, or some of them might 
be destroyed or held back. It should not be assumed, however, that  “all kinds of  
documents  … contain  the  unmitigated  truth.  In  fact,  important  in  reviewing  any  
document is to understand that it was written for some specific purpose and for some  
specific audience  other than  those of the case study being done” (Yin 2009: 105). 
Therefore  many  actual  considerations  of  the  actors  might  not  be  manifest  in 
documents.
Nevertheless it seems that historians tend to assume that documents still somehow 
provide  a  more  'authentic'  picture  of  past  events.  For  example,  in  an  otherwise 
excellent  guide to  constructing international history,  Trachtenberg (2006) reserves 
only a few pages for interviewing. After warning the researcher against the fallible 
memories  of  the  interviewees  and  differing  levels  of  honesty  he  comes  to  a 
conclusion that “as a general rule you cannot quite take what people tell you at face  
value, and what you learn in this way is not quite as solid as what you learn from the  
documents”  (2006:  154).  He then  goes  on to  discuss  in  detail  the  techniques  of 
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avoiding different biases in documentary material arising from selected availability.
I may be overgeneralizing here, but it seems to me that more than anything else this 
characterization reflects convenience derived from tradition: as historians are used to 
working with documents they are better aware of the advantages and disadvantages 
of these. The weaknesses of other, not so familiar, sources are amplified and hence 
discarded  more  easily.  However,  I  would  argue  that  the  inferences  work  quite 
similarly in both cases: for documents, one has to infer the possible motives of the 
participants on the basis of accessible documentary material. During the interview 
the question can be asked directly and the honesty of the answer judged. In both 
cases, it is the work with other sources (documents or interviewees) that helps the 
researcher to make the decision about whether the particular piece of information is 
to be considered trustworthy or not. In my view assessments like Trachtenberg's lead 
to reinforcing the perceived history–sociology divide and encourage the researcher to 
stick to the sources and techniques with which they are already most familiar.
In the current study documents were ascribed secondary importance mainly because 
of three factors: 1) many documents and even archives as a whole were destroyed 
when the Soviet Union collapsed; 2) for many documents it is unknown whether they 
exist at all,  and if so then where (quite often important documents were received 
from interviewees, who had kept personal copies); 3) the totalitarian regime meant a 
prevalence of 'double speak', i.e. in most cases (some) actual motives were not (could 
not be) present in the documents, and so the declared actions and their actual reasons 
needed double-checking with primary sources, whenever possible.
Other valuable sources include prior works on related subjects. Here I am referring to 
articles and books which include historical background or direct information about 
the issues at hand: for example, some brief descriptive writings on computing in the 
Soviet Baltics (Telksnys & Žilinskas 1999, Tõugu 2009), analysis of the transition of 
the Soviet Estonian telecommunications sector (Högselius 2005), national histories 
or histories of the Baltics (e.g. Zetterberg 2009, Kasekamp 2010), analysis of Soviet 
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political  economy  (Kornai  1992),  review  of  Soviet  educational  reforms  and 
information technologies (Kerr 1991) and so on. The obvious advantage of these 
sources  is  that  they  provide  information  about  contextual  factors  important  to 
understanding the case and formulating the appropriate research questions, but which 
exceed the immediate scope of the research. Moreover, most of them have been peer-
reviewed, which raises their reliability.
The drawback is  having no control  over  authors'  choices regarding the selection, 
presentation and interpretation of facts. In the best case the writings might only cover 
some aspects of interest. In the worst case, however, there is a danger of taking an 
author's  questionable inferences  as matters  of  fact.  Following Bryant's  distinction 
between reportage and interpretation, wherein the first “consists of information that  
pertains to basic questions of what, where, when, who, how many, etc.” while the 
second  “involves establishing the meaning and the significance of these historical  
'facts', i.e., the materials that constitute reportage” (1994: 13) then overreliance on 
secondary sources might lead to ascribing the quality of reportage to interpretation. 
Moreover, some interpretations might be heavily contested by specialists. So ideally 
the use of secondary sources should be coupled with some knowledge about recent 
progress made by historians.
Finally,  there  is  also  a  chance  to  inspect  the  artefacts  themselves.  The  actual 
experience of using, touching or examining the computer can prompt new questions 
about design decisions, components etc.,  potentially bringing forth novel insights. 
Not every device may be available for such purposes, especially not those that never 
progressed  to  or  beyond the  prototype  phase.  In  this  study such devices  or  their 
components were sometimes used as memory aids for the interviewees (e.g. one used 
a printed circuit board from Tartu computer to explain the weakest spot in the design) 
and as such they were of tertiary importance.
The most arduous task of historical research is to combine these multiple sources of 
evidence obtained by the use of various techniques so that they form an integrated 
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and convincing whole. In the best case  “the events or facts of the case study have  
been supported by more than a single source of evidence” (Yin 2009: 116); that is to 
say, they have been triangulated. In this case multiple sources of evidence confirm 
and  support  each  other  (inter-triangulation).  I  would  also  say  that  there  is  a 
possibility of intra-triangulation: this happens when conducted interviews or gathered 
documents are compared with each other and common assessments and perceptions 
are detected.
The work of a historical sociologist can be compared with that of a detective (George 
& Bennett 2005: 218): when faced with several suspects and clues one must decide 
on  the  basis  of  evidence  which  causal  explanation  would  be  the  most  likely. 
Sometimes one type of hypothetical explanation can lead the researcher to gather 
more evidence to test that hypothesis, giving further support to it or, failing to find 
anything (or finding something completely contrary to expectations), disproving it. 
“Historiographic  composition is  thus  ultimately  disciplined  by the  empirical  and  
analytical  constraints  that  are  placed  on interpretations  by  the  available  source  
materials”  (Bryant  2000:  501).  In  other  words,  although the  evidence  is  usually 
incomplete, it is possible to arrive at more or less valid (though potentially fallible) 
interpretations. Bryant himself demonstrates how the connection between the Greek 
hoplite revolution and the rise of democracy is supported by a number of different 
interweaving elements,  including the findings of war equipment,  inferences about 
them, demographic data, historical texts etc. Alternative accounts, on the other hand, 
have failed to embrace the totality of evidence or have drawn dubious comparisons, 
interpretations  or  inferences  (ibid.:  500–501).  Trachtenberg  has  summarized  the 
essence of historical critical analysis as such: “You first identify the author's general  
thesis. You then try to understand the structure of the argument that supports the  
thesis. In particular, you try to see how general conclusions rest on more specific  
claims.  You then evaluate those specific claims in terms of the evidence that  the  
author gives to support them. It is all very straightforward. Along the way, you are  
taking your measure of the intellectual quality of the work as a whole, and when you  
find someone twisting the evidence, your opinion of the work plummets” (2006: 73). 
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Although he is speaking about the analysis of existing works, I think that this quote, 
although  worded  in  reverse,  entails  the  basic  mechanism  of  the  process  of 
constructing historical narratives: interpretations have to be grounded in evidence, 
the latter  itself  to  be viewed and evaluated critically,  with remaining gaps  being 
acknowledged honestly and self-reflexively, and efforts made to fill them.
How is this critical evaluation achieved? Bryant offers two answers: source criticism 
and what he calls sociology of knowledge. The first directs attention to the fact that  
sources  of  evidence  always  represent  reality  in  partial  ways  or  even deliberately 
misrepresent it, according to the interests, ideas, values and ideologies of the author 
(of a document or a spoken word). It means that the historian must not only turn 
attention to what is manifest, but also keep an eye open for hidden implications or 
gaps in the record. The practical ways to achieve this are many: for example, looking 
for  and  comparing  claims  about  the  same  events  in  different  places,  collecting 
different  evidence  from various  angles,  detecting  the  biases  of  the  sources  and 
assessing the information in this light (Trachtenberg 2006: 147–162). This strategy 
helps to ensure that evidence is sufficient and interpretations are valid. Sociology of 
knowledge, advised as a second check, helps to situate the historical sociologist in 
the site  of  knowledge production.  By turning attention  to  how the production of 
knowledge  is  always  partly  shaped  by  the  social  environment  of  the  analyst,  it 
potentially helps to reveal his or her 'blind eye' and prevent hasty overgeneralization 
of  findings.  In  sum:  “In  detecting  the  biases  inherent  in  created  records  and  
monuments, source criticism exposes their manifest and latent ideological intentions  
and  limits,  thereby  allowing  for  counteractive  reconstructions  that  discern  or  
apprehend the larger realities that were screened or amended for contemporaneous  
and possibly  posterior  indoctrination.  In  detecting  intellectually  paradigmatic  as  
well  as  socially  partisan  forms  of  perspectival  bias  in  contending  interpretive  
accounts,  the sociology of knowledge correspondingly exposes and so neutralizes  
their  effects,  thereby  allowing  for  both  informed  arbitration  and  objectively  
defensible selection-decisions” (Bryant 2000: 510–511).
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Although I am somewhat sceptical about the extent to which the researcher could 
entirely avoid his or her socialized biases—after all, what makes them so effective is 
exactly their implicitness, their being hidden from the observer's gaze—there are at 
least two personal aspects of my own background which merit brief consideration.
The first is my background in social sciences, and that I have received no formal 
technical education.  At the same time it  is the very core of STS that in order to 
explain certain phenomena, causes both technical and social need to be accounted 
for.  This  sets  various  potential  barriers,  e.g.  temptations  to  avoid  important  but 
complicated technical explanatory factors, limited understanding of various technical 
details  or  an  inability  to  make  independent  decisions  about  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  different  technical  alternatives.  I  have  tried  to  decrease  these 
hazards  by  1)  obtaining  more  knowledge  about  computing;  2)  asking  different 
interviewees  about  the  technical  choices  made,  including  possible  alternatives—
occasionally some aspects  were clarified later  on (by second interview or e-mail 
exchange) ; 3) consulting independent experts (e.g. curators of computer museums).
The second concerns the fact that I am a native Estonian speaker but do not speak 
Latvian or Lithuanian. This means that some interviews were conducted in a foreign 
language (English or Russian). As such, some of the richness of the oral data may 
have been lost. Also, the language barrier influences my ability to seek out and work 
with written materials. To overcome this issue I have been aided by various people, 
including but not limited to interviewees, for locating and collecting various written 
sources.  Native  speakers  also  helped  me  to  translate  various  documents  and 
newspaper articles.
In this chapter I have discussed a wide variety of methodological principles, ranging 
from the general to the specific. In the next chapter I will put all of these principles 




This  chapter  presents  the  stories  of  the  evolution  of  domestic  PC  construction 
attempts in the three Soviet Baltic countries. The material was compiled on the basis 
of interviews, documentary evidence and existing publications.
The  interviewees  were  chosen  to  reflect  the  multifarious  nature  of  the  projects: 
software programmers, project managers, chief engineers, members of committees, 
teachers  and  so  on,  each  highlighting  different  aspects  of  the  story.  Overall, 
interviews with 58 individuals were conducted, 28 in Estonia (14 of them previously 
interviewed for my Master's dissertation (2009), a thoroughly revised and updated 
version of which constitutes section 3.1.1 of this thesis), eight in Latvia and 22 in 
Lithuania. Interviews were conducted in Estonian, Russian and English,12 and lasted 
from 30 to 150 minutes. Generally the interviews were conducted face-to-face, apart 
from two  interviews  on  Skype  and  one  by  e-mail.  Furthermore,  as  I  could  not 
establish a direct contact, three interviews with one interviewee were conducted by 
Andrejs Skuja. Including this individual, nine people were interviewed more than 
once. Some interviewees were later contacted by e-mail for additional clarifications. 
The full list of interviewees is provided in appendix A. In addition, other people were 
consulted regarding various minor aspects (e.g. finding the key people, locating the 
written sources, obtaining preliminary information about the artefacts, specifying the 
names of the organizations etc.).
To complement  the information obtained from interviews,  written  materials  were 
also collected where possible.  This includes journal and newspaper articles,  book 
chapters, technical documentation, photos, academic publications etc.
The information obtained from various sources was compared and assembled in such 
a way as to present the most plausible course of events. In the course of writing up 
12 Note that I have occasionally made slight corrections to the interviewees' English quotes (word 
order, grammar) to make the intended meaning clearer, as none were native speakers.
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the preliminary draft some interviewees were allowed to read parts of the overall 
narrative and assess its plausibility—however, the final decision as to whether these 
assessments were well-motivated and thus whether to accept them in full, partially or 
reject them altogether, was made by the author, who thereby takes full responsibility 
for possible omissions, false information and biases.
In the following sections the development of ten cases—five in Lithuania, three in 
Estonia and two in Latvia—will be described in more detail (see table 3.1 for their 
technical  characteristics  and  comparison  with  contemporary  Western  PCs).  The 
'missing'  cases  which  were  detected  but  on which  no substantial  detail  could  be 
found are also briefly described when relevant. The account begins from the Estonian 
cases, continues with those from Lithuania and ends with the Latvian projects.13 As 
such the section on Estonia is a bit longer than others, since the first-time description 
involves a fuller explanation of many recurring factors that need only be mentioned 
later. Such background is required to show not only the actors' choices, but also their 
contextual  reasoning,  so that the possibility of alternative options (or the lack of 
them)  could  be  assessed.  But  it  is  only  fair  to  admit  that  the  amount  of  detail 
available also partly derives from the fact that empirical fieldwork in Estonia had 
started somewhat earlier.
The extensive use of oral sources also raises a problem for data presentation: after 
all, the claims made in the narratives often rely on the (potentially fallible) memories 
of  the  interviewees.  But  referencing  each  and  every  factual  statement  would 
unnecessarily clutter the text, disrupt its flow and seriously undermine its readability. 
Therefore  I  have  decided  to  exclude  references  to  what  I  have  decided  to  be 
13 Thus the focus is strictly on local developments. Useful analysis of wider trends and movements 
(directly or indirectly contributing to the evolution of current cases, but not being mainly about  
them)  can  be  found  in  many other  works.  Of  those,  I  have  found especially  useful  Kornai's 
analysis  of  the  political  economy  of  communism  (1992),  Åslund's  analysis  of  post-Soviet 
economic and political transition (2002), Kasekamp's history of the Baltic states (2010), Ceruzzi's 
general history of computing (2003), Gerovitch's (2002) and Malinovsky's (2010) early histories of 
cybernetics and computers in the Soviet Union respectively. Excellent contemporary surveys in 
English about the state of Soviet computing can be found in Goodman et al. (1988) and Judy and 
Clough (1989, 1990),  while Kerr (1991) provides a fine overview of Soviet computer literacy 
reforms.
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relatively  non-controversial  claims.  This  usually  means  that  statements  that  are 
supported by more than one source (e.g. the participants of the projects) or claims the 
veracity of which I had no reason to doubt (e.g. the interviewee's occupation). As a 
general rule, for every aspect of the development of the particular case I have tried to 
rely most on the accounts of the people most intimately connected to them (e.g. when 
speaking about user experience the accounts of the teachers or the members of the 
education sector were preferred to those of hardware constructors).
However, there are still a number of occasions when references to the interviews will 
be made. I have reserved these for the following situations: 1) a direct quote; 2) a 
particularly detailed statement, especially when no reference to a document could be 
found (e.g. dates, quantities); 3) a particularly controversial or conflicting claim; 4) 
speculations about the motives and/or actions of other players about which definitive 
information remains unknown. By using the words 'likely' or 'probably' I also try to 
point  out  the  situations  in  which  I  am  presenting  my  own  interpretation  or  an 
educated guess on the basis of indirect evidence.
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Table 3.1. Selected characteristics of Soviet Baltic PCs and some Western contemporaries*






Entel 1983 KP580BM80A, 8-
bit, 2.0 MHz 
(Soviet Intel 
8080A analogue)
16K 64K B&W or colour TV (8), 
90x32 symbols, 180x96 
pixels
Yes No*** No CP/M




64K B&W or colour TV (16, 
Kursk)/ B&W TV (Palivere), 
64x25 symbols, 
384x256/768x256 pixels 







Juku 1985 KP580ИK80, 8-
bit, 2.0 MHz 
(Soviet Intel 8080 
analogue)
16K 64K B&W TV, 40x24/64x20 
symbols, 320x240/384x200 
pixels
Yes Yes (2) No CP/M
Latvia




56K Black-and-green Videoton 
V24 display, 80x32 symbols















2-4K 62K Black-and-green Videoton 
V24 display, 80x32 symbols













2-4K 62K 80x25 symbols Yes Yes - ISIS-II, CP/M, RMX-
80
Lithuania****
BK-0010Š 1986 K1801BM1, 16-
bit, 3.0 MHz




Yes No** No Initially only some 
monitoring software




16K 48K Colour TV (8), 32x24 
symbols, 256x192 pixels
Yes No No Sinclair ZX Spectrum 
compatible (Sinclair 
BASIC)
Poisk 1988 KP1810BM88, 16-
bit, 5.0 MHz 
(Soviet Intel 8088 
analogue) 
16K 128K TV (B&W, colour) or CGA 
colour monitor (16), 
40x25/80x25 symbols, 
320x200 (4/16)/ 640x200 
(2/16) pixels
Yes No** No** MS-DOS
Sigma 8800 1990 KP1810BM88, 16-
bit, 4.77 MHz
16K 64K B&W or colour monitor 






















IBM PC/AT 1984 Intel 80286, 16-
bit, 6.0 MHz
64K 512K EGA colour monitor (16), 









1987 Motorola MC 
68020, 16-bit, 
15.66 MHz








4.0, Finder 5.4 
* These characteristics attempt to refer to the first mass produced or 'standard' configuration, not to the possible-in-principle or configuration-in-
development. For display, the number of colours are given in parentheses.
** The approximate year of the working prototype.
*** Respective peripherals could be bought and connected. Custom solutions have been excluded.
**** The characteristics of Lema's PC/XT (see section 3.2.4) cannot be given because of insufficient information and quite likely the lack of a  
stable configuration. The specifications of IBM's original computer have been provided instead.
Sources:  VEF (1983), Krivchenkov (1986), Elektronika BK-0010 user manual (ca. 1986), Malsub (1986), EKTA (1987) Videnieks  et al. (1987), 
Märtin (1988), Santaka user manual (ca. 1988), Talanov (1988), Tartu user manual (1989), Basmanov et al. (1990), STIMTI (1990.15.02), Boyko 




In  April  1984,  Soviet  central  authorities  initiated  an  educational  reform to  start 
teaching informatics in secondary and vocational schools. A resolution followed in 
March  1985,  stating  that  120,000  school  computers  for  at  least  8,000  computer 
classes all over the Soviet Union (USSR) would be centrally produced between 1986 
and  1990  (cited  in  a  resolution  from 1985.27.05).14 The  reform plan  was  likely 
influenced  by the  growing  use  of  PCs  in  Western  countries.  The  importance  of 
personal  computing  had  started  to  pervade  the  minds  of  Soviet  authorities:  the 
catchphrase 'second literacy', coined by esteemed Soviet computer scientist Andrey 
Ershov (1981.27.07, 1985a, 1985b),  was widely used with an implicit  or explicit 
expectation that in the future programming skills would be essential for virtually any 
social activity.
By that time two PCs—Entel (see section 3.1.3) and Tartu (3.1.2)—were already 
being developed in Estonia. The Tartu working group had started talking about their 
design as potentially suitable for school needs. This promotion caught the attention 
of people associated with the Institute of Cybernetics (IoC) in Tallinn, who decided 
that  the  idea  of  a  domestically  produced  school  computer  was  a  good  one  in 
principle, only that the IoC should be the one realizing it instead (Eller interview). 
This could have served both ends: to do the 'Estonian thing' while gaining prestige 
for the IoC. The idea sparked the interest of the rector of the Tallinn Polytechnical 
Institute, Boris Tamm, also a previous vice director of the IoC, who quickly became 
the most vocal proponent of the endeavour.
On May 12th,  1985,  a  meeting between the  representatives  of  various  ministries 
(communication, education, finance), the local Planning Committee (responsible for 
the allocation of resources on union republic level), the Estonian Communist Party, 
the  education  sector  (different  education  committees,  representatives  from 
14 For documents,  newspaper articles and other similar written sources the dates are specified as 
exactly as possible. This degree of precision will be maintained in the bibliography section.
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institutions of secondary and higher education etc.), the IoC and a possible producer 
(RET plant) was held. The IoC presented five criteria for the school computer: 1) 
reliability;  2)  low price;  3)  simplicity;  4)  expandability;  5)  connectivity  to  other 
computers.15 It  then  presented  specifications  for  its  prototype:  Soviet  Intel  8080 
analogue microprocessor, 16 KB ROM, 64 KB RAM, black-and-white TV display, 
tape recorder for external memory, programming languages (BASIC, assembler), text 
editing software etc. Future expansions included local networking, printer interface 
and a floppy disk drive. In the IoC's vision this was not supposed to be a high-end 
product, but 'good enough' so that it could be designed and put into production as 
quickly as possible (Tõnspoeg interview). At the same time the too-narrow view of 
its  uses  was  to  be  avoided:  “Computer  is  not  a  calculator  with  a  TV  but  an  
information  processing  device  to  be used  not  only  to  teach programming but  in  
teaching process  [in  general]” (Jaaksoo's  statement  in  the  IoC meeting  protocol, 
1985.12.05).
The IoC's proposal was approved and it promised to deliver a working prototype in a 
few months. Meanwhile, letters from the local Council of Ministers and the Academy 
of  Sciences  would  be sent  to  the  authorities  of  the  Ministry of  Communications 
Industry in Moscow so that the latter would approve mass production in its RET 
factory in Tallinn. However, since there was no computer industry in Soviet Estonia, 
no large factories churning out large numbers of PCs and thus no real experience of 
such mass production, one could well ask why do it in the first place? In order to 
understand why regional production was advocated a contextual detour is needed.
In  the  planned  economy  the  production  of  enterprises  was  managed  by  central 
authorities who allocated a certain fund for each union republic, which in turn dealt 
with  further  allocation  at  the  local  level.  Alternatively,  some factories16 (such  as 
15 Computing in school was commonly imagined as a network, where the teacher could monitor the  
progress of students and students in turn could use the teacher's floppy disk for saving data (since 
the latter were in short supply).
16 Officially  RET  was  called  a  'production  union'  because  its  facilities  extended  to  numerous 
locations in Estonia. The factory in Tallinn would be considered a part of the production union as a 
whole.
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RET) belonged to the military–industrial complex, in which case they were under 
direct central control. Either way the process was generally cumbersome: one had to 
plan how many components would be needed for how many years, request them and 
then wait for a central decision as to whether the components would be allocated 
from existing reserves, whether the request would have to wait until next year or 
whether the application would be rejected altogether. The needs could be negotiated 
with the centre and personal connections used to pull  favours, but in the end the 
relation was profoundly unsymmetrical: the power of final decision was firmly in the 
hands of central authorities.
Add  to  this  what  János  Kornai  has  aptly  called  'economics  of  shortage'  (1980): 
constant  scarcity  of  resources  of  every  kind.  Money  was  often  secondary,  the 
approval to buy the resources primary. If resources are scarce (this being especially 
so  for  something  as  novel  as  a  computer),  but  everyone  must  get  something 
according to the central plan, then everyone will be dissatisfied in the end, unless the 
production  increases  dramatically  to,  say,  120,000  additional  computers.  The 
everyday  experience  of  Soviet  reality  had  made  people  very  wary  of  official 
promises of near-future abundance of more-or-less anything.17 “[The]  Soviet Union 
[was] a country of dreams” is how one of the interviewees described the situation 
(Ališauskas interview).
What about ordering the computers from abroad? Again the flow and allocation of 
foreign  currency  was  strictly  controlled.  Soviet  roubles  were  normally  non-
convertible—a private individual was generally forbidden to own foreign currency, 
and organizations needed a special account for foreign transactions. The permit to 
use currency and respective allocation had to be centrally approved. Although at the 
time  the  USSR  was  contemplating  a  large-scale  import  of  Western  computers 
17 To take the most general example, Vahtre (2007: 168–169) describes a situation in 1980 when it 
suddenly turned out to be impossible to obtain the programme of the 22nd congress of the Soviet 
Union Communist Party from 1961, the type of material usually widely available in bookshops 
and  libraries.  The reason  was  that  in  1961 it  was stated  that  the  transition from socialism to 
communism  would  take  place  by  1981.  20  years  later,  however,  this  was  nowhere  near  to 
happening. Vahtre acerbically notes that the subsequent 'new edition', published in 1985, found in 
hindsight that the party's statements from 1961 had 'in principle' turned out to be correct.
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(eventually buying Yamaha models, see below), it would not have been enough to 
equip all schools. And spending valuable currency to cover the computer needs of 
only one small union republic of the Soviet Union was definitely not a top-priority 
endeavour.  The  hierarchy  of  supply  was  well-known  by the  local  actors:  space, 
military and industry first, civil uses later; Moscow first, peripheral regions later.
So it  is  safe  to  say that  the  possibility of  a  quick foreign  acquisition  was never 
seriously  considered:  yes,  in  principle  Estonia  could  ask  central  authorities  for 
thousands  of  school  computers  but  the  chance  of  actually  obtaining  them  in  a 
reasonable time-span was virtually zero. The IoC (1985.12.05) argued that Estonian 
schools would need 4,000–8,000 personal computers and it would be unrealistic to 
get them in 5 years time. But the availability of computers needed to coincide with 
the start  of  teaching,  i.e.  autumn 1986.  As computing  was deemed important  by 
regional-level  actors,  the  latter  decided  not  to  rely  on  the  promises  of  central 
authorities and to take initiative instead.
There was yet another concern, that of national identity:  to counter Sovietization, 
which aimed at  erasing cultural  differences in theory,  but enforced linguistic and 
demographic Russification in practice (Kasekamp 2010: 158). Teaching and using 
Russian  was  increasingly  supported  by  official  doctrines,  with  Russian  being 
proclaimed as Estonians'  second mother  tongue since the early 1970s (Zetterberg 
2009:  549).  Over  the  years  there  had also  been  a  continuous  influx  of  Russian-
speaking workers, resulting in the percentage of ethnic Estonians dropping from 94% 
in  1945 to  62% in  1989 (table  3.2).  The extrapolation  of  these  trends  created  a 
justified fear among ethnic Estonians of becoming a minority in the country, which 
was also reflected in the reasoning of people in the education sector:  “We feared 
Russification, it was like a little allergy to Estonians. And I think Juku was made in  
order not to go – you see, if Russian computers come here too, it is over, then we'll  
only speak Russian” (Jürisson interview).
Just  in  March  1985,  Gorbachev  had  come  to  power  and  announced  a  need  for 
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reforms.  This  meant  a  gradual  loosening of  constraints:  more  initiative  could  be 
taken  without  fear  of  repression.  But  it  also  meant  more  room  for  colouring 
seemingly innocent and practical initiatives with identity concerns: “I think in some 
sense Juku was used for political goals. Let's say, I don't know, nationalism and…  
These were such times when we had to show our level or being better or whatever, do  
something differently” (Märtin interview). It was not to be simply a school computer 
for children—it was also to be a symbol of positive national differentiation. But in 
the USSR, where nationalism was a swear word in official rhetoric, considerations 
like this had to remain largely unspoken.
Table 3.2.  Titular  ethnic groups as a percentage of  the population and the 
population  in  1989  (Kasekamp  2010:  155,  Eesti  Statistikaamet,  Latvijas 
Statistika, Lietuvos Statistikas Departmentas)
Soviet 
republic
1945 1959 1970 1989 Population in 1989 (in thousands)
Estonia 94 75 68 62 1,565.6
Latvia 80 62 57 52 2,666.6
Lithuania 78 79 79 80 3,647.8
In many ways the IoC was extremely well-positioned for the task: 1) compared with 
other  groups  it  already  had  a  few  years  of  experience  with  developing 
microprocessor-based networked control systems for science and industry; 2) its PC 
was to be designed specifically for the task; 3) it was a large organization18 with large 
numbers of staff—more than 600 people in the second half  of the 1980s (Kutser 
2000). Although the school PC was not to be a primary task for the IoC, it could 
nevertheless put much more manpower into the project than other organizations; 4) 
its good connections from prior contracts (including with the military) meant that the 
IoC was better informed about available components, had better access to them and 
could use more specialized elements in the design; 5) it  had better  resources for 
designing the PC at its  disposal (e.g.  a photoplotter  used in printed circuit  board 
18 In the Soviet system the institutes were usually responsible for R&D and small-scale experimental  
production, while mass production was carried out by plants.
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(PCB)  design,  means  for  diagnostics  and  set-up  etc.);  6)  the  organization  had 
dedicated lobbyists and visionaries (with good connections in Estonia and Moscow) 
who could tirelessly promote the project  on many levels;  7) its  prestige strongly 
contributed to positive expectations about its capability to sustain and develop the 
project further. In fact, its position was so greatly superior compared to the Tartu 
State  University  (Tartu)  and  the  Computing  Centre  of  the  Ministry  of 
Communications (Entel) that making the school computer seemed to the IoC like a 
perfectly natural course.
The  IoC,  or  to  be  exact,  its  subdivision,  the  Special  Construction  Bureau  of 
Computing Technology (SCBCT), produced a working prototype in 6 months solely 
through its own means (IoC 1985.14.11, 1985.21.11, see also photo 3.1). Its name, 
Juku, was derived from an Estonian proverb, 'what Juku will not learn, Juhan will not 
know',19 with clear educational connotations. The IoC's vision meant a very down-to-
earth attitude regarding the construction. If the project was to rely on official supply 
channels then one could not  “put very special stuff into this computer because we  
wouldn't have been able to produce it then. It would have been hard to guarantee  
[that] these [components] would be available for production” (Tõnspoeg interview). 
So the problem looked a bit like a Matryoshka doll: 1) on the outside was a set of 
technical  possibilities  in  the  era  as  a  whole;  2)  a  subset  of  which  comprised 
technologies  actually  available  for  the  Soviet  Union;  3)  a  subset  of  which  were 
available  for  the  IoC;  4)  a  subset  of  which  consisted  of  technologies  that  could 
presumably be acquired for  mass production;  5)  finally,  inside of which was yet 
another subset of what would actually be allowed to be done with these technologies 
or what could be achieved within a given time-frame.
Alas, compared with Western countries the initial choice was not much to begin with. 
The historical reasons for this are lucidly summarized by Judy and Clough:  “The 
Soviet  policy  of  copying  Western  hardware  design,  combined  with  international  
isolation and an industrial structure that retards domestic development, production,  
19 Juku is a nickname for Juhan used for small children.
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and support, effectively doomed Soviet computerdom to an expanding lag behind the  
West during the 1980s” (1989: 321). The situation had become so poor (see table 3.3 
for examples)  that  it  was  joked that  a  32-bit  microprocessor would arrive in  the 
Soviet Union on a rocket.
Figure 3.1. Juku's prototype (Arvo Eller's private collection)
Not  only was  the  technology outdated,  it  was  also  often  of  shoddy quality.  The 
umbrella term 'technological culture' covers a wide variety of all the little things that 
could  and  did  go  wrong  in  the  production  process,  resulting  in  wastefully  and 
inefficiently produced, unstable and unreliable final products. Five ministries were 
producing computers  and 23 more were producing materials  and components  for 
them (Goodman  et al.  1988: 198) and any weakness in any link of the chain (e.g. 
impure  production  environment,  impure  materials,  bad  soldering)  affected  the 
outcome. The quality problems were tremendous: a chief engineer of the Lithuanian 
Sigma  production  union  (see  section  3.2.3),  recalls  that  only  about  10% of  the 
enterprise's PCBs assembled with chips had no problems at all. Since discarding all 
the rest was out of the question, the factory needed a special unit of workers tasked 
95
with checking and repairing already assembled PCBs. The same engineer  visited 
Western  factories  in  the  1980s  and  noted  the  absence  of  such  units,  since  the 
percentage of high-quality products exceeded 90% (Drąsutis interview). And Sigma 
was not even among the plants notorious in the USSR for their low quality products.
Table 3.3.  Technological  backwardness of  Soviet  computing (selected from 
Goodman  et  al.  1988,  Adirim  1991;  cross-checked  from  CPUShack,  CPU 
World, Museum of Electronic Rarities)
Delay in microprocessor production (Goodman et al. 1988)








Intel 8080 1973–1974 K580 1978–1979
Zilog Z80 1976–1977 U800 (GDR) 1980
Intel 8086/88 1978–1979 K1810 1983–1984
Intel 80286 1982–1983 No equivalent produced*
Intel 80386 1985–1986 No equivalent produced
Soviets' own estimations (Adirim 1991)
Domain Year of 
statement
Level of declared 
backwardness
Microcircuits with logical circuit 
and external memory
1987 Backwardness of two 
generations (E. Velikhov)
Mass production and use of 
computers
1989 12 years behind the Western 
nations (A. Aganbegyan)
Service, guarantee and support of 
computer technology
1989 'Where the West was with the 
introduction of IBM/360' 
(roughly 25 years earlier) (A. 
Aganbegyan)
Infrastructure of computer 
technology (production 
equipment, measuring and control 
machinery, special clean material)
1987 Backwardness of the order of 
10 times (E. Velikhov)
*  According to the Museum of Electronic Rarities prototypes exist but mass production 
cannot be confirmed.
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However, from the point of view of a school computer project the situation was even 
worse. Because from this pool of components it was the military that got the best 
ones  that  had  passed  extensive  testing  and were  likely to  work  for  an  extended 
duration. And there was no hope that a school computer could somehow qualify as a 
super-important, high-end project eligible for components of assured quality.
So  the  components  that  could  be  used  imposed  various  technical  limitations  on 
Juku's  design.  Microprocessors  were  unstable  and  often  ceased  to  work.  Tape 
recorders were used as external memory devices but they were slower than floppy 
disks and had poor mechanics, resulting in many errors when reading from or writing 
to  the  tape.  TVs  were  used  instead  of  computer  monitors  but  they  were  less 
convenient to watch because of insufficient resolution and the fact that the sharpness 
of the display area was uneven. To ease up mass production the material of the case 
had to be switched from metal to plastics, which affected the cooling conditions of 
the power supply unit and the processor, which were quite susceptible to changes in 
temperature. The use of tapes instead of floppy disks meant that the functions of the 
operating system had to be somewhat reduced. Small memory capacity limited the 
scope  of  possible  applications  (e.g.  some  of  them simply  could  not  fit  into  the 
memory). And so on and so on. But what could be seen as a nuisance for the future 
user provided a creative challenge for developers:  “The bridles were hideous, but  
there was more playfulness to it, since you had to squeeze the maximum out of these  
resources”  (Haavel interview).  For example,  one programmer insisted that it  was 
exactly the limited memory capacity that forced the workers to plan better and come 
up with more elegant software solutions (Paluoja interview).
Software-wise  a  decision  to  adopt  CP/M operating  system—a standard  for  8-bit 
computers at the time—was made. This decision saved time and resources which 
would have otherwise had to be spent on programming the operating system and user 
applications from scratch. Instead, the project could take advantage of 'borrowing' 
already  existing  (mostly  Western)  software.  The  selection  included  various 
programming  languages  (assembler,  BASIC,  Pascal,  Forth,  C),  word  processing 
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(WordStar),  database  management  (dBase  II),  spreadsheet  calculation  (Multiplan) 
etc.  Some  software,  however,  was  created  by  the  IoC  itself,  e.g.  testing  and 
diagnostics  programs,  graphics  editor  (GTR),  games  etc.  (EKTA 1987,  various 
interviews).
In parallel  with prototype design,  the IoC started negotiations with two potential 
producers, the radio engineering factory RET and Estron, a subsidiary electronics 
production enterprise of the Kuusalu kolkhoz (collective farm).20 It was agreed that 
the three organizations would cooperate in preparing the necessary documentation 
for mass production by June 1986. As a large plant RET had valuable experience 
here that others lacked. Estron was also to be aided with appropriate technological 
preparations so that it would be able to produce a total of 500 PCs in 1986, including 
an experimental batch of 100 computers. Upon its ministry's central approval, RET 
would receive necessary components by 1987 and take over the production. At the 
same time the SCBCT would develop a new design of Juku to be produced by Estron 
(meeting protocols 1985.04.06, 1985.11.06, 1986.28.02, 1987.12.03).
Meanwhile the education sector was preparing for informatics teaching. The pace 
was frantic because the whole school computerization process resembled a campaign 
with characteristic Soviet traits:  “Soviet central education planners decided on an  
addition  to  the  curriculum (computing  literacy);  they  mandated  it  for  the  entire  
country  with  little  advance  discussion;  they  produced a  single  text  and a  single  
teacher-training  program;  and  they  required  teachers  to  shift  their  teaching  
assignments  on  short  notice” (Kerr  1991:  227).  In  Estonia  the  task  was  to  be 
implemented jointly by the Ministry of Education and the Republican Supplementary 
Training Institute of Teachers. The academics from universities acted as pedagogical 
20 Since the profits from agricultural production were often quite low, kolkhozes tried to gain extra 
from  subsidiary  production,  often  remotely  or  not  at  all  related  to  agriculture.  Subsidiary 
production enterprises somewhat resembled private entrepreneurship, since they had freedom to 
choose their own projects, could potentially operate in a Soviet-wide market (which often had a 
very low competition because state enterprises were slow to respond to user demand) and keep the 
profits after appropriate tax payments to the state and the kolkhoz. In cases in which the enterprise 
also  had  a  resourceful  leader—and  the  man behind  Estron's  success,  Vladimir  Makarov,  was 
celebrated for his organizational skills—the combination of creative freedom and high salaries 
attracted many talented engineers.
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advisers and visionaries, while the IoC's representatives provided mainly technical 
consultation.
Teaching needed to start  in 1986, but, hardware/software issues aside,  there were 
other  immediate  problems:  400  teachers  had  to  be  trained  and  study  materials 
prepared. This in turn required quick sub-solutions: searching for people able to train 
the  teachers,  organizing  the  courses,  finding  suitable  candidates  for  informatics 
teaching (teachers of mathematics and/or physics were generally preferred for they 
were  presumed  to  be  more  capable  of  the  task),  translating  the  study materials, 
creating additional material and so on.
Contemporary  Soviet  informatics  education  was  strongly  oriented  towards 
programming and algorithms. In general, attention to other domains only started to 
emerge  at  the  end  of  1980s  (Kerr  1991:  233–234).  In  Estonia  the  advice  from 
academics resonated with the IoC's vision by stressing the need for user applications 
from the beginning. Therefore it was decided to deviate somewhat from the general 
thrust of informatics education (Jürisson interview). But this could only be achieved 
if  computers  were  available  on  time since,  by contrast  with  reading and writing 
algorithms, user applications were strictly a hands-on matter.
There  was  the  additional  problem  of  language:  avoiding  Russian  computers, 
programming languages and materials as much as possible meant that a substitute of 
some kind needed to be found. Considering the scope of local resources and rapid 
development  of  computing  it  was  quickly  realized  that  translating  all  computer 
vocabulary into Estonian would be too demanding. The only remaining choice was to 
embrace  the  English  language,  to  see  it  as  an  opportunity  for  communicating 
between  different  cultures,  not  as  a  threat  to  identity.  “We  decided  to  let  the  
operating  system be,  let  it  be in  English:  if  we  can create  software  in  our  own  
language and focus on that, it will do” (Jürisson interview). But the programming 
languages  also  used  English  commands  and  a  glance  at  Juku's  case  revealed 
mysterious words like 'power' and 'reset'.
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The first group of teachers was indeed ready to start in 1986. More were trained over 
the following years. In parallel, a pilot group of teachers was formed who had early 
access  to  experimental  Jukus  and  were  tasked  with  disseminating  knowledge  on 
computing  in  schools  further  down the  line  (e.g.  technical  advice,  local  training 
sessions).  So  despite  the  hurry,  by autumn 1986 every aspect  of  the  grand plan 
seemed to be in place: informatics in schools with well-equipped computer classes 
was soon to be widely available. From the supply side there was a prototype, consent 
of two producers, a dedicated banner bearer and support from Bruno Saul, chairman 
of the Council  of Ministers  of Soviet Estonia (in essence a prime minister).  The 
approval from central authorities and so the allocation of necessary components was 
still missing, however.
The issue was tackled on a broad front. Newspaper articles on Juku appeared. Its 
documentation was sent to factories in Leningrad, Kishinev (Moldavia), Zaporozhye, 
Riga  (Latvia)  and Narva  (Estonia)  to  see  if  any of  them would  be  interested  in 
producing the computer (IoC's resolution from 1987.18.03). The issue was formally 
raised on Gorbachev's visit  to Estonia (resolution from 1987). Since many young 
developers had been participating in the project, the computer was presented for and 
gained an award from the Estonian Leninist Communist Youth Union. It was also 
demonstrated  at  an  all-union  exhibition  of  National  Economy  Achievements 
(VDNH) in Moscow, where it was awarded a bronze medal. Exhibitions like this had 
multiple  functions:  informing  others  about  available  products,  finding  potential 
business partners, and receiving awards which increased the prestige of the project, 
making it harder to ignore and giving grounds to pay wage premiums to developers 
(important in the context of fixed wages). According to one interviewee from the 
Entel group, premium-paying considerations were the reason why the IoC influenced 
the  chairman  of  the  Estonian  Popov  society  (a  union  of  radio,  electronics  and 
communications  specialists)  to  organize  a  school  computer  contest  in  May 1986 
(Malsub interview).  Tartu and Entel  seized  this  chance to  demonstrate  their  own 
computers too, but this intrusion did not affect Juku's first place.
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Centrally the case for Juku proved to be difficult to make, however. At the time the 
Ministry of Radio Industry (Minradioprom) was already producing Agat (Агат) and 
preparing the production of Korvet (Корвет), whereas the Ministry of Electronics 
Industry  (Minelektronprom)  was  doing  the  same  with  BK-0010  (БК-0010)  and 
UKNTs (УКНЦ) respectively. All four were branded school computers and none of 
them were software-compatible with each other. At least on paper the competition 
seemed formidable. Agat was an Apple II clone with colour graphics, whereas BK-
0010 had a new generation 16-bit processor. Korvet, while still an 8-bit computer, 
had 24 KB ROM while UKNTs could boast with two enhanced 16-bit processors, 
both working at higher clock speed than the one in BK-0010, and 192 KB RAM 
(BK-0010  user  manual,  Pavlov  1986.21.11,  comparison  of  Juku  and  Korvet 
1987.12.05, Frolov et al. 1988). Off-paper features of existing models were far less 
impressive, however: Agat's compatibility with Apple was actually quite limited and 
its colour monitor so bad that it was eventually declared hazardous by the Ministry of 
Health  (Jürisson  1995).  The  expression  'fifth  Agat'  denoted  its  catastrophic 
breakdown rate—it was used to suggest that for every four Agats one needed the fifth 
one for spare parts (Krivtsov 1988, quoted in Goodman et al. 1988: 159). BK-0010 
on the other hand had little RAM, no operating system and scarcely any software at 
all (see section 3.2.1).21
So  Juku  needed  justification.  Based  on  available  information—because  the 
computers themselves could not be obtained, of course—the project manager Rein 
Haavel compiled a comparison of Juku and Korvet, the only CP/M machine of the 
four  mentioned  above  (1987.12.05).  Although  seemingly  strictly  focused  on 
objective technical characteristics, the overall aim was to 'prove' Juku's superiority. 
This could be achieved in the following way: 1) choosing a sufficient number of 
categories  to  be  able  to  point  out  as  many single  elements  in  favour  of  Juku as 
21 As  a  monopoly  producer  of  key  components  Minelektronprom  had  an  upper  hand  in  this 
competition, since it could hold back resources until its own products had matured. In fact, the 
ministry was suspected of doing exactly this in the case of both Korvet (Judy & Clough 1989:  
277–278) and Agat (Eglājs interview).
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possible; 2) interpreting technical characteristics creatively (for example, while both 
computers used the same processor, Korvet's clock speed was 2.5 MHz while Juku's 
was 2.0 MHz, but by adding a comment about how processors working at top speed 
reduces reliability—remember, no actual performance comparison was conducted—
Juku  could  be  argued  to  excel  Korvet  in  that  particular  category);  3)  choosing 
suitable overarching domains of comparison (central system hardware, construction, 
external devices, flexibility, efficiency, diagnostics and 'functional possibilities'); 4) 
calculating  coefficients  (no  exact  information  is  given  but  presumably  for  each 
domain  the  number  of  criteria  in  which  Juku was  shown to  surpass  Korvet  was 
divided by the number in which the reverse was true). As a result it could now be  
shown that  at  best  Korvet  was equal  or  close  to  Juku in  some domains  (central 
system hardware,  construction),  but  up  to  five  times  less  capable  in  other  ones 
(diagnostics,  functionalities).  This  could  be  presented  to  authorities  as  proof  of 
Korvet's inefficiency and limited capabilities.
Another strategy was to request components to produce school computers, but—in 
order  to  deal  with  the  possible  rejection—to  also  include  a  plea  to  consider  the 
production  of  'intellectual  terminals'.  (Jaaksoo  interview).  The  actual  difference 
between the two products was zero, of course. The State Committee for Computing 
and  Informatics,  an  organization  formed  in  1986 to  oversee  the  development  of 
computing  in  the  USSR  (Goodman  et  al.  1988:  195–197),  was  not  that  easily 
convinced,  however.  Having examined Juku's  production request  twice it  advised 
against it on the grounds that it did not correspond to technical requirements set for 
school  computers  (resolution  from  1987.30.06).  'Intellectual  terminals'  were  not 
found to surpass the ones already in production either.
The  Committee's  advice  was  to  stick  to  officially  approved  Korvet  and  UKNTs 
computers. The trouble was that such recommendations tended to refer to a parallel 
reality.  Because  the  basic  assumption  of  Estonians  in  1985 about  the  continuing 
shortage of school computers despite official promises had proved to be correct: the 
supply  was  nowhere  near  the  desired  quantities.  Take  the  comment  of  Gennady 
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Iagodin,  chair  of  the  State  Committee  on  National  Education,  about  the  overall 
situation in the USSR in 1988: “We were supposed to receive more than 30,000 UK-
NTs machines. We received 2,500. We should have received 34,000 'Korvets', but we  
actually received 3,000” (cited in Kerr 1991: 238).
Meanwhile,  the  IoC  continued  to  make  minor  improvements.  Local  networking, 
floppy disk drive and printer interfaces were developed. A mouse, which allegedly no 
other Soviet PC had at the time (Hanson 1987.22.04), was constructed. Additional 
software  was  adapted  or  created.  An  industrial  version,  Juss,  was  also  designed 
which had a  built-in  floppy drive  and colour  TV display.  It  was  used in  several 
automatic control systems.
As 1986 turned into 1987 and 1987 into 1988, linkages between the IoC, Estron and 
RET started to weaken. Estron, initially motivated by technical interest and a touch 
of patriotism,  produced an experimental batch of at  least  100 Jukus (Tüksammel 
interview).  The  enterprise  discovered  then  that  the  design  was  'raw':  contrary  to 
expectations computers needed constant tinkering and set-up by engineers.  Juku's 
design  seemed  too  complicated  and  too  demanding  to  Estron.  Matters  were  not 
helped by somewhat tense relations between the IoC and Estron, since they had been 
competing for some contracts in the past. Some employees of Estron had previously 
worked for the IoC and left bearing a grudge. Also the project had a distinctive IoC 
flavour and Estron did not like to play a secondary role. To prepare the production in 
planned amounts additional investments would have been needed. But Estron was 
already doing  quite  well  with  other  projects  including  work  for  the  high-profile 
Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Kala interview). So the 
enterprise decided to quit.
RET  had  been  convinced  to  participate  in  the  project  by  the  regional  Central 
Committee  of  the  Party.22 After  analysing  Juku's  technical  specifications  and 
22 The details of events concerning RET and Boris Tamm come from an interview with the manager 
of  RET's Special  Construction Bureau Toom Pungas.  By the time I started the research Boris 
Tamm had died, so some of the information could not be verified from the primary source. I have 
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considering the time needed for implementation and production, it remained quite 
sceptical. RET people had found out, however, that at Moscow State University a 
laboratory led by Evgeny Velikhov, a renowned scientist and vice president of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, had worked out an experimental design called K-101 (a 
16-bit  computer  with  colour  display).  RET  deemed  this  design  promising  and 
proposed to the IoC and Boris Tamm that Juku be redesigned on the basis of K-101, 
while implementing the production in parallel. The enterprise believed that it  was 
capable of fulfilling its part in 1 year. Despite two visits to Velikhov's lab, Tamm did 
not like the idea and continued to support Juku as in its original form, allegedly 
hoping for quick success and an accompanying enhancement of the IoC's reputation. 
However, from the IoC's point of view there was a real danger that Juku would fall 
into a cycle of endless redesign while still failing to get produced (Jelle interview). 
Facing  this  trade-off  it  went  for  a  short-term  option.  But  RET  was  already 
manufacturing  radio  receivers  as  consumer  goods  and  when  its  proposition  was 
rejected  it  felt  that  it  lacked  a  proper  incentive  to  produce  a  computer  that  it 
perceived as outdated anyway. The production union dropped out.23
So the situation that  had started out  highly promising suddenly looked very frail 
indeed.  Tamm,  forced  to  change  gear,  contacted  Baltijets,  a  factory  in  Narva. 
Similarly to RET, Baltijets was a large centrally controlled enterprise with over 5,000 
workers producing various electronic devices (e.g. dosimeters). It belonged to the 
Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which oversaw the nuclear industry and was 
thereby also part of the military–industrial complex. As part of an 'elite' ministry it 
had also very good production facilities compared with RET (Jelle interview). Its 
interest in Juku production can be explained by the conjunction of various factors.
First,  to alleviate scarcity,  factories were required to manufacture some consumer 
also failed to find any documentary evidence related to the episode.
23 However, Pungas went to prepare a business plan for the production of 20,000 16-bit computers a 
year in cooperation with Taiwan. Having received preliminary approval from authorities, he also 
held  negotiations  with a  potential  partner  from the  Taiwan side.  However,  he  was  eventually 
forced to resign and with the disintegration of the Soviet Union the project failed to be realized 
(Pungas interview).
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goods in addition to their main output. A plant could show initiative in this area so 
long as it  somehow corresponded to general  central  guidelines.  However,  such a 
production was of secondary importance to the factories. Therefore, following the 
principle of least effort, often the most convenient way to meet this requirement was 
to combine the plant's current stock and production infrastructure in a manner that 
would  not  require  any major  preparations.  This  often  led  to  curious  results:  for 
example, the Pöögelmann factory in Tallinn was mainly producing semiconductor 
devices. Its consumer goods, however, included decorative belts, metal chains for 
toilet flush tanks, generators for electric fences, battery wire kits etc. (Jõgi 2003: 43–
44). At that time Baltijets was interested in the production of consumer goods of 
some kind, although computers were not a simple and convenient product. However, 
the potential use as an 'intellectual terminal' to aid the factory's overall production 
processes  might  have  been  a  decisive  factor  in  offsetting  these  considerations 
(Haavel, Tõnspoeg interviews).
Third,  the  overall  political  situation  must  be  taken into  account:  beginning from 
environmental protests in 1986 in Latvia (Kasekamp 2010: 161), the opposition to 
Soviet authorities had gradually become more vocal in all Baltic states, while the 
central authorities were less and less willing to intervene militarily. A telling sign is 
Gorbachev's  replacement  of  Karl  Vaino,  the  first  secretary  of  the  Estonian 
Communist  Party,  who  had  requested  that  tanks  be  brought  onto  the  streets  to 
suppress the demonstrations (ibid.: 163). Over a few years then there was a gradual 
move  from  demands  for  increased  autonomy  towards  independence.  In  these 
conditions, military orders from Moscow started to diminish—no new orders were 
placed and existing ones were gradually curtailed (Pungas interview)—which in turn 
might explain the increased willingness of large factories to undertake new projects.
A high-level  meeting  between  Tamm,  Bruno  Saul  and  the  minister  of  Medium 
Machine Building followed. Relabelled as 'intellectual terminals for real-time system 
E5104', the production of these machines (with a possible use for school computing) 
was agreed upon: 200 in 1988 and 1,000 in 1989 (meeting protocol from 1987). This 
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agreement was followed by Saul's letter to the deputy chairman of the USSR Council 
of Ministers (1988.06). The letter stressed the general scarcity of computers: whereas 
Estonia's need for microcomputers was claimed to be 5,000, the number actually 
allocated in 1988 was 200.
This time the project was approved. It even turned out to be possible to equip Jukus 
with  Bulgarian  floppy disk drives,  ten  floppy disks  and Epson printers  (Jürisson 
interview,  Levi  1990.09.01).  Being  mainly  research-oriented,  the  IoC  had  little 
knowledge of how to prepare technical documentation for mass production. Thus it 
hired a person from RET who started working on this task in August 1988. In effect,  
this  meant  adapting  the  prototype  both  to  all-union  standards  (GOST)  and  to 
Baltijets's manufacturing equipment. The drawings produced were then used by the 
factory to set-up the production to be able to adhere to the details specified in the 
documentation with required precision. If certain technical requirements could not be 
fulfilled,  additional  minor  modifications  needed  to  be  made  in  the  original 
documentation. SCBCT also agreed to prepare automated set-up and testing systems 
(Jelle, Haavel interviews). All this took time, so it was 1989 by the time Baltijets was 
eventually ready. 4 years had passed since the prototype design and by this point 
Juku was outdated even by Soviet standards, not to mention Western ones.
But  the  education  sector  had  waited  long  enough.  To  some  extent  the  lack  of 
computers  had  been  alleviated  by  computer  classes  at  some  secondary  schools, 
learning  centres  and  universities.  These  were  serving  many schools  at  once  and 
allowed  pupils  to  get  at  least  a  glimpse  of  hands-on  computing,  albeit  on  very 
different models (depending on what one or another organization had managed to 
acquire). Some pilot group schools had also received experimental Jukus. But most 
informatics teaching was theoretical: students wrote programs on paper and these 
were then assessed by teachers. Despite the initial wide vision, the actual teaching 
practice concentrated heavily on programming (Kivimäe, Ruut,  Tõnso interviews) 
and the shift in focus to user applications was only gradual. It is sensible to assume 
that both the general lack of computers and diversity of those that were available had 
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crucial roles here. So if there was a choice between getting by with a handful of 
computers in the hope that many better ones would be available at some point in the 
future (and the issue with such promises has to be remembered here) and using large 
numbers of outdated machines in the short term, the latter option was preferred.
2,500 Jukus were produced for schools (the total quantity produced is unknown), of 
which  2,000  were  produced  between  1989  and  1991  (Jürisson  1995).  Schools 
requested computers from the Ministry of Education, who then made selections from 
among the applicants. Usually a set of ten computers was allocated to the successful 
applicant. Not all computers made it to the schools, however, since the supply was 
filtered  by  regional  education  departments.  Hence  some  computers  could  be 
officially listed as having been sent to schools when they were in fact kept by local 
officials (Ruut interview). However, there is no exact information about the extent of 
this practice.24
There were serious hardware issues. 300 Jukus stopped working within the first year 
and could not be repaired owing to the lack of  spare parts.  At least  50% of the 
computers needed repair every year (Jürisson 1995). Bulgarian floppy disk drives 
often broke down and disks themselves were faulty. The printers on the other hand 
lasted for years and were even sold to other organizations after the Jukus themselves 
ceased to be used (Jürisson interview). Despite the initial reliability requirement the 
actual user experience of Juku was riddled with difficulties.
The problem was further accentuated by the repair process. Although formally Jukus 
had a warranty and enterprises other than Baltijets offered repair services, in practice 
the computers often had to be sent to another town. A long wait, possibly lasting up 
to several months, then ensued. At least partly this situation was caused by the lack 
of  spare  parts.  To  sidestep  this  problem,  self-repair  was  a  frequent  solution. 
24 In general theft and fraud were common in Soviet system, however. An interviewee from Tallinn 
Pedagogical Institute brought an anecdotal example of his own. When two shipments were mixed 
up—a university received a thermal  printer  meant  for  another  organization, whereas  the other 
organization received a floppy disk drive meant for the university—the other organization refused 
to switch them back and had to be bribed to be persuaded to do so (Tõnso interview).
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Sometimes various parts of different non-working machines could be combined into 
one properly functioning PC. Alas,  not every problem could be solved in such a 
manner and not every school had tinkerers with enough skill, in which case delays 
were unavoidable.
It is difficult to say from where the problem with software originated. Whether it had 
something to do with Juku being largely a self-financed side-project  for SCBCT, 
Baltijets's lack of experience with computer production,  communication problems 
between the two (the SCBCT group was mostly Estonian while Baltijets's workers 
were Russian) (Haavel, Jelle interviews), or user inexperience—software issues were 
numerous. Operating system could be read into the memory only from drive A. If 
this drive failed (and as noted above, the Bulgarian drives often did), drive B was 
also useless. The original WordStar software package included other programs (e.g. 
MailMerge)  but  only  WordStar  itself  was  adapted  for  Juku.  Therefore  some 
commands which also needed other, non-adapted programs, crashed the computer. 
So did using arrow keys in WordStar.25 Since the @ key was replaced with one of the 
vowels from Estonian alphabet, users could not insert any commands in dBase II 
beginning with @. Character code tables were badly synchronized: occasionally a 
keystroke,  displayed  symbol  and  print-out  might  have  differed  from each  other. 
There were two versions of BASIC language, one in ROM and one on floppy disk: 
the first had commands for graphics but the result could not be saved while reverse 
was the case for the other version (e-mail discussion between Tõnso & Toom 2000, 
Tõnso interview). In yet another twist of irony it appeared then that Juku was best 
suited not for user applications but for programming: the limitations of hardware and 
software,  so  troubling  for  lay  users,  created  challenging  obstacles  for  software 
writers.
The  Republican  Supplementary  Training  Institute  of  Teachers  received  feedback 
about such difficulties, but never sent it on to Baltijets. It would simply not have had 
25 There  was  a  somewhat  cruel  joke  on  the  matter:  Juku  does  not  have  real  WordStar,  only  a  
WordStar emulator. But that is okay, because Juku itself is not a real school computer, only an 
emulator of one.
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any effect. The factory had secured certain resources for a certain period of time. 
Making any substantial changes would have meant running through the bureaucracy 
gauntlet again—and again with no guaranteed success. Likely there was also a lack 
of incentive to do so because the users did not have much choice in the first place. 
Also,  the overall  relations  between the  central  authorities  and Estonia  only grew 
worse, to the extent that finally the supply chain was completely cut off, severely 
limiting any possibility for modifications even if the plant had wished to make them. 
The net result was a total absence of influence of user experience on production. 
After initial negotiations and choices had been made, the move from mass production 
to use was unidirectional.
In  the  meantime,  political  struggles  within  Estonia  and between Estonia  and the 
Soviet  Union  had  culminated  with  Estonia's  declaration  of  independence  on  the 
August 20th, 1991. A rapid shift from a planned economy to a market economy and 
from  a  totalitarian  regime  to  democracy  followed,  involving  major  changes  in 
virtually every aspect of life. Market liberalization considerably diminished limits to 
the flow of goods. With the currency reform in 1992 it now became possible to buy 
as many Western computers as desired for steadily decreasing prices—but for some 
time  these  machines  were  far  more  expensive  than  Soviet  electronics  so  no 
immediate, large-scale replacement could be undertaken. Nevertheless the attitude of 
the specialists in the education sector started turning against Juku. Compared with 
Western computers Jukus had many features perceived as obvious disadvantages: 1) 
low reliability; 2) low speed—users could not dream of using complex graphics or 
multimedia packages;  3) lack of compatibility—MS-DOS and then Windows had 
become new standards for 16-bit computers. Similar to CP/M compatibility for 8-bit 
computers, IBM compatibility now provided access to a vast collection of ready-to-
use (educational) software; 4) copyright issues—prior Soviet 'adaptation' of software 
had actually been a breach of copyright in Western terms. The continued use of such 
programs  in  schools  would  have  created  legal  problems  in  the  future  (Jürisson 
interview, Jürisson 1995).
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But halting production was not easy. Although in 1992 a group of experts consulting 
the Ministry of Education proposed to buy IBM PC-compatible computers (Jürisson 
1995), 500 more Jukus were ordered from Baltijets instead. There was speculation 
(Tõnso  interview)  that  the  main  reason  for  this  neglect  was  related  to  national 
security.  With  the  sudden  disappearance  of  Eastern  orders,  large  factories  were 
struggling: stocks were plenty but contracts few. Producing Jukus would have kept 
Baltijets busy at least for a little while, and so delayed the discontent of thousands of 
employees.  At  a  time  when  relations  with  Russia  were  very  tense  and  Russian 
military forces had still  not withdrawn from Estonia,  avoiding conflict in an area 
adjacent to Russia and populated mostly by ethnic Russians would have been crucial. 
This explanation is supported by the fact that movements called International Fronts, 
who had been opposing reforms and the move towards independence in all Baltic 
states, had been strongly supported by members of the military–industrial complex. It 
is also true that the director of Baltijets was one of the key figures in a 1993 crisis in 
which  a  group  of  high-ranked  Russians  attempted  to  initiate  a  referendum  for 
establishing the national-territorial autonomy of Narva (Elling 2001). However, this 
explanation  has  been  disputed  on  the  grounds  that,  for  such a  large  factory,  the 
production of 500 computers would not have taken much time (Kala interview).
SCBCT  realized  that  the  delay  had  been  too  long  and  that  IBM-compatible 
computers had become a new standard. That is why it lost interest in Baltijets as soon 
as it had fulfilled its part of the deal. But new opportunities had opened up in the 
midst  of  reforms.  In  1989  SCBCT  was  allowed  to  establish  a  joint  venture, 
EKTACO,  with  Finnish  partners.  One  of  the  first  tasks  was  to  provide  Finnish 
schools with computers based on Taiwanese components, but assembled and tested in 
Estonia. This inspired SCBCT to develop a PC-version of Juku based on the Intel 
80286 processor. Using connections from the school contract, the components would 
have been imported from Taiwan while  mechanical  works,  assembly,  testing and 
marketing was to be arranged in the USSR. The prototype was built in 1990 (Jelle 
interview) but the disintegration of the USSR disrupted the supply chain of local 
factories, and potential working relations with Russian factories, to the extent that 
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cooperation  and  mass  production  became  impossible.  The  project  was  soon 
discontinued.
Despite all the delays, the controversies over the meaningfulness of the project and 
the problems with the end product, it did create a general availability of computers in 
schools at a time when PCs were considered a luxury item. The extent of the effort is 
best  understood by comparison. Based on the available data,  table 3.4 presents a 
comparison of school computerization in Estonia in 1992 and Lithuania in 1994.
Table 3.4. School computerization in Estonia and Lithuania (Ališauskas 1995, 
Jürisson 1995, Eesti Statistikaamet)





Various other computers 262 533
Total 3,326 3,333
Number of students in schools 47,200 (1995) 60,113
Students per computer 14.2 18.0
Students per computer (excluding 
data for vocational schools)
13.0 18.0
It is notable that the Lithuanian data only includes schools where informatics was 
mandatory and excludes vocational schools, whereas Estonian data is an aggregate 
for  all  schools  (of  which  36,800  were  in  upper-secondary  and  10,400  were  in 
vocational schools). It can be seen that, even so, the ratio of students to computers 
was lower in Estonian schools. If the students in vocational schools are excluded 
along with data for UKNTs and BK-0010Š computers (as these were mostly used in 
vocational or Russian-speaking schools) the ratio becomes even smaller. Moreover, 
the table does not show that IBM-compatible PCs started to be supported to schools 
in greater numbers from about 1991–1992 in Lithuania (Ališauskas interview). By 
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1995  Estonian  schools  had  also  obtained  approximately  900  IBM-compatible 
computers (Jürisson 1995), roughly equalling the number in Lithuania.
Therefore it can be claimed that, although late, Jukus did eventually enable Estonia 
to gain a head start in mass school computerization, provided early access and a more 
standardized study environment (the table shows that in 1992 Jukus made up roughly 
75% of  computers  in  schools).  The  number  of  students  who  had  got  their  first 
computing experience with Juku was in the tens of thousands—much more, much 
earlier and more frequently than would have been possible otherwise. Even with the 
influx of Western computers, Jukus could be shifted to secondary and primary school 
level and then gradually phased out, a process largely completed by the second half 
of the 1990s. But it was an individual who was mostly critical of the endeavour who 
perhaps managed to capture best the additional dimension of Juku project:  “If the  
goal was not so much that children could compute but to show that Estonians can get  
something done, then it was [a] right [move]” (Kala interview).
3.1.2 Tartu
This  story  starts  with  the  envy  of  Anne  Villems,  working  in  a  programming 
department of the Faculty of Mathematics of the Tartu State University. She envied 
her husband, a molecular biologist, who had just managed to obtain foreign currency 
to buy lab equipment.  Villems decided that her department needed good Western 
computers and sought to use the approaching 350th anniversary of the university in 
1982 as a pretext. Although the actual chances of getting the currency were slim, 
university authorities generally did not block such initiatives and were willing to sign 
the documents—provided that they had already been prepared. Villems chose to go 
for  Apple  II,  a  legendary  PC  introduced  in  USA in  1977,  which  united  user-
friendliness  with  flexibility  of  use  (Ceruzzi  2003:  266).  There  were  now  two 
important  questions:  will  the  Motorola  6502  processor  be  embargoed?  Will  the 
application be approved?
The  processor  was  not  embargoed  and,  to  much  dismay,  the  application  was 
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approved indeed. Thus the university received four brand new Apple II computers to 
enable a completely novel approach to programming. Instead of writing the program 
on paper, submitting it to the university's computing centre, waiting for the output for 
a week and starting all over again if the code had been buggy, here was a small,  
powerful and elegant device allowing direct interaction. “It was a real cultural shock  
for a Soviet citizen to see a machine like this” was how one of the members of Tartu 
working group described the feeling (Toom interview).
At roughly the same time, an engineer Leo-Henn Humal had advised the university's 
vice  rector  for  science  to  establish  a  research  unit  related  to  microprocessor 
technologies.  Although  no  immediate  action  followed,  a  decisive  push  in  that 
direction  came  from  an  all-union  directive  issued  around  1981.  This  document 
demanded that universities should start developing microprocessor technologies. The 
conjunction of central command and local interest resulted in the establishment of a 
microprocessor  sector  as  part  of  the  Laboratory  of  Electroluminescence  and 
Semiconductors (LES) in spring 1982.
At  first  it  was  not  too  clear  what  was  to  be  developed.  Gradually  the  idea  of  
constructing a PC emerged (Humal interview). This project seemed both technically 
interesting and potentially useful—Humal imagined that it could be used for teaching 
in the university (mainly for programming) and for automating scientific experiments 
(Vajakas 1985.15.10).  Not everyone shared this  vision,  however:  Humal refers to 
'authoritative figures', including one from the IoC, who claimed that such an effort 
would be unnecessary because industrially produced PCs would be available in great 
numbers soon. Seeing the current difficulties with obtaining Soviet (not to mention 
foreign) PCs, Humal himself was less optimistic.
Newly arrived Apples provided an immediate inspiration.26 The trouble was that the 
USSR  was  not  producing  MOS  6502  microprocessor  copies.  In  fact,  the  only 
26 A telling indication  comes  from the  person  involved  with  the  production  of  the  Tartu  PC in  
Palivere (see below), who noted during the interview that Tartu resembled an Apple computer 
without knowing at that time that it had actually been inspired by one (Vilgats interview).
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reasonably up-to-date processor one could hope to acquire was an Intel 8080 copy. 
Since Humal wanted to  avoid getting tied up with official  (read:  slow, rigid and 
uncertain) supply channels, he aimed to go for a cheap, simple but robust design: an 
expandable one-board-computer made from components that with a bit of luck even 
a hobbyist could buy from a radio electronics shop.
These goals were not completely compatible, however: in order to be made from 
accessible components, the design of the PCB had to become more complicated. It 
also meant that the basic design could not include much memory and could have no 
printer, floppy disk drive or monitor (Vajakas 1985.15.10). In fact, the first version 
used eight 0.5 KB ROM chips. A tape recorder was used as the external memory 
device.  In the hope that  respective components would be available  in  the future, 
floppy drive and printer interfaces were developed when the head of LES, Arved-
Aleksandr  Tammik,  managed  to  get  some  Soviet  electronic  typewriters.  All  but 
German (Robotron) floppy drives and printers were discarded. Black-and-white TVs 
were used as displays. An experimental interface for colour TV was also built, but 
the picture quality turned out to be so low that no further attempts were made (Toom 
interview).
The basis of the design had become clear by the beginning of 1984. The prototype 
was working by autumn that year (LES's summary from 1984, Tenner 1985.26.12). 
Whereas Apple computers had been used for designing the prototype, the latter in 
turn could now be used to design a second, slightly enhanced version. The use of 
better,  2  KB EPROM chips  allowed integration of  the  BASIC language into  the 
ROM. When the team managed to get a copy of CP/M from one of the employees of 
the  IoC (Toom interview) and make it  run on Tartu,  a  whole  world  of  software 
applications  opened up.  Self-developed applications  included a  program for  PCB 
tracing (used for designing the second version and controllers for peripherals), text 
editor TE for entering and editing programs, CP/M's adaptation to using the hard 
drives of EC mainframes (7/29 MB versions seemed like a vast universe compared 
with 64 KB RAM), local area network software so that all the students could share 
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one hard drive in a computer  class,  and some games.  By the end of 1985, eight 
computers were in operation (Tenner 1985.26.12).
In  parallel  with  development,  Tammik  had  used  his  connections  to  initiate 
discussions  about  possible  serial  production.  In  1982  or  1983  Estron  expressed 
interest  in cooperation with Tartu. Estron showed Humal some Western examples 
(likely Sinclair ZX Spectrums) and claimed that such simple computers would sell 
well. Tartu seemed interesting enough for Estron to design a power supply unit and a 
preliminary version  of  the  case.  The project  was  eventually  abandoned,  possibly 
because Estron might have found the case too difficult to produce after all (Toom 
interview). A military factory in Tartu known for its production of black boxes for 
airplanes (Högselius 2005: 98) was also contacted, but it turned out that the plant was 
unable to fit the project into their production plan (Humal interview). Finally, there 
were some preliminary talks with Baltijets, but the enterprise, referring to very busy 
schedule of its construction department, was only willing to consider production if it 
was provided with full construction documentation. The irony is that Baltijets had an 
actual  department  for  preparing  such  drawings  (around  100  people  according  to 
Humal's estimate), whereas fewer than ten people in total were working on Tartu. Of 
those only one had any knowledge about preparing technical documentation. Thus 
LES simply could not satisfy Baltijets's requirements and therefore no cooperation 
followed.
The  campaign  for  informatics  teaching  in  schools  led  Humal  to  think  about 
expanding Tartu's domain of application. A newspaper article from 1985 mentions 
that the university had turned to 'respective authorities' to arrange a meeting between 
all organizations that had been developing microcomputers (Vajakas 1985.15.10). As 
noted above, by that time the IoC had already taken up the idea itself and started 
intense work on the prototype of Juku. Humal and Malsub (leader of the Entel group) 
both  witnessed  Juku's  demonstration  in  November.  Although  Tartu  was  still 
presented as a school computer it had become clear that the IoC had taken a decisive 
lead. That is why participation in a school computer contest (Tartu gained the 2nd 
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place) was seen as a possible opportunity for a demonstration rather than as a serious 
competition between equal participants. In fact, Humal went as far as to state that “if  
Juku had been developed earlier we would have gladly used it. We would not have  
gone through all this trouble.”
But now the computer existed.  And despite being locked out  of the local  school 
computer competition, other possible uses could still be found. Again it was likely 
through Tammik's  connections that contact with Schetmash (Счётмаш) factory in 
Kursk,  Russia,  was  established  either  in  1985  or  1986  (Humal  interview).  The 
factory had been producing the Iskra (Искра) line of computers and was searching 
for a suitable prototype to be manufactured as a consumer good. Tartu PC seemed 
promising. The plant agreed to construct the power supply unit and case by itself, 
prepare a full technical documentation (LES could only offer some drawings of the 
electronics).  The Tartu  group was to  help  with  the  preparation  of  production.  In 
return the university would get 200 Tartus which it had otherwise planned to produce 
itself.
Familiar  time-consuming  activities  followed—preparing  the  documentation, 
preparing and testing the machinery, making necessary corrections, requesting and 
waiting for components, learning to test the products properly etc. Several setbacks 
occurred: in one episode Humal and another member of the working group had to 
travel  to  Kursk  in  1987  to  find  out  why  none  of  the  computers  that  had  been 
produced so far worked. Soon it appeared that the factory had simply not tested all 
the functions of some chips (which tended to happen occasionally when new chips 
became available). Alas, Tartu's design happened to employ one of these functions. 
Although  in  this  case  the  problem  could  be  solved  by  simple  replacement,  the 
accumulation  of  factors  like  this  contributed  to  the  delay  of  mass  production. 
Production finally started in 1989 and lasted at least until 1991. The name of the 
model was Iskra 1080 'Tartu' (Искра 1080 'Тарту'). On one hand it is ironic that the 
number of Iskra 1080s produced very likely exceeded the number of Jukus. On the 
other hand, these computers were centrally allocated meaning that only a fraction of 
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the total would be actually sold in Soviet Estonia.
Similar  to  the  story  of  Juku,  the  university's  hopes  for  quick  provision  of  the 
necessary amount  of  computing  equipment  had been in  vain.  It  had  managed to 
acquire a classroom set of Yamaha computers in 1986, but only on the condition of 
having to provide time for school informatics lessons (Villems interview). Jukus, a 
possible alternative choice, were not coming either. Likely for these reasons, Humal 
started  looking  for  alternative  options.  In  1988  he  established  a  contact  with  a 
subsidiary production enterprise of the Palivere Factory of Construction Materials.
The factory itself was part of a cooperative called Estonian Kolkhoz Construction. 
Although the cooperative was only partly tied to official supply channels and related 
obligations, subsidiary electronics production promised a number of already familiar 
advantages—higher profits,27 higher salaries, a greater degree of creative freedom 
and so on. There were more prosaic reasons too: the wives of men working for the 
construction materials factory were generally not in paid work. They could be used 
as a cheap labour force for electronics assembly (fully automated production would 
have been far too expensive) (Enok interview). Coincidentally one of the buildings 
on the factory premises had just  been vacated,  and another subsidiary electronics 
producer for Lääne Kalur kolkhoz was doing so well at the time that it was willing to 
outsource some of the work.
Under the leadership of Leo Enok, Palivere's electronics production started in 1977. 
Enok had good connections, especially with the Academy of Sciences, enabling him 
to initiate contracts with many research institutes (in Moscow, Leningrad and also the 
IoC in Tallinn) that were generally searching for someone who would produce their 
prototypes. There were also some contracts with factories, of which RET became 
gradually  more  and  more  prominent.  Palivere's  quality  was  good  enough  for  its 
27 According to estimates by the head of Palivere's electronics production, towards the end of Soviet 
times 350 people in the construction materials factory had a turnover of 2,000,000 roubles, while 
in  electronics  production  there  were  72  people  and  a  turnover  of  3,000,000  roubles  (Enok 
interview).  Although  the  prices  were  fixed,  this  illustrates  the  value  created  from  subsidiary 
activities.
117
contractors  and  therefore  it  expanded  quickly.  In  so  doing  it  needed  to  attract 
additional workers, and was helped in large part by the fact that it could immediately 
offer an apartment to new recruits.28
Despite  having  good working relations  with  the  IoC,  Juku was  never  offered  to 
Palivere: it was just too small for mass production, whether in terms of obtaining 
supplies or the capabilities of manufacturing equipment. The offer from Tartu had 
less  grandeur:  production  of  200 computers  seemed an  ambitious  yet  achievable 
goal. In addition to economic considerations, patriotic ones—pride in producing an 
Estonian-designed school computer—were in play too. Still it  must be mentioned 
that the 'school computer' label could be (and was) used to gain leverage in resource 
acquisition and also that  eventually only one computer  class  was actually set  up 
(Tingas interview).
It is notable but characteristic of the time that Palivere's consent was preceded by no 
market  research:  it  was  believed  that  the  product  could  be  sold  in  any  case. 
Consumers  in  the  Soviet  Union  were  (mostly  correctly)  expected  not  to  know 
anything  about  computers  at  the  time  and  therefore  not  to  have  any  particular 
expectations. If any did exist, the buyer was simply expected to adjust them. The lay 
consumer was mostly facing a zero–one choice—get the available computer or get 
none at  all.  Choice between competing products was usually out of the question, 
especially for novelty items like PCs.
The downside of the flexibility of subsidiary production was exclusion from official 
supply channels. Therefore the success of the enterprise depended a great deal on the 
ingenuity of its suppliers and its network of connections. Palivere employed the latter 
skilfully, conducting a series of barter deals with other members of the construction 
cooperative and customers of its electronics production. Some of the following deals 
were typical. First a certain quantity of the factory's off-plan produce was exchanged 
for  a  few truckloads  of  particle  boards  manufactured  by another  member  of  the 
28 Something very mundane but very important at the same time—usually one had to wait for years 
to get one.
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cooperative.  These materials  were sent to  Zelenograd,  where a previously agreed 
upon number of processors and memory chips were sent back in return. Similar deals 
helped Palivere to acquire TV displays elsewhere. RET promised to supply 10 kg of 
copper  wire  for  transformers  in  exchange  for  an  agreement  according  to  which 
Palivere would work extra shifts on one weekend to supply RET with some required 
products so the plant  could fulfil  its  plan on time. Informal  negotiations through 
personal contacts resulted in 200 tape recorders—half of that year's planned retail 
sales  in  Soviet  Estonia—being  redirected  to  Palivere  (officially  justified  on  the 
grounds  of  the  shortage  of  school  computers).  Materials  for  PCBs  came  from 
Leningrad, but boards themselves were made in Lääne Kalur; polyvinyl chloride for 
keyboards came from RET, metal for the case from Teras factory (Enok interview) 
and so on.
As always, there were various factors affecting the reliability of the computer. PCB 
quality was a general problem, itself dependent on production technology and the 
materials  used.  Three  main  problems  affected  PCBs:  1)  conductive  tracks  were 
severed (in particular, the insufficient metallization of PCB holes created a lot  of 
problems  which  could  be  only  temporarily  solved  by  manual  re-soldering);  2) 
conductive  tracks  were  inappropriately connected  to  each  other,  leading  to  short 
circuits;  and  3)  tracks  came  loose  from  the  board  (Rätsep,  Vilgats  interviews). 
Additionally,  production technology limited the possible  size of PCBs,  making it 
difficult to manufacture large ones of decent quality. Mistakes could also happen in 
the process of manual hole drilling. A Palivere technician recalls that in this case the 
quality  issues  of  Lääne  Kalur's  PCBs  were  especially  serious,  leading  to  the 
instability of the computer (Vilgats interview).
Manual assembly could create further problems. Differences in workers' skills and 
degrees of sloppiness were reflected in the final product. Recurring problems were 
either  poor  soldering  or  too  high  a  temperature  of  the  soldering  torch,  which 
damaged microcircuitry.  After assembly each computer was visually inspected by 
magnifying  glass.  An  experienced  inspector  could  spot  possible  faults  by  the 
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reflection of the area around soldering. But such workers did not have any substantial 
knowledge  about  electronics.  The  final  check  was  conducted  by  a  qualified 
technician,  whose  task  was  to  find  the  faults  missed  in  visual  control,  fix  them 
manually, run additional tests and ensure that the final product would work properly 
(Enok interview).
With Humal's  help,  preparations for production started in 1988. Some difficulties 
with supplies delayed the start of production until 1989 (annual report of Palivere 
factory, 1989). Although the first versions were produced with tape recorders, later 
machines  were  equipped with  Bulgarian  floppy disk drives.  If  so desired  by the 
buyer, the set would also include a printer which was capable of printing special 
characters of Estonian alphabet.
However, what had seemed like a commercially safe bet did not turn out to be so safe 
after  all.  To  begin  with,  such  small-scale  production  proved  to  be  relatively 
expensive (each computer cost the equivalent several months' wages of an average 
worker).  Much  more  serious  macro-problems  were  also  emerging  at  the  time—
falling output, rising shortages, wage inflation, high overall inflation, a large fiscal 
deficit and excessive foreign debt—the disintegration of the USSR had it all (Åslund 
2002: 50). This was happening hard, fast and for most of the people, both suppliers 
and consumers,  unexpectedly.  A telling  tale  comes  from Anne Villems  who,  not 
being sure whether there would be any food in stores in the following year, learned 
how to grow potatoes in 1989—later finding out that every other member of the 
programming  department  had  been  doing  the  same  (Villems  interview).  So  it  is 
reasonable to assume that most potential individual consumers did not have much 
time to worry about whether investing in a PC now or a few years later would be the 
more rational choice. Those who could afford to do so, however, were already getting 
themselves  Western  computers—if  possible  from abroad where  the  selling  prices 
were lower than in the USSR. A warranty check for a computer number 47 exists, 
and it is likely that fewer than 100 were made (Tingas interview). The production 
lasted until 1991 at latest and most were eventually bought by various organizations 
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rather than going to schools (Vilgats interview).
Figure 3.2. Heido Vilgats setting up the Tartu computer produced in Palivere 
(Heido Vilgats's private collection)
It would not be wrong to conclude that Palivere's attempt was simply caught between 
the  cogs  and  wheels  of  the  overall  societal  transition.  The  Eastern  market 
disappeared  virtually  overnight.  RET,  who  had  bought  about  80%  of  Palivere's 
output, got into considerable difficulties and collapsed in 1993. After that it was all 
about  survival:  browsing through existing  inventory and trying  to  come up with 
products—like doorbells—that  someone would be willing to buy. But the story of 
Palivere's  survival  through  the  establishment  of  early  contacts  with  Finnish  and 
Swedish enterprises, while interesting in itself, is not related to the story of the Tartu.
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3.1.3 Entel
The story of Entel (an abbreviation of 'Estonian Intel') goes back to 1971, when the 
republican Ministry of Communications established a Computing Centre (CCMC) in 
Tallinn.  The  opportunity  to  work  with  computers  attracted  Jüri  Malsub,  who 
organized his transfer to the CCMC and began assembling a team of specialists. The 
main task was to perform required computing tasks for the ministry, but in order to 
earn a 40% wage premium additional contracts were sought.
The  CCMC's  ability  to  seek  external  contracts  was  hampered,  however,  by  two 
factors.  The  first  concerned  Malsub's  family  tree:  his  close  relatives  had  been 
fighting for Germany in World War II and later as 'forest brothers' against Soviet rule. 
This made him unreliable in the eyes of Soviet authorities, denying him advancement 
to top positions on the career ladder, foreign travel and access to military institutes 
and plants. The second was related to the nature of the planned economy, wherein the 
division  of  labour  and  prioritization  regarding  the  allocation  of  resources  was 
determined from above. The CCMC was not supposed to be a centre of innovation—
as its workers well knew—and thus it was unreasonable to hope that the central plan 
would cover the desired 'secondary' activities. In the context of scarcity, why should 
a  small,  unknown  organization  with  an  explicitly  defined  purpose  of  merely 
providing computing services be allocated extensive resources when large research 
institutes and factories were waiting in line?
But small-scale projects could still be both professionally challenging and profitable. 
The  supply  issue  was  alleviated  when  the  CCMC  established  contacts  with  an 
Estonian chief engineer working for the well-connected Yerevan Scientific Research 
Institute of Mathematical Machines in Armenia. The CCMC developed a solution for 
setting  up  a  new  version  of  a  computer  called  Nairi  that  the  institute  had  just 
designed but had not managed to finalise and polish. Thereby the CCMC became the 
partner of the institute and started to implement the Nairi project all over the USSR. 
In  so  doing  the  CCMC  gained  additional  connections,  technical  know-how  and 
experience of obtaining various resources.
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This  gradually  built-up  network  became  useful  around  1980  when  the  CCMC's 
interest turned to microcomputers. The first of the reasons was professional: “Now a 
large part of a computer had been put onto a microchip and there was simply an  
interest to study and experiment with it” (Rätsep interview). The second reason was 
more practical: problems with the telephone network in Tallinn, where some lines 
were  overloaded  but  others  were  used  well  under  full  capacity.  Microcomputers 
could be used to gather statistics about the situation.
The story of how the CCMC acquired the first Soviet Intel 8080 analogues perfectly 
illustrates the continuous struggles with everyday Soviet realities.29 For a relatively 
insignificant organization like the CCMC the troubles started with finding out what 
was out there in the first place: information about products, some of them classified, 
was (more readily)  available  to  well-connected,  high-level  organizations  (e.g.  the 
Institute  of  Cybernetics).  Especially  when  it  came  to  newer  (often  classified) 
products, low-level organizations had to rely on their own informal networks. The 
CCMC came  upon  the  rumour  that  the  production  of  8-bit  microprocessors  had 
started in Kiev, Ukraine. Knowing was not enough, however: authority to act was 
also needed. The CCMC had enough experience to know that request letters sent to 
large factories to sell their products that were not backed up by informal authoritative 
support usually went unanswered. This is why Malsub contacted his schoolmate from 
the  Pöögelmann  factory,  who  spoke  to  the  plant's  production  manager.  The 
production  manager  got  the  phone number  of  the  director  of  Kiev  factory.  It  is 
important to note that, by contrast with the CCMC, the Pöögelmann factory and the 
one in Kiev both belonged to Minelektronprom. Thus it was hoped that the informal 
intra-ministerial contact along with the request letter authorized by the director of the 
CCMC would prove sufficient.
Next the CCMC sent a representative to Kiev. However, it turned out that because 
the factory was classified, the public information bureau refused to reveal either its 
29 The entire story comes from Ülo Rätsep, who acted as the CCMC's representative on this 
occasion.
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location or its general phone number. The real trouble was that the director's phone 
number was one for the internal phone. The representative solved the problem by 
talking to a nearby taxi driver who started driving around the city asking other taxi 
drivers wherever they were encountered.  Finally one who knew the location was 
found.
Once in the factory lobby the representative was glad to discover a set of phone 
booths. The bad part was that none of them seemed to work. Not knowing what to 
do, the representative then observed others who stepped in the booths and started 
talking. Closer inspection revealed a message stating that the phones only worked 
when the booth was fully closed (to avoid eavesdropping). Having slammed the door 
shut, the representative managed to contact the director, improvised greetings from 
Pöögelmann's production manager whom he had never met in person, and finally 
received a signature for his letter. The secretary—accompanying the representative 
everywhere  because  it  was  forbidden  to  move  alone  in  such factories  without  a 
special permit—took him to a warehouse where he was promptly given all currently 
available microprocessors. This amounted to four pieces. The trip was considered 
highly successful. Save for the fortunate outcome, trips and arrangements like this 
were entirely ordinary.
To build a prototype, similar problems needed to be solved at every step. Initially 
only trial batches of 8080 microprocessors were produced in the Soviet Union which 
had no clock generators or system controllers to go with them. Substitutes for those 
had to be designed from other elements. There was no information about how to 
program the microprocessor and it was forbidden to bring in foreign literature on the 
matter. But unofficial Soviet typewriter copy of the Intel 8080 manual was full of 
errors and so very unreliable.  Through a person who had studied in Budapest an 
original manual was obtained from Hungary. Memory chips were difficult to get, had 
a small capacity and were slow which, in turn, limited other possibilities, e.g. the 
number of symbols that could be shown on the monitor. Monitors themselves—large, 
expensive, hard to obtain and unreliable—had to be substituted with TVs, with their 
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respective  shortcomings.  There  was  the  familiar  lack  of  floppy  disk  drives  and 
disks.30 PCBs from Lääne Kalur were unstable. Acquiring keys for making keyboards 
was  also  an  endemic  problem  which  the  CCMC  could  not  overcome.  The 
organization  bypassed  this  issue  by  devising  a  sensor  keyboard:  symbols  were 
depicted on one side of the PCB. Each 'key' had a metal contact in the centre leading 
to  a  conductive track on the other  side.  When finger  was placed on the contact,  
change in electrical impedance signalled a keystroke (Rätsep interview).
Technical considerations like this surely affected the design of the computer. But also 
important  was  the  purpose  to  which  Entel  was  to  be  put—solving  various 
technological problems. It was envisioned that the hardware could be reconfigured 
depending on the specific problem to be addressed. Hence the developers decided to 
avoid  a  standard  one-board-computer  solution  (one  motherboard  with  all  basic 
elements of a computer and connections for peripheral devices). Instead a module-
based approach was taken,  wherein the power supply unit  and processor module 
were based in a frame with 10–15 vacant slots. These could be connected to various 
other modules of choice, e.g. memory, monitor and keyboard, but also to a hard drive 
of  an  EC  mainframe,  punched  tape  reader,  video  recorder  or  a  photoplotter,  to 
mention more exotic examples. This solution was also convenient for the division of 
labour, since every group member could always be working on something.
Although this design was flexible it had its fair share of downsides. First of all, each 
module had 44 contacts. With the addition of modules the chances that one of the 
contacts  would  be  faulty increased.  Compared with  one-board  computers,  it  was 
more expensive and labour-intensive to build. One-board computers were also better 
exposed to air, whereas Entel's components were placed tightly next to each other 
(fans  were  not  used  at  the  time).  Owing  to  the  high  degree  of  sensitivity  to 
30 Quality floppy disks were a good bartering item: when Malsub managed to visit Japan in 1987—
legal restrictions had already been relaxed—he used all the money he was allowed to convert (the 
amount  was  officially  fixed)  to  buy  5.25-inch  floppy  disks.  In  order  to  avoid  them  being 
confiscated at Soviet customs he had to hand them out to other members of the tourist group. 
These disks helped the CCMC to obtain a pirated copy of P-Cad from Moscow, a piece of software 
used to aid PCB design.
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fluctuations in temperature of Soviet components, the overall reliability of the PC 
was adversely affected (Rätsep interview).
Work on the  processor  module  started  around 1981,  with  memory solutions  and 
graphics (including colour) to follow soon after.  With the acquisition of a floppy 
drive and disks the prototype was working in 1983 (Malsub interview). As with the 
hardware, obtaining software was not easy and personal contacts had to be used. For 
example, a version of CP/M was received from a worker at the IoC despite explicit 
prohibitions for these workers from distributing the operating system. This fact is 
even more ironic considering that the software itself was pirated from the West.31
Figure 3.3 shows one possible set-up. From left to right the central block consists of 
a power supply unit, processor (1), ROM up to 16 KB (2), RAM up to 64 KB (3),  
CRT1 symbol graphics (4), CRT2 colour monitor (5), tape recorder and keyboard 
interface  (6)  and  vacant  slots.  Also  shown  are  the  keyboard  and  tape  recorder 
themselves, colour TV display, video recorder and video camera. 
In  parallel  with  the  development  of  additional  modules,  first  applications  started 
from  1983  onwards.  Monitoring  the  telephone  network  indeed  yielded  useful 
statistics,  and  one  system  was  developed  for  the  Lithuanian  police  to  scan 
fingerprints. The CCMC employees themselves were interested in receiving teletext 
from Finland—as Finnish  TV could  be  seen  on the  northern  coast  of  Estonia  it 
provided a window to the free world, making TV schedules themselves highly sought 
after items. A video computer system was developed for Tallinn Pedagogical Institute 
which used Entel to track and analyse the movements of skiers and swimmers. It was 
because  of  the  recommendation  of  an  employee  of  this  institute  that  Uno Pilvre 
contacted Malsub.
31 One  IoC  employee  recalled  people  in  Moscow scanning  the  original  code  and  programmers' 
comments to replace phrases like 'copyrighted' with 'made in USSR' (Paluoja interview). It is also 
interesting to note that nowhere in the article outlining the basic features of Entel (Malsub 1986) is 
CP/M compatibility explicitly mentioned.
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Figure 3.3. The set-up of Entel as pictured by its developers (Malsub 1986)
The  Estonian  education  sector  at  that  time  was  coordinated  by  three  different 
administrative  domains,  with  vocational  education  coordinated  separately  from 
general  secondary  education.  Pilvre  was  a  computer  enthusiast  working  for  the 
Committee of Vocational Education. He convinced Malsub to think about adapting 
Entel for school needs. While Juku was becoming a computer for secondary schools, 
Pilvre argued that Entel could find its niche in vocational education: as a computer 
designed for managing technological processes it would be suitable for industrial arts 
classes. Pilvre also envisaged its mass production.
Malsub  was  more  interested  in  new  technical  challenges,  however,  and  so  his 
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commitment  to  the whole endeavour was half-hearted.  Only some novel  features 
were developed. A curious one includes a wooden case which was designed because 
an employee  of  the  CCMC was married to  a  department  manager  in  a  furniture 
factory. For promotional purposes Entel also participated in a local school computer 
contest. The developers did not do too much to prepare specifically for the occasion, 
however: in 3 days some introductory programs were written and BASIC language 
integrated  into  the  ROM (Malsub interview).  Its  limited  colour  capabilities  were 
enough to attract attention and raise some controversy, but hardly anything else. Its 
third place was therefore no surprise.  Entel fared better in the VDNH exhibition, 
where it received a silver medal.
Some additional demo programs were developed (e.g. chess, filing instructions for 
industrial arts classes) and demonstrations to teachers carried out. As a result at least 
two  computer  classes  for  vocational  schools  were  created  .  A director  of  the 
Pöögelmann  factory,  Taivo Uffert,  participated  in  one  those  and  was  sufficiently 
impressed to suggest the production of Entel as the plant's consumer good. However, 
being centrally controlled, the mere wishes of the director were not enough. Soon it 
turned out that it would be impossible to allocate a sufficient quantity of memory 
chips  even  for  a  Minelektronprom  factory,  the  exclusive  producer  of  computer 
components (Malsub interview).32 Shortly afterwards Uffert was fired for political 
reasons and replaced by a Russian director.
The connection between Entel and Pöögelmann was thus severed, and the CCMC 
lacked incentives to pursue the matter further. Getting Entel into mass production 
would  have  required  good  connections  and  dedicated  lobbying.  But  the  CCMC 
workers  were earning premium pay from various  contracts  already.  The pressure 
from the management was notably absent—the director of the CCMC only aimed to 
create an environment  “to let the boys play” (Tajur interview). If anything useful 
turned  out,  good,  but  wider  diffusion  of  these  applications  was  never  seriously 
32 As an illustration of the failings of the Soviet supply chain, a teacher from one of the vocational  
schools that had obtained Entels, having learned of the CCMC's troubles, introduced Malsub to a  
black market dealer in Moscow who could sell him 200 required memory chips immediately.
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considered. In fact, no detailed technical documentation that could be sent to large 
factories was ever prepared.
One might also say that it was the variety of constantly shifting interests that limited 
the CCMC's commitment to PCs. For example, by 1985 one employee of the CCMC 
had designed his own version of a school computer based on the Zilog processor. But 
Malsub  found  Zilog  technologically  outdated,  discarded  the  project  and  no  full 
prototype was ever built. The combination of technically interesting and profitable 
challenges meant that the CCMC's interest in computing disappeared as new avenues 
opened up. When reforms allowed extension of private initiative to many economic 
activities  hitherto  state-controlled,  the  CCMC  workers  established  a  cooperative 
called  Viko  in  1987  and  started  producing  satellite  receivers.  There  was  a  brief 
attempt to cooperate with an enterprise in Leningrad to design a PC based on the 
8086 microprocessor, but it was abandoned. Entels themselves continued to be made 
by (decreasing) demand roughly until the end of the 1980s, with the total quantity 
produced being around 50 (Malsub interview). New Soviet and Western computers 
were already coming and the CCMC itself had moved on.
3.2 Lithuania
3.2.1 Developments in the education sector and BK-0010Š
As  in  Estonia,  the  history  of  personal  computers  in  Lithuania  intersects  with 
developments  in  the  education  sector.  What  is  notably different,  however,  is  the 
presence of a computer industry: Sigma production union (various factories and later 
a  research  institute)  which  belonged  to  the  Ministry  of  Instrument  Making, 
Automation Equipment, and Control Systems (Minpribor, see section 3.2.3), Venta 
institute  and  Nuklonas  plant  in  Šiauliai  which  belonged  to  Minelektronprom. 
Nuklonas in particular became involved in the serial production of school computers. 
To understand why and how, the situation at the local level needs to be discussed.
Informatics teaching in Lithuania generally began in autumn 1986. Many problems 
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facing  the  education  sector  were  similar  to  those  in  Estonia:  lack  of  informatics 
teachers, lack of courses for them, lack of materials, lack of instructors, conservative 
attitudes and even scepticism among some who perceived it as yet another fad soon 
to  be  forgotten.  And  of  course,  only  a  handful  of  computers  with  virtually  no 
educational software (Dagienė 2006: 15, 19). The first teachers only passed a 2-week 
summer course (Dagys 1995), so the actual teaching practice must have involved a 
great deal of on-the-job learning.
At  that  time  one  could  speak  of  three  main  academic  centres  involved  with 
informatics  education.  Each  had  a  slightly  different  outlook  on  school 
computerization.  Probably  the  most  prominent  in  terms  of  tradition  and  lasting 
legacy was the Institute of Mathematics and Cybernetics of Vilnius State University 
(IoMC). Led by Gintautas Grigas, the institute had established a School of Young 
Programmers  as  early  as  1981.  The  call  to  start  school  computerization  and  an 
accompanying  stress  on  algorithms  and  programming  landed  on fertile  soil.  The 
IoMC's vision was to develop 'precise thinking', to enhance the skills of problem-
solving  by  dividing  overall  problems  into  various  sub-problems,  to  read  and 
comprehend  algorithms,  and  realize  them in  actual  programs  (Grigas  interview). 
Computer  access  was  scarce  at  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  but  a  lot  of  these 
exercises could be performed without a computer anyway. When it came to school 
computerization, the IoMC favoured supplying schools with Western PCs if possible
—at first Yamaha computers which the USSR was negotiating to buy at the time. 
When this  failed,  the  IoMC oriented  itself  towards  IBM-compatibles,  which  had 
started to gain popularity in the West. The combination of these two visions about 
teaching and 'computers of the future' accounts for the IoMC's overall preference to 
have relatively few computers of higher quality rather than the other way round. The 
IoMC  was  also  notable  for  its  dedication  to  the  Lithuanization  of  computing 
(software, keyboard standard and vocabulary).
The second centre, the Computing Centre of Vilnius State University (CCVSU) had 
struck up an agreement with the Exciton (Экситон) plant in Pavlovsky Posad in 
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1984. The plant was the first producer of BK-0010 computers, Minelektronprom's 
proposed models of school/home computers (see below). The CCVSU developed a 
version of BASIC33 which was embedded into BK-0010's  ROM and by so doing 
gained an early and thorough knowledge of the computer and its capabilities. This 
made the CCVSU perhaps a bit more sympathetic towards the computer than would 
otherwise  have  been  the  case  (Ališauskas  interview).  While  the  IoMC  and  the 
CCVSU  were  both  more  software-oriented,  the  third  organization,  Kaunas 
Polytechnical Institute (KPI), was more interested in hardware (see section 3.2.2). 
At the time computers were a novelty to most people,  including members of the 
Communist Party apparatus. Hence it is very likely that officials might initially not 
have had any particular vision about school computing, but were rather receptive to 
different  proposals  (Zlatkus  interview).  For  example,  in  1985  the  Lithuanian 
Planning Committee approved a computer classroom equipped with 10–15 Vilnelė 
computers34 (1985.19.06), using TVs produced in Šiauliai and Vilma tape recorders, 
as a temporary solution until school computers started to be produced. This decision 
seems to have disappeared without ever being actualized. It can be interpreted as an 
illustration of the willingness of Lithuanian authorities to accept local initiatives in 
conditions of little knowledge about the topic and a lack of machines.
Things changed considerably when Minelektronprom stepped onto the stage. It  is 
unknown whether the initiative came from the local level (Venta institute/Nuklonas 
plant)  or  whether  it  was  centrally  decided  by  Minelektronprom  authorities  in 
Moscow, but a resolution of the Lithuanian Central Committee and the Council of 
Ministers (1986.30.06) approved the production of microcomputer BK-0010Š (BK 
stands for 'home computer', Бытовой Компьютер, and Š for 'school', школьный) in 
Nuklonas  from  1986  to  1990,  throughout  the  12th  five-year  plan.  “It  was  a  
33 Initially offered to the Laboratory of the Problems of  School Informatics in Riga,  Latvia,  but  
rejected by them (Eglājs interview, see also section 3.3.2).
34 Developed in the Semiconductor  Physics  Institute  of  the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences for 
industrial process control. Used Soviet Intel 8080 clone. The team was small, approximately five 
to  six  people.  A software  programmer,  Raimundas  Malaiška,  recalls  that  maybe  about  ten 
computers were built in total, one of which was used in Panevežys TV factory. Little else is known 
about Vilnelė.
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possibility for Lithuania too—to produce computers for the whole USSR. This had an  
influence [on] the later decisions on delivering BK to Lithuanian schools more than  
opinions  of  experts”  (Ališauskas  interview).  That  is  to  say,  neither  the 
aforementioned centres of informatics education nor the schools themselves had any 
formal influence on decision-making (Ališauskas, Grigas interviews). The game was 
now being played at the higher level—but of course such participation could also 
have  meant  that  more  computers  would  eventually  be  available  for  Lithuanian 
schools.
It is uncertain whether the mobilization of local actors against this decision could 
have made any difference at this point. What is notable instead is the lack of such 
action before and after the fact. Regarding schools this can be largely attributed to 
insufficient knowledge. When asked about whether teachers had any opinions about 
the BK-0010Š before it came to schools, one answered: “In the beginning there was 
only information that there will be some kind of computer” (Dinda interview). When 
the actual supply started later on, information was obtained by seminars held by the 
CCVSU. So it is sensible to presume that  at this point schools themselves had no 
particularly specific  preferences except  for favouring the presence of a  computer 
over the absence of one.
But the better-informed educational centres were also divided in opinion. KPI was 
advocating Santaka, its own Sinclair ZX Spectrum clone (see section 3.2.2). But for 
the CCVSU “to buy Santaka or something similar but cheap was almost the same as  
to buy one old-fashioned computer instead of another old-fashioned computer. It was  
already clear that the future was IBM-compatible”  (Ališauskas interview). Likely 
this view was also shared by the IoMC, at least to some extent. But as long as IBM-
compatibles could not be obtained (no Soviet clones for civil uses and no possibility 
for large-scale import) while the CCVSU already had practical experience with BK 
computers,  then  accepting  the  central  decision  could  have  been  perceived  as  a 
satisfactory short-term pragmatic solution to the scarcity problem. So the relevant 
questions came to be about what could be achieved with the resources at hand, how 
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much effort should be put into such a project and for how long.
One may also wonder why the issues of cultural identity were not so pertinent here as 
in Estonia. An interesting suggestion was made by an interviewee that one reason 
why  local  school  computerization  did  not  become  mobilized  around  a  single 
Lithuanian PC project, why therefore different visions prevailed and why Russian-
designed  computers  were  not  seen  as  threatening  might  be  found  in  Lithuania's 
demographic situation (Ališauskas interview)—by contrast with Estonia and Latvia, 
the proportion of ethnic Lithuanians had remained at around 80% in Soviet time (see 
table 3.2).35
With respect to the computer itself, BK-0010 was a Soviet design running on a 16-bit 
K1801ВМ1 processor,  an  original  Soviet  single-chip  processor  developed on the 
basis of DEC LSI-11 (single-board PDP-11) (Ceruzzi 2003: 244, Malashevich 2008: 
97). The PC had 32 KB ROM and 32 KB RAM, half of which was devoted to video. 
Black  and white  TV was  used  as  a  default  display,  although  with  a  little  bit  of 
soldering a colour TV could be connected (Gurevičius 1988). A tape recorder acted 
as an external memory device. Initially BK-0010 had a membrane keyboard (figure 
3.4) which was later replaced with a traditional one. Its cost was 600 roubles, or 650 
including  the  integrated  BASIC  (BK-0010Š  user  manual,  Ališauskas  interview), 
making it  cheaper than other personal computers (most of which appeared later). 
Characteristically for Soviet computers, the basic set included neither the display nor 
the external memory device, which had to be sought out by the user. Twelve BK-
0010Šs  connected  to  a  teacher's  computer  DVK-2MŠ  (ДВК-2МШ)  made  up  a 
school set called KUVT-86 (КУВТ-86): in this case the teacher's computer did have 
a floppy disk drive and (when possible) a printer.
Save for adding Lithuanian characters to the keyboard, the rest of the design was left 
35 Lithuania's homogeneous demographic situation, which resulted in a lesser degree of existential 
threat and less of a potential impact by minority groups, has been used somewhat similarly to 
explain  why  Lithuanians  were  the  last  of  the  Baltic  republics  to  start  movement  towards 
independence but were the first to declare it (Taagepera 2000, cited in Kasekamp 2010: 168).
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unchanged.36 Plastic details were prepared by the  Plasta factory in Vilnius, while a 
plant in Kaunas was supposed to take care of repairs. Sigma was required to provide 
a  specified  quantity  of  PCBs  from  1987  (resolution of  the  Lithuanian  Central 
Committee and the Council  of Ministers from 1986.06.30).  However,  a warranty 
coupon from the time shows that at least some computers had already been produced 
in November 1986.
Figure 3.4.  BK-0010  with display,  power  supply and software tapes (photo 
taken by the author)
36 For this reason I would characterize both BK-0010Š and Poisk (see section 3.2.3) as quasi-cases:  
although  production  took  place  or  was  meant  to  take  place  in  Lithuania,  the  local  input  to  
hardware design was minimal. A good historical overview of BK-0010's development from the 
designer  side  is  provided  by  Malashevich  (2008),  although  the  value  of  factual  information 
surpasses that of his somewhat enthusiastic assessments of the viability of the endeavour.
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By  contrast  with  decisions  about  hardware  production,  academics  were  heavily 
involved in software development. An expert group for school computerization was 
formed  by Juozas  Zalatorius  (meeting  protocol  of  the  Lithuanian  State  Planning 
Committee 1986.09.04). In cooperation with the CCVSU and KPI a plan for school 
software  preparation  for  1986–1990  was  formed.  The  centres  agreed  to  develop 
various  solutions  beginning  from  system  software  (e.g.  networking),  and 
programming languages (LOGO, Pascal), and continuing with educational programs 
(e.g. systems for studying algorithms or creating exercises for students) and ending 
with user applications (e.g. text and graphics editors). The plan was quite detailed for 
1986–1987, specifying various developments by quarters of the year, but a large bulk 
of software (e.g. packages of user applications, database software, games etc.) was 
simply left to be programmed at some point between 1988 and 1990. Eventually it 
was only the first half of the plan that was mostly realized (Ališauskas interview).
The problem was that BK-0010Š had several shortcomings. The tape recorder was as 
inconvenient and unreliable a memory device as always and the TV screen was still 
uncomfortable to watch. Flat keys were difficult to press, and it was difficult to focus 
on the screen and type without  errors at  the same time. A later,  more traditional 
keyboard was highly sensitive,  which resulted in many letters being created with 
only one push; occasionally the keys themselves got stuck too. If the whole display 
was used all software had to fit into 16 KB of RAM, which could not be expanded.  
This in turn set limits to possible software solutions. Initially 8 KB of ROM was 
reserved for system software and 8 KB for the Focal programming language, with 16 
KB remaining unused (later replaced by the CCVSU's Vilnius BASIC, occupying 24 
KB of ROM). But Focal was perceived as an extremely poor language, suitable for 
calculations but difficult to programme for more complex tasks. The accompanying 
system software itself was so rudimentary that it was difficult to speak of BK-0010Š 
as having an operating system. Although the instruction set of the microprocessor 
was also being used by other Soviet computers (e.g. Elektronika 60, SM-3), adapting 
the programs was not straightforward. Neither was the computer compatible with 
Western  models.  As  a  result,  a  lot  of  extra  effort  was  required  on  the  part  of  
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programmers to create or adapt software. Additionally, troubles in schools arose from 
insufficient  knowledge about  electronics  among teachers  and students,  leading to 
errors,  crashes  and  improperly  repaired  machines  (Ališauskas,  Bernotas,  Dinda, 
Grigas,  Kaklauskas,  Sasnauskas  interviews,  Markevičius  1987).  Owing  to  these 
factors neither the schools nor the academics liked the BK-0010Š very much. But 
what was said about the Latvian situation—“it is better to have BK than it is to have  
nothing” (Eglājs interview)—was also believed in Lithuania.
At least for a while the central mindset about the importance of programming and 
algorithms  was  enforced  by  computers  with  little  or  no  user  applications. 
Unsurprisingly then, this accorded best with the IoMC's stress on algorithms. This 
was clearly illustrated by a Lithuanian informatics curriculum from 1987, the lion's 
share  of  which  was  devoted  to  algorithms,  computer  architecture,  operating 
principles  and  programming  (Ališauskas  &  Čėsnienė  1992).  The  ever-present 
scarcity of computers has already been mentioned numerous times. The solutions to 
overcome this included looking for the patronage of sponsors (e.g. factories, film 
studios  etc.)  or  heavy lobbying  to  obtain  rare  Yamaha  models  (Dinda  interview, 
Oginskas 1987.30.04)—or really computers of any kind. This gradually contributed 
to the diversity of PCs in use: so much so that by the end of the 1980s the situation 
was described as a 'zoo' (Dagienė 2006: 31). Furthermore, there was a general lack of 
experience  with  computing  in  schools  making  it  difficult  to  form  any  prior 
preferences and expectations at all.
Thus it is sensible to presume that at the time most of the teachers did not deviate 
much from the algorithm-based and programming-centred direction, and the main 
skills  developed during teaching practice and communicated to others by various 
means (e.g. conferences, journal articles) were also mainly of this type. In my view 
the shift towards user applications would have required widely diffused computers 
(user applications are meaningless to teach without the PCs themselves), a certain 
amount  of  standardization  (making  it  easy  to  diffuse  both  created  and  adapted 
software) and, of course, software itself (for it is unrealistic to think that every user 
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would be a talented programmer). It is no wonder then that perceptions started to 
change only at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. However, before 
moving on to this era another contender for Lithuanian school/home computerization 
should first be examined.
3.2.2 Santaka
The origins of Santaka can be traced back to Eimutis Karčiauskas from KPI, who 
managed to visit Austria in the mid-1980s. He brought back a Sinclair ZX Spectrum, 
a popular British 8-bit computer released in 1982. Allured by its simple architecture, 
low  cost,  colour  graphics  and  wealth  of  software  (especially  games)  Gintautas 
Žintelis  (also  from  KPI)  and  Karčiauskas  devised  a  plan  in  1985  to  create  a 
Lithuanian Sinclair clone for young people.37
The  situation  KPI  was  trying  to  tackle  should  be  familiar  by  now:  a  dearth  of 
personal  computers  in  schools and especially homes.  And even where computers 
themselves were available there was not much software to speak of. On the other 
hand,  8-bit  computers  were  not  exactly  cutting-edge  technology any more.  “We 
understood quite clearly that Santaka is for a short period of time. It was not the  
case that  it  would be possible  to  use Santaka in  ten  years” (Žintelis  interview). 
Therefore  the  aim  was  to  act  quickly  while  producing  as  many  computers  as 
possible. Considering the difficulties with getting sophisticated technology into mass 
production in the USSR, the goals were somewhat contradictory—spend too much 
time on bureaucracy and the project might become obsolete, or act now but without 
full official support.
Initially the idea was simply discussed between people at KPI themselves and with 
other  personal  computing  enthusiasts.  Notable  individuals  include  Vidmantas 
37 They were not alone in this reasoning. Sinclair-type computers became very popular in the USSR. 
For example, the website Planet Sinclair lists over 50 such clones that were produced in the USSR 
and  Eastern  Europe;  more  machines  can  be  found  on  a  Russian  ZX  Spectrum  website, 
SpeccyWiki. A few examples can also be found in Estonia, where Estron was contemplating the 
idea  of  producing  Sinclair-compatibles  and  proposed  the  idea  to  Tartu,  Palivere  electronics  
producers were assembling their own ZX Spectrums as a hobby, and a member of Entel group had 
devised a school computer design based on a Germand Z80 microprocessor analogue.
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Balčytis  from Vilnius State  University and Henrikas Matulionis  from the  Kaunas 
Radio Measurement Equipment Scientific Research Institute (KRMESRI). While the 
first went on to design his own Sinclair38 and later a PC/XTclone (see section 3.2.4), 
the second expressed serious interest in KPI's idea.
The KRMESRI, belonging to the Ministry of Communications, was mainly involved 
in military tasks. These included the construction of various measurement devices 
(e.g. for checking the parameters of microchips), preparation of necessary technical 
documentation and small-scale production. As such it had finances, know-how of 
compiling  the  technical  documentation,  some  production  base  and  professional 
employees  accustomed  to  working  according  to  military standards.  Although  the 
KRMESRI  was  already  providing  some  output  for  civil  purposes  (e.g.  medical 
measurement equipment) this project could better express the wish of (at least some 
of) its workers  “to be useful for Lithuania”  (Matulionis interview). In addition, a 
Sinclair  clone was a technically interesting project.  Furthermore,  the KRMESRI's 
geographical proximity to KPI eased communication and facilitated the maintenance 
of close contacts. So in many ways the KRMESRI was an excellent partner for the 
university.  In  fact,  a  working group of six  members was soon established in  the 
institute. Compared with the KRMESRI's total number of workers—around 2,700 
(Matulionis  interview)—it  was  not  much,  but  nevertheless  a  considerable  and 
welcome addition to the project.
Work on the prototype at KPI began in 1986 and lasted about 6 months (Matulionis, 
Žintelis interviews). A feature characteristic of Soviet computer production in general 
was especially salient  in  an attempt to make a  direct  copy a foreign analogue—
whereas  in  the  West  clone-makers  aimed  to  use  fewer  chips  than  the  original 
machines had used, often the newer chips or even ones that were used in the initial 
38 According to Balčytis this was serially produced by an unknown cooperative at the end of 1980s. 
Balčytis's idea was not to duplicate Sinclair hardware as closely as possible, but simply to achieve 
the same functionality. The result was a simpler device which used far fewer components than 
Santaka  and  reportedly  enjoyed  much  popularity  among  hobbyists  (Matelionis  interview). 
However, its full compatibility with the ZX Spectrum has been disputed by one member of the 
Kaunas group (Prekerienė interview).
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model were not being produced in the USSR (yet). So when Western clones could be 
smaller,  more  reliable  and  easier  to  produce  (see  Cringely  1996,  ch.  9  for  a 
particularly clear illustration) it was the other way round for Soviet versions.  But 
more components meant that more could go wrong. A higher degree of complexity 
might create additional problems not present in the original design (e.g. the need to 
deal with increased power consumption).  In this particular case, the  uncommitted 
logic array chip used in the ZX Spectrum was not being produced in the USSR and 
thus needed to be built from other types of chips. Also, available RAM and ROM 
chips had smaller capacities than those used in the original design and thus their 
number needed to be increased to achieve the same memory size. Additional issues 
arose from the ever-present quality problems: components not working, components 
stopping  to  work  after  a  while,  components  being  sensitive  to  changes  in 
temperature, having unpredictable output voltages and so on (Matelionis interview).
But (similar to other projects like Juku or Tartu in Estonia) it was important to use 
simple enough components so that they could potentially be acquired. Here the main 
problem was that Z80 processor analogues were at that time only produced in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The usual obstacles applied 
here: getting approval to buy them officially could have resulted in spending 2–3 
years on bureaucratic procedures with no guaranteed success. That would have made 
the goal to speed up the production process void. Emulating Z80 was considered as 
an alternative, but this would have reduced the speed of the processor to the point at 
which some programs using graphics would not have run (Žintelis interview). This 
worked against  the idea  of  full  software  compatibility.  Paradoxically,  by contrast 
with organizations it was relatively easy for private individuals to buy the processors 
from East German shops in small quantities—provided that they were permitted to 
visit the country of course—and bring them back to the USSR. Hence it was possible 
to buy them on the local black market for use in prototypes. The issue of obtaining 
larger quantities of microprocessors was bracketed by the development team at this 
stage of the project.
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In  parallel,  people  in  the  KRMESRI  were  already preparing  necessary  technical 
documentation so that the computer could be manufactured. They had started looking 
for display and external memory solutions—Šilelis  TVs and Vilma tape recorders, 
both produced in Lithuania, were eventually chosen (see figure 3.5). The group also 
designed the case and the keyboard. Since it was supposed to be used locally some 
special  characters  from the  Lithuanian  alphabet  needed  to  be  added,  raising  the 
number  of  keys  and  increasing  the  overall  dimensions  of  the  case  (Matulionis 
interview).
Figure  3.5.  Santaka  set  including  the  main  unit,  TV,  tape  recorder,  power 
supply and some software tapes (Saulius Matelionis's private collection)
Žintelis was on good terms with both industry people and politicians in Lithuania. He 
therefore attempted to advocate the computer as potentially suitable for schools. He 
and the director of Venta institute, Kazimieras Juozas Klimašauskas, participated in 
top-level meetings devoted to the issue. The proposed computer could actually claim 
several technical advantages over BK-0010Š: despite having an 8-bit processor its 
clock speed was higher (3.5 MHz vs. 3.0 MHz); it had more colours than BK (eight 
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vs.  four)  and did not  need any additional  tinkering to  display them; it  had more 
RAM; finally and most importantly, it could use any existing piece of ZX Spectrum 
software. But the main arguments used against the proposal were BK-0010Š's new 
generation processor and Minelektronprom's promises to produce them in massive 
numbers—hundreds of thousands if need be.39 These arguments proved decisive and 
it quickly became apparent to Žintelis that BK-0010Š would remain the main choice 
for schools.
By 1987 the working prototype was completed (Rimkus 1987.31.01). People at KPI 
and the KRMESRI decided to call the computer Santaka—'confluence'—to express 
the merging of science and manufacturing. Žintelis approached Sigma next to obtain 
the microchips  and produce Santakas,  but was turned down. The recollections of 
people from both sides (Drąsutis, Židonis, Žintelis interviews) are vague, confusing 
and contradictory regarding this particular episode, but some possible reasons can be 
teased  out.  First,  Sigma's  main  task  was  to  produce  DEC  analogues  for  Soviet 
industry and demand for those far exceeded the factory's capability to supply them. 
So  it  was  quite  preoccupied  with  its  primary  production.  Second,  for  people 
accustomed to minicomputer building and well-acquainted with Western technology, 
Santaka  seemed  an  unreliable  'hobbyist  computer'  (Židonis  interview)  with  no 
technically  interesting  solutions.  Third,  the  production  of  Santaka  as  Sigma's 
consumer good on mass scale would probably have delayed the process, which the 
developers wanted to avoid. But otherwise small-scale production could have simply 
used too little of Sigma's capacity while being a nuisance to prepare at the same time. 
It  just  did  not  seem to be worth the  effort.  Having good mechanical  equipment, 
Sigma did however agree to produce the cases for Santaka.
In the same year (1987) the prototype was also presented to Lithuanian state leaders 
along  with  the  plan  of  raising  the  computing  skills  of  young  people.  Algirdas 
Brazauskas, a future key figure in Lithuania's movement towards independence, was 
39 This did happen eventually, but only by the beginning of the 1990s. Malashevich claims that the 
total number of BK-0010s and BK-0011s produced was 162,000, of which nearly 125,000 were 
produced in the Eksiton plant (2008: 100). Production figures for Nuklonas are unknown.
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also in an influential position in the Party, being a secretary responsible for industry 
matters. He liked the idea and asked the institute to produce 200 Santakas. But the 
support was informal—Santaka was not part of the local, Soviet Lithuanian plan and 
it  was  up  to  the  developers  themselves  to  find  the  necessary  components  and 
production infrastructure. As a Minelektronprom representative, Klimašauskas had 
opposed Santaka as an official  school computer;  however,  he did not oppose the 
project altogether as an acquaintance of Žintelis. Thus he agreed to visit the GDR, 
buy  200  microprocessors  and  smuggle  them  to  Lithuania  (Žintelis  interview, 
Matulionis 2011)—the easiest way to solve the availability problem for small series 
production.
Initially  KPI's  design  was  quite  unstable  and  therefore  unsuitable  for  serial 
production: there were simply too many small, unpredictable errors differing from 
machine to machine which had to be corrected manually. It was the task of the group 
in the KRMESRI to eke out such faults so that the computer could be more easily 
produced (Prekerienė interview). As always the production equipment itself needed 
to be set up properly. As a result, the serial production could only begin in 1988. 
Nevertheless  the  whole  process  from  prototype  to  production  was  considered 
exceptionally quick for the Soviet context (Matulionis interview).
KPI's idea was to expand the circle of young people with hands-on experience with 
personal computers. Therefore as wide diffusion as possible was encouraged. Of the 
200 Santakas that were produced by the KRMESRI, some were kept by the project 
participants  but most were given to secondary schools for free (Matulionis 2011, 
Žintelis  interview).  The  informal  diffusion  of  the  design  and  the  emergence  of 
homemade copies was also considered a success. Numerous modifications appeared, 
e.g. a floppy interface and CP/M adaptation. Matulionis (2011) has suggested that the 
number of self-made Santakas might have exceeded the KRMESRI's production by 
about ten times. However, because of the lack of statistics and the popularity of ZX 
Spectrum in the USSR it is impossible to substantiate this estimation. Hobbyists did 
not  need to  bother  themselves  with mass  availability of  resources  and hence  the 
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solutions could differ according to which components could be acquired. So they did 
not  necessarily  need  to  resort  to  Santaka's  outline—indeed,  Balčytis's  previously 
mentioned design was one of the popular alternatives that diffused beyond a single 
prototype.
One could argue that from KPI's viewpoint the project of temporary production had 
been  fulfilled.  Therefore  at  some  point  it  dropped  out  of  the  endeavour.  The 
KRMESRI itself, however, took the project further. In 1988 Santaka was presented in 
the Ministry of Communications in Moscow as an example of the institute's success. 
Various plant managers were also present. Allegedly the minister was a huge fan of 
basketball and thus most impressed seeing a basketball game being run on Santaka 
(Matulionis 2011). Subsequently many different plants took a serious interest in the 
project because Santaka seemed a promising and relatively cheap way to fill a still 
largely empty home computer niche. For the institute selling the design was a good 
way to make money, although fixed salaries meant that developers themselves could 
not gain much from the transactions.
Owing to the impact of the presentation, the minister let the institute itself choose a 
factory that would start the production. One in Minsk, Belarus, was chosen because 
of  its  good  reputation  and  proximity  to  Lithuania,  making  it  easy  to  travel  and 
provide assistance in case of potential problems. The specialists in Minsk were able 
to prepare serial  production in less than a  year without  initially even having full 
technical documentation. The latter was prepared in parallel by the joint cooperation 
of  the  KRMESRI  and  the  factory  specialists.  The  computer  went  into  mass 
production in the beginning of the 1990s under the name Santaka 002 (Сантака 002) 
and thousands of machines were likely built over many years.40
Santaka was also very successful in the VDNH exhibition, where its various design 
solutions gained one gold and four silver medals. Subsequently it was supposed to be 
40 Matulionis (2011) suggests  5,000 computers a  year  over 3–4 years,  but  once again the actual 
figures are unknown. A picture of Santaka 002 number 4492 from November 1991 can be found 
online (Frolov 2009).
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entered  into  exhibitions  in  Prague  and  Berlin  as  an  illustration  of  Soviet 
technological achievements. However, it was only presented in Prague before wider 
changes in political landscape kicked in. Lithuania was by far the earliest of Baltic 
republics to declare independence on the 11th of March, 1990, over a year and a half 
before the official dissolution of the Soviet Union. Relations between Moscow and 
Lithuania  quickly  worsened,  resulting  in  an  economic  blockade  then  military 
intervention that resulted in the death of civilians, followed by Soviet special forces 
murdering  Lithuanian  border  guards  to  provoke  a  violent  response  and  so  on 
(Kasekamp 2010: 165–171). The same was true of relations between Lithuania and 
the other union republics that were still loyal to Moscow. The KRMESRI workers 
were denied the trip to Berlin, did not get half the money from the Minsk factory and 
got into severe financial difficulties as orders were abruptly cut.
As one of the engineers was leaving the KRMESRI to become a director of a plant in 
Krasnodar, Russia, Santaka's documentation was also sent there. For unclear reasons 
(but  quite  likely  once  again  related  to  worsened  relations)  the  institute  failed  to 
receive any payment, despite the fact that production was initiated on two models, 
called Impulse and Impulse-M (Импульс and Импульс-М; SpeccyWiki 2009). With 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union the project initiated in Lithuania had migrated 
out  of  the  hands  of  its  original  developers  for  good.  Left  with  no  military 
applications,  the  KRMESRI's  primary  but  at  the  same  time  relatively  narrow 
expertise  in  advanced  high-frequency  devices  could  not  find  enough  output  in 
Lithuania's  internal  market,  nor  was  it  able  to  reorient  its  production  quickly  to 
Western markets. The institute dissolved in the early years of the 1990s.
3.2.3 Sigma and the education sector: Poisk and Sigma 8800
So far only passing references have been made to production union Sigma, a genuine 
computer  hardware,  computer  systems  and  software  production  industry.  All 
computers described so far were devised and/or produced elsewhere. At best their 
encounters with Sigma were episodic. It is therefore relevant to ask why it was that 
the production union devoted to building computers was not very active in the PC 
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domain. This is the subject of the present section. As before, the answer is related to 
developments in the education sector and wider social context.
Being a producer on the Soviet scale, Sigma was a true industrial giant in local terms
—by the end of the 1980s it comprised of seven plants in various locations across 
Lithuania (Vilnius, Kaunas, Tauragė, Panevėžys, Telšiai and Pabradė) and a research 
institute  that  united  four  design  bureaus.  About  18,000  people  were  involved  in 
production  and management,  while  approximately 2,000 people  conducted  R&D. 
Established  in  1957,  the  production  union  had  moved  from  cash  registers  to 
minicomputer production, mainly for Soviet industry. At the beginning of the 1980s 
it was centrally ordered to reorient itself to producing DEC clones (PDP and VAX), 
and in 1986 it started the production of SM 1700, a VAX 730 clone (STIMTI 1989, 
Telksnys  &  Žilinskas  1999:  33–35,  Drąsutis  2000.15.11,  Drąsutis  2000).  Other 
notable products included multi-layer  PCBs and hard disk drives (up to  80 MB) 
which were highly valued in the Soviet Union for their relatively high performance 
and reliability (Drąsutis, Židonis interviews). Being a strategically important part of 
Soviet  industry  it  was  directly  controlled  by  Minpribor,  meaning  in  effect  that 
Lithuanian government had no formal say in determining its main activities.
In the West, DEC itself had not picked up on personal computing.  In the USSR, 
Sigma's DEC clones were in excess demand. Building them was a laborious and 
demanding task. PCs were already being produced by other factories in the Soviet 
Union, including Minpribor factories (e.g. Schetmash in Kursk, which also produced 
Tartus, see section 3.1.2). All this being the case, Moscow had no reason to change 
its technical policy and encourage the plant to divert from its main line of production. 
From the central point of view this could have seemed simply as an unnecessary 
duplication of effort. Sigma was to do what it was told to do and leave decision-
making to those who knew better.
The utmost priority of Sigma was to fulfil the plan. Upon success new resources and 
investments could be gained. Failure on the other hand brought the risk of sanction. 
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Thus  the  top  management  of  the  plant  had  little  reason  to  encourage  initiatives 
related to PCs, which seemed like toys compared with big, expensive and powerful 
minicomputers. The directives from central authorities aligned with the execution by 
top management help to explain why the first wave of PC production passed Sigma 
by in mid-1980s.  It  might be argued that this  created conditions in which Sigma 
engineers, well-aware of Western solutions, perhaps found it easier to deem already 
existing Soviet personal computers, using unreliable tape recorders and inconvenient 
TV screens, as 'unprofessional' and 'technically uninteresting'. The lack of supporting 
features of various prototypes (such as proper production documentation), problems 
with  ensuring  that  the  supply  would  be  timely  and  in  required  quantities,  or 
questionable correspondence to all-union standards made it all  the more easier to 
ignore novel efforts in this area (Židonis interview). However, it is difficult to tell 
whether  it  was  genuinely a  case  of  sour  grapes:  whether  some employees  could 
potentially have been interested in personal computing in other circumstances.
Of  course,  there  was  a  formal  requirement  that  every plant  should  also  produce 
consumer  commodities.  But  as  explained  above,  factories'  choices  were  usually 
based on their existing capabilities, which did not need extensive reorganization. In 
principle it was possible to show initiative or accept the initiative of others, but that 
would have meant organizing the production on mass scale—thousands of computers 
over many years—so that the plant could make use of its capacity. There was little 
incentive  to  do  so  provided  that  consumer  goods  were  of  secondary importance 
anyway, and easier means were available to satisfy that particular central demand. 
But  it  was  exactly  thus,  taken  as  a  whole,  that  a  curious  situation  emerged  in 
Lithuania: BK-0010Š was mass produced for schools, but the schools were not too 
fond of it; Santaka was at least potentially more attractive for its compatibility with 
Western software, but never went into mass production in Lithuania; and Sigma with 
its ample capacity, infrastructure, resources, know-how and skills virtually stayed out 
of this process altogether.
The  reforms  of  perestroika  attempted  to  make  state-controlled  enterprises  more 
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responsive  to  different  initiatives.  With  the  introduction  of  the  Law  on  State 
Enterprise in July 1987, producers gained more freedom: whereas crucial state orders 
still  had  to  be  fulfilled,  the  rest  of  the  output  could  be  set  by  the  enterprises 
themselves.  The  procurement  of  resources  depended  on  contracts  with  other 
organizations and the prices of those could vary to some extent. In principle it made 
sense insofar as the strengths  of different  enterprises  could be united in  a  single 
project. It was also announced that the plants would have to become self-financing 
and would no longer be bailed out by the state (Desai 1989: 32–34). The possibility 
of choice and the promise of making more profit made Sigma look out for various 
undertakings,  PCs  among  them.  Enterprise-internally,  a  proposal  was  made  to 
organize  the  PC production  line.  Within  Lithuania,  the  possible  production  of  a 
PC/XT clone designed in a newly established cooperative called Lema was briefly 
considered, but was quickly abandoned because of lack of interest from both sides 
(see also section 3.2.4) (Židonis interview).
Sigma's  attempt  to  cooperate  with  the  Scientific-Production  Union  Elektronmash 
(Электронмаш)  in  Kiev,  Ukraine,  progressed  somewhat  further.  In  1987 
Elektronmash had started preparations for the production of a fully IBM-compatible 
computer  called  Poisk  (Поиск).41 Soviet  IBM PC/XT clones  had been attempted 
before, but they had severe shortcomings: for example, Mindradioprom's EC-1840 
was very expensive and not fully IBM-compatible (Judy & Clough 1989: 276–277). 
Elektronmash's  idea  was  to  target  schools  and  lay  consumers,  meaning  that  the 
construction had to become considerably cheaper. This meant, however, that one-to-
one  copies  of  graphics  controllers  and  keyboard  controllers  could  not  be  made. 
Hence some of these functions had to be handled by the CPU. That in turn made the 
computer considerably slower, and even increased clock speed (5.0 MHz vs. 4.77 
MHz for the original IBM PC/XT) could not fully compensate for it (Smagin 2008).
41 Information on Poisk comes mainly from Boyko (1991).
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Figure  3.6.  Full  depiction  of  Poisk  set-up  including  all  peripherals  (Boyko 
1991: 85)
Technical  specifications  of  the  realized  model  (Boyko  1991)  included  a  16-bit 
KP1810BM88 processor (Intel 8088 analogue), 128 KB RAM, CGA graphics with 
two modes and the possibility to connect the computer to a colour monitor or a TV. 
At least on paper expansions were abundant: extra ROM (8–64 KB) and RAM (256 
KB and 512 KB blocks), one or two 5.25-inch (720 KB) floppy disk drives, a hard 
drive connection (20 MB or 40 MB), sound synthesizer, mouse, two joysticks, local 
network adapter etc. An inkjet printer, plotter and 3.5-inch floppy drive interfaces 
were also being developed. School sets included 8 or 16 student computers (384 KB 
RAM) connected to a teacher's computer (640 KB RAM, colour monitor, two floppy 
disk drives, printer, plotter). However, the initial set-up had only 8 KB ROM, a tape 
recorder as an external memory device and only three programs (BASIC and testing 
software), i.e. not even the operating system was included. Every expansion had to 
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be bought separately, significantly adding to the price of the main module (which 
alone was 1,000 roubles). Various weaknesses aside, the Poisk still looked superior 
compared with other contemporary home/school computers.
Elektronmash was willing to trade its documentation, which would have allowed it to 
obtain  Sigma's  sought-after  multi-layer  PCBs  and  hard  disk  drives  (Židonis 
interview).  Mutual  visits  and consultations  followed and Sigma's  interest  became 
genuine. A statement from October 1989 (cited in LCS 1989.08.12) made explicit its 
plans to start producing Poisk as a school computer (among other possible uses).
It  seems  that  this  proposal  could  have  resonated  well  with  intended  consumers. 
Despite the production in Nuklonas,  by 1989 only 130 schools out 800 had BK-
0010Š  classroom  sets  (Petrauskas  1989),  and  the  computer  itself  had  many 
shortcomings. None of the academic centres saw BK-0010Š as a viable long-term 
solution  and  efforts  to  develop  (educational)  software  became  increasingly  half-
hearted. To the IoMC, Poisk could have seemed a relatively cheap IBM-compatible 
PC, making their strategic vision finally practical. The CCVSU, perhaps always a bit 
more flexible, could have seen it as a chance to advance further computerization in 
schools whatever the means. And KPI had only seen Santaka as a temporary solution 
anyway.
On the other hand, a lot had happened in the previous few years. In addition to the 
emergence  of  cooperatives,  joint  ventures  were  also  being  allowed  to  a  limited 
extent. One of those was Baltic Amadeus, a Soviet Lithuanian–Austrian enterprise, 
established in September 1988 (Dagys 1989). Baltic Amadeus imported IBM PC/AT 
components from Taiwan through Austria, with assembly and testing being done in 
Lithuania. Although superior in performance and reliability, the prices were still far 
too  high  for  any  of  the  schools  and  so  the  computers  were  mainly  bought  by 
industrial  enterprises all  over the Soviet  Union.  Between 1989 and 1992,  around 
2,000 computers were sold (Zalatorius interview).  The examples of organizations 
that had established foreign contacts signalled increasing possibilities for importation 
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of  Western  technology in  the  future.  But  they  also  pointed  to  what  became the 
prevalent  strategy  in  the  1990s—the  move  from  large-scale  domestic  hardware 
design and production to local assembly of Asian-produced components.
At the same time, the gradual loosening of the constraints of the regime also meant 
more freedom to organize and express opinion. In September 1989 the Lithuanian 
Computer Society (LCS) was established. This was an expert group which aimed to 
give professional advice to decision-makers and shape the future computerization of 
Lithuania (statute of LCS 1990, Lupeikienė 1990). LCS took quite a strong stance 
against  equipping  schools  with  Soviet  technology.  For  example,  it  advised  the 
Ministry of  Education  and the  local  Planning Committee  against  buying UKNTs 
computers (specifically citing poor reliability and the lack of system and educational 
software).  Buying  IBM-compatibles  was  favoured  instead  (LCS  1989.29.11). 
Considering that the core of LCS consisted of key people from all three academic 
centres, its firm 'no' to Poisk stated in a letter to Sigma and the Lithuanian Planning 
Committee  (1989.08.12)  might  seem  quite  surprising—especially  given  that  the 
initial  opinions  of  local  experts  asked to  assess  Poisk by Sigma were reportedly 
supportive (Židonis interview).
“We  tried  to  find  some  balance,” is  the  key  to  understanding  this  decision 
(Ališauskas interview). The debates on school computerization involved trade-offs 
between  quantity  and  quality,  diversity  and  standardization,  low  and  high  price, 
immediate availability and waiting, which determined the acceptance or rejection of 
new  proposals.  For  example,  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  Lithuanian  schools 
acquired a few hundred Commodore computers for free.  Quantity,  zero price and 
immediate availability became more important than a strategic orientation towards 
standardization and IBM-compatibility.  Another  example concerns a talk between 
Juozas Kazimieras Klimašauskas, the director of Venta, and Gintautas Žintelis from 
KPI at the end of the 1980s—Klimašauskas discussed the possibility of KPI helping 
Venta to design a Soviet IBM-compatible computer.  He was turned down on the 
grounds that the proposal would have been meaningful a couple of years previously, 
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but was by that point too late (Žintelis interview). Similar considerations were in 
play with Poisk. Compared with Western computers Poisk was already outdated and 
would be even more so when it eventually became available; it would also be more 
unreliable and likely in short supply.42 Its only advantages would be low cost and 
superiority over existing Soviet school computers.
In this light, LCS's decision seems less like an issue of possible hidden economic 
interests  in  preventing  Sigma from entering  the  PC domain  or  of  blind  idealism 
(Drąsutis,  Židonis  interviews),  but  rather  like  a  reasoned choice  to  abstain  from 
immediate action and wait for better alternatives to emerge. LCS pointed out that 
whereas Sigma had proposed Poisk as a school computer the schools themselves had 
not been consulted about their needs and preferences. Instead of haphazard decisions, 
more consultation, testing and thinking about alternatives was advised. Even then, 
however, Sigma might have pursued its course—after all, LCS was an expert group 
with no formal power—but then Kiev decided to raise its demands and ask for more 
money for the documentation (Židonis interview). As the terms of exchange became 
unfavourable to Sigma the idea of cooperation was subsequently dropped. From the 
viewpoint of the education sector it is curious to note that even though BK-0010Š 
was not  especially desired,  this  outcome actually strengthened its  position as  the 
dominant Lithuanian school computer, at least for the near future. It would take 10 
more years until BKs would be completely phased out of schools (Dinda interview).
If all participants in these events in all countries agree on something it is probably the 
largely unforeseen speed of events at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s.  In  many ways the transition was especially hard on Sigma,  since making 
changes in a large-scale organization demanded more resources. And the problems 
were  many.  Probably the  most  acute  was  the  virtually  overnight  loss  of  Eastern 
contracts.  While  relations  between  individual  people  could  be  friendly,  relations 
42 This expectation was confirmed by Boyko, who cites Kiev's production figures as being a 'few 
hundred' in 1989 and 10,000 in 1990. However, he also admits that Poisks are difficult to find in  
shops (1991: 85). In the light of the above discussion, the problem was likely much greater for  
peripherals.
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between  countries  were  certainly not:  in  response  to  Lithuania's  proclamation  of 
independence in  March 1990, the USSR imposed a  3-month economic blockade. 
Lack of orders, money and new supplies resulted, while 20,000 workers still needed 
to be paid somehow. By contrast with Baltic Amadeus, Sigma had not established 
any joint ventures with Western enterprises and new business partners could not be 
found  overnight,  especially  in  a  country  still  in  the  middle  of  political  turmoil. 
Moreover,  there  was a  profound lack  of  marketing skills—whereas  in  the Soviet 
system much ingenuity and effort was put into obtaining resources, now potential 
buyers needed to be convinced.  Having until  recently relied on extensive central 
support with secured contracts all over the USSR, Sigma found itself suddenly in a 
highly vulnerable position.
Equally important was the state of material support. The problem was that Sigma's 
productivity was lower than that of Western enterprises. For example, Sigma's chief 
engineer  recalls  the  production  union  spending  eight  times  more  than  American 
manufacturers to produce the same Winchester hard disk (Drąsutis interview). But 
there was also an upper limit starting from which a certain technology became too 
complex to be produced at all. In the case of hard disks, the capacity limit for Sigma 
was  80  MB.  In  comparison:  Apple  Macintosh  IIfx,  introduced  in  March  1990, 
already had a 160 MB drive option (EveryMac.com).
In this situation Sigma needed to take a look at its production equipment, finances 
and existing stock to quickly come up with some products which would satisfy three 
conditions: profitability, demand and ability to produce. Many ideas were put forth 
and tried out. A discussion with Leningrad involved the production of the first laptop 
in  the  Soviet  Union;  Polish  Mera-Błonie  was  contacted  to  produce  printers; 
Armenians  were  negotiated  with  regarding  the  production  of  floppy  disk  drives 
(Židonis  interview).  But  none  of  these  proposals  progressed  further  than  the 
prototype stage at best, because of recurring issues: lack of hard currency, lack of 
finances, economic recession and political hostility.
152
One of the later projects was Sigma 8800, an IBM-compatible 16-bit computer which 
was planned with a colour monitor, a printer and a 20-MB hard disk. Essentially the 
idea resembled that of Poisk: an IBM-compatible with a price advantage. An initial 
outline of technical characteristics was prepared in February 1990, with a plan to 
start  production  in  April  1991  (STIMTI  1990.15.02).  In  search  of  potential 
customers, Sigma once again approached the education sector.
Yet  again  the  social  context  had  changed.  In  the  now independent  Lithuania  the 
Centre of Informatics and Prognosis had been established in October 1990 to guide 
school computerization. A few key people had moved from the CCVSU to work at 
the new centre. For the first time the education sector had full autonomy to decide 
whether to accept or reject any proposal. On the other hand, Sigma's need to secure 
contracts had increased. But in many ways the dilemma was the same: in whom and 
on what grounds should trust be invested?
Initially the Centre of Informatics and Prognostics showed interest in the proposal. 
But for reasons unknown the project was delayed—in December 1991 the computer 
was  still  to  be  tested  by  Sigma  (State  Institute  of  Information  Technology 
1991.21.12).  By that  time,  however,  schools had started receiving Western IBMs 
with 80286 processors, by various means (charity, purchases by municipalities etc.). 
Sigma's  PC/XTs,  while  domestically  produced,  were  mostly  based  on  Soviet 
technology,  were  expensive  (small  series,  obsolescent  production  equipment)  and 
would have been outdated even more by the time they would have become available 
in mass quantities. The education sector was willing to approve Sigma's offer on the 
condition that  the  computer  would  use 80286 processors  (Zlatkus  interview),  for 
which there were no widely available Soviet analogues. Sigma could not meet these 
requirements. The enterprise also tried to negotiate with Riga, most likely the VEF 
plant, for production of Sigma 8800s as control devices for the plant's private branch 
exchanges. The negotiations fell through, however, and eventually about 100–200 
PCs were made (Desiukevič, Drąsutis, Židonis interviews). These were used to aid 
Sigma's own production.
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All in all, Poisk and Sigma 8800 were just small episodes for Sigma—reasons for its 
collapse ran much deeper.43 To continue computer production, the organization would 
have  needed  to  escape  the  trap  of  existing  capabilities  failing  to  meet  changed 
expectations.  Upgrading  production  capabilities  would  have  required  a  lot  of 
investments, both in terms of equipment and for retraining the workers. Although 
there  had  been  discussions  between  DEC and  the  USSR,  and  some  of  Sigma's 
engineers even received some training in DEC's facilities, DEC's growing financial 
troubles meant that no investments followed. Other promises of foreign financing 
also failed to  realize (Židonis  interview).  The tumultuous political  and economic 
environment  probably  did  not  help  to  gain  the  trust  of  potential  investors,  who 
preferred to continue investing in low-cost mass production in Asia. There was also 
the question of whether after such large-scale technological renewal Sigma would 
have been competitive. Too big for the domestic market, it would have needed to 
enter into global competition and produce computers cheaper than its competitors. As 
an independent producer, it could not have bought components cheaper than could 
large corporations. Also to be taken into account is the amount of mental adaptation 
needed to operate in a market economy. In every Baltic state the beginning of the 
1990s was about (re-)learning “what is capitalism and how to eat it”, as summarized 
by one Estonian engineer (Jelle interview).
In  this  regard  perceptions  had  strongly  turned  against  Sigma.  The  organization 
evoked an image of an eastwards-facing, sinking Titanic that had relied too much on 
its  Eastern contacts for too long and was too passive,  hoping for state initiatives 
rather  than taking its  own.  Lithuanian politicians did not  have much faith  in  the 
viability  of  Sigma either,  and  there  was  insufficient  political  will  and  a  lack  of 
support to keep the enterprise going (Židonis interview)—but it has to be reminded 
that  taking  into  account  the  overall  situation,  doing  so  would  have  been a  most 
43 Thus I do not want to create the impression that the reasons for the downfall of Sigma (or others 
such as RET or VEF, see below) were necessarily related to their inability to produce personal  
computers. However, my explanatory focus is on the domestic PC production attempts, not on the 
collapse of the industry, which would require a separate account.
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difficult  task.  Additionally,  other  Lithuanian enterprises  that  had emerged outside 
Sigma had no interest in handing their contacts over to Sigma so that the organization 
could prosper.
Finally, the internal cohesion of Sigma was also compromised—this time by its own 
employees, who sensed that they could be better off by establishing their own small 
businesses with a competitive edge in some specialized niche and started to leave the 
organization. In the end, Sigma was simply unable to withstand all of these pressures. 
But further discussion of its collapse and its descendants would take us too far from 
the topic at hand. Therefore it is sensible to stop here and take a look at the case 
which managed, for a while at least, to thrive on the downfall of Soviet industry.
3.2.4 Lema and its PC/XT
Lema's story started, somewhat by accident, around 1985–1986. At that time there 
was  a  foreign  PC/XT-clone  in  Vilnius  State  University.  One  academic  with 
acquaintances at Sigma had heard that the organization had obtained another clone, 
known as Apricot. He wanted some data from Sigma's computer, but the floppy disk 
drives of the two machines supported different formats. Thus the computers had to be 
connected by serial cable. An unfortunate electrical failure occurred during which 
some components burned out. As foreign-made machines were highly valued, every 
possible means needed to be sought to repair them. Vidmantas Balčytis, an employee 
of the IoMC, started looking for solutions. Consulting the documentation that came 
with the university's computer, he soon found that most of the original components 
could  be  replaced  with  Soviet  analogues,  making  the  repair  much  cheaper  than 
initially supposed. This discovery prompted the idea to start making PC/XTs using 
mainly Soviet components.
However, because some Western components would still be needed, foreign currency 
was also required. A suitable opportunity presented itself in spring or summer 1987, 
when the university managed to establish some contacts with a military institute in 
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Moscow.44 The institute was looking for someone to duplicate a WANG computer 
using as few Western components as possible and agreed to provide foreign currency 
for parts that could not be replaced. Balčytis and Rimantas Kazlauskas were then 
allowed to travel to Moscow to examine the original WANG. Upon closer inspection 
they realized that its architecture was very similar to that of an IBM PC/XT. With 
IBM slowly establishing itself as a standard in the West, it was professionally more 
interesting to attempt a PC/XT clone instead. So while they formally started to work 
on a WANG design, the work was actually done with PC/XT in mind.
Once again, the exact copy was impossible to make. For one thing, the Soviet and 
Western standard distance between pins of the chips differed (2.50 mm vs. 2.54 mm). 
Also,  the  dimensions  of  some available  chips  (RAM and  EPROM) were  simply 
larger than those used in the original. In some cases, functional equivalents of certain 
chips not available in the USSR had to be devised. Differences in hardware led to 
minor changes in software (BIOS, testing procedures). The original components that 
could not be replaced or were difficult to replace included the Intel 8088 processor, 
DMA controller,  timer  controller  and interrupt  controller  (Balčytis  interview).  In 
some cases even if Soviet analogues existed they were so hard to find that when the 
opportunity  to  use  foreign  currency  was  available  it  was  easier  to  buy  the 
components abroad.
The preliminary design was completed in 1988 (Balčytis interview). However, by 
that time, both the university and the military institute had lost interest in the project. 
The reason was quite simple: in the intervening period joint ventures between Soviet 
and Western companies had been allowed and some workers from the university had 
seized the chance to establish Baltic Amadeus.
The developers of the design, however, did not want to give the project up, since they 
already had a working model and diagnostic tools. They therefore started to explore 
ways to profit from the computer. Taking advantage of the loosening of the Soviet 
44 Its official name could not be recalled by the interviewees.
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regime in general and the law of cooperatives in particular, they acquired an approval 
from  the  Central  Committee  of  Lithuanian  Communist  Union  of  Youth  and 
established  a  cooperative  called  Lema  at  the  beginning  of  1989  (Kazlauskas 
interview). Being a small enterprise with around ten employees, Lema was mainly 
oriented  to  designing  hardware,  building  prototypes  and  small-scale  customized 
production. The advantages and disadvantages of cooperatives in the late USSR are 
well known: having to pay higher prices than state enterprises for some resources and 
relying  on  one's  own  supply  channels  vs.  more  freedom to  choose  and  modify 
production goals, the possibility of paying higher wages and permission to convert 
foreign currency.
One of the ways to make profit from computer sales was to seek out people who had 
visited Western countries and brought back a PC. These were in high demand among 
various  organizations.  For  legal  reasons,  however,  it  was  difficult  for  state 
organizations to buy technology from private individuals. It was easier to buy from 
cooperatives  like Lema.  These  could also provide  a  warranty and service  to  add 
value.  The  problem  was  that  although  the  price  of  a  Western  PC  was  high—
equivalent to that of a three-bedroom flat in Vilnius (Balčytis interview)—the profit 
from reselling one was not.
For Lema then, it would be more profitable to produce and sell its PC/XT clone. 
Since Lema had good relations with the Tauragė plant (part of the Sigma production 
union),  PCBs  were  prepared  there.  Chips,  bought  from  various  sources,  were 
manually  soldered  to  the  PCBs.  The  computers  were  then  checked  with  various 
diagnostic tools Lema itself had prepared. In one day a single person could solder 
three boards and make one computer work (Balčytis interview). As possibilities to 
acquire new resources became available, the design was gradually improved (e.g. 
addition  of  a  floppy disk drive  controller,  expanded use  of  Programmable  Array 
Logic chips to imitate the functionality of some Western chips).
Despite Lema having working relations with Sigma, the latter never produced the 
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computer.  Sigma briefly evaluated  the design (Židonis  interview),  but  it  was  not 
deemed suitable for manufacturing. Many factors might have played its role here, 
e.g.  lack  of  proper  documentation,  lack  of  consideration  for  all-union  standards 
which mass-produced goods had to adhere to, use of foreign components etc. But 
Lema itself did not attempt to push its design into mass production too hard either—
people  at  the  enterprise  perceived  themselves  mainly  as  designers,  not 
manufacturers.
By contrast  with the other cases,  it  is  interesting to  note that in  Lema's case the 
quality  of  components  was  not  seen  as  the  most  crucial  issue:  “I  insist  on  my 
opinion, that the main problem was design” (Balčytis interview). It was indeed joked 
that the low quality of Soviet technology stemmed from engineers being unable to 
resist the temptation to improve the original design. On one hand this is consistent 
with Åslund's more general remark about the increase of value detraction down the 
Soviet production chain:  “Soviet raw materials were excellent, Soviet intermediary  
goods  (such  as  metals  and  chemical)  were  shoddy,  while  consumer  goods  and  
processed foods were substandard” (2002: 125). It is indeed likely that each new 
level of production allowed for additional errors and difficulties, which cumulated 
with an unreliable end product. It is also likely that a good product design could 
alleviate at least some problems presented by poor lower-level components.
On the other hand, the implication that most Soviet engineers were sub-par is very 
far-fetched, whether it  refers to Sigma or the Institute of Cybernetics. At least in 
some cases making an exact functional copy with available Soviet technologies was 
an explicit demand of the authorities, leaving little room for improvisation (e.g. when 
RET was commanded to copy Sharp's  HiFi set  (Jelle interview)).  In other  cases, 
needed components were simply not available in the USSR (or were very scarce or 
very expensive): as a result the functionality could not be fully replicated (e.g. Poisk 
did not use any Western components and suffered from performance loss). It is also 
notable  that  quality  problems  were  mentioned  less  often  among  small-scale 
producers.  One  could  argue  that  in  small-scale  production  a  more  customized 
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approach  to  each  unit  was  possible—if  problems  occurred,  computers  could  be 
tailored  individually  until  they  worked  properly.  Mass  production  and 
standardization left less time to tinker with individual machines.
Finally,  there  is  also  the  question  how  many  components  could  affordably  be 
discarded. Here Lema profited from change in the political climate. When conflict 
with Moscow worsened, large factories did not have orders to fill. Suddenly finding 
themselves overstocked with supplies, they were willing to sell to whoever could 
afford  them.  This  enabled  access  to  many  items  heretofore  hardly  or  not  at  all 
available,  including  components  intended  for  military  purposes.  Fixed  prices  in 
combination  with  increasing  inflation  meant  that  the  components  effectively  got 
cheaper  and  cheaper  as  time  passed—provided  that  one  had  foreign  currency. 
Therefore Lema had increasingly easier and cheaper access to Soviet components. It 
could thus pick out the best ones and discard the rest: a degree of freedom of choice 
that would not have been possible even a few years earlier. The lion's share of the 
design's expenses was from the Western components (Balčytis interview).
Therefore  Lema  continued  on  the  path  of  small-scale,  customized  production. 
According to the interviewees' estimates about 100 computers were bought mainly 
by  factories  and  newspaper  or  broadcasting  companies  (Balčytis,  Kazlauskas 
interviews). Later some of them also ended up as text buffering devices for teletype 
systems which were used to contact Russian enterprises. Somewhat similarly to Entel 
and the CCMC in Estonia (see 3.1.3), Lema was small,  flexible and not strongly 
committed to its PC project. Therefore it could quietly phase it out in the first half of 
the 1990s when new and superior computers (e.g. IBM PC/AT) started to be diffused 
more widely and prices of foreign PC/XTs started approaching Lema's own. Lema 
simply moved on to more profitable projects.
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3.3 Latvia45
3.3.1 VEFormika and VEF Mikro series
By contrast with Lithuania, where major industrial enterprises were created after the 
Second World War, Latvia was more similar to Estonia in that it had substantial pre-
war production experience. Its VEF plant, started in 1919, was specialized for the 
production  of  various  communications  equipment  such  as  telephones  and  radio 
receivers.  Its  profile  was  retained  after  Soviet  occupation,  when  VEF became a 
renowned  producer  of  various  telegraph  and  telephone  exchanges  for  civil  and 
military purposes all over the USSR. The enterprise was expanded into a production 
union in 1979, centred in Riga but another plant in Stučka and additional production 
units elsewhere (Alūksne, Malta, Skrunda). Its prominence was reinforced in 1984 
with the establishment of a research institute devoted to the design and development 
of the latest  communications  technology for the Soviet Union. In 1990 VEF had 
about  20,000  workers  (Jērāns  1988:  721–722,  Jubels  2009:  727–728,  775). 
Belonging to the Ministry of Communications Industry, it was a centrally controlled 
enterprise. Similarly to Sigma, its scale of operation and thinking, its connections, 
and its  supply channels and resources were vastly superior to  those of the lesser 
players  whose  struggles  have  been  described  above.  Drawing  an  analogy  with 
Western enterprises, VEF was to Tartu group what IBM was to Apple in the 1970s.
By  the  beginning  of  the  1970s  VEF  had  started  developing  quasi-electronic 
automatic  telephone  exchanges  (systems  for  connecting  telephone  calls).  In  that 
regard  engineers,  especially  younger  members  of  the  profession,  soon  took  an 
interest in the advances of integrated circuit technologies. This was not coincidental: 
having less prestige to lose and no particular direction of technological development 
to defend, younger workers were more willing to experiment (Ļenskis interview). In 
this  respect  the  motive  force  was  Mikhail  Tovba,  working  in  VEF's  Special 
Construction Bureau, a sub-division employing about 1,500 people.
45 Owing to difficulties with finding interviewees, this section relies less on oral and more on various 
written  sources.  In  this  regard  the help from Andrejs  Skuja in  locating various materials  and  
providing translation has been truly invaluable.
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Here VEF's good connections came into play. Possibly as early as the end of 1976 or 
the  beginning  of  1977,  one  of  VEF's  suppliers  visited  Kiev  and brought  back  a 
microprocessor from a K580 series computer, a Soviet Intel 8080 analogue. Seeing 
the architecture of the processor, Tovba realized that it  could be employed in the 
design of telephone exchanges. Work on the prototype started around February 1977 
and was completed in a few months (Tovba interview), meaning that it may well be 
one of the earliest microcomputers in the Soviet Union (the first according to Tovba). 
The computer was named VEFormika. Tovba then approached Kiev with an idea to 
emulate the processor on a mainframe computer so that 60 programmers could start 
to develop and debug software for the system.
But upon his return from Kiev in May the project experienced an immediate setback. 
Tovba recalls the chief engineer of the Special Construction Bureau telling him that 
at  best  microprocessors  could  be  used  in  refrigerators,  washing  machines  and... 
billycans. The reason for this peculiar statement might be that the chief engineer 
himself was involved as an author in the patent of another control system. In any 
case the net outcome was that all chiefs of the divisions of the construction bureau 
were explicitly forbidden to use microprocessors. At this point Tovba resigned his 
position.
He did  not  leave  VEF,  however,  but  moved on to  the  Computing  Centre  of  the 
factory, where the centre’s chief enabled him to develop the computer further. Along 
with  a  few people  who  had  left  the  construction  bureau  with  him,  Tovba  hired 
students from Riga Polytechnical Institute to aid with further design efforts. Photos 
taken at the time indicate that the number of people involved was fewer than 15. The 
salary was minimal (just enough to get by), the room where the work was being done 
had  no  windows—nevertheless,  in  a  paradoxical  manner  so  characteristic  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  marginal(ized)  status  of  the  project  did  not  preclude  its 
presentation in an exhibition in November 1977 celebrating the 60th anniversary of 
the USSR and devoted to the achievements of the Soviet electronics industry, visited 
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by the General Secretary of the party Leonid Brezhnev himself. In yet another twist 
of irony Tovba himself  had to wait in the hotel  and was not allowed to visit  the 
exhibition for security reasons. When he took a vacation to visit Kiev in July 1978 
things did not  look too promising though:  despite the one-off exhibition the PC-
building had met severe internal resistance in the factory and the production was 
nowhere near in sight.
His  holiday  was  cut  short,  however,  and  he  was  instructed  to  return  to  Riga 
immediately. The deputy minister of Communications Industry had heard that VEF 
had built the first personal computer in the USSR, and so was paying a visit to the  
plant. The result was a true reversal of fortune: Tovba received a bonus, was given 
his  own division with about  60 people  and was tasked to  develop an  automated 
computer-aided design system (to be called Ekrāns) based on VEFormika. The work 
started in the autumn of 1978 (Tovba interview).
This  was  a  prestigious  task  prioritized  by  the  powers  in  Moscow.  As  such,  the 
designers were granted extremely good access to various resources that could be put 
into the system. Let us compare: whereas most of the PCs described in table 3.1 did 
not have a hard disk even by the end of the 1980s, Ekrāns, built 10 years earlier, 
included  two  Bulgarian-produced  hard  drives,  each  with  a  capacity  of  2.4  MB. 
Videoton  displays  came  from  Hungary,  another  sign  of  privileged  supply  (for 
comparison, recall the difficulties of the Santaka group in obtaining microprocessors 
from  the  GDR  (see  section  3.2.2).  The  early  access  granted  to  Kiev-produced 
microprocessors  (initially  probably  the  experimental  versions)  has  already  been 
mentioned.
With  a  special  production  shop for  microcomputers  being  organized  in  February 
1980 (Kolektīvais līgums—mūsu dzīves likums 1980.19.02) the Ekrāns system itself 
and the technical  documentation were ready by autumn.  According to  the plant's 
newspaper it was the first microcomputer-based 'automated workplace' in the Soviet 
Union (Livšics  1984.31.08).  In  September  the  production  of  VEFormikas  started 
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(Suslovs 1980.30.09) and by 1982 more than 500 had been produced (Kļimanova 
1982.15.06). Tovba estimates that the total number produced might have been more 
than 1,000.
After VEF had produced the computers they were shipped to Vyshgorod, Ukraine, 
where the system as a whole was assembled and then allocated to enterprises all over 
the Soviet Union. Indeed there were news reports of VEFormika being used in over 
40 cities in the USSR in 1982 (Kļimanova 1982.09.07) and of Ekrāns being installed 
in approximately 100 enterprises and institutes in 1984 (Livšics 1984.31.08). Yet in 
the very same year, complaints arose that Ekrāns was yet to be employed in VEF 
itself (Tehniskās pārkārtošanas galvenais uzdevums 1984.17.02). The production ran 
until roughly 1985 (Tovba interview). In 1987 around 600 enterprises were using the 
system (Mantojums 1987.10.03).
All in all,  VEFormika was designed for industrial  use and remained in such use, 
although the possibilities of using it for agricultural and home needs were briefly 
mentioned early on (Korneliuss 1980.01.12). Its main functionality was claimed to 
be data collection and processing, control of technological processes, automation of 
design  processes  and local  networking.  They were  also  seen  as  workstations  (or 
'automated  workplaces')  and  'intelligent  terminals'  (“Sakari-81”  1981.01.09,  VEF 
1983).  The price—20,000 roubles  (VEF 1983)—made it  a very expensive device 
indeed (recall the 600-rouble BK-0010Š in the mid-1980s for comparison).
Although the factory newspaper mentions that VEFormika was modernized to some 
extent  to  expand  the  capabilities  of  Ekrāns  (Suvorovs  1984.10.07),  the  basic 
architecture  of  the  computer  remained the  same:  some chips  were replaced with 
newer versions, more memory added and additional software written. The reasons 
are  familiar  by  now:  “Nobody  wanted  to  deal  with  production,  it  was  like  a  
punishment” (Tovba interview). It was relatively easy for people working at VEF to 
acquire new technologies for experimental purposes. But then one needed to test the 
components, write a request to the ministry, await approval, and await response from 
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the enterprises (often saying that the components would not be currently available or 
available only in limited quantities). All in all, it was extremely difficult—or next to 
impossible—to guarantee that new components—and moreover, the variety of new 
components from different sources—would be available on time. And even if they 
did  arrive  there  was  no  guarantee  that  the  description  would  correspond  to  the 
content, e.g. the number of actual chips could be fewer than the quantity written on 
the box in which it came (Tovba interview). Thus the problem was not the lack of 
money, but the lack of ability to exchange money for actual products. At the same 
time the approval of allocation of resources still meant an obligation to produce a 
given amount, and the failure to do so could have brought serious sanctions for the 
factory.  To  this  one  should  add  the  time  required  to  compile  the  necessary 
documentation with appropriate parameters that needed to correspond to the central 
standards (GOST), to do the checks to ensure that correspondence to these standards 
was indeed achieved and to prepare for production. Therefore from the managerial 
point  of  view  it  was  often  safer  to  avoid  difficult  projects  altogether  (Ļenskis 
interview).  From  the  engineering  point  of  view  it  was  easier  to  proceed 
incrementally. This would explain why VEFormika continued to be slightly modified 
until the mid-1980s and became gradually outdated with the emergence of the 16-bit 
processor standard.
Tovba  recalls  that  the  information  about  VEFormika  was  given  to  the  plant's 
Technical  Research  Department  (TRD),  a  sub-division  of  roughly  400  people 
responsible  for  optimizing  and  developing  VEF's  internal  production  processes. 
However, TRD had already independently started to become interested in integrated 
circuits a few years earlier. In 1969, VEF constructed a relay-based scoreboard for a 
newly  built  sports  arena  in  Riga.  In  1974  the  same  construction  was  used  in  a 
Universiade  in  Moscow,  where  it  caught  the  interest  of  representatives  from 
Longines and Omega (Červinskis interview).46 The fact that these enterprises liked 
the  appearance  of  the  scoreboard  very  much,  but  vainly  searched  for  integrated 
circuits  inside  it,  suggested  the  constructors  that  ICs  could  be  a  promising 
46 All three interviews with Jurijs Červinskis were conducted by Andrejs Skuja.
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technological domain worth looking into.
The exact construction year of TRD's first microcomputer is unknown. In 1978 the 
head of TRD, Pēteris  Videnieks, commented about the first  microcomputer being 
built at VEF (Preses konference rūpnīcā 1978.17.02), but the specific model was not 
mentioned  (hence  it  could  have  been  VEFormika).  Nor  does  VEF's  book  on 
microprocessor-based control systems (Videnieks 1981) mention the year of TRD's 
first microcomputer which, however, already includes references to different types of 
computers.  The first  explicit  mention of VEF Mikro 1021 and 1022 comes from 
1982, when they are claimed to have already been in use (Ciesalnieks 1982.10.08). 
However,  some experimental batches of microcomputers with other names (VEF-
Sports, VEF-Vita, up to 20 machines) had already been built by the end of the 1970s 
and the name VEF Mikro was allegedly in use in 1981 (Červinskis interview).
Similarly to VEFormika, VEF Mikro was first and foremost intended for industrial 
use—more specifically, to manage a plant's internal production processes. Its uses 
included  monitoring  the  workers'  output,  quality  control  of  products,  automatic 
testing of the parameters of radio receivers, checking the circuits of quasi-electronic 
telephone  exchanges  (with  two  versions  of  systems  called  Kontests),  controlling 
devices for assembling electronic circuits, controlling drilling machines (for PCBs) 
and  creation  of  hardware  and  software  (using  systems  MKS-802  and  MKS-803, 
respectively) (Videnieks 1981, VEF 1983, Ventiņš & Skorinko 1988.17.05, Ventiņš 
1988). More exotic uses include the real-time sports information system Gimnasts-2, 
built  for managing the gymnastics competition in the Moscow Olympics in 1980 
(actually based on the predecessors of VEF Mikro (Červinskis interview)) and the 
plant's  own  automated  canteen  service  (Pudāns  1983.30.12).  Depending  on  the 
application different peripherals could be connected, e.g. perforator, printer, floppy 
disk drive,  display,  devices  for  programming read-only memory etc.  (VEF 1983, 
Videnieks et al. 1987).
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Figure 3.7. VEF Mikro 1021 (Pēteris Videnieks's private collection)
Figure 3.8. VEF Mikro 1025 (photo taken by author)
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The initial versions, VEF Mikro 1021 and 1022, were actually developed by two 
different teams in TRD, led by Jurijs Červinskis and Jānis Ventiņš, respectively. So 
were  the  follow-up  models,  1024  and  1025,  built  some  time  around  1983 
(“Automatizācija-83”  1983.01.07,  VEF  1983,  Ventiņš  &  Skorinko  1988.17.05, 
Ventiņš  1988,  Červinskis  interview).  However,  the  comparison  of  their  basic 
characteristics (see table 3.1) seems to indicate little differences between them: the 
processors, RAM, ROM, display and basic software seem to be roughly the same 
(e.g.  Intel  Soviet  8080  copy  in  1021/1022  and  8080A in  1024/1025).  The  only 
notable difference is that at least one version of VEF Mikro 1025 was said to use 
three microprocessors: one as a central unit, one for the video terminal and one for 
external memory (Ventiņš & Skorinko 1988.17.05, Ventiņš 1988).
The reasons why the models were many but the changes few are unknown. However, 
the structure of the Soviet system might be assumed to account for this. On one hand, 
as  mentioned  above,  upgrading  the  design  radically  was  a  time-consuming  and 
highly  uncertain  process,  perceived  as  increasingly  pointless  as  the  Soviet 
technological lag kept increasing and Western equivalents could be acquired more 
and more easily. Therefore the design process was likely to be incremental. On the 
other hand, inventive efforts were still rewarded by the central authorities. Therefore 
it  might  have  simply  been  a  good  rhetorical  move  to  create  different  labels  for 
essentially similar products and production upgrades.
Although  in  principle  all  VEF  Mikros  could  be  used  as  standalone  devices,  in 
practice  they  were  always  integrated  into  various  systems  (Videnieks  interview). 
Save for a few exceptions,  such as giving about 20–25 computers to a  scientific 
institute in Chelyabinsk (Červinskis interview), most of them were used for plant-
internal purposes only. The reasons are once again familiar: that way it was easier to 
avoid  bureaucracy,  to  avoid  becoming  entangled  with  the  state  plan,  with  its 
regulations, standards,  documentation, obligations and often failing promises. The 
price for speed, however, was to remain local and unofficial.
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The  VEF  Mikro  1025  at  least  was  still  being  produced  in  1986  (Bramņika 
1986.10.10), and it is likely that the actual production lasted even longer, until the 
late  1980s  (Krivchenkov,  Videnieks  interviews).  Approximately  200  1021s,  100 
1022s and around 600–1,000 1024s and 1025s (taken together) were eventually built 
(Krivchenkov's estimate). Owing to the aforementioned factors, the computers were 
used  until  needed  and  only  slightly  upgraded—whenever  possible,  they  were 
increasingly substituted with foreign machines: first Robotrons from East Germany 
and later PC/XTs or ATs from Taiwan (Ļenskis interview). Similar to the other cases 
described, (foreign) substitution (where possible) was preferred to a new round of the 
product cycle. If anything, VEF's position enabled this process to start even earlier 
than it did elsewhere.
At this point two questions emerge. First, if VEF was really one of the earliest in the 
Soviet  Union  to  get  into  microcomputing,  then  why did  it  not  become a  major 
producer alongside Minradioprom and Minelektronmprom? Second, how did VEF's 
experience  with  microcomputing  manifest  itself  in  relation  to  the  (local)  school 
computerization  initiative?  The  focus  of  this  dissertation  precludes  me  from 
discussing the first question. One can assume that the answer is to be found in the 
nature of central control, the rigidity of changing the production focuses of various 
plants  plus  fierce  inter-ministerial  rivalry  between  Minelektronprom  and 
Minradioprom about  computer  production.  The  second,  however,  requires  closer 
consideration of the developments in the Latvian education sector.
3.3.2 Latvian response to the school computerization initiative
Compared with other Baltic states, Latvian PC production started very early indeed. 
To a lesser extent this was also true for school computerization. The take-up of the 
latter initiative can be traced back to Ilmārs Vītols, the founder of the Institute of 
Solid  State  Physics  in  the  Latvian  State  University  (LSU)  and  an  enthusiastic 
supporter of computer-related activities. Around 1983–1984, he wrote a letter to the 
central  powers  stressing  the  need  for  school  computerization and  educational 
software, and insisting that a corresponding organization governing these processes 
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should be established in Riga (Eglājs interview). Matters might have been helped 
further by the fact that some Latvian scientists had close ties to Andrey Ershov, a key 
figure in Soviet school computerization (Vītiņš interview).
Vītols's letter seems to have coincided with the central decision to start preparing for 
the teaching of informatics in schools. As a result, the establishment of a Laboratory 
of the Problems of School Informatics (LPSI) at the Computing Centre of Latvian 
State  University was approved. LPSI was to be responsible  for preparing for the 
teaching of informatics in schools and for developing corresponding materials for the 
whole Soviet Union. It was one of only six such laboratories in the USSR (LPSI 
1986), with a planned staff of 25 people. In 1985 it could command 120,000 roubles 
for  technical  devices  and  another  50,000  for  salaries  (order  from  LSU's  rector 
1984.07.12).
Modris  Eglājs  was  appointed  head  of  the  laboratory.  Having  previously  done 
research in the field of nuclear physics, he was somewhat surprised to hear that the 
university had decided he would be the best man for the job and that the Central  
Committee had already approved his suitability for the task. Nevertheless it was a 
prestigious opportunity which left much room for improvisation, as it was initially 
far from clear what exactly such a centre would be expected to do (Eglājs interview). 
Therefore the first tasks were very practical: find the space, find the people and find 
the technology. Luckily a military complex had just been vacated in the centre of 
Riga—on the other hand, they had left it in a dreadful condition. Eglājs insisted on 
full renovation including new furniture and parquet flooring, a luxury item at the 
time. When he was initially denied the request by the university he threatened to quit 
the job. But as he had already been approved by the Central Committee this would 
have compromised the university, potentially resulting in sanctions. Therefore using 
the central support as leverage it was possible to equip the laboratory according to 
the  highest  standards  of  the  time.  This,  of  course,  also  went  for  people  and 
technology. When it came to the former it was necessary to avoid giving in to the 
informal pressure to employ the children of high-ranked officials instead of actual 
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specialists. When it came to the latter, such recommendations as “[in the] first year 
you can work with calculators” needed to be overcome (Eglājs interview).
Stressing  that  the  proper  technical  equipment  was  lacking,  that  the  task  was 
important, that there was a need to hurry and consequently that there was a need to 
adapt Western software,  the laboratory soon started to search for opportunities to 
obtain various computers. Symptomatic of the level of scarcity is the request of the 
Latvian  Planning  Committee  to  the  respective  central  organization  and 
Minradioprom  for  the  allocation  of  just  two  Agat  computers  to  the  laboratory 
(Latvian State Planning Committee 1984.28.08), or the request of the local Ministry 
of Higher and Vocational Education to the Latvian Planning Committee to receive 
15,000 dollars to buy an original Apple III computer (1984.17.09). In other words, 
these struggles for acquisition were experienced by the very same laboratory which 
was supposed to develop solutions for school computerization in the first place.
The Sistematronika-84 exhibition in November turned out to be a true eye-opener. It 
was here that people from LPSI first saw the Acorn BBC be presented (Ministry of 
Higher  and  Vocational  Education  1984.04.12).  This  British  design,  running  on 
Apple's MOS 6502 1.8 MHz processor could boast a variety of attractive features: 
colour graphics, games, excellent sound, lots of educational software and a working 
local area network which students could use to share a common drive: an unseen 
feature in the Soviet Union at the time. Moreover, the British representatives were 
willing to sell. After a series of negotiations about the exact terms between the local 
and  the  central  authorities  (e.g.  Ministry  of  Higher  and  Vocational  Education 
1984.04.12, letter from the deputy chairman of Latvian State Planning Committee 
1984.05.12),  a  contract  between  3SL  Overseas  Ltd  and  Elektronorgtehnika 
(Электроноргтехника,  official  buyer)  was  reached  by  the  beginning  of  1985 
(contract from 1985.31.01). The sum allocated for hardware and software was close 
to £40,000 (GBP), a huge amount of money at the time. As a result LPSI received a 
classroom set with one teacher's computer and 15 working places for students, a local 
area network solution, a wide variety of software, courses for teaching and training 
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from the company—the full list extends to 11 pages. By June 1985 the deal was 
concluded (protocol from 1985.17.06).
For a while this computer classroom set became a kind of a trophy, presented to 
various visitors from Latvia and elsewhere. LPSI itself started to advocate the wider 
use  and possible  mass  purchase  of  Acorn BBCs for  the  USSR and was  initially 
successful, as laboratories from Moscow and Kiev also took interest. However, at 
some point, allegedly due to more successful lobbying (Eglājs interview), Yamaha 
computers gained more support instead. And when the latter were finally bought they 
were far too few to cover the needs of the whole Soviet Union: for example, in 1986 
Estonia received 6 Yamaha classroom sets, each with 15 working places (Jürisson 
1995).
What  about  domestic  production?  Like  Estonia  and  Lithuania,  Latvia  is  a  small 
country, but contrary to the others most key activities were concentrated in only one 
city. Therefore LPSI was well aware of the developments in the industrial sector. For 
example, the need to look into the possibilities of using VEF's production for school 
use had been stressed by the local Planning Committee as well as the laboratory itself 
(Latvian State Planning Committee 1984.28.08, LPSI 1984). Later mention is made 
of cooperating with VEF, Komutators and Radiotehnika plants, wherein the designs 
of the first two are deemed most promising (LPSI 1986). Thus it seems that for some 
time LPSI was also pursuing multiple options at the local level. Yet no domestic 
design eventually prevailed: instead it was the familiar BK-0010 that diffused most 
widely. Why?
At least part of the answer is to be found in LPSI's own preferences and choices. The 
laboratory's  pragmatic  approach  to  school  informatics  was  well  expressed  by its 
former employee:  “To proceed in such a manner that we could likely outdo others  
and where we would be noticed” (Vītiņš interview). It seems that the formal role of 
the laboratory matched quite well with the interests of the workers and thus LPSI 
was first and foremost oriented to contributing to developments on the level of the 
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USSR as a whole. In so doing it aimed to find a suitable niche where it would have  
the edge. For example, it abstained from writing textbooks because the competition 
was high and it would have been unlikely that a Latvian book would be preferred to 
ones written by Ershov and other leading figures of Soviet school computerization. 
Compiling various exercises and other methodical materials for existing textbooks 
was a niche much less occupied (Vītiņš interview).
The  programming  and  reprogramming  (adaptation)  of  software  (educational 
programs plus  some more  basic  software,  e.g.  local  network  for  BK-0010s)  was 
another  such  niche.  “At  this  time  it  was  [the] general  belief  that  hardware  is  
everything—the software is creating itself somehow and it is not a problem” (Eglājs 
interview).  Software and supplementary teaching materials  thus became the main 
directions of LPSI, with the aim to acquire as much knowledge about the practical 
use  of  PCs  elsewhere  and apply it  in  Latvia  using  any computers  that  could  be 
obtained,  whatever  the  source  (Eglājs  interview).  “I  think  that  neither  us  in  the  
laboratory nor  the ones  in  the ministry  were afraid that  the  technology will  not  
come” (Vītiņš interview).
This would explain why LPSI was indeed probing different possibilities, including 
some hobbyist  proposals,  but  not  pursuing any of  them very intensively.  Bad or 
lacking  graphics  were  one  of  the  reasons  for  rejecting  some  Intel-based  clones 
(Eglājs  interview).  The stress  on software  therefore  meant  having to  rely on the 
scarce  central  provision  of  different  types  of  PCs.  The  problem of  scarcity  was 
overcome by taking the attitude that even one computer per school was better than 
nothing. The problem of adaptation simply meant more work for programmers, a task 
LPSI thought itself capable of handling. 
Of course, one should not place the sole responsibility on LPSI. From the other side 
there  were  well-known  issues  with  the  Soviet  system:  large  local  industrial 
enterprises  were  centrally  controlled  and  there  was  virtually  nothing  except 
persuasion local authorities (not to mention the universities or the LPSI) could do to 
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shape their attitudes. The fact that the factories were quite occupied with their main, 
'serious' production also meant they had little incentive to engage in local matters. As 
a  result  “nobody  in  Latvia  was  pushing  very  hard  for  local  school  computers”  
(Eglājs interview). Lacking a dedicated local leader, the support for a single domestic 
project also failed to emerge.
3.3.3 VEF and others: experiments from the mid-1980s and onwards
Having discussed VEFormika, VEF Mikro series and the choices of the education 
sector I will now turn my attention to other cases of which little is known at the 
moment. As such, the outline in this section will have to be somewhat sketchier than 
in the previous sections.
Although the VEF Mikro series was not introduced to Latvian schools, it may well 
be  that  the  school  informatics  initiative,  possibly owing  to  some communication 
between the local education sector and members of the factory, did have some impact 
on VEF's plans after all. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why, in 1984, VEF's 
Computing  Centre  suddenly  started  developing  a  device  called  the  'educational 
microprocessor kit',  EMK. It  essentially consisted of a small  set  of  modules that 
could be arranged in various ways, e.g. to assemble a working microprocessor. It had 
limited programming capabilities, a small keyboard for input and a six-digit display 
(figure 3.9). It was planned to be enhanced with additional modules so that it could 
be connected to another kit, used as a voltmeter or a music player. It was envisioned 
that eventually it could have the full capabilities of a personal computer (Suvorovs 
1984.10.07, Bramņika 1987.11.08, Maigeļdinova 1987.27.10).
In  a  way this  is  a  prime example  of  a  hardware-oriented  approach,  because  the 
production of such a kit relied heavily on the assumption that in order to use PCs 
effectively one would need a detailed understanding of the working principles of the 
machine.  For  VEF,  however,  this  made good sense because it  could draw on its 
expertise in microcomputing while avoiding the troublesome question of acquiring 
peripherals (Ļenskis interview). In fact, at least for a while EMK seems to have been 
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advocated quite vehemently, not only for schools but also for decreasing the training 
times for various technical specialists without having to buy more expensive devices 
(Vitze 1985.18.01).
Figure 3.9. Educational microprocessor kit (photo taken by the author)
Initially the endeavour proved successful. Production began in December 1986, two 
years  after  the  work  on  the  design  itself  had  started—allegedly  VEF's  quickest 
project. It was also said to be the cheapest of its kind, with a price of 700 roubles  
(Lifšica 1987.10.07, Bramņika 1987.11.08). And the orders were coming in: 600 a 
month were produced in 1987, but the lack of a sufficient number of workers and 
requested components (again) were cited as major problems (Lifšica 1987.10.07). 
One  of  the  workers  from  the  Computing  Centre  recalled  visiting  Moscow  and 
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receiving  an  order  for  around  10,000  EMKs  (Ļenskis  interview).  The  planned 
production for 1987 was 10,000 kits, but the alleged demand for 1987–1988 was 
35,000.  It  is  notable  that  even  talks  with  the  Indian  government  were  started 
regarding export of the kits (Lifšics 1987.15.12, Rūmniece 1988.16.02).
However, just as the rise of the EMK was meteoritic, so was its downfall. A warning 
sign  came  from  a  computer  exhibition  in  Riga  in  1988  when  the  visitors 
complimented the kit, demanded quicker production(!), but also noted that the device 
had arrived on the scene a few years too late (Zaicevs 1988.25.03). A year later the 
project  was  already  called  a  costly  mistake  in  the  plant's  own  newspaper  and 
production was stopped (Maigeļdinova 1989.03.10).
The newspaper article cites the sharp drop in demand as the main reason, following 
on from the fact that many other plants had started to produce similar devices for 
cheaper prices. However, one must also be reminded that some of the actual PCs—
albeit without peripherals—were also in the EMK's price range. In that context it is 
quite likely that the ready-to-use sales pitch of EMK did not prove very convincing: 
its miniature keyboard and display,  along with the promises of future expansions, 
could not make up for the fact that it was not a fully functional PC, by contrast with  
the likes of the BK-0010 (once the TV and the tape recorder had been connected of 
course). And although slowly, computers from the USSR and abroad were making 
their way into various domains. As the EMK could only be considered a temporarily 
satisfactory replacement for personal computers, it is safe to assume that the market 
for such devices was drying up rapidly anyway. Perhaps the fact that the project was 
undertaken at all once again illustrates the unforeseen trajectory and rapidity of the 
events unfolding in the second half of the 1980s.
In previous sections I have described the convergence of a set of issues—the  rigid 
inter-ministerial  division  of  labour,  the  central  control  of  VEF  and  its  formal 
detachment from the influence of local authorities, the difficulties with starting mass 
production and renewing designs, and the lack of a local leader lobbying actively on 
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multiple levels—that contributed to VEF's computer production remaining largely 
factory-internal and advancing incrementally. The circle was broken by the economic 
reforms,  after  which  the  requirement  of  self-financing  of  factories  provided  an 
incentive  to  develop  desirable  and  profitable  consumer  items—with  VEF-Prīma 
emerging as a result (Prohorova 1988.23.12).
Developed  in  cooperation  between  VEF's  Computing  Centre  and  TRD,  little  is 
known  about  the  PC.  Its  features  included  160  KB  of  RAM,  colour  graphics 
capability, two joysticks, more than 50 accompanying programs, and the potential to 
connect a tape recorder, a floppy disk drive and a printer (Prohorova 1988.23.12). 
Tellingly  the  800-rouble  machine  was  claimed  to  surpass  'a  number  of  personal 
computers'  produced in  the  USSR (Prohorova 1988.03.01).  Developed in a  year, 
production was supposed to start in July 1989. However, allegedly only a prototype 
was built (Červinskis interview). According to Andrejs Skuja's personal recollections 
the public demonstration was announced, but never took place. The reason? Jurijs 
Červinskis,  the  designer  came  into  conflict  with  his  superiors,  became  badly 
offended  and  subsequently  cancelled  the  project  (Červinskis  interview).  He  later 
went on to cooperate briefly with the plant of hydrometeorological devices, which 
attempted to produce a Sinclair Z80 clone designed in Leningrad. The experimental 
batch  of  around 400 computers  was  built  around 1989.  Because  of  faulty  chips, 
however, the project was soon halted.
Even less is known about the Komutators factory and its production. Allegedly it was 
heavily involved in producing specialized electronic devices for military needs that 
had such strategic importance that by the time the Soviet Union collapsed most of the 
technologies had already been removed (information provided by Andrejs Skuja). 
Komutators was also one of the plants to which the technical documentation of Juku 
was sent (Kashin 1987.30.05, see also section 3.1.1). The reasons why the plant was 
not interested in producing Juku cannot be stated for certain, but LPSI's report from 
1986 allows for an educated guess. Namely, while mentioning the designs of VEF 
and Komutators as the most promising, mention is also made about the ease with 
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which  the  software  of  Yamaha  computers  could  therefore  be  adopted.  As  VEF's 
computers  were  Intel-based,  this  suggests  that  Komutators  might  have  been 
attempting to clone Yamahas. Having their own design already would also explain 
why Komutators was not interested in Juku.
Yet another attempt can be traced back to Latvian scientific institutes, namely the 
Institute of Solid State Physics and the Institute of Polymer Mechanics. Here the 
prior experience with microprocessor technologies, the lack of computers and the 
release of the 8-bit Soviet computer Irisha (Ириша) provided a sufficient incentive 
for two friends to start developing a design called Skudra (meaning 'ant' in Latvian). 
The initial  goal  was  to  to  build  a  computer  for  personal  needs  while  surpassing 
Irisha's design in elegance. Constructed after working hours, the prototype, with 16 
KB ROM, 128 KB RAM and a tape recorder as an external memory device, was 
ready by 1985. CP/M was used as an operating system, but the software needed some 
adaptation to be run on Skudra (Žuks interview).
The news soon reached the ears of Ilmārs Vītols, the previously mentioned founder 
of the Institute of Solid State Physics and the person who had played a crucial role in 
the establishment of LPSI. Seeing the simplicity of the design and realizing that it 
was  constructed  from relatively  accessible  components  (Špungins  1988.20.02)—
likely out of necessity rather than choice from the point of view of the constructors—
Vītols thought it would be suitable for mass production. As he knew the director of 
the local Radiotehnika plant he offered the design for the production union.
Radiotehnika, an enterprise mainly focused on the production of radios and other 
audio equipment, was initially interested in the proposal. Therefore the Skudra team 
proceeded to prepare three prototypes. An experimental batch of ten computers with 
floppy disk drives was built by 1987–1988 (Žuks interview). Skudra was also present 
at the computer exhibition in Riga in 1988, with mass production being planned for 
1989  (Spila  1988.22.01).  By that  time  the  situation  had  changed,  however.  The 
growing opportunities to buy computers elsewhere, with high-end users already able 
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to  afford  foreign-made  computers  (IBM  PCs)  and  the  hobbyist  community 
enthusiastically adopting Sinclair clones with their ubiquitous software, little room 
was  left  for  Skudra.  Hence  both  the  designer  team and  Radiotehnika  itself  lost 
interest in the project. In broad strokes the story is then quite similar to many others
—a good-enough idea at the time simply taking too much time to realize, largely 
because  of  the  tardiness  of  the  Soviet  production  system  and  unforeseen  rapid 
developments in the environment.
In parallel, Radiotehnika was also briefly pursuing the possibility of producing BK-
0010 computers. In 1986 a Special Constructor Bureau dedicated to the development 
and production of 'semiconductor microcircuits' was established (Unisonā ar laiku 
1986.12.08).  Some  trial  batches  were  produced  in  1987  (Ļisicina  1988.01.02, 
Sadzīves kompjūtera BK-0010 1988.15.03), but little else is known. It is very likely 
that the causes for abandonment were similar to Skudra's: BK-0010 was becoming 
more and more outdated, it was a side-project anyway and at that stage it was simply 
easier to discontinue the project.
In the end it seems that the fate of local PC production was very similar to that in 
Estonia and Lithuania. Existing attempts were gradually halted in light of increasing 
possibilities of substitution, starting from high-end users in roughly the second half 
of the 1980s and proceeding to  lay users by the beginning of  the 1990s.  Moves 
towards independence, growing political animosity, then the loss of existing supply 
chains and a lack of Western contacts raised a number of existential questions—for 
example, the debates in VEF's newspaper Vefietis seemed to move from the questions 
of how to produce to what to produce to whether to produce at  all  as the 1990s 
approached. At the beginning of the 1990s, large industrial enterprises went through 
major reorganization, were privatized part by part or were closed down altogether. As 
none of them were specialized for computer production anyway, this was probably 
not  considered  a  serious  option  in  independent  Latvia.  As  in  the  other  Soviet 




In the introduction the thesis was depicted as a U-shape, proceeding from the highest 
levels of abstraction to specific narratives and back. The lowest point of the curve, 
and so the highest  amount  of  detail  was reached in the previous  chapter.  In  this 
chapter  the  direction  is  reversed.  Based  on  the  histories  presented  in  chapter  3 
various reductions, simplifications and generalizations will be made.
It seems that compared with various techniques of data collection and analysis, the 
process of theorizing from data has received relatively scant attention. Therefore I 
will first make a little detour into the nature of theorizing and try to find answers to  
two  questions:  what  actions  are  performed  when  one  is  said  to  'theorize'  from 
historical  processes? What  are  the differences  between the potential  outcomes  of 
these actions and correspondingly what different types of 'theory' could there be? I 
will then draw briefly on what I believe are the strengths and weaknesses of STS and 
grounded theory to offer a simple technique for approaching the analysis of historical 
narratives  while  avoiding  complexity  overload  at  the  same time.  For  illustrative 
purposes this technique will then be applied to intra-case analysis in detail. Inter-case 
and system-level analyses end the chapter.
4.1 From narrative to theory: what is involved and how to do it?
Once the initial materials have been worked through and narratives distilled from 
them, how should one proceed? Relying on the assumption that further theorizing on 
the basis of historical narratives is a desirable goal, how does one begin generalizing 
from such  a  wealth  of  data?  How does  one  pick  out  patterns  from the  flow of 
continuous interaction of various entities and causes operating on various levels? I 
propose that there are four basic ways of doing so. These commonly—although I 
would hazard a guess that usually intuitively—used strategies are: 1) generalization; 
2) reduction; 3) phasing; and 4) counterfactual reasoning.
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Figure 4.1. Four ways of simplifying the complexity
In the theory chapter the term 'ladder of abstraction' was used to point out that in 
order to group certain entities or events one needs to reduce the number of properties 
that  count.  In  other  words,  as  soon  as  we  start  to  classify  some  aspects  of  the 
narrative we are already performing generalizations. Taking the standardization of a 
technological product as an example, let’s assume that a researcher has compared 
two cases. In so doing she or he has found that in one instance the standard emerged 
in a producer–consumer feedback loop whereby some commercially most successful 
products  gradually became standards.  In  another  case  the  government  wanted  to 
speed  up  the  process,  intervened  and  imposed  its  own  standards,  which  the 
enterprises subsequently had to adhere to. On one level of generality we seem to 
have two completely contrasting explanations: bottom-up vs. top-down pathways of 
standardization. However, if the research was to adopt the SCOT framework (e.g. 
Pinch & Bijker 1984, 1987) a commonality can be noted: namely, in both cases there 

















closure (standardization) finally occurred. In other words, on this level of generality 
the explanations would not differ at all.  By generalizing, the cases were rendered 
equal in content.
In theory it  might be possible  to generalize all  elements of the narrative without 
excluding anything. However, usually a selection between essential and non-essential 
elements is being made. That is to say, the explanation of the case always entails a 
mix of particular unique causes and more recurrent  ones.  Once again,  to bring a 
hypothetical example: say, an organization obtains a premium from a government for 
a successfully implemented project. A day later the happy project manager slips on 
the ice and breaks her leg. Being forced to stay at the hospital for some time she 
unexpectedly has some free time on her hands. Reading the newspaper she notices an 
article about computers being required for educational needs and suddenly comes up 
with  an  idea  of  using  the  available  organizational  funds  to  develop  a  cheap  but 
efficient school PC. She then convinces her partners and thus the prototype is built. 
Now,  when government  funding,  expressed social  need and a  working prototype 
might be considered general conditions of success, slipping on ice and reading a 
newspaper are not. Moreover, it is quite likely that the idea could have been born 
anyway (e.g.  someone else  might  have also read  the paper  and proposed it  in  a 
meeting). Although all of these causes did contribute to the outcome it is probably a 
sensible strategy to discard the final two and build a model around the potentially 
more  general  ones.  Eliminating  causes  deemed  superfluous,  random and  one-off 
defines a reductive strategy.
A  particular  combination  of  reduction  and  generalization  constitutes  the  third 
strategy concerning the timeframe of the narrative. Here one first selects the events 
of  interest  (reduction),  leaving some aside,  and then  groups  them by a  common 
denominator (thus, following Sartori's (1970) definition (see section 1.1), performing 
a generalization). For example, one might divide the development of a PC into a 
number of product cycles, each characterizing one model of the computer. The length 
of these cycles may vary but the class of events they belong to are exactly the same 
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and therefore comparable.
And  finally,  there  is  always  an  option  not  only  to  focus  on  the  immediately 
observable,  but also to ask:  “How  should it  be on logical  grounds?”  (Taagepera 
2008:  5).  In  other  words,  relying  on  prior  research  experience,  reading  and 
theoretical imagination one can ask whether something is missing from the picture, 
whether some elements are confounding the underlying mechanism or whether the 
presence of such factors means that in the observed cases the mechanism has been 
realized  only  partially,  but  could  have  manifested  itself  fully  under  different 
conditions.
Of course, these strategies are closely interrelated in practice.  That is,  arriving at 
stylized  models  often  involves  removing  causes,  classifying  them,  drawing 
generalizations, identifying certain episodes, comparing the observed to the expected 
and shifting between them all. For example, one might research the involvement of 
the  education  sector  in  PC  development  and  find  that  in  all  observed  cases  it 
demanded a domestic computer. However, in one case it also provided funds for the 
development of the prototype. Once again, this particular occurrence can be deemed 
a unique cause to be dropped from the general explanation. However, it can also be 
subsumed under the category 'initiative from the education sector', by which process 
it re-enters the explanation. Moreover, in the actual research process the distinction 
between unique and general causes is far from clear-cut. The understanding might 
emerge during the research or, worse, when the results are compared with the wider 
population of cases (of which there might or might not be a good selection depending 
on the state of the field). This makes theorizing from process data a complex craft 
demanding  that  attention  is  paid  to  various  aspects  simultaneously,  as  is  well 
summarized by Poole and colleagues:  “Typologies of sequences should enable the  
researcher to recognize resemblance among patterns that differ in length,  exhibit  
different degrees of overlap among contiguous events, and exhibit  “noise” in the  
form of nonessential events which complicate the sequence” (2000: 44).
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But what is the significance of all these strategies? To my mind the above discussion 
serves to sensitize researchers to the ways in which their analytical choices define the 
theoretical population that a case represents. This of course turns the usual demand 
that a case should be selected according to its theoretical relevance on its head. I am 
arguing instead that in the presence of sufficiently rich historical data—which case 
data usually is—the theoretical relevance often depends on the way in which the 
narratives are analysed. Data can lead to theory selection, not always and necessarily 
the other way round. And this does not depend on whether one aims to construct or 
test a theory. Therefore, for data-driven research, defining the class of events a priori  
in terms of belonging to 'Soviet innovation in the field of microcomputing', 'Soviet 
innovation' or 'innovation in microcomputing' simply might not get one very far. The 
same  goes  for  the  classification  of  cases  as  'typical',  'divergent',  'critical',  'most 
similar', 'most different' etc. As this interpretative flexibility is a property of most 
qualitative data, I think that the accusation that a piece of research is (initially) data-
driven is actually less of an issue in qualitative research than it might seem.
However, this is not to deny that once the analytical choices have been made the 
cases do start to represent a certain part of the overall population: in other words, 
they act as empirical instances of particular theoretical claims. Nor do I intend to 
claim that  the  results  of  each  analysis  would  automatically  constitute  a  relevant 
theoretical contribution—because of poor selection decisions the outcome may well 
end  up  duplicating  already  existing  knowledge.  After  all,  it  is  not  the  various 
practices of theorizing that are being assessed, but the outcomes themselves. And in 
that respect one can distinguish between six possibilities, each of which could be 
considered a 'theory' of some kind (see figure 4.2). In the following section I will 
briefly describe each of these possible outcomes.
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Example: extent of strategic change in an 
organization is determined by the attributes of 
environment, leadership, decision processes 
and performance (Langley 1999)
Example: 'objectifying' and 'thinging' 




Example: explaining the run on the bank as a 
sequence of one actor's withdrawal signalling 
the other possible problems with the bank 
leading to another withdrawal etc. (Merton 
1968/Hedström 2005)
Identify a driving 
mechanism
3
Example: addictive behaviour 
(smoking, drinking, gambling) can be 
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Example: the shape of socio-technical 
transitions depends on the state of landscape, 
regime and niche and the timing of processes 
on each level (Geels & Schot 2007)





      M2
       M1
Event sequence
The first possible strategy would be to detect some variables that make a difference 
to a certain specified outcome. It is a powerful strategy, especially if the relevance of 
these variables is tested on a large sample. However, as the sole outcome of a single 
case study it is usually unsatisfactory because it quickly sacrifices all the internal 
dynamics  of  the  case.  An  example  would  be  Bijker's  (1995:  123)  notion  of 
technological  frame,  which  essentially  unites  widely differing  elements  (e.g.  key 
problems,  testing  procedures,  tacit  knowledge)  that  influence  the  attribution  of 
meanings to an artefact in the process of technological development.
The second outcome abstracts  a  general  direction,  process  or  tendency from the 
narrative. In a good case a few parallel processes or phases can be identified. An 
example is provided by Storni (2012), who highlights two alternating movements in 
the design process  in  which the emergence of  a  certain design trajectory can be 
understood as orderly practices coming to dominate over unexpected and surprising 
movements (objectifying vs. 'thinging' tendencies).
In  the  third  case  one  could  enquire  deeper  and  offer  a  generative  mechanism 
responsible for the observed outcome (e.g. an event like a bank run). The difference 
between  this  and  the  previous  outcome is  that  the  identification  of  a  process  is 
essentially  a  description  of  the  outcome,  while  the  addition  of  a  generative 
mechanism enables an explanation of “why we observe what we observe” (Hedström 
& Bearman  2009b:  9).  For  example,  the  observation  of  the  sequence  of  certain 
phases constituting the lifecycle of large technical systems (Hughes 1987) does not in 
itself explain what sustains these phases and what enables shifts from one phase to 
another, whereas the conceptualization of a bank run in terms of 1) the actions of one 
individual; 2) leading to changes in the beliefs of another; which in turn leads to 3) 
subsequent actions, could be considered explanatory.
The  fourth  outcome takes  this  reasoning  one  step  further  by uniting  a  proposed 
mechanism with contextual factors (in principle, outcomes 3 and 1). Here an attempt 
is made to specify the conditions in which some mechanisms occur, those in which 
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they do not occur and where the tipping points are. Elster (1998) uses an example of 
a study conducted by Tversky and Shafir (1992): in a series of experiments it was 
found that people tend to accept gambles when they know whether they have won or 
lost  the  previous  one,  but  usually  reject  them  when  the  previous  outcome  is 
unknown. One could interpret the amount of information available to the gambler as 
a contextual factor affecting whether the mechanism of finding excuses for what one 
wants to do anyway actualizes or not.
Implicit in the previous two outcomes is the assumption that the realization of the 
mechanism remains largely the same in each case. The fifth outcome challenges this 
belief by turning attention not only to the differences between the properties of the 
context and the actors responsible for realizing the mechanism, but also the timing 
and duration of local and contextual processes. For example, Geels and Schot (2007) 
have shown that when a relatively rapid landscape pressure opens up the regime, 
quick  substitution  only  follows  when  a  niche  has  sufficiently  matured.  If  not, 
competition  between  various  niches  takes  place  until  one  of  them  emerges  as 
dominant.  Conversely,  if  the landscape pressure does not unfold that quickly,  the 
regime has enough time for adaptation and the transformation is more gradual. The 
constituents of  the analysis  (niche,  regime,  landscape),  the event  to  be explained 
(socio-technical transition) and the basic process (niche–regime dynamics) remain 
the same, but the pattern is different in each case.
The sixth outcome introduces even more complexity: here one could focus on the 
internal  dynamics  of  the  constituents  of  the  original  mechanism.  For  example, 
whereas the theory of socio-technical transitions focuses on the interaction of the 
outcomes  of  niche-internal  and  regime-internal  processes,  it  is  also  possible  to 
disaggregate both into their respective subcomponents and the interactions between 
them (e.g. as Raven and Geels (2010) have done in the case of niche formation). 
Hypothetically,  the  overall  transition  could  now  be  explained  in  terms  of  the 
interactions of smaller units of analysis, although in practice the complexity of the 
analysis increases considerably (which likely explains why I have failed to find such 
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a work). Alternatively, if one has identified multiple mechanisms one could focus on 
how their interaction in time makes up the aggregate event sequence to be explained 
(see Gambetta (1998) for three examples). If such an interaction itself can be deemed 
a meta-mechanism the circle is complete: one has essentially identified a higher-level 
mechanism (outcome 3) and another round of theoretical specification can follow.
Note that figure 4.2 was not meant to imply that some of those outcomes would be 
inherently better or worse than others: as Edmondson and McManus (2007) have 
argued, it depends heavily on the state of prior knowledge. For example, in the early 
stages of theoretical development, finding concepts, variables or general tendencies 
can indeed be very stimulating, whereas in the mature phase rigorous quantitative 
testing can often yield better results. However, when it comes to many case studies in 
STS I frequently get the feeling that the data would have enabled many more insights 
beyond the identification of a few concepts and relations between them. Outcomes 
3–6 are rarely found, meaning that the cases remain undertheorized. This, in turn, 
hampers the theoretical cumulativity of STS. I believe that usually this does not need 
to be the case, however, and with a sufficiently rigorous approach the narratives offer 
ample possibilities for more nuanced theorizing.
But in that regard there is yet another issue: namely, when reading STS case studies 
one often notices that the journey from data to theory remains opaque. This goes for 
both 'classic' studies, such as Pinch and Bijker's on bicycles (1987) or Callon's on 
scallops (1986),  and for contemporary studies,  including those published in high-
ranked journals. For example, of the articles published in  Science, Technology, & 
Human Values during the past 3 years that claimed to use the case study approach, 
some speak about  data  collection  (e.g.  interviews,  documents,  trade publications) 
while  not  mentioning  or  scarcely  mentioning  any  analysis  at  all  (e.g.  Davis  & 
Abraham  2010,  van  Egmond  &  Bal  2011,  Storni  2012).  Other  works  mention 
specific techniques such as (iterative) coding, but only in passing (e.g. Glenna 2010, 
Morrison & Cornips 2012). The same is true for articles that claim to have used 
grounded theory, an approach characterized by a clearly specified set of guidelines—
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it is amusing to note that all such articles devote exactly one sentence to the issue 
(Felt et al. 2010, Frickel et al. 2010, Timmermans 2011).47
There are at least two explanations for why this might be the case. A sizeable part of 
the STS community might think that 1) the link between data and generalization is 
usually  intuitive  and  self-evident—people  reading  the  same  data  with  the  same 
theoretical expectations can easily arrive at the same conclusions and/or;  2) what 
happens between data and theoretical models is a craft that cannot be captured or 
formalized—some are simply able to theorize better than others and no amount of 
description of techniques can substitute for that.
There is much to agree with in this account. First, some generalizations, especially 
higher-level ones, can often be quite intuitive. For example, it does not demand much 
effort to make a mental connection between any STS case description and a claim 
that  'the interactions  are  complex and mutual  shaping of  actors  and technologies 
takes place'. I also agree that the capabilities of theorizing differ: good theorizers are 
few and far between.
On the other hand, the way in which such models were derived should be made 
visible to others so that the researcher's choices could be assessed better. Langley 
(1999)  discusses  seven  different  strategies:  narrative,  quantification,  alternate 
templates,  grounded  theory,  visual  mapping,  temporal  bracketing  and  synthetic 
strategy.  Space  considerations  do not  allow me to  cover  each of  these  in  depth. 
Therefore I will discuss the shortcomings of many such techniques on the basis of 
grounded theory, likely the most popular qualitative approach by far.
47 If the reader remains unconvinced at this point let me propose a hypothetical situation in which 
one  aims  to  publish  an  article  containing  quantitative  analysis  in  a  high-ranked  journal.  The 
discipline—economics, sociology, psychology, management studies, political science—does not 
matter. The results are accompanied with only a following methodological note: “The data was 
analysed according to the principles of linear regression analysis.” What would be the chances of  
passing peer review?
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seek specific new data
Advanced memos, refining 
conceptual categories
Data collection ----- Focused coding
Initial memos raising codes to 
tentative categories
Initial coding, data collection




The process of grounded theory, as understood by Charmaz (2008),48 consists of the 
following elements:  1)  formulating the research problem and initial  questions;  2) 
performing initial data collection and coding; 3) writing preliminary memos to create 
categories out of codes; 4) more focused coding; 5) the creation of advanced memos 
and refined categories; 6) theoretical sampling in which the emerging theory guides 
further  data  collection  to  test  the  propositions  in-the-making;  7)  more  refining, 
resulting in the emergence of some theoretical concepts; 8) sorting and integrating 
memos; 9) writing the first draft, possibly followed by more theoretical sampling. 
Note that the process is iterative: in many phases emerging categories prompt new 
examinations of existing data or require collecting more data according to new ideas. 
The end product should be a theory strongly 'grounded' in data (that is,  the links 
between theoretical propositions and data can be easily and clearly established).
There  are  two reasons,  however,  why the  parallel  process  of  data  collection  and 
analysis is unlikely to work very well for this thesis. The first is related to the nature  
of historical sociology. One can argue that in the process of establishing the historical 
course of events something resembling the above set of procedures is at work: one 
collects  the  data,  assesses  it,  formulates  a  preliminary  idea  about  how  events 
unfolded, proceeds to collect new information while addressing the existing gaps and 
testing alternative explanations, re-assesses the information acquired etc. until one 
explanation can be deemed more plausible than the others. But in this thesis (and in 
other historical sociological works) the narrative is not an end point in itself, but an 
intermediary step providing grounds for further theorizing. This means that as long 
as  there  are  multiple  equally  plausible  historical  explanations  there  are  multiple 
generalizations  to  be  derived  from  each  of  them.  However,  as  some  of  the 
explanations  become  more  unlikely  over  the  course  of  research  the  space  for 
theoretical  variety  decreases  and  some  previously  possible  generalizations  lose 
connection with the evidence. Since the ways in which one can theorize complex 
48 I prefer Charmaz's treatment to the orthodox version (Glaser & Strauss 1967) and to the more  
narrow recent interpretations (e.g. Suddaby 2006). The reason is that Charmaz retains the essence 
of procedural guidelines for moving from data to theory while abstaining from making what I  
deem  unnecessary  restrictions.  For  example,  Charmaz  allows  prior  theoretical  literature  to 
influence the problem formulation, and she acknowledges the possibility that grounded theory can 
be 'objectivist' or 'constructivist', descriptive or explanatory etc.
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narrative data are abundant anyway, it seems sensible to avoid overburdening oneself 
with both first-order (narrative) and second-order (theory) generalizations during the 
process of narrative assembly. In my opinion, the complexity of qualitative research 
is managed better by settling down to a certain interpretation of events first and then 
theorizing further on that basis.49
The  second  observation,  derived  from  my  personal  research  experience,  is  also 
related to managing complexity. When one looks at the grounded theory process one 
notices that despite the iterations the general direction of the process is still bottom-
up,  moving  from  a  variety  of  initial  codes  and  memos  to  more  general  and 
interrelated  constructs.50 The  trouble  with  this  kind  of  approach—to  speak  in 
metaphors—is that it forces one to juggle with all the balls from the beginning, even 
before one has learned how to do so with two or three. But when confronting the 
complexity of data in its entirety it is very easy to get lost and miss the wood behind 
the trees. Indeed, grounded theory has been accused of failing to turn attention to 
more general and large-scale patterns (Langley 1999: 700). Moreover, considering 
the limited time resources of each researcher, the effort is quite failure-prone in that 
the whole data  has  to  be worked through in  minute detail  and all  strings  pulled 
together before the theory could be said to have emerged.
Personally, I have noticed that it is often preferable to start from the other end, to try 
and capture the process as a  whole—to ask: “What  is  going on here?” After  the 
answer to this question has been found, one can specify: “Yes, but what exactly is 
going on here?” By gradually adding new elements,  the theorization moves from 
abstract  and schematic  towards  middle-range and nuanced.  In  addition  to  feeling 
more intuitive the advantage is that the process can be stopped by the analyst at any 
49 Of course, one cannot escape the irony that future historical research can undermine the initial 
narrative  and  thereby put  the  derived  generalizations in  doubt.  Should this  happen one  could 
attempt to save the theory by arguing that  the explanatory power of  the generalization is  not 
automatically lost—it only loses connection with one particular instance, but may still apply to a  
range of others. But theorizing the extent to and conditions in which this happens already belongs 
to the domain of the sociology of scientific knowledge.
50 The same is true for at least some strategies outlined by Langley (1999), especially quantification 
and visual mapping.
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time, yet at any point one also has a theory of some kind (whether it is too simple or 
too complex is an entirely different matter).
In fact, many STS case studies I have read leave an impression as if the authors had 
actually  followed  this  strategy  and  (at  least  implicitly)  had  tried  to  capture  the 
essence of their story in such a manner. For example, the core of Bijker's extended 
study on  bicycles  (1995:  19–100)  seems  to  be:  'Social  groups  attribute  different 
meanings to an artefact by which consensus is achieved and the artefact stabilizes in 
a  dominant  design'.  Callon's  study  of  scallops  (1986)  can  be  summarized  as  a 
sequence  of  translation  proceeding  from  problematization  to  'interessement'  to 
enrolment to mobilization. The main trouble with case studies like this is, however, 
that such high-level theorizations are often the endpoint of the analysis, meaning that 
there remains a “gap between relatively simple, sensitizing conceptual schemes and  
detailed,  complex  case  descriptions  with  some  empirical  generalizations”  (Geels 
2007b:  633).  So sympathizing  with  the  (apparent)  starting  point  of  STS and the 
rigour of grounded theory, the following intra-case analysis will simply attempt to 
make the best out of their combination.
4.2 Intra-case analysis
4.2.1 Step one: detecting the key nodes
To illustrate  the technique (and the gradual emergence of substantive results)  the 
following outline  will  be  quite  extensive.  A few clarifications:  first,  the  level  of 
analysis sets certain demands on the detail of data required. Therefore, owing to the 
combined reasons of space and data insufficiency the intra-case analysis will mainly 
focus on three cases in Estonia and three in Lithuania.  Developments external to 
these localities (i.e.  production in other  factories in the USSR) will  be excluded. 
Latvian  events  will  be  included  in  inter-case  and  system-level  analyses.  Finally, 
space considerations mean that the treatment of the cases is necessarily short. The 
reader is referred back to the previous chapter for more detail.
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The very first step was to start from the case that I knew best—Juku. I attempted to 
summarize the basic course of its development in a few sentences: “Strong network 
around  the  Juku  project  formed  fast,  but  it  proved  to  be  difficult  to  get  it  into 
production. Various participants dropped out of the project and substitutes had to be 
found,  delaying  the  process  and  leading  eventually  to  an  outdated  product. 
Difficulties with upgrading and shifting user perceptions put an end to the project.” 
Figure 4.4 shows a visualization made on the basis of this summary.
Figure 4.4. A rough visualization of Juku's development
It  can  be  seen  that  in  general  the  network  of  Juku went  through two phases  of 
expansion  and  contraction  similar  to  each  other  regardless  the  differences  in 
interactions with its environment. It could also be expressed in terms of its properties 
undergoing  some  changes  (e.g.  losing  RET  and  Estron  with  their  production 
infrastructure and know-how of compiling technical documentation resulted in an 
inability to perform some activities and the need to look for new partners).
This formulation led to a question: what kind of properties? Are there any key nodes 
of development that would capture the story in more detail? A trial-and-error process 
followed  in  which  I  attempted  to  select  and  link  the  optimal  number  of  nodes 
(enough to capture the whole development process, but not so many that would result 
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in  duplication  or  over-complicated  depiction).  Figure  4.5  shows  one  such  early 
sketch. Note how this visualization obscures the temporal progression in favour of 
providing more information about case-internal developments.
Figure 4.5. An initial sketch of Juku's key nodes of development
Many  problems  occurred  when  comparing  this  sketch  with  the  narrative.  For 
example, there was no part for the vision that often preceded actual developments, 
the criteria  for defining a good product  were vague,  the perceived quality of the 
product changed over time (e.g. even the most committed participants admitted that 
Juku went into production far too late, but even then helped to reduce the shortage of 
computers considerably)  etc.  Iterations  and  re-drawings  followed,  involving  the 
addition,  deletion  or  merging  nodes  and interactions  until  existing  and emerging 
questions like the ones found above could be more or less solved and approximate 
representation of moving from one property state to another could be attained.
I then moved on to other cases. By comparing the brief summaries of each case with 
the model, I quickly discovered many elements that did not fit. For example, initially 
the Entel group was not planning mass production and thus did not seek support from 
the  environment,  instead  proceeding  straight  to  production.  To  account  for  the 
possibility  of  reformulating  the  vision  during  the  development  of  the  case,  a 
respective feedback link had to be devised. The Poisk project sensitized me to the 
possibility of a project being abandoned outright if environmental support fails. And 

















Figure 4.6. Changing properties of socio-technical networks
Note: Although the figure has been inspired by flowchart diagrams it is strictly speaking not a flowchart because it allows for non-unique 
connectors to exit from some nodes. The reason is my preference for ontological accuracy over methodological requirements: different networks  
simply chose different ways to proceed from the same property state.
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Explanation of the key nodes is as follows:
1) 'Vision'  refers  to  more  or  less  fleshed  out  ideas  about  the  reasons  for 
development  of  the  computer,  including  but  not  limited  to  technical 
characteristics, price,  domain of application,  potential  users,  plan for mass 
production etc. (Note that it does not need to be an eventual or an explicit 
vision—characteristic  users  and  uses  might  only  be  imagined  by  the 
designer).
2) 'Capability  for  prototyping'  refers  to  necessary resources  (including actors 
with necessary skills, knowledge and technologies) for building a prototype. 
At minimum it could be a single sufficiently equipped enthusiast.
3) 'Local  production/use  network'  refers  to  the  preliminary  constellation  of 
actors,  technologies  and  rules  involved  in  the  project.  Domain-wise  it 
includes engineering, economics, politics, culture etc. Functionally it includes 
potential producers, distributors and users (note that this does not mean that 
the network is fixed, e.g. that all application domains are known, all potential 
users have been included etc. These may well turn out considerably larger or 
smaller than initially expected).
4) 'Reconfiguration' refers to changes in the socio-technical network to achieve a 
desired goal or adapt to changes. These changes are multiple but all involve 
some alterations to the constellation of the network (e.g. the prototype might 
need improvements, existing users might lead to new ones).
5) 'Environmental support' refers to the wider context external to the local socio-
technical network in focus that asymmetrically affects the chance of the latter 
to realize its  vision (e.g.  in planned economy this  might refer to approval 
from the central authorities, in market economy it can mean the wider market 
of consumers not included in the design process whose behaviour can lead to 
adjustments in the local network).
6) 'Satisfaction' refers to the question whether the product is able to satisfy at 
least some of consumer needs (e.g. in planned economy products might be of 
relatively low quality but nevertheless be desired due to overall shortage).
7) 'R&D' refers to plans regarding further development of the product, i.e. the 
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beginning of another product cycle.
Explanation of possible interactions is as follows: 
1) An idea, even a raw one about the potential uses of the computer, might lead 
to mobilization of necessary resources to realize it. Failure to conceive of one 
can lead to  aimless  tinkering  (although in  principle  it  is  possible  that  the 
vision gradually emerges from such activity).
2) If the necessary resources and capabilities for prototyping exist, a prototype 
will be created. If not, then additional reconfiguration is needed (e.g. more 
components, people with relevant skills, more information).
3) If  the  product  is  seen  to  have  any  use,  the  need  to  produce  it  in  larger 
quantities  emerges.  Here  direct  contacts  with  some  potential  producers, 
distributors  and  users  are  often  established,  if  only  through  preliminary 
negotiations.  If  the  mobilization  is  successful,  production  could  start 
immediately or support sought from the environment first (note that this is 
one  of  the  main  differences  between  a  market  economy  and  a  planned 
economy—in  the  former  mass  production  can  start  immediately,  but  the 
success of the product still depends on its resonance with the environment; in 
the latter only small-scale customized production is possible without central 
support, otherwise approval from the authorities must be obtained first). In 
case the mobilization of the extended local network fails for some reason, 
reconfiguration of the network is needed.
4) If reconfiguration is successful, a local network comes into being. If not, the 
original  vision  can  be  reformulated,  leading  to  possible  changes  in  other 
elements (e.g. new prototype, new participants). Alternatively, the project can 
be abandoned altogether. Yet another option is to attempt bypassing the local 
network  (e.g.  gaining  the  support  from  the  central  authorities  for  local 
production or making the project 'migrate' by linking up with producers or 
users outside of the local network).
5) If  preliminary environmental  support has been secured,  the question of to 
what  extent  the  product  is  able  to  satisfy  consumer  needs  emerges.  If 
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environmental support is absent this might lead to problems with the stability 
of the local network and the project might be even abandoned.
6) If  the  product  is  found  satisfactory  in  at  least  some  respect,  the  socio-
technical  network  in  question  might  be  reconfigured  (e.g.  expanding  the 
production  with  all  required  preparations  and  adjustments,  adapting  the 
product to new uses). Continued production can also give rise to a question 
about the next product cycle. On the other hand, if the product turns out to be 
lacking in  some aspects,  support  from global  network and local  extended 
network needs to be re-checked. If these still hold production can continue 
unchanged at  least  for  some time.  Alternatively,  the original  vision  might 
need adjusting.
7) If the new product cycle is to be started, further research and development 
activities are required, with the possibility that both the original vision and 
the  local  network  need  to  be  rethought  and  reconfigured  accordingly. 
Alternatively, the production of the existing product can continue without any 
or with only minor improvements (e.g. the addition of better memory chips, 
but no alterations to the basic design) until demand exists. In that case the 
project will be gradually phased out of production and use.
This model can be applied to each of the cases:
Juku: this  case was characterized by fast  vision-formation,  including the plan of 
mass production (1), creation of a local prototype by an influential organization (2) 
and mobilization  of  a  local  supplier–user  network (3).  The disapproval  from the 
central authorities (5) led to delays, after which two producers dropped out because 
they  had  changed  their  vision  about  feasible  production  (3).  Reconfiguration 
activities followed (4),  resulting in the agreement with another producer (3). The 
outdated product was perceived as better than nothing in the short term (6), but not in 
the long term, leading to R&D to create the second generation school computer (7). 
The vision (1) and prototyping capabilities (2) remained largely the same, but the end 
of the USSR, disruption of the supply chain and other  difficulties resulting from 
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wider  social  macro-processes  meant  unsuccessful  network  mobilization  (3)  and 
reconfiguration activities (4), which is why the project was abandoned.
Tartu: after the LES lab was created the idea of building a PC emerged gradually. 
The initial vision of Tartu (1) was about small-scale, customized production for the 
university's own needs. After creation of the prototype (2), discussion of production 
with various parties followed (3, 4), but did not result in actual cooperation. School 
computerization programme led to reformulation of the vision (1) around roughly the 
same computer (2), but the local support network formed mainly around Juku (3). 
Reconfiguration activities (4) led to a contact with a factory in Kursk (5). As the start 
of production was delayed, Palivere was sought as a partner at the local level (3). 
When Palivere's production finally started, Tartu was quite outdated and only had a 
steadily  decreasing  price  advantage  (6).  Competition  with  Western  products  was 
deemed unthinkable and thus no R&D activities followed (7).
Entel: the initial vision emerged (1) from technical interest and practical problems of 
the Ministry of Communications, affecting the design of the prototype (2). Contracts 
for  various  projects  followed (3).  References  from satisfied  customers  (6)  led  to 
various new contacts (4), in turn leading to further changes in the local network (3). 
One of the new potential users approached with a proposal to adapt Entel for schools, 
leading to changes in vision (1), minor additions to design (2) and links with the 
vocational education sector (3). Contact with the Pöögelmann factory meant another 
reconfiguration (4) and another potential adjustment in vision (1), but support from 
the central authorities could not be secured (5) while the commitment of the Entel 
group itself was rather half-hearted. The computers continued to be used for a while 
(6) and the project was quietly phased out (7) as the interests of the group changed.
Santaka: the vision of a cheap, simple, software-compatible and quickly produced 
computer for schools and young people (1) led to the cloning the Sinclair Spectrum 
(2). Although contacts with the KRMESRI were established (3), mass production did 
not get an official approval and a satisfactory agreement with Sigma regarding the 
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production could not be established (4). The vision had to be slightly adjusted with 
respect to the quantities to be produced (1), but otherwise the prototype was made (2) 
and  small-scale  production  prepared  with  an  approval  from local  politicians  (3). 
Produced computers (6) were given to schools and copied by hobbyists (4), leading 
to a larger local network (3). Due to the initial vision seeing Santaka as a temporary 
solution and the increasing (expectations of the) availability of newer computers no 
R&D followed (7), and the project was terminated on the local level. In parallel with 
local  production,  however,  the  KRMESRI  established  successful  links  with  the 
central  authorities  (5),  leading  to  the  migration  of  the  project  and  subsequent 
production in two Soviet factories (6).
Sigma 8800: with the increased need to find products that could be produced and 
marketed Sigma came up with a PC/XT project (1) and a prototype (2) which it 
offered to schools.  The education sector  initially agreed (3).  Sigma proceeded to 
prepare  the  production  and  produced  some  computers  (6).  In  the  meantime  the 
education sector increased its demands with respect to the desired characteristics of 
the computer (3). Sigma was unable to meet these requirements (4) and the project 
was soon abandoned (7). The already produced computers were eventually used in 
Sigma's own production processes.
Lema's PC/XT: tinkering with an IBM PC/XT clone to fix it led to a vision to copy 
the IBM design with as many Soviet components as possible (1). The capability of 
prototyping (2) was hampered by the lack of foreign currency, which could only be 
solved by establishing a contract with a partner from Moscow (4). The development 
resulted in a working prototype (3), but owing to new possibilities existing partners 
lost interest in the project (4), leading to the establishment of Lema (3). Small-scale 
customized production followed, with new contracts gradually coming in (6, 4, 3). In 
parallel,  the half-hearted contact with Sigma did not lead to mass production (4). 
Otherwise  no  major  alterations  to  the  design  were  made  (7)  and  with  new 
possibilities and more profitable projects the PC was gradually phased out.
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BK-0010Š: the  vision  of  Venta/Nuklonas  saw the  production  of  BK-0010Š  as  a 
school computer (1) in which the design (2) could be acquired from the environment 
almost  without  any changes.  The local support  was limited because some parties 
were  excluded  from the  decision-making  process  and  divided  in  opinion,  while 
others  thought  that  agreeing  to  the  production  proposal  might  result  in  a  more 
favourable attitude of the central  authorities in the future (3). The central  powers 
provided  official  support  (5),  leading  to  production  (6).  With  the  increasing 
availability of newer computers and the accompanying shift in user perceptions no 
R&D followed (7) and the production was eventually stopped.
Poisk: the possibility of engaging in cooperative activities between state enterprises 
and earning profits led Sigma to the idea to start producing a Soviet IBM-compatible 
(1), the design which had already been developed elsewhere (2). Although there was 
notable resistance from the local level, albeit without formal authority (3), production 
might have still started (4, 3) if the potential partner had not increased its demands 
(5).  Lacking  the  support  from the  environment,  the  project  was  abandoned  and 
Sigma started seeking other, more promising projects.
4.2.2 Step two: from key nodes to key node sequences
Figure 4.6 presented a model of the key nodes of all cases and the interactions that 
led  from one to  another.  Although  seemingly quite  complex  it  actually  excludes 
many important details about the actual development of each case. Most importantly, 
it  hides the unfolding of each case in time. Thus one cannot distinguish between 
different  phases  of  development,  consider  parallel  developments  or  detect  the 
repeated occurrence of some event sequences.
Thus in the second step I mapped the development of each case separately, turning 
explicit attention to the shortcomings outlined above. An example of such a map for 
the case of Tartu PC is provided in figure 4.7 (all others are found in appendix B).
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Figure 4.7. The evolution of Tartu PC
The dashed line in the figure separates local developments from the environment, 
whereas the vertical ones divide the evolution into phases. The small empty circles 
refer either to the parts of the local event sequence that remained roughly the same or 
to unspecified developments in the environment.  Finally,  X marks the end of the 
project in the environment.
It can be seen that figure 4.7 unites the temporal progression of figure 4.4 with the 
amount of detail of figure 4.6. The use of vertical separators allows attention to be 
turned to the evolution of the cases as series of key node sequences with certain 
outcomes. In Tartu's case one can distinguish between a preparatory phase in which 
tinkering with microprocessor technologies gradually led to the idea of the computer, 
followed by a search for possible producers. The third phase, triggered by school 
computerization in 1985, involved changes in vision but ended without any success. 
Yet another round of search in the following phase led first to the migration of the 
project and then to the establishment of local contacts. In the fifth phase the project 
started losing ground, first gradually and then more rapidly, until the production was 
terminated.
Applying this logic to each case, I detected a set of such key node sequences, each 
concerning a particular aspect of the evolution of the network. I then grouped the 
sequences according to which aspect of the development they seemed to be about. 
The  results  are  presented  in  table  4.1,  along  with  a  short  explanation  of  each. 
Additionally, the outcome of each sequence has been indicated—that is, whether the 
network expanded (+), remained the same (0), decreased (–) or collapsed (×).
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Table 4.1. Key node sequences of socio-technical network evolution
No Sequence Description Example Outcome
1
a
Preparations: shared vision along with 
(capability to build) a prototype
IoC envisioned Juku as  a  simple,  cheap 
and  quickly  produced  school  computer 
and had the capability to design one
+
b
Preparations: shared vision exists but 
some elements for prototyping are 
missing, leading to attempts at 
reconfiguration
Lema's PC/XT: not all components could 
be replaced with  Soviet  ones,  therefore 
foreign currency was needed before the 
project  could  continue;  partners  in 




Local search: unsuccessful initial attempts 
to secure local support, followed by 
successful reconfiguration
Many  organizations  were  initially 
interested in the Tartu project,  but only 
Palivere started local production
+
b
Local search: unsuccessful initial attempts 
followed by unsuccessful reconfiguration, 
leading to the attempts to 'migrate' the 
project
Tartu  people  established  connections 
with the Kursk plant so the latter would 
mass produce their design
+
c
Local search: unsuccessful initial attempts 
followed by unsuccessful reconfiguration, 
leading to no change in the initial network
Santaka  was  advocated  for  mass 
production but was eventually produced 
on  a  small  scale  by  the  initial  KPI-
KRMESRI network (note: the example is 
not  perfect  because  the  vision  also 
needed to be adjusted accordingly)
0
d
Local search: unsuccessful initial attempts 
followed by unsuccessful reconfiguration, 
leading to the collapse of the network
When  the  education  sector  changed  its 
preferences,  no  new  potential  market 























Adapting to the environment: searching 
for the support of the environment is 
successful
The  proposal  from  Venta/Nuklonas  and 
the approval from the central authorities 




Adapting to the environment: searching 
for support from the environment fails, but 
local network remains committed to the 
project
No exact empirical match, but similar to 
2c—the closest  match:  Entel  continuing 
on  the  path  of  small-scale,  customized 
production  after  mass  production  failed 
to be realized (but as the contacts with 
the Pöögelmann plant were disrupted the 
shape of the network was altered too)
0
c
Adapting to the environment: searching 
for support from the environment fails, 
followed by the instability of a local 
network
After  the  mass  production  of  Juku  was 
refused  approval  by  the  central 




Adapting to the environment: searching 
for support from the environment fails, 
leading to the collapse of the network
When Sigma's  potential  partner  in  Kiev 





Normal diffusion: use of products leads to 
new customers with similar preferences 
and application of the product to new 
functional domains for which extensive re-
design is not necessary
Santaka  design  diffused  into  hobbyist 




Normal diffusion: addition of new users 
with different preferences, followed by 
(slight) adjustments in vision
An enthusiast from the education sector 
influenced the Entel  group to adapt the 
computer for school needs along with the 


















Decline/renewal: while existing user needs 
are still fulfilled, the new product cycle is 
already being planned (proactive renewal)
While existing Jukus were alleviating the 
scarcity of school computers, IoC people 




Decline/renewal: as no renewal is planned, 
users with changed preferences gradually 
drop out until the network decays
No  next-generation  computer  was 
planned in Lema. The existing design was 
produced until  demand dropped off and 
then was completely phased out
×
Vision = presence/absence of the vision, PT = prototype, RCF = reconfiguration, LN = local network, Env' = support from the environment,  






As noted, such a mapping opens up the compressed model presented in figure 4.6 
and shows that  each case involves moving through multiple  loops to capture the 
whole  sequence.  But  another  issue  also  manifests  itself:  namely,  that  in  certain 
situations some steps were actually redundant. In Juku's case, for example, the vision 
and the prototype remained roughly the same for years while partners for production 
were searched for. This directs attention to the cumulative nature of socio-technical 
network evolution. At least three different states of the network have been implicit in 
the discussion: 1) vision; 2) prototype; and 3) set-up for production. But (how) is this 
distinction relevant for the next step of analysis?
4.2.3 Step three: inserting the multi-level interaction
One could criticize the results described above from many angles. For example: 1) 
the results are too undifferentiated, downplaying or failing to make a clear distinction 
between network-internal and network-external events; 2) this inadequate distinction 
leads  to  a  lack  of  understanding of  the  interaction  between network-internal  and 
network-external events; 3) the groups and the activities enacted by these groups that 
underlie  the  key node sequences  remain  obscure;  4)  the  sequence of  certain  key 
nodes does not necessarily imply that they are causally connected; 5) the sequences 
might be misleading or simply empirically inaccurate—for example, in Juku's case 
the attempts at network-building preceded the development of the prototype.
There are several ways that these problems can be addressed. What I chose to do was 
to zoom in on each phase of development. As seen from figure 4.7, however, some of 
these  phases  contained  a  number  of  interactions  or  episodes  (e.g.  repeated 
unsuccessful searches for different partners). I decided to focus on explaining the 
outcome of each such episode,  turning attention to the temporal unfolding of the 
interaction between different local socio-technical actors/networks. I also sensitized 
myself to the properties of these actors/networks and to the role of network-external 
events. The overall purpose of this step is thus to explain changes in the properties of 
the  socio-technical  network  as  a  result  of  network-internal  and  network-external 
events. In this section I will present these episodes to show how the understanding of 
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these processes gradually improved during the analysis process. Once again I will 
take Juku as my starting point.51
Case 1, episodes 1–2: explaining the formation of the local network
IF there has been a clear positive environmental stimulus
AND a strong leader
that presents a compelling vision
THEN formation of a strong local network follows
Figure 4.8. Network formation (Juku)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: by the time the events started, the IoC 
was  a  well-established,  capable  organization  with  ample  resources  and 
connections(2). School computerization provided a direction for adapting the IoC's 
experience  in  microcomputing  (2).  The  IoC  came  up  with  an  idea  of  a  locally 
designed and mass produced school computer (3). Meetings and negotiations with 
51 It must be remembered that (similarly to the preceding analysis) the following theorization gives 
up some of the conditionality of the narrative, favouring one explanation of events over others 
(e.g. the change in RET's preferences is taken at face value, excluding problems with potentially 
biased presentation of the events by an interviewee). On one hand, this is regrettable; on the other  
hand, it is rather unavoidable if one is to move forward from deconstruction to reconstruction.
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Many interdependent and intertwining developments take place in the 
environment opening up certain possibilities and closing others. Most 
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local decision-makers, producers (RET, Estron) and future users (4) resulted in the 
formation of a broad support network dedicated to the realization of the idea (5).
The first  problem with such a  generalization is  the increasing imprecision of the 
terms used. One can well contest the adjectives used: what do 'clear', 'strong' and 
'compelling' actually refer to? Some tentative criteria can be presented in response:
1) Clarity of the environmental stimulus is mainly defined by its proximity and 
connectedness  to  local  events.  For  example,  the  idea  of  a  local  school 
computer  production can be easily traced back to  the influence of  central 
initiatives for school computerization.
2) Strength  of  the  network  reflects  mainly  the  aggregate  attributes  of  the 
network  and  thereby  its  potential  capability  to  effect,  resist  or  adapt  to 
changes.  It  is  expressed  in  many attributes:  number  of  actors,  production 
infrastructure, relevant know-how and skills, resources for producing the PCs 
etc.  As  such,  all  actors  and  networks  of  actors  are  thoroughly  socio-
technical.52 In this  case the IoC managed to establish a  broad network of 
decision-makers,  potential  producers,  designers  and  users  with  sufficient 
production  capabilities  and  potential  influence  on  central  authorities—the 
machines as well as the people mattered.
3) Whereas the strength refers mainly to the aggregate attributes of the socio-
technical network, the compelling quality of the vision denotes mainly the 
degree of commitment of its components to act as a whole. The criteria by 
which the quality of the vision might be judged are many. These include (but 
not limited to): a) clarity; b) perceived timeliness; c) perceived realizability; 
d)  scope;  e)  match  with  pre-existing  organizational  interests  and 
commitments; f) expected pay-off from new commitments; g) extent of new 
commitments  and  obligations;  h)  power  to  decide  over  the  terms  of 
participation (including entry and exit). As such, different participants might 
ascribe different values and different levels of importance to these criteria, 
52 Hughes seems to have a similar idea in mind when speaking about the mass of a large technical  
system (1987: 76).
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influencing their joining/staying/leaving the network. In this case the vision 
of a locally designed and mass produced computer was articulated clearly, it 
was  deemed  sufficiently  up  to  date  (provided  the  production  would  start 
soon), it seemed possible to realize this vision, and the production might have 
brought prestige to all and profit to at least some of the participants.
Although the use of these adjectives has been clarified, it must be noted that these 
variables  are  not  strictly  measurable:  it  is  unclear  how  some  of  them  can  be 
operationalized  more  rigorously  and  if  so,  whether  the  data  on  current  cases  is 
sufficient to do so. The characterization is based on my knowledge of the cases and 
their contexts, and is relative to the entities involved. The degree of arbitrariness and 
subjectivity  in  analytical  decision-making  is  therefore  notable.  As  a  first 
approximation, however, I deem the approach satisfactory because compared with 
step two it allows for attention to be paid to more nuances.
Case 1, episodes 3–4: explaining the contraction of the local network
IF there has been a clear negative environmental stimulus
along with changed structural possibilities
AND the performance of the local network has yielded negative results
there are irreconcilable differences regarding the renewal of the network
and there is a prototype but the vision keeps weakening
THEN contraction of the network follows
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Figure 4.9. Contraction of the network (Juku)
Correspondence  to  the  narrative  is  as  follows:  the  central  authorities  refused  to 
approve the project and did not allocate resources (1). New prototypes were being 
worked  out  elsewhere  in  the  USSR  (2).  Estron  had  experienced  unexpected 
difficulties with the production and quit (3). RET had come to see the project as 
outdated  when finally  implemented,  had  found a  more  promising  prototype  and, 
unable  to  convince  the  IoC,  also  quit  the  project  (4).  As  a  result,  two potential 
producers  along  with  the  necessary  production  infrastructure  and  know-how  of 
preparing full technical documentation disappeared and the overall strength of the 
network decreased (5).
Case 1, episode 5: explaining the expansion of the local network
IF the strength of the local network is moderate
BUT there is a prototype and the vision is sufficient
THEN expansion of the network follows
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Figure 4.10. Expansion of the network (Juku)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: changes in environmental conditions 
also changed the frame of reference and accompanying expectations (in Juku's case 
the actual content of the vision was more or less the same, but (global and Soviet) 
developments in the domain of computing provided a different measuring stick for 
judging the merits of the project—thus a 'reasonably up-to-date' computer in 1985 
became 'outdated' by 1989) (1). The network still had local political support, a clearly 
defined user group and the design of the prototype,  but it  had lost  the producers 
along with the relevant infrastructure and know-how (2). Although the project had 
become somewhat outdated, it  matched with Baltijets's need to use computers for 
their own production processes,53 hence making it 'sufficient' (3). Baltijets was part of 
an elite ministry with good production infrastructure and thus was a strong ally (4).
In principle the description of this episode is similar to the first one: a smaller entity 
formulates a vision that exceeds its capabilities and therefore, requiring additional 
entities,  diffuses  it  through  various  means  (organizing  meetings,  negotiations, 
presentations) in an attempt to raise the interest of other actors. In both cases the 
53 It seems reasonable to assume that the realizability of the vision actually increased over time as the  
components used in Juku became more widely available, whereas newer components with higher 
performance remained difficult to obtain.
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outcome is an increase in the overall strength of the network. What is different is the 
initial size of the network—single actor vs. existing medium-strength network with 
some experience and expectations—and the attractiveness of the vision.
Case 1, episode 6: explaining the renewal of the local network
IF there has been a clear positive environmental stimulus
while environmental developments have opened up new possibilities
AND the local network has stabilized on the path of 'normal diffusion' while it is 
considered  possible  that  it  can  to  cope  with  future  change  in  consumer  
preferences (i.e. the expected rapidity and scope of environmental dynamics 
do not exceed the network's adaptive capability)
THEN reorientation of the network follows
Figure 4.11. Renewal of the network (Juku)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the central authorities approved the 
production  and  allocated  necessary  resources  (1).  Production  was  prepared  and 
started in Baltijets (floppy drives and printers were added, schools gradually obtained 
the computers, new applications appeared, the number of people having hands-on 
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experience with Juku gradually increased etc.) (2). In the meantime various reforms 
had  resulted  in  decreasing  economic  and  political  constraints  and  increasing 
possibilities (3). One of such possibility—to start joint ventures—was taken up by 
the IoC (4). The experience from working with Finnish and Taiwanese partners led to 
the idea to design a new version of Juku. At the same time contacts with Baltijets 
virtually stopped after  the plant  had started production.  The involvement  of  new 
actors was considered instead (5).
The outcome of this  episode brings  us  back to the beginning of  another  product 
cycle.  Here  the  vision  can  be  adjusted,  a  new  prototype  designed,  existing 
components excluded from the network and new ones included until a sufficiently 
strong and stable configuration is achieved. Although new partners were contacted 
and a prototype designed, the project did not proceed further.
Case 1, episode 7: explaining the collapse of the local network
IF the local stabilized network (with a vision and a prototype)
encounters rapid and wide-ranging environmental changes
AND changing demands and preferences exceed the network's adaptive capability
and the participants expect this to continue (so coping with future change in
consumer preferences is deemed impossible)
THEN the network collapses
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Figure 4.12. Collapse of the network (Juku)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the old version of Juku was being 
produced and the IoC had already designed a prototype of the newer version (1). 
Independence  meant  transitions  in  economic,  political  and  cultural  domains 
involving many radical disruptions, e.g. the loss of Eastern contacts along with the 
lack of Western ones (2). Disappearance of the closed market meant opening up to 
global competition, leading the participants to change their preferences regarding the 
feasibility  of  the  project  and  future  course  of  action—catching  up  with  the 
achievements of foreign computer production was deemed unrealistic (3). Baltijets 
stopped production, the IoC moved on to other activities and school computerization 
was reoriented towards Western PCs (4).
Note that the term 'lose faith' does not necessarily refer to irrational behaviour: on the 
contrary, the participants had rational and reasonable expectations about their ability 
to compete with Western PCs considering the outdated production infrastructure, lack 
of  funds,  superiority  of  Western  computers  and  rapid  advances  in  computing 
technology. The fact that even the strongest local networks did not survive the wider 
societal transition gives an indication of the strength of this pressure.
The first round of the analysis is thus complete. It is time to reflect on some of the 
215
Network is stabilized 
and can even be in the 
process of renewal...




faith in the network's 
capability to adjust 
accordingly now and 
in the future...
...leading to the 
collapse of the 
network
findings. I will focus on environmental developments here as a sufficient variety of 
them have been observed already.
First,  theoretically  one  should  distinguish  between  environmental  stimuli  and 
structural opportunities or constraints.  The first is defined by its proximity to the 
local event, where the logical connection between the environmental stimulus and 
the local response can be easily established (e.g. the connection between the central 
initiative  of  school  computerization  and  a  vision  of  a  local  school  computer). 
Structural opportunities and constraints on the other hand can be characterized as 
crystallized properties of past environmental dynamics which have preceded local 
events in focus but have had no direct connection to them. At any point they can be 
drawn upon by the  local  network,  however.  An example  of  this  is  an  economic 
reform allowing  joint  ventures  between  Soviet  and  Western  companies.  Initially, 
when this opportunity was seized by the IoC, it had nothing to do with local school 
computerization. Experience, however, led to the idea of establishing a new network 
and designing another version of Juku. Thus the environmental change had an impact 
on the outcome, but was temporally and initially thematically disconnected from the 
local response. Another example of this is provided by RET, which took advantage of 
changes  in  the  domain  of  computing  and  altered  its  preferences  when  the  Juku 
network failed to achieve early central support. Once again such developments had 
occurred  in  parallel,  and until  that  point  had  no direct  connection with  the local 
network.
The problem is  that  the  number  of  potentially relevant  structural  constraints  and 
opportunities is overwhelming. In any theorization only some of these, usually most 
visible, can be picked up, while others are relegated to the background. But that does 
not meant that they are unimportant altogether—for example, the overall quality of 
Soviet technology or problems with shortage and accessibility influenced each and 
every case (albeit to different degrees). But listing all of these background factors 
would quickly result in massive and mostly tedious lists, going all the way back to 
the fundamental laws of physics.
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The problem with such selection is, of course, that in different contexts these 'silent' 
factors might suddenly become visible as changes in their values better enable the 
detection of their impact on the outcome. This in turn would instantly refute the IF–
THEN statements presented above, with their seemingly deterministic flavour. For 
example, the characterization of episode 5 rests implicitly on the assumption that 
other suitable local actors are present and known to the local leader. Otherwise the 
network could collapse or the product could be made to 'migrate' despite the qualities 
of  the  network  and  the  vision  remaining  exactly  the  same.  Without  further 
comparison it is quite difficult to tell in which context one or another structural factor 
can become visible and what their impacts might be. However, it should be noted 
that the 'determinism' of IF–THEN statements is actually conditional on the values of 
a huge number of 'unseen' background variables.
However,  the  distinction  between  structural  opportunities  and  constraints  and 
environmental stimuli is not enough, as the latter are far from uniform. As shown in 
chapter 1, such stimuli can be defined as combinations of varying degrees of four 
attributes: frequency, amplitude, speed and scope (Suarez & Oliva 2005, Geels & 
Schot 2007). In the above episodes there were basically three environmental stimuli: 
1) transition-related; 2) educational reform-related; and 3) central authorities-related. 
Only the first seems to correspond well with one of the types outlined by Suarez and 
Oliva (2005): high amplitude, speed and scope of changes but with low frequency 
would make such a societal transition an 'avalanche' change.
In the second case the reform spanned the education sector, so its scope might be 
described as medium. It  was also supposed to be implemented relatively quickly 
(high speed).  However,  I would characterize the amplitude as rather low—Soviet 
reforms were often more about rhetorical slogans than actual change itself.  Quite 
likely  this  was  the  case  here—despite  slogans  like  'programming  is  the  second 
literacy'  and the aim of changing the thinking of children, initially few computers 
were  provided  for  schools,  their  integration  to  other  subjects  was  low  and  the 
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teaching process itself was not fundamentally changed. In fact, based on previous 
experience of Soviet reforms, some teachers thought computers to be a passing fad 
(Dagienė 2006). The frequency of such reforms can be described at least as medium. 
Therefore I would generalize and call it a domain-related reform.
In the third case it must be remembered that decisions about the viability of different  
projects were frequently made by central authorities and the result could range from 
enthusiastic approval to outright ban. Although the Soviet bureaucracy was perceived 
as notoriously slow, the speed of the decision itself (while often negative) could be 
regarded as relatively quick. Finally, as the decision was network-specific, the scope 
did not extend beyond a particular case. Therefore, I would call this type of impact a 
network-specific shock.
Table 4.2. Types of observed environmental stimuli
Frequency Amplitude Speed Scope Type of environmental change
High High High Very low Network-specific shock
Medium Low High Medium Domain-related reform
Low High High High Avalanche
The analysis will now proceed to the case of Tartu.
Case 2, episode 1: explaining the formation of the local network
IF there has been a clear positive environmental stimulus
AND a weak leader
that presents a weak vision
THEN formation of a weak local network follows
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the all-union directive demanded that 
universities  develop  microprocessor  technologies  (1).  This  coincided  with  an 
expressed interest of an enthusiast from Tartu State University to establish a working 
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group  with  this  aim (2).  In  the  beginning  there  was  no  specific  idea  about  the 
direction in which actual developments should start—the idea to build a PC emerged 
gradually (3). A microprocessor sector was formed as a part of the LES lab (4).
It can be argued that in the cases of Juku and Tartu the environmental stimulus was 
similar—a  domain-related  reform  opening  up  multiple  opportunities,  but  not 
prescribing any specific solutions. On the other hand, the working group in Tartu was 
much weaker and had no clear vision. As a result the network remained internal to 
the university for some time.
Case 2, episodes 2–4: explaining the failure to form the local network
IF a weak leader
presents a moderate vision
THEN the formation of the local network fails
Figure 4.13. Failure to form the network (Tartu)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: developments in the environment had 
enabled  the  team  in  Tartu  State  University  to  start  developing  microprocessor 
technologies (1). The team was small, it did not have many resources, prior practical 
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experience with computer design or production preparation etc. (2). As the computer 
had  been mainly developed for  the  university's  own purposes,  the  idea  of  serial 
production was not coupled with a broad vision (in fact the movement towards a PC 
was  gradual  and  likely  influenced  by  discussions  with  potential  partners)  (3). 
Although sympathetic in theory, Baltijets required full technical documentation for 
production and another possible partner, the plant in Tartu, thought it impossible to 
fit the computer into the production plan (4). Despite some consultation no actual 
production followed (5), and hence no network formed around the Tartu project (6).
The  case  of  Estron  offers  another  entry  point  for  theoretical  refinement.  If  one 
accepts that the reasons why Estron did not participate were technical in nature for 
Juku  and  Tartu  both  (difficulties  with  preparing  the  production  of  the  case, 
difficulties with the production as a whole) and attempts to explain these events in 
terms of the vocabulary already developed, one encounters at least two problems. 
First, it might be that the overall quality of the vision can suffer not because of the 
ambition and timeliness of the plans, but because of its ill match with participating 
organizations' interests, since both criteria are included in the definition of vision. 
One can make a case for Estron that this is an example of preferences changing after 
negative  experience.  Theoretically,  it  could  lead  to  a  somewhat  counter-intuitive 
situation in which a clearly presented, ground-breaking vision classifies as a low-
quality one only because it does not match the wants of other actors.
At the same time, the aim of the 'vision' category is the same: to point to the degree 
to which the socio-technical network is ready to act as a single whole. Therefore, it 
would be best to divide the defining criteria of the vision into two sub-categories: 1) 
strength—clarity,  timeliness,  realizability,  scope;  and  2)  match—match  with  pre-
existing  commitments,  expected  pay-off,  extent  of  new  commitments,  power  to 
decide over terms of participation. Note that the difference between the two is not  
about objective/subjective or absolute/relative dichotomy, as it may at first seem: 1) 
the degree to which the vision can be deemed clear, timely or realizable depends on 
the judgement of the analyst; 2) 'strength' corresponds to the content judged from the 
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perspective of the (changing) socio-technical context of the time, whereas 'match' is 
concerned with the viewpoint of the particular actor. Thus the vision can be strong 
context-wise but organizationally ill-matched, affecting the unity of the network.
Also, Estron was a notable organization but still  small compared with local R&D 
leaders  like  the  IoC  or  big  plants  like  Baltijets,  whether  it  came  to  available 
resources,  established  connections  or  a  formal  role.  The  fact  that  it  encountered 
difficulties in computer production that led to moving on to other projects also means 
that the 'strength' of the partner should also be considered an important factor. The 
content of this attribute is similar to that of the socio-technical network as a whole. 
One can therefore clarify the above statements for Baltijets and the plant in Tartu as 
follows:
IF a weak leader
presents a moderately strong but ill-matching vision
to a strong partner
THEN formation of the local network fails
Whereas the episode with Estron could be described as:
IF a weak leader
presents a moderately strong and moderately matching vision
to a moderately strong partner
THEN formation of the local network fails
This would take into account the differences in the capabilities of actors plus the 
match of the vision with their preferences, while still explaining the overall outcome. 
Compared with the likes of RET and Baltijets, Estron can be deemed a moderately 
strong organization at the local level. Producing a personal computer in the first half 
of the 1980s was also quite a novel, challenging and interesting endeavour, although 
the vision was not very clear or wide in scope. And while Estron was strong enough 
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to undertake the challenge (twice), it could be said that the lack of organizational 
strength  affected  its  ability  to  participate.  The  ability  to  engage in  other  equally 
profitable deals that required less effort also meant that the organizational match was 
not high and thus Estron's  commitment was easy to change, especially when the 
project had not progressed far.
Case 2, episode 5: explaining the failure to form the local network
IF there has been a clear positive structural stimulus
AND a weak leader (with a prototype)
that presents a strong vision
BUT stronger leaders are also propagating the same vision
THEN formation of the local network around the weak leader fails
Figure 4.14. Failure to form the network (Tartu)
Correspondence  to  the  narrative  is  as  follows:  Tartu  group  had  failed  to  find  a 
producer for their prototype (1). School computerization provided an incentive (2) to 
'update' the vision (3) and start to propagate Tartu as a potential school computer (4). 
However, the very same initiative was also taken up by the IoC who, as a stronger 
actor,  managed  to  move  much  more  decisively  and  quickly established  a  strong 
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Another minor point of theoretical refinement: the prior analysis has worked on an 
assumption that the vision is specifically targeted. In Tartu's case there is no evidence 
about actual negotiations having taken place during this particular episode. Instead 
the  idea  was  mentioned  in  a  newspaper  interview.  This  turns  attention  to  the 
possibility that the vision can be general, uncoupled from a particular referent. The 
propagation of such a general vision can act as a signal to attract possible partners. 
Presumably it  was the failure to achieve this  that led the university to extend its 
search outside Estonia, resulting in a (temporary) migration of the project.
Case 2, episode 6: explaining the formation of the local network
IF a weak leader
presents a weak but well-matching vision
to a weak partner
THEN formation of a weak local network follows
Correspondence  to  the  narrative  is  as  follows:  around 1988  Tartu  group,  having 
experienced delays in implementing production in Kursk, contacted Palivere (1). The 
idea was to produce 200 computers for schools—by that time an 8-bit computer had 
become considerably less of a technical challenge than it had been 5 years previously 
and  it  was  probably  also  easier  to  obtain  the  components  (producing  a  school 
computer  while  making a  good profit  also made it  a  good match with Palivere's 
interests)  (2).  Palivere  could  be  characterized  as  a  small  player  even  among 
subsidiary electronics production enterprises (compared with Estron or Lääne Kalur), 
not to mention the large state-controlled factories (hence its  characterization as a 
weak actor) (3). Cooperation between Tartu and Palivere followed (4).
The above process is very similar to that already shown in figure 4.8: an episode of  
successful  vision-propagation  from  one  actor  to  another,  resulting  in  network-
formation.  The  differences  are  in  the  strengths  of  both  actors  and  the  challenge 
presented by the project compared with the overall socio-technical context.
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Case 2, episode 7: explaining the collapse of the local network
IF the local stabilized network in production phase
encounters rapid and wide-ranging environmental changes
AND rapidly changing demands and preferences exceed the network's  adaptive  
capability and the participants expect this to continue (so coping with future
change in consumer preferences is deemed impossible)
THEN the network collapses
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: Palivere started to produce the Tartu 
PC (1) but technology-wise the end of the Soviet Union meant an influx of newer 
and faster Western computers with decreasing prices while the existing supply chain 
was abruptly cut (2). The Tartu PC itself was not comparable with Western PCs (3) 
and upgrading the production facilities was deemed unrealistic (4). Hence Palivere 
dropped the project and moved on to search for a suitable market niche that matched 
its existing capabilities (5). The process is similar to one depicted in figure 4.12, but 
in this case the computer was already being produced and the network was much 
weaker.
The clarified categories can now be used to briefly revisit the case of Juku: 
1) One could claim that the IoC's vision was compelling content-wise, but only 
moderate  in  match—both partners  remained somewhat  sceptical  about  the 
project—whereas  the  partners  were  strong  (RET)  and  moderately  strong 
(Estron).
2) The attractiveness of the strength of the vision decreased over time because of 
local developments and changes in socio-technical context. When production 
was delayed, the match decreased until the participants exited.
3) Whereas technically the project continued to be less and less challenging, it 
was still ambitious in its scope, which is why it can be still called moderately 
strong at the time when Baltijets was contacted. The match with the factory's 
interest was also moderate in the sense that the plant needed some computers 
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for their own production and something to produce as a consumer good, but 
was probably little or not at all motivated by the concerns of local identity.
4) The renewal of the network was at least partly about updating the technical 
content of the vision, but also keeping an eye out for new participants.
5) The rapid opening up to global competition meant that the capabilities of the 
network in relation to the socio-technical context quickly turned out to be 
insufficient to cope with the standards of Western computers. The vision lost 
its  appeal  both  content-wise  and  match-wise  as  the  preferences  of  the 
participants changed.
Case 3, episode 1: explaining the formation of the local network
IF environmental developments have opened up favourable opportunities
AND a weak leader (with a prototype)
presents a weak and moderately matching vision
THEN formation of a weak, fleeting producer–user network follows
Figure 4.15. Network-formation (Entel)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: 8-bit  microprocessors started to be 
produced in the USSR, making access to them somewhat easier, while increasing 
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importance was ascribed to microcomputing etc. (1). Entel group was small, lacked 
formal authority and had to rely on informal networks to acquire resources (2). The 
plan was only partly inspired by practical problems of the ministry, and professional 
interest was also a major motivating force (although the developments started quite 
early the PC was not imagined to have a wide circle of users) (3). Using its informal 
networks potentially interested customers were found (4). As a result a small-scale 
network preparing customized, one-off solutions for different clients came to be. In 
parallel, relations with partners assisting with certain elements of production were 
gradually established (5).
Why characterize the vision as weak in this case? On one hand, one could claim that  
as an early starter the content of the vision was quite strong in the technical sense.  
Also the fact that there were clients buying different one-off applications implies that 
there must have been a match with their interests. But then again, the scope of the 
vision was quite limited. For example, no mass production was envisioned and no 
preferred functional domain was specified. In fact, taking into account that the PC 
was adapted for numerous uses, with existing clients leading to new ones, it is even 
hard to  speak of  the group as  having a  vision at  all  or  if  so,  then not  a  clearly 
specified one. On the other hand, the clients were not interested in establishing long-
term  relationships  and  thus  the  extent  and  durability  of  new  obligations  and 
commitments was low. Therefore, the interest was sufficient to participate, but not 
enough to establish more durable ties—hence the characterization of the network as 
both 'weak' and 'fleeting'.
Case 3, episode 2: explaining the failure to expand the local network
IF there has been a clear positive environmental stimulus
AND a weak network (with a prototype)
presents a strong vision
BUT stronger local leaders are also propagating the same vision
THEN expansion of the weak network fails
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The case here is very similar to that of Tartu (case 2, episode 5). Entel participated in 
the school computerization project, but was far too weak compared with the network 
formed around the IoC. Juku remained the dominant line for a local school computer.
Case 3, episode 3: explaining the expansion of the local network
IF there has been a clear positive environmental stimulus
AND a weak network (with a prototype)
redirects a strong vision into a slightly different functional domain
and presents it to a strong partner
THEN expansion of the local network follows
Figure 4.16. Expansion of the network (Entel)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: by that time it was apparent to other 
players that Juku would become the main local school computerization design (1). 
The stimulus provided by the central authorities was still topical (2). The proposal to 
adapt Entel for vocational schools came from an enthusiast from the education sector 
(the  fact  that  the  education  sector  was  divided  between  different  administrative 
domains provided an alternative niche in which Entel could potentially prosper as the 
Juku  project  was  mainly  focused  on  the  computerization  of  general  secondary 
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A clear positive stimulus from 
the environment occurs 
providing a suitable opportunity
A weak network slightly reformulates 
its vision and continues to propagate it 
but is not fully committed to it...
...expansion of the network 
characterized by weak 
commitment follows
...but when one partner 
finds it at least minimally 
matching its interests...Prior attempts to 
capture a certain 
domain with a 
strong vision have 
been in vain
schools)  (3).  Demonstrations  to  teachers  led  to  contact  with  the  director  of  the 
Pöögelmann factory (4)  who expressed  interest  in  producing Entel  as  the  plant's 
consumer good (5).
This is an interesting variation on the theme of the reaction to the failure to expand 
the local network. Whereas the Tartu people extended the search outside Estonia, the 
Entel group found a way to benefit from the existing structural conditions, retain the 
basic content of the vision (computers for schools) and continue the search locally.  
As a result contact with a strong actor was established. But this also directs attention 
to  the issue of overall  commitment.  So far  the use of strength and match as the 
criteria  of the vision has been used to  imply that  the overall  commitment of the 
network was at  least  moderate.  In Entel's case the situation is  different:  first,  the 
members of the Entel group themselves were not too enthusiastic about providing 
PCs for vocational schools, despite the enthusiasm of the member of the education 
sector. Second, the Pöögelmann plant was centrally controlled, therefore the interest 
from the director did not automatically guarantee actual production. The plant was 
also producing its own consumer commodities, so it was probably not hard-pressed 
to pursue the project. Therefore, one could make a case that although the network did 
expand, the overall commitment of the participants was actually quite low.
Case 3, episode 4: explaining the contraction of the local network
IF a moderately strong but barely committed local network (with a prototype)
encounters a clear negative environmental stimulus
THEN the vision is weakened to a point
at which the contraction of the network follows
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Figure 4.17. Contraction of the network (Entel)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the network linked the creators of the 
prototype  to  the  possible  mass  producer  and  part  of  the  education  sector—the 
coalition was not as strong as that of Juku since it lacked wider support from the 
education sector and local politicians (moreover, the degree of commitment was also 
quite low) (1). The factory proved unable to acquire necessary components and the 
director was soon replaced (2). In these conditions at least the Pöögelmann plant and 
the  Entel  group did  not  want  to  pursue  the  possible  mass  production  further,  as 
realizing the project would have demanded much effort (e.g. dedicated lobbying) (3). 
Pöögelmann continued its existing production while the Entel group turned back to 
small-scale customized production and other activities of interest.
In many ways this description is quite similar to the contraction of the Juku network 
(figure  4.9).  In  both  cases  the  stability  of  the  initially  formed  network  was 
compromised  by  network-specific  negative  signals  from the  environment  which, 
denying the network an immediate realization of its goals, led to or accelerated the 
change  of  preferences  of  the  participating  actors.  At  a  certain  point  the  critical 
threshold was reached and some actors left the network. Differences can be found in 
the relative strengths of the networks and their degrees of commitment.
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A clear negative stimulus denies the 
immediate realization of the plan...
...as few actual steps have been 
taken and the commitment of 
both parties is quite low...
...it is easy for both to stop 
cooperating and turn back 
to previous activities
A barely committed 
network has expressed 
preliminary interest in 
cooperation
Case 3, episode 5: explaining the decay of the local network
IF environmental developments have opened up new possibilities
AND a weak local network with a relatively low degree of commitment
does not see an easy way to cope with changes in future preferences
THEN decay of the network follows
Correspondence to  the narrative is  as  follows:  owing to the economic reforms it 
became possible to establish cooperatives, while new computers both Western and 
Soviet increasingly became available (1). The interests of the Entel group shifted to 
satellite receivers (2). As the production of the latter seemed more profitable and 
Entel was gradually becoming obsolete, no serious effort was put into upgrading the 
design of the PC (3). As a result Entels continued to be made on (decreasing) demand 
until the project was completely phased out by the end of the 1980s (4).
Compared with the other cases analysed so far, Entel offers an example of a phasing 
out of the network rather than a quick collapse. The reason can probably be traced 
back to the early start and the opportunistic nature of the leader. On the one hand, no 
sudden new opportunities to get the computer into mass production opened up. On 
the other,  the changing interests  of the leader meant that these were not actively 
sought  for  either.  When  other  new more  profitable  opportunities  for  small-scale 
production  appeared,  a  shift  to  other  activities  took place  before the  great  social 
disruption. Therefore, the decay of the network was more gradual in nature.
Case 4, episode 1: explaining the failure to form/expand the local network54
IF there has been a clear positive environmental stimulus
AND a weak leader
presents a strong vision
BUT a stronger local leader is already propagating the same vision
THEN no expansion of the network follows
54 I am treating KPI's two attempts to expand the network as parallel events as they occurred in a  
relatively short time-span. I am assuming that the order of these two events is unlikely to affect the  
overall explanation. Hence the ambiguity about whether the network is being formed or expanded.
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Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: school computerization provided a 
stimulus to start thinking about the provision of personal computers for Lithuanian 
young people (1). Although KPI had good connections with various members of the 
industry and local politicians, it was essentially focused on scientific activities, had 
little  experience  with  actual  production  and  could  devote  only a  small  group  of 
enthusiasts to develop the prototype (2). The idea to provide many young people with 
as many computers as quickly as possible in order to advance their computing skills 
could be considered a strong one in that moment, as the scope of the project was 
potentially  wide  (3).  Local  Minelektronprom  authorities  were  proposing  the 
production of BK-0010Š in mass quantities instead (4) hence Santaka did not gain 
full support from local politicians, remaining an unofficial parallel choice (5).
One can note similarities with the cases of Tartu and Entel, in that the functional 
domain was captured by a stronger actor. In this case, however, the stronger actor 
simply 'domesticated' a pre-existing design.
Case 4, episode 2: explaining the formation of the local network
IF there has been a clear positive environmental stimulus
AND a weak leader
presents a strong and well-matching vision
to a strong partner
not engaged in other networks with a similar vision
THEN formation of the local network follows
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: school computerization initiative (1) 
was  taken  up  by  the  KPI  (2).  The  vision  matched  the  KRMESRI's  interest  in 
technical challenges and the desire to contribute to local well-being—apart from that 
the extent of new obligations was not great (the scale of production was not clearly 
specified), meaning that the KRMESRI could devote only a fraction of its labour 
force  to  the  task  (3).  The  institute  had  experience  with  production  according  to 
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military standards, a skilled labour force, finances, knowledge of compiling technical 
documentation etc. (4). On the other hand, the institute had no engagements with 
other local  networks and was therefore available (5).  Hence cooperation between 
KPI and the KRMESRI followed (6).
In  some  ways  the  episode  is  similar  to  Entel's  attempt  to  cooperate  with  the 
Pöögelmann plant. In both cases there was a weak leader presenting a topical and 
attractive vision to a strong partner following a positive environmental stimulus. Nor 
were the partners engaged with similar projects at the time. The main difference is in 
the degree of commitment, which was very low in Entel's case but high in the case of 
Santaka. Thus the Santaka network might be called vision-directed compared with 
the more opportunistic nature of Entel, persisting after having experienced negative 
signals from the environment.
Case 4, episode 3: explaining the renewal of the local network
IF some environmental dynamics continue to unfold in an expected direction
BUT have not opened up any particular windows opportunity
this results in the gradual decrease of the strength of the local vision
while the local network remains otherwise committed to the task
THEN reorientation of the vision follows
Although direct evidence of this particular episode is hard to find,  it  is a logical 
implication of the first episode of Santaka's failed network formation/expansion. It is 
plausible to assume that as the initial and more ambitious probing for production 
possibilities failed and Lithuanian school computerization centred on BK-0010Š, the 
initial  goal  had  to  be somewhat  toned down.  In other  words,  if  the  goal  was to 
produce  as  many  computers  as  possible  as  quickly  as  possible,  the  production 
quantities had to be adapted to the capabilities of an already existing KPI-KRMESRI 
network. Otherwise the search for new partners and/or the official acquisition process 
would  have  delayed  the  project  even  further,  while  newer  and  faster  computers 
would become available, decreasing the strength of the vision—theoretically up to 
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the point at which the users would have no need to acquire the product at all.
Case 4, episode 4: explaining the failure to expand/the limited expansion of the 
local network
IF a moderately strong network (with a prototype)
presents a moderately strong but ill-matching vision
to a strong partner (not engaged in other networks with similar vision)
THEN no expansion of the network follows
OR expansion is limited
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the network of KPI and KMESRI (1) 
approached Sigma (2) with the idea that it  would assist the network in producing 
Santaka. However, Sigma had little motivation to participate as it was occupied with 
its  primary production  while  also producing its  own consumer  goods.  KPI itself 
preferred to avoid possible delays with the production which would have followed 
had Sigma started to produce the computer as a consumer good in mass quantities. 
The match  between the  preferences  of  both  was  far  from ideal  (3).  As  a  result, 
Sigma's role in the network was limited to the production of the case (4). One can 
note similarities with the IoC's attempt to cooperate with Baltijets (figure 4.10), but 
in this case the match between KPI–KRMESRI and Sigma was worse, leading to a 
more fleeting commitment and a more limited role.
Case 4, episode 5: explaining the decay of the local network
IF some environmental developments have continued in an expected direction
while others have not opened up fortunate windows of opportunity
AND the local network has stabilized on the path of normal diffusion
while the strength of the vision is gradually decreasing
THEN at one point the network decomposes/stops acting as a whole
Correspondence  to  the  narrative  is  as  follows:  developments  in  the  domain  of 
computing meant that 8-bit computers slowly but steadily started giving way to 16-
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bit  computers  (1).  Environmental  developments  had  not  resulted  in  favourable 
opportunities  to  expand  the  network  locally  (2).  About  200  computers  were 
produced, allocated to schools and also copied among hobbyists.  This resulted in 
various  modifications  and an  expanding circle  of  people  who obtained  hands-on 
experience with the PC (3). After some search for other partners and opportunities at 
a very early stage, Santaka's vision had stabilized as a quick, temporary solution. The 
content of the vision did not entail the development of the new version (4). Therefore 
at  one point KPI and KRMESRI had no reason to continue the cooperation.  The 
former turned to other activities while the latter established successful contacts with 
Moscow on its own (5).
Case 5, episode 1: explaining the formation of the local network
IF rapid  and  wide-ranging  environmental  changes  are  taking  place  in  the  
environment
AND a strong leader
presents a moderate and ill-matching vision
to a strong partner
THEN formation of a strong but weakly committed network follows
Correspondence to  the narrative is  as  follows:  amidst  extremely rapid  economic, 
political and cultural shifts, Sigma found itself in a situation in which the Eastern 
connections had been cut, but new ones had not yet been established. In order to 
sustain itself the organization needed to come up with marketable products fast (1). 
The organization was still a local industrial giant even, if its production infrastructure 
was outdated compared with Western companies (2). Sigma's suggestion to produce 
PC/XTs for schools was not very appealing as the possibility of obtaining newer and 
better Western computers was slowly emerging. In addition, Sigma was perceived as 
a remnant from the past, both technically and mentally. On the other hand, Sigma 
itself  was  only  looking  for  a  marketable  product  and  was  thus  not  necessarily 
attached to the PC project (3).  As both partners were influential  and there was a 
potential producer–user connection, the network might be called strong. However, as 
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both were considering various other options in parallel, the interest in cooperation 
was lukewarm at best (4).
Case 5, episode 2: explaining the collapse of the network
IF rapid  and  wide-ranging  environmental  changes  are  taking  place  in  the  
environment
opening up windows of opportunity
AND the the strength of the vision keeps weakening
while  there  are  irreconcilable  differences  regarding  the  renewal  of  the  
network (with a prototype)
THEN the network collapses
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the rapid large-scale social transition 
was still ongoing (1). New chances to acquire Western IBM-compatibles opened up 
for  the  education  sector  (2).  Sigma's  quite  expensive  PCs  using  many  Soviet 
components  seemed  less  and  less  an  appealing  choice  (3).  The  education  sector 
increased its demands, requiring the computer to be 286 rather than XT. Apparently 
Sigma was unable or unwilling to fulfil this requirement (4). Sigma moved on to 
focus on other products, while the education sector shifted decisively to acquiring 
foreign computers (5).
Case 6, episode 1: explaining the failure to form the local network
IF environmental opportunities are scarce
AND a weak leader
creates a moderate vision
THEN the local network does not form
Correspondence  to  the  narrative  is  as  follows:  although personal  computing  was 
establishing itself, foreign currency and foreign components were very difficult to 
obtain (1). An enthusiast from the Vilnius State University can be considered a weak 
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leader in terms of available resources, finances, production capabilities etc. (2). The 
vision  was  technically  demanding—building  a  PC/XT  using  as  many  Soviet 
components as possible. However, this made it difficult to realize and thus the vision 
was not specifically targeted. The vision was probably mainly motivated by technical 
and professional interest, lacking scope and clarity. For this reason I would deem the 
overall strength of the vision moderate (3). For some time the project was on hiatus
—it had been demonstrated that the endeavour was possible in principle, but there 
were no resources to realize the vision owing to the lack of a suitable window of 
opportunity (4).
This case is intriguing because in all other episodes the content of the vision matched
—or rather was from the beginning tailored to—the available resources. In the case 
of Lema, however, the exceptional circumstance of having to repair a Western PC led 
to the idea to create a mostly-Soviet PC/XT. Compared with the other cases,  the 
acquisition of resources proved to be a much bigger problem because of the framing 
of  the  problem  in  a  certain  manner.  Therefore  this  is  a  good  example  of  a 
metatheoretical  statement  made  in  the  first  chapter—while  the  overall  structural 
repertoire remains the same at a given point of time, the relevant problems might 
differ  due  to  the  selection  of  the  actor.  This  explains  why  the  environmental 
opportunities can be said to be scarce in this case but stimulating for other cases. In 
all other episodes the other weak actors were also struggling, but as they stuck to 
only Soviet components the scarcity of foreign currency did not make itself instantly 
visible. By choosing to frame the problem in terms of locally available and cheaper 
components they could choose a functional domain (school computing) where the 
opportunities had opened up.
Case 6, episode 2: explaining the formation of the local network
IF there has been a clear positive stimulus
AND a weak leader
has a moderate vision
THEN formation of a weak local network follows
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Correspondence  to  the  narrative  is  as  follows:  the  university  had  managed  to 
establish contacts with military representatives from Moscow who were willing to 
provide currency to build a WANG clone (1).55 The leader and the vision remained 
the same, meaning that it would have been very difficult to consider the production 
of such a computer in mass quantities (2) but since necessary resources could now be 
acquired, a working group inside Vilnius State University was formed (3).
One can note that save for differences in the nature of environmental pressure and the 
strength of the vision,  this  episode is pretty similar to the formation of the Tartu 
network (case 2, episode 1). Paradoxically, in this case it was probably the strength,  
not the clarity of the vision (a in Tartu's situation) that inhibited the formation of a 
stronger  network,  as  the  needed  resources  were  difficult  to  obtain  and  potential 
producers  would  not  have  even  considered  the  project  seriously.  In  both  cases, 
however, the end result was the same: a weak, university-internal local network with 
the  university  itself  acting  as  a  cover  organization  (providing  conditions  for  the 
project to continue).
Case 6, episode 3: explaining the reconfiguration of the local network
IF the weak local network (with a prototype)
encounters a clear negative environmental stimulus
while environmental developments have opened up new possibilities for all 
participants
THEN the match of the vision decreases to a point
at which the existing network contracts a new one comes to being
55 Note that since the analysis was geographically delimited in a certain manner the relation between  
Vilnius State University and the partner from Moscow is being treated as one between the network  
and its environment.
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Figure 4.18. Reconfiguration of the network (Lema's PC/XT)
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the university people working on the 
project were few (1). The partner from Moscow lost interest in the project (2). The 
working  group  had  already  prepared  the  prototype  and  diagnostic  tools.  The 
possibility  to  establish  cooperatives  gave  a  chance  to  generate  profit  from  this 
product (3). Vilnius State University itself had lost interest in providing institutional 
support (4). The group that designed the PC/XT formed Lema cooperative to start the 
production (5). As the overall strength of the network decreased, one could claim that 
the  commitment  increased,  because  on  average  the  remaining  members  were 
motivated to put in more effort into the realization of the project.
Case 6, episode 4: explaining the expansion of the local network
IF rapid  and  wide-ranging  environmental  changes  are  taking  place  in  the  
environment
AND a local weak leader
with a moderate and (at least) moderately matching vision
expects the changing demands and preferences not to exceed the network's  
adaptive capability (in the short term)
THEN formation of a weak, fleeting producer–user network follows
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...some participants benefit from new 
opportunities and want to sustain the 
project at the same time...
...while some lose interest seeing more 
chance to benefit from other 
opportunities and exit the network...
A weak local network
The emergence of new possibilities is 
coupled with a clear negative stimulus...
...resulting in a weaker 
but more committed 
network
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: overall social transition once again 
provides the context, opening up a number of opportunities to make a quick profit—a 
right to make transactions in foreign currency and thus to obtain components from 
abroad, overstocked factories selling their components for decreasing prices because 
of the combination of fixed prices and inflation (1). Lema was a small cooperative 
mainly focused on design and prototype-building of various customized applications, 
its PC/XT among them (2). While the technical appeal of the project had decreased, 
Lema still thought it possible to find interested buyers. The enterprises which could 
not afford to buy a 'real' Western computer were still many at the same time, even if  
they were not  interested  in  long-term cooperation (beyond warranty service)  (3). 
Therefore it was expected that the PC could still be marketed for a certain period of 
time (4). The formation of a small fleeting producer–user network resulted, probably 
quite similar to that of Entel's (case 3, episode 1) (5).
Case 6, episode 5: explaining the decay of the local network
IF some environmental dynamics continue to unfold in an expected direction
BUT have not opened up any particular windows of opportunity
AND a weak local network has stabilized on the path of normal diffusion
while the strength of the vision is gradually decreasing
and there is no easy way to cope with change in preferences
THEN decay of the network follows
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: transition to a market economy made it 
easier to pursue various projects with foreign partners. These new deals were more 
interesting professionally and also more profitable. The developments in the domain 
of  computing  resulted  in  better  Western  computers  (1).  Favourable  conditions  of 
instability  were  disappearing,  along  with  the  closing  down  of  factories  and  re-
profiling of the industry (2). Lema computers were still being produced on demand 
for various partners (3) with the prices of Western computers decreasing and newer 
ones arriving, fewer customers were interested in the product and thus the project 
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became less relevant (4). Therefore it was easier to profit from new projects rather 
than attempt to upgrade the old one (5). As a result the production was gradually 
phased out (6).
Above I have noted the exceptional nature of this case compared with others, in that 
initially the requirements of the project tended to exceed the opportunities available 
for the leader. This illustrates a point made in chapter 2: a selection bias of the cases 
towards more or less realized projects. Therefore, it  must be kept in mind that in 
cases in which the network-building did not take place or was abandoned early on, 
the importance of various factors or the factors themselves may be different from 
those highlighted here. Further work on vision-formation could help to specify the 
conditions under which the opportunity–vision balance is  such that the project is 
deemed viable.
4.2.4 Making sense of the findings
At this point I will stop adding more detail to the analysis, because the complexity of 
the last step raises enough questions about the significance of the findings on its own. 
Additionally, I think that the principle and viability of top-down analysis has been 
sufficiently illustrated. Therefore, I will now attempt to synthesize the results and 
make  some  theoretical  propositions  regarding  the  evolution  of  socio-technical 
networks.  In  so  doing  I  will  also  draw  connections  with  different  outcomes  of 
theorizing from the narratives, as depicted in figure 4.2.
First, why focus on episodes? More specifically, what defines an episode? Generally, 
each describes a particular interaction. But can these interactions be grouped in any 
way? Closer inspection reveals that in all episodes related to the change in the size 
and  shape  of  the  network,  the  basic  underlying  processes  can  be  described  as 
variations on the same theme: 
1) The formation/expansion of the network:
a) A presents a set of preferences to partner B;
b) B changes its preferences;
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c)  the  subsequent  actions  of  A and  B  are  based  on  at  least  some shared 
preferences (i.e. aligned to each other).
2) Unsuccessful formation/expansion:
a) A presents a set of preferences to partner B;
b) B does not change its preferences;
c) the subsequent actions of A and B are not based on shared preferences (i.e. 
not aligned to each other).
3) Contraction/decay/collapse of the network:
a) the actions of A and B are based on at least some shared preferences (i.e. 
aligned to each other);
b) A and/or B change their preferences;
c) the actions of A and B are not aligned to each other anymore.
Figure 4.19 depicts all three situations. D stands for the desire to engage in a PC 
project, B denotes the beliefs about the way to proceed, and O signifies the existing 
opportunities to do so. Subscripts designate different actors, straight lines indicate the 
characteristic desires, beliefs and opportunities of these actors and arrows show how 
the influence is transmitted from one actor to another.
Note that the translation of these statements into DBO vocabulary reveals that no 
distinction is being made as to whether the actions of actor A affect the desires or the 
beliefs of actor B (in other words, whether the presentation of the way to proceed 
evokes a desire to do so or whether the desire to proceed leads to the specification of 
relevant activities). Also, prior experience and new opportunities are both allowed to 
shape  the  preferences  of  the  members  of  the  network  (that  is,  the  cooperation 
experience within an existing network might  not  necessarily be negative,  but  the 
opening up of novel possibilities can nevertheless lead to its contraction). However, 
it must also be noted that these formulations go beyond detecting the changes in the 
size  and  shape  of  the  network  over  its  course  of  development  and  identify 
explanations  as  to  why  they  occur.  As  such  they  can  be  considered  generative 
mechanisms of network evolution (outcome three on figure 4.2).
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Figure  4.19.  Three  basic  processes  underlying  the  dynamics  of  socio-
technical networks
This,  of  course,  does  not  indicate  the  conditions  in  which these  mechanisms are 
realized. In other words, the underlying processes are not contextualized. Over the 
course  of  the  analysis  a  number  of  such  factors  were  identified.  These  can  be 
characterized as attributes of certain variables:
1) Type  of  environmental  change  (structural  opportunities,  network-specific 
shock, domain-related reform, avalanche).
2) Phase  of  development  of  the  project  (no  clear  vision,  vision,  prototype, 
readiness for production).
Additional properties of the leader/network were as follows: 
3) Strength of the leader/network (weak, moderate, strong).
4) Strength of the vision (weak, moderate, strong).
























6) Strength of the partner (no clear partner, weak, moderate, strong).
In some episodes the importance of additional factors became visible: 
7) The extent to which the niche had been occupied by other players/networks 
pursuing similar vision.
8) The extent to which capable actors were still available for negotiation in the 
locality.
9) Expectations  about  the  possibilities  of  continuing  the  project  (short-term, 
long-term).
10) Prior experience of the performance of the network.
Such a characterization in which the realization of the mechanism is dependent on 
the  values  of  background  variables  corresponds  to  outcome  four  on  figure  4.2. 
However, in order to test the relevance of each and their possible clustering on the 
probability space, a statistically representative sample of episodes is required. The 
current  selection  of  cases  is  not  suitable  for  this  purpose:  it  was  observed  that 
network-formation, (non-)expansion and contraction took place in different phases 
and under the influence of different types of environmental change. In other words, 
the variation was too large, the variables too many and the cases too few to make any 
statistical generalizations.
Does this mean that the synthesis has to stop here? Not at all. Because so far no  
attention has been paid to the possible differences in the realization of the underlying 
mechanisms dependent on the timing of interactions between the environment and 
the network, i.e. outcome five on figure 4.2. In that regard nine propositions on the 
patterns of intra-case evolution can be presented: 
1) The  lack  of  environmental  pressure  means  that  there  is  no  particularly 
suitable window of opportunity for any socio-technical networks to emerge. 
The  development  is  mainly  motivated  by  technical  interest,  solutions 
customized and/or local (for solving specific problems). Since no particular 
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functional domain has opened up it is difficult to raise the interest of partners, 
even if this is sought. The process of network-formation is likely to be drawn-
out, with the vision emerging gradually and the ties between the participants 
weak and fleeting. Examples: Tartu, Entel, Lema's PC/XT.
2) When there is no environmental pressure and the network has already entered 
the phase of production, gradual phase-out of the project is likely. Lacking 
suitable windows of opportunity, the producers are likely to move on to other 
projects rather than attempt to start another product cycle. The product can 
still be produced on demand, but the number of new users decreases while the 
number  of  users  switching  to  other  products  increases.  Examples:  Entel, 
Santaka, Lema's PC/XT.
3) Domain-related reform opens up a space of opportunities. As such it guides 
the attention of local players to a certain functional domain. At the same time 
the  effect  of  the  stimulus  is  limited,  leaving other  social  domains  largely 
intact (at least in the short-term). Shared stimulus and general stability create 
the conditions for the emergence of strong networks. Strong players with a 
clear  vision  enter.  Network-formation  and  initial  development  is  quick. 
Examples: Juku, Santaka.
4) If  domain-related  reform  occurs  while  the  leader/network  already  has  a 
prototype,  a  re-domaining  strategy  can  follow.  This  involves  the 
leader/network quickly changing its vision about the domain of use, along 
with  possible  modifications  to  the  prototype  to  try  to  take  advantage  of 
changed environmental conditions and its (newly emerged) early lead. If the 
niche is already occupied, another re-domaining attempt (different functional 
domain or geographical location) can be made. Examples: Tartu, Entel.
5) By  contrast  with  domain-related  reform,  avalanche  change  means  major 
shifts in various opportunity structures. Multiple spaces of opportunities open 
up and disappear simultaneously. In these conditions there is a need to act 
quickly, but there is also much uncertainty about the best course of action. 
The process of network-formation is rapid, but the ties between participants 
remain  weak  as  the  actors  keep  scanning  the  environment  for  more 
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favourable opportunities. Example: Sigma 8800.
6) If avalanche change coincides with the (still up-to-date) production phase of 
the network, 'riding the wave' can be attempted. In other words, temporary 
advantages provided by the context of rapid change are mobilized to earn 
quick  profit  from various  applications.  The  process  is  quick,  the  network 
fleeting,  and  production  is  likely  to  be  small-scale  and  applications 
customized to specific users. Example: Lema's PC/XT.
7) More often than not, however, avalanche change has a destructive impact on 
the network regardless its phase of development. Uncertainty and the urgent 
need to act lead the participants to frequently changing preferences about the 
ways in which to achieve their goal (computerization) or the desirability of 
the goal itself (computer production). Abrupt disintegration follows and each 
participant continues on separate paths of opportunistic survival. Examples: 
Juku, Tartu, Sigma 8800.
Whereas in all of the above cases the environmental conditions affected a group of 
players  simultaneously,  the  network-specific  shock  is  different  by  definition. 
However, it can still have an indirect impact by signalling other players as to whether 
there is room to be occupied in the functional niche or not and/or what kinds of 
strategies are likely to bear more fruit: 
8) The role  of  a  positive  network-specific  shock is  similar  regardless  of  the 
exact phase of (early) development (vision or prototype). In the first case it 
enables the creation of a local niche in which a technically more demanding 
product can be developed. In the second case it enables the stabilization of 
the network on the path of 'normal diffusion' (gradually expanding producer–
user network). In both cases it enables access to more resources, increases the 
certainty about the pay-off of the chosen direction and presumably leads to an 
increase  in  the  commitment  of  the  leader/network.  In  sum,  it  enables  the 
network to pass from one phase of development to  another,  working as a 
catalyst. Examples: Lema's PC/XT, Juku.
9) The  role  of  a  negative  network-specific  shock  has  the  reverse  effect:  by 
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inducing  the  delay it  enables  the  network-internal  discrepancies  to  (fully) 
develop.  It  denies  access  to  resources,  increases the uncertainty about  the 
pay-off of the chosen direction and presumably decreases the commitment of 
the leader/network. Weakly committed participants leave early, whereas more 
committed  ones  stay  longer  until  the  technical  appeal  of  the  vision  has 
decreased  to  a  point  at  which  questions  about  the  meaningfulness  of  the 
project  start  to  emerge.  If  the  vision  remains  unchanged,  contraction  or 
dissolution of the network follows. Examples: Juku, Entel, Lema's PC/XT.
As seen from the above analysis, each of the cases experienced some twists and turns 
over  its  course  of  development.  Therefore,  it  was  analytically  meaningful  to 
decompose  the  evolution  of  each  PC  into  a  number  of  episodes  and  formulate 
propositions about these episodes instead. However, this obscures the possibility that 
the overall development of the cases might at least partly result from the differing 
characteristic traits of the networks. Pursuing this logic further, one could distinguish 
between two major types of socio-technical network: 
1) Opportunistic  network—the preferences of the participants and the overall 
vision are changing frequently and the network tries to make the best use of 
changes in environmental opportunities. On one hand, this means a certain 
flexibility is available and quite possibly multiple successful attempts to find 
different  niches  of  application  (re-domaining)  can  be  made.  On the  other 
hand,  the commitment  of the network is  unlikely to  remain strong for  an 
extended  duration  of  time  and  will  be  easily  affected  by  negative 
environmental stimuli. The users are willing to change their ideas about the 
best course of computerization, and the producers are ready to abandon the 
project  and move  on to  others.  I  would  characterize  Tartu,  Entel,  Lema's 
PC/XT and Sigma 8800 as opportunistic networks.
2) Vision-directed network—here the preferences of the participants are more 
durable as the project is  inspired by a single environmental stimulus.  The 
problem is clearly defined in relation to a specific functional domain and the 
scope  of  the  project  is  ambitious,  requiring  the  formation  of  a  broad 
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consensus and a strong network in order to be fully realized. On one hand, it 
gives the network a capability to move decisively towards a certain goal: as 
the  participants  are  more  committed,  the  network  is  more  resistant  to 
environmental  stimuli.  On  the  other  hand,  the  network  can  become 
characterized by mission blindness: some of the participants can be unwilling 
to re-think not only the goal, but even the ways in which this goal can be 
achieved. I would characterize Juku and Santaka as vision-directed networks.
It  follows  that  these  two  types  should  differ  somewhat  in  their  responses  to 
environmental stimuli: 
1) Opportunistic networks are likely to react to minor chances of diffusing their 
product and to adopt narrower niches. Therefore they are likely to emerge 
even when there is no particular environmental pressure. By contrast, vision-
directed networks are less likely to appear from scratch.
2) Vision-directed  networks  emerge  after  the  occurrence  of  domain-related 
reforms  and  are  more  likely  to  prevail  over  an  extended  period  of  time, 
whereas  opportunistic  networks  are  more  prone  to  follow a  re-domaining 
strategy (jumping on the bandwagon, staying if immediately possible, exiting 
early if not).
3) Avalanche change has a negative effect on both types, triggering an 'every-
man-for-himself' strategy. However, opportunistic networks should be able to 
adapt better to changing conditions and their survival should be more likely. 
New  networks  that  emerge  during  avalanche  change  are  likely  to  be 
opportunistic, whether suited for pursuing this strategy or not.
4) Positive network-specific shock has a similar effect on both types. If such a 
shock is negative, opportunistic networks are more likely to collapse earlier.
Although these strategies clearly depend on actors' choices, I would also like to point 
out  that  the  distribution  of  opportunistic  and  vision-directed  networks  is  most 
unlikely to be random. Instead it is sensible to presume that structural conditions 
affect the choice for one or another.  For example,  if  the leader's  initial  structural 
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position  is  unfavourable,  it  is  easier  to  choose  an  opportunistic  strategy because 
otherwise  much  more  effort  would  have  to  be  put  into  vision-directed  network-
formation  (e.g.  programming  a  lot  of  software,  providing  full  technical 
documentation,  convincing  the  big  local  players  to  join  in,  lobbying  activities 
directed at central authorities etc.). The implications of the differing capabilities of 
different  players  for  their  actions  were  well-recognized  by  the  interviewees 
themselves.  The most  explicit  example comes from the leader of the Tartu team, 
commenting the efforts of the Juku group to get the computer into mass production: 
“The fact that they were struggling shows exactly that we did not have this kind of  
competitive  power  by  far” (Humal  interview).  The  exact  specification  of  the 
background conditions in which different kinds of networks come to be would once 
again require statistical analysis, however.
At  this  point  some  readers  may  feel  that  the  enquiry  has  not  gone  far  enough, 
remaining too descriptive: more depth, more detail, and more explanation would be 
required. The theorization has excluded and simplified various aspects and much of 
the complexity has remained untapped—there are so many fascinating black boxes 
still to be opened. I would agree with everything in the previous sentence. However, 
instead  of  initiating  yet  another  round  of  analysis,  I  would  like  to  address  the 
accusation of descriptiveness in more detail. In fact, I want to put forth the following, 
seemingly paradoxical argument: a demand to decompose every phenomenon into 
the most detailed interactions between smallest units of analysis possible can easily 
lead to an impoverished overall theoretical understanding because it sets very high (if 
not completely unrealistic) expectations for the researcher.
The  critique  of  descriptiveness  is  one  of  the  recurring  themes  in  social  science: 
instead of explaining why the phenomena occur, social scientists allegedly too often 
stick  to  describing  how  they  do  so,  thus  conveniently  avoiding  real  causal 
explanation.  Alas,  what  is  how and what  is  why depend on how the  question is 
presented.  The  progression  of  the  above  analysis  can  be  taken  as  a  convenient 
example:
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1) To begin with, one can focus on observing how different cases evolve and 
note some regularities, e.g. the alternation between expansion and contraction 
in case of Juku.
2) This observation can be criticized on the grounds that it does not explain why 
these alternations occur.
3) By probing further, finding key nodes and recurring key node sequences, one 
could claim in response that 'a contraction of the network was a result of a 
negative environmental impact followed by actors exiting the local network'. 
One can probably agree that this constitutes a sort of an answer to the why-
question—an overall change is explained in terms of smaller sub-changes.
4) However, one can also quite correctly point out that the sequence itself does 
not necessarily imply causal connection. Thus we should be asking why the 
actors decided to exit the network in the first place.
5) Now one can offer an answer in terms of an environmental stimulus inducing 
a delay, during which the structural properties of the environment changed to 
the extent that some actors decisively changed their preferences and exited 
the network.
6) Alas, this observation can again be criticized on the grounds that 'changed 
preferences'  is  an  umbrella  term  for  an  array  of  processes  and  should 
therefore be explained itself.
7) In response one can identify the following event sequence: a) an actor with a 
set  of  desires  regarding  the  goal  and  beliefs  about  the  ways  in  which  to 
achieve the goal; b) searched for potential alternatives; c) changed its beliefs 
about the best way to achieve the goal; d) attempted to convince other actors 
of the network about the supremacy of its alternative; e) having failed to do 
so, changed its desire about the goal and; f) exited the network altogether.
I will stop here as the problem with such reasoning has become abundantly clear 
already.  Yes,  each how–why cycle leads  one closer to the data  and increases the 
empirical accuracy, but at the same time the overall sequence continues to be cut into 
shorter  and shorter  bits  and the  unit  of  analysis  decreases:  in  this  example  from 
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organizations  contributing to network dynamics  to organization-internal  dynamics 
contributing to a certain organizational outcome. In fact, every outcome can always 
be decomposed into a conjunction of various lower-level events, each of which in 
turn is a result of yet another event sequence. In practical terms, the descriptions set 
out in point 7 require considerably more work and historical detail than the ones in 
point 5, while the overall outcome to be explained (stated in point 1) remains exactly 
the same. To illustrate it even more bluntly: if the analyst decides to limit the lowest 
level  of explanation to the change in  preferences,  the mechanisms of preference-
formation are simply omitted from the analysis.  The latter,  although theoretically 
useful, are excluded for the practical purpose of managing the research.
In my view, there are at least three reasons why the a priori demand to explain in as 
much detail as possible is unsatisfactory and at times even counterproductive:
1) Methodological and practical limits to the availability of data and duration of 
data  collection—for example,  an ethnographic observation,  no matter  how 
detailed, does not and cannot reveal neurological causes of exerting agency, 
nor does it need to do so to give a useful account of some social phenomenon.
2) The logical expectation that as the distance between the phenomenon to be 
explained and the elements making up the explanation increases, i.e. more 
and  more  units  of  analysis  and  interactions  between  them are  taken  into 
account,  the  amount  of  information  becomes  increasingly difficult  for  the 
researcher to handle. And when every episode suddenly seems conditional on 
the myriad of factors, there is a grave temptation to claim that higher-level 
patterns are illusory, to abstain from explaining them altogether and/or resort 
to somewhat bland statements to account for the situation as a whole like 'the 
interactions  are  complex  and unpredictable',  'mutual  shaping  and learning 
continuously takes place' etc.
3) Finally,  one could claim that historically STS itself  has suffered from this 
attitude. Its traditional focus on the local, the complex, the contingent, the 
fluid and the uncertain has largely been unsuccessful in leading to meso- or 
macro-theories with a strong micro-grounding. The original call of Pinch and 
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Bijker (1984) to 'open the black box' of technology was soon accompanied by 
'closing  it  behind  you'  (Williams  and  Russell  1987)  or  'finding  it  empty' 
(Winner 1993) to hint at  these difficulties.  Subsequently the micro-bias of 
STS has been a recurrent theme in an array of reviews and criticisms, e.g. 
Russell  (1986),  Williams  &  Edge  (1996),  Rammert  (1997),  Klein  & 
Kleinman  (2002),  Russell  &  Williams  (2002),  Brey  (2003),  Bruun  & 
Hukkinen (2003). To date STS has continued to struggle with the issue so that 
only recently Wyatt and Balmer were still complaining that  “even the best  
writing in the field … could provoke such uncharitable thoughts as: What is  
this  a  case  study  of? What  does  it  add to  our  understanding of  different  
concepts? Interesting as the story itself may be,  how does it contribute to  
discussions of anything beyond itself?” (2007: 619–620).
To recap:  1)  in  my opinion  the  large  gap  between  complex  narratives  and very 
general theories often found in STS case studies is exactly a result of a (possibly 
implicit)  a priori preference for minute detail; 2) insisting on going into as much 
depth as possible and starting to solve the problem 'bottom-up' threatens to maintain 
that gap because in the mess of information generalizations of a very high level are 
the easiest to make. On the other hand, 3) increasing accuracy is indeed preferable in 
the  long  term  because  it  enables  the  establishment  of  a  closer  correspondence 
between the events of the narrative and theoretical categories.
Above I  have  made the  point  that  mechanism-based explanation  is  a  thoroughly 
epistemological affair: the way in which mechanisms are defined and the amount of 
detail involved depend heavily on the choices of the researcher. I also warned against 
going in depth too early, as to do so might obscure larger patterns. Instead I offered a 
way of gradually increasing the degree of detail of the analysis. However, one may 
wonder whether I have zoomed in too close myself. Perhaps the amount of detail 
brought  in  has  already  made  it  difficult  to  notice  some  interesting  higher-level 
regularities? In other words, would we see something different if we focused on the 
interaction of socio-technical networks instead?
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4.3 Inter-case analysis
In this section I will start by asking how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania responded to 
the school computerization initiative. Following this logic, three different patterns 
can be identified, one for each country. It has to be stressed here, however, that 'inter-
case' is not meant to signify the comparison of different cases (which, to some extent, 
was already done in the previous section). Instead this term is used as a shorthand for 
'interactions between cases resulting in particular collective outcomes' which in this 
context  entails  focusing  on  the  emergence  of  local  dominant  designs  for  school 
computers.
Estonia: local dominant design pathway
IF an environmental stimulus
is  followed by the rapid creation of local vision and alignment of actors  
(including powerful ones)
THEN a local dominant design emerges
pushing alternatives from the functional domain




...followed by rapid creation of vision 
and mobilization of powerful actors
A local dominant design establishes itself...
...pushing existing alternatives to 
'migrate' to other functional niches 





Correspondence  to  the  narrative  is  as  follows:  the  command  to  start  teaching 
informatics was quickly taken up by a potential designer (the IoC), producers (RET, 
Estron),  and  was  supported  by  academics,  the  education  sector  and  local  party 
officials, owing to intensive lobbying. The emergence of Juku as the main school 
computer led Tartu and Entel to search for other niches of application (e.g. Entel for 
vocational schools) or to search for a similar niche elsewhere (Tartu in Kursk), even 
though both were conceived and prototyped before Juku.
Lithuania: external dominant design pathway
IF an environmental stimulus
is followed by a mixed response from interested but less powerful local actors
THEN the niche can be captured by interested and more powerful actors with their 
own existing design, not requiring the consent of others
pushing alternatives from the functional domain








...followed by mixed 
response from local actors
Local powerful actors capture the niche and 
adopt an external design the preferences of 
other local actors notwithstanding...
...pushing existing alternatives to 
'migrate' to other functional niches 
or other geographical locations 
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: each of the three academic centres 
responsible for implementing informatics in schools had somewhat different ideas 
about the best ways to do so. As a result,  no broad coalition supporting a single 
vision emerged. The centres were also excluded from formal decision-making. The 
local  authorities  remained  indecisive  at  first,  but  were  then  convinced  by 
Minelektronprom's authoritative proposal to adapt the existing design of BK-0010Š 
and start  mass  production in  the Nuklonas  plant.  Santaka remained an  unofficial 
parallel  in  Lithuania,  later  migrating  to  a  home  computer  niche  in  Minsk  and 
Krasnodar.
Latvia: non-intersecting pathways
IF an environmental stimulus occurs
and there are already local existing designs in some functional domains
BUT actors from either domain are not motivated to engage in network-building
THEN parallel  development  continues,  with  different  possible  solutions  and  
outcomes in both domains






...but local actors have 
different preferences...
...while some functional domains have 
already been occupied by a local design...
...leading to the search of alternative 
solutions for this particular niche
Correspondence to the narrative is as follows: the VEF plant had been developing its 
microcomputers for industrial applications since the 1970s. The education sector also 
had an early start, but the Laboratory of the Problems of School Informatics decided 
to acquire as many computers as possible wherever they were produced and to focus 
on  software  production.  Despite  some  initial  contacts,  none  of  the  parties  were 
pursuing the issue of local PC production very actively. As a result, local computer 
production  efforts  remained  largely  separate  from  the  school  computerization 
process.
Although highlighting important differences between the countries, the patterns are 
not very revealing in some aspects. Because if they are patterns of something, then 
what exactly? In other words, is there an underlying mechanism, or even several? In 
order to tackle this problem, I will begin by noting the commonalities and differences 
between the three countries. The question of which of these factors were actually 
important and why gets us closer to the driving processes. Table 4.3 lists eight such 
factors implicit in figures 4.20–4.22.
Table 4.3.  Differences  and commonalities  of  school  computerization in  the 
Soviet Baltic countries
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Presence of a central stimulus for informatics 
teaching
√ √ √
Perceived need for school computers √ √ √
Existence of local visions/prototypes √ √ √
Industrial production capability √ √ √
Prior experience with serial production of PCs √
Motivation to engage in local network-building √ √
Did the dominant network form around the 
strongest leader?
√ √




It is interesting to note that if only the first five criteria are considered, the observed 
patterns run counter to what one might expect. By the mid-1980s Latvia was the only 
country  with  years  of  experience  in  serial  microcomputer  production;  Lithuania, 
while not having such experience, did have a computer industry; while Estonia had 
neither. Based on this situation, one would expect that it would have been easiest for 
Latvia to create and produce a domestic design, whereas Estonia should have had to 
rely  on  acquiring  computers  produced  elsewhere  in  the  USSR.  But  actually  the 
reverse happened: Estonia went for local design and production, Lithuania adopted 
an external design but started local production,  and Latvia did neither.  Therefore, 
other reasons related to local choices had to be in play to even out the differences in 
the starting points of each country.
The first distinguishing characteristic is related to the framing of the problem. In 
Estonia and Lithuania the issue of school computerization was quickly associated 
with local PC production as one of the ways to overcome the scarcity of computers. 
In  Latvia  no  existing  or  proposed  solution  seemed  attractive  enough  to  the  key 
members of the education sector, while the local decision-makers and producers were 
not showing much initiative either.
This  would  explain  the  difference  between  Latvia  and  the  other  two  countries. 
However, in Estonia and Lithuania some local network-building building took place. 
And in both countries it was the strongest leader that established the main line of 
school  computers:  the  Institute  of  Cybernetics  in  Estonia  and  Venta 
institute/Nuklonas plant, as Minelektronprom representatives, in Lithuania. It seems 
that the main difference can be found in the unity of local actors. In Estonia the IoC 
people initially managed to establish a broad alliance between designers, producers, 
users and decision-makers. In Lithuania the preferences of the education sector were 
more fragmented and remained so. As the strongest participant with central support,  
Venta/Nuklonas  could  capitalize  on  the  lack  of  local  consensus  and  obtain  the 
approval  of  the  decision-makers.  Lacking  serious  resistance  from the  user  side, 
Nuklonas could take the easiest route by simply adapting the existing design of its 
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ministry, which was already being centrally advocated as a school computer anyway.
Let me now attempt to formalize these considerations using the DBO framework 
once again. I would start with the actions (Aa,  Ac,  Ad),  of the leaders of different 
networks, directed towards the decision-makers who desire to computerize schools 
(Db), although at that point they may not have any clear beliefs about the best ways to 
achieve that goal. It is the action of the leader (e.g. lobbying, presentation of the 
vision) that leads the decision-maker to form new beliefs or to alter the existing ones 
about school computerization (Bb). Subsequent official or unofficial backing from the 
decision-makers (Ab) changes the opportunities available for the initial actor (Oa). 
This in turn triggers further changes in the desires and beliefs of other networks (Dc, 
Bc,  Dd,  Bd),  leading  to  corresponding  actions.  Figure  4.23  summarizes  the  event 
sequence, which consists of what I have called the mechanisms of opportunity space 
capture and coping strategies (outcome six in figure 4.2).
Figure 4.23. The opportunity space capture and resulting coping strategies
This  depiction  seems  to  summarize  quite  well  the  commonality  of  processes  in 
Estonia and Lithuania: in both cases the Juku and BK-0010Š networks managed to 
obtain the support of the local decision-makers. The situation is different for Latvia 
because one of the components necessary for the initial action to occur—the desire to 
do so (the motivation to engage in local network-building in table 4.3)—was absent. 












I have pointed out the degree of unity of preferences as the distinguishing factor 
between Estonia and Lithuania. However, it is one of the core tenets of the DBO 
framework that preferences are not set in stone. What further distinguishes between 
Estonia and Lithuania is that in the former the opportunity space capture was directed 
to both groups—local decision-makers and potential users. That is to say, the unity of 
preferences was actively sought after and the process inclusive. In the Lithuanian 
case the education sector was mostly excluded from negotiations between producers 
and decision-makers,  i.e.  the process  of  opportunity space capture  was exclusive 
from the viewpoint of future users. Anticipatory shaping of preferences did not take 
place, but the users themselves did not resist actively either.
Following from this, one can propose a tentative hypothesis that the mechanism of 
opportunity space capture: 
1) Materializes when it is supported by both decision-makers and users.
2) Materializes  when  there  is  support  from  decision-makers,  but  the  users 
remain divided or indifferent.
3) Fails to materialize when the decision-makers might be willing to offer their 
support, but the users actively mobilize against it.
4) Fails to materialize when decision-makers and users resist the attempt.
Unfortunately the narratives do not offer sufficient evidence to test proposals 3 and 4. 
The closest  would  be  the  case  of  Poisk,  in  which  Sigma's  proposal  to  the  local 
authorities, bypassing the education sector, was actively resisted by the Lithuanian 
Computer Society. The project was indeed dropped, but it cannot be attributed to the 
resistance  of  the  user  mobilization  for  certain,  since  Sigma  also  experienced  a 
network-specific shock (problems with reaching an agreement with the partner from 
Kiev). Therefore, it is quite possible that in the absence of this event, Sigma would 
have  continued  anyway.  This  indicates  a  need  to  further  theorize  the  power 
differences between groups active in the opportunity space.
The second part of figure 4.23 draws attention to various reactions of other networks 
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after the opportunity space has been captured by one of them. Logically, there are 
four possibilities: 
1) Neither the desire of school computerization nor the belief in the best way to 
do so change, in which case the competition between the networks continues.
2) The desire to participate in school computerization remains, but the belief 
about the best way to do so changes.
3) The desire  to  participate  in school  computerization disappears,  but  beliefs 
about  the  opportunities  to  do  so  remain—in  this  case  the  leader/network 
would be convincing itself that it did not desire the goal that much anyway.
4) Both  the  desires  and  beliefs  change  and  the  network  moves  on  to  other 
functional domains.
For the short-term perspective, I think that the second reaction is the most pertinent 
here.  In Estonia,  Entel  tried its  luck in  the vocational  education sector  and Tartu 
made a late re-entry with small-scale production towards the end of the 1980s. In 
Lithuania  the  Santaka  group  decided  to  continue  development  and  small-scale 
production as an unofficial parallel option. I think that two contextual factors explain 
why this response was prevalent: first, the opportunity space had been captured by 
the strongest leader, signalling grave difficulties for other players/networks to engage 
in direct confrontation. But at the same time all the players were well-aware of the 
systematic shortage in the USSR and had justified expectations that this would be the 
case  for  computers  too.  This  meant  a  justified  belief  that  the  functional  domain 
would only be partly occupied and that there would be still some room left for other  
networks. This would also explain why the attempts of smaller networks to (re-)enter 
the functional domain continued over the years.
4.4 System-level analysis
Hopefully I have managed to show that intra-case and inter-case focuses indeed help 
to tease out different patterns present in the same historical narratives. However, at 
this stage I also feel that the analysis on these two levels has created a somewhat 
fragmented  picture.  Yes,  mechanisms  and  patterns  of  different  kinds  have  been 
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identified, but do we have an overview of the course of events as a whole? I think 
not,  until  we  switch  the  level  of  aggregation  to  treat  all  cases  in  one  locality 
collectively  as  technological  innovation  systems  (or  socio-technical  regimes). 
Relating changes in the system to changes in the environment and choosing a time-
frame of 8–10 years, the pattern of system-internal transformation emerges. I would 
argue that this model, presented in figure 4.24, captures the basic dynamics of all 
three countries.
Figure 4.24. System-internal transformation
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Attempts at system-internal 
reform initially stimulate the 
local socio-technical regime...
1 2 The speed and scope of changes gradually increase. Some more, mainly high-end 
functional domains, can access external 
technology but... 
...existing and new networks attempt to use 
new possibilities occupying different 
functional domains. Only selected few have 
access to external technologies at this time
...the access to and price of external 
technology is still too high to affect most 
domains. This allows existing and new 
networks to occupy existing and new (low-
end) domains but some may already start 
to phase out the production
3 Disruptive change escalates into avalanche change. The combination of many rapid and far-
reaching changes paves way for the influx of 
external technology with superior performance 
but still higher price ...
...major uncertainty on the local level follows. 
Producers start a frantic search for marketable 
products whereas the users keep an eye out for 
various possibilities. Ties of the networks 
weaken and most collapse completely
4 The local socio-technical regime has become uncoupled from the existing 
system and opened itself up to external 
influences. Some stability starts to 
emerge...
...domestic production has mostly ceased: some 
producers have completely disappeared, some have 
moved on to new activities, even those who survived 
previous turbulent change have started phasing out. 
Users in all functional domains gradually move to 
the new generation external technology completing 
the transformation
The transformation can be divided into four distinct phases. At first the attempts to 
reform the communist system internally increase the freedom of action and direct the 
attention  of  producers  and users  to  certain  issues.  As the  overall  stability of  the 
system is not in question, these environmental influences can be treated as positive 
stimuli. In Estonia and Lithuania, the school computerization reform encouraged the 
creation of  new networks  (Juku,  Santaka)  and the  re-domaining of  existing  ones 
(Tartu, Entel). The stability of the rest of the socialist system meant that the large-
scale introduction of foreign computers was not going to happen, at least  from a 
short-term perspective.  Western  computers  were  rare,  extremely sought  after  and 
used only for limited applications by organizations that were highly influential or 
lucky enough to afford them.
The  system-internal  developments,  however,  do  not  stabilize,  but  increase  in 
strength, becoming more and more disruptive in nature. In the second phase some 
visible cracks begin to appear, but most actors do not yet believe that the system 
itself would be in any serious danger. Many well-known difficulties such as getting 
the computer into mass production or renewing the prototype for a new product cycle 
remain the same. Some products of the existing networks may therefore be phased 
out and the participants of the networks move on to new activities to take advantage 
of novel opportunities. But overall, the performance of local networks is similar to 
the  previous  stage.  Gradually  increasing  opportunities  also  mean  that  Western 
computers continue their inroads into various applications, but their influence still 
remains  limited.  At the same time,  some of  the Soviet  components  can be more 
easily obtained than before, lowering the entry barrier for smaller players (Tartu). 
The ratio  of  Soviet  computers  to  Western  ones  can  even  increase  as  the  former 
invade low-end functional domains (e.g. home computers) at a higher rate.
In the third phase the disruptive change has turned into an avalanche. The speed, 
scope and amplitude of changes are breathtaking. Uncertainty abounds. All countries 
experienced the virtually overnight disappearance of the supply chain. Independence 
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meant  a  freedom  of  choice,  but  also  de-isolation  from  the  Western  world. 
Technologically lagging computer production was no longer shielded from external 
influence.  Lack  of  investors  meant  that  the  producers  urgently  needed  to  find 
something that  they could produce with the existing infrastructure and which the 
customers would be willing to buy. From the user side, Western computers were now 
starting  to  pour  in  (e.g.  used  PCs  being  donated  to  Baltic  schools),  making  the 
formation of local networks even more difficult. In these conditions local computer 
production was going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, and many networks 
quickly collapsed (Juku, Tartu, Sigma 8800). But the case of Lema's PC/XT also 
shows that the conjunction of certain factors allowed some to continue profitably in 
the short-term.
In the fourth phase the confusion starts to disappear and stability slowly emerges. 
The price advantage, maybe the last shield of Soviet computers, also starts to vanish. 
Catching up with Western production is deemed impossible by the local actors. Large 
state-controlled  factories  have  mostly  collapsed;  many  small  enterprises  have 
emerged  instead.  Concerning the  PCs,  there  has  been  a  move from local  design 
and/or  production  to  assembly  and  re-branding,  or  simply  re-selling  of  Western 
computers.  Other  players  have  shifted  to  new activities  (e.g.  focused entirely on 
software).  The networks that might have survived the previous stage also start to 
phase out their product as new possibilities become more profitable (Lema's PC/XT). 
The old computers continue to be used in various functional domains for some time, 
until they can be completely replaced (e.g. Jukus and BK-0010Šs were still used in 
schools around the mid-1990s). This completes the transformation.
In this chapter I have illustrated a crude analytical technique for generalizing from 
the historical narratives. I have also presented analyses on three different levels of 
aggregation,  illustrating  how  each  of  them  enables  the  capture  of  different 
mechanisms  and  patterns  of  development.  I  have  argued  that  one  should  avoid 
zooming in on minute detail a priori at any cost, because it might too easily lead to 
an inability to capture wider patterns. However, it  could be noted that although I 
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advocated a top-down approach to historical narratives, the analysis itself progressed 
from the lower to the higher level of aggregation. Is this not a slight contradiction?
A little secret can be revealed now: the order in which these patterns emerged during 
the research process was actually from the higher to the lower level of aggregation. 
The first idea of a system-level pattern came after I had conducted only one case 
study (Juku). The background knowledge obtained during the research enabled me to 
sketch the basic course of events. When most of the cases had been researched I 
began to notice different paths of school computerization in each country. Finally, 
after most of the data had been collected and written into historical narratives, intra-
case results started to appear. The lower-level analysis enabled me to specify various 
nuances  of  higher-level  analyses  later  on  (e.g.  outlining  in  more  detail  the  local 
responses  of  system incumbents  during  various  phases),  but  it  did  not  prompt  a 
fundamental revision. It was the structure and logic of the thesis that forced me to 
reverse  the  order  of  presentation.  But  it  was  the  actual  research  experience  that 
encouraged me to put forward the suggestion of a top-down approach, from higher to 
lower levels of aggregation, from more general to more specific, from less to more. 
Confirmatory  research  or  intuitive  progression?  I  will  leave  it  for  the  reader  to 
decide.
Having performed the middle-range analysis, only a few questions remain from the 
viewpoint of this thesis: can these theories, narratives and analyses be used to re-
think some higher-level conceptualizations? Is it possible to use this whole research 
experience  to  build  a  more  nuanced  metatheory?  And  if  so,  then  how?  These 
opportunities are explored in the next chapter.
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5. Higher-level generalizations
It is well known to practising scholars that the research process is far from linear: 
rarely if ever does one proceed directly from theory to research design to fieldwork 
to  analysis  to  results  without  looking  back.  Rather  more  likely,  new knowledge 
gained  in  any  of  these  phases  will  feed  back  to  previous  parts  of  the  process, 
prompting  partial  revisions,  re-examinations  and repeated  analyses  from different 
angles.  Charting  these  movements  truthfully  would  make  the  research  report 
excruciatingly difficult to follow, justifying the linear structure of the text usually 
found in books and journal articles.
This  point  serves  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  following  ideas  pertaining  to 
metatheory and (to some extent)  philosophy have been gathered into this chapter 
largely for presentational reasons. The actual origin of these ideas is more varied. 
Some  bits  resulted  from  working  with  existing  substantive  theories,  some  were 
inspired directly from the narratives, some had already been in my mind in some 
vague shape for quite a while but had not been sufficiently thought through, and 
some indeed emerged after the middle-range analysis when I shifted my attention to 
the higher-level meaning of these findings. But they all share a level of generality 
that goes beyond middle-range theories, i.e. they are potentially much more widely 
applicable.
In the following discussion I first cover the distinction between rules and meanings 
adding one basic component to the socio-technical metatheory outlined in chapter 1. 
I then move on to propose a typology of rules and sketch out the possible phases of  
rule evolution. The discussion of the usefulness of the realist approach along with the 
possibilities of speaking about 'technical' or 'material' causes concludes the chapter. I 
occasionally draw on the historical narratives as illustrative examples, but the very 
act of forcing oneself to think in more general terms reveals that the narratives at 
hand are often not enough: one constantly needs to exercise theoretical imagination 
and ask what kinds of categories are not directly observable in the data but should be 
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there logically. Thus the actual discussion covers much more ground and draws on a 
variety of examples in order to highlight the potential scope of these ideas.
5.1 Basic causal forces
The initial version of the socio-technical metatheory employed in chapter 1 adopted 
Geels's  (2004)  distinction  between  actors,  technologies  and  rules  as  its  basic 
elements. I argued that technologies and rules manifest their influence through the 
mediation  of  actors.  However,  this  did  not  mean  that  the  explanation  could  be 
reduced  to  actors—the  absence  of  technologies  or  rules  would  surely  make  a 
difference to the outcome. That is to say,  actors can and do behave differently in 
different socio-technical contexts. The narratives illustrated this general point many 
times: actors frequently changed their preferences as new technologies (e.g. 16-bit 
computers) or new laws (e.g. the possibility to establish cooperatives) appeared.
Borrowing from and building on Giddens (1984: 21), a rule was defined as a tacit or 
explicit  prescription  guiding  the  enactment  or  reproduction  of  social  life  and 
manifested  in  patterns  of  practice.  The  question  is  whether  this  definition  is 
applicable to all the instances found in the narratives. Which ones do I have in mind? 
Take the newspaper articles about the Soviet Baltic PCs like Poisk (Boyko 1991) and 
Juku (Hanson 1987.22.04): both contain descriptions of new computers, including 
the possibilities they offered and their potential uses. However, one would be hard-
pressed  to  claim that  articles  like  these  are  prescriptive—they do  not  create  the 
impression  that  these  described  uses  would  be  necessarily  required  whereas 
alternative  uses  would  be  somehow  sanctioned.  In  other  words:  while  the  rule 
'demands'  a certain course of action this is not necessarily so for aforementioned 
descriptions. These descriptions seem rather to have the quality of a resource instead. 
Various  words  used  in  everyday language like  statements,  classifications,  claims, 
ideas, representations, utterances, propositions, information, knowledge or wisdom 
seem to suggest this possibility—influence without prescription. This is analogous to 
many theoretical frameworks in STS and elsewhere, e.g. Technological Systems of 
Innovation, which refers to knowledge development and knowledge diffusion as key 
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activities (Hekkert et al. 2007) vs. creating and changing institutions (Edquist 2005: 
191), or desires and beliefs as factors that influence actions (Hedström 2005).
As a first approximation I will therefore use the umbrella term 'meaning' to cover 
these  instances.  This  term  is  preferred  to  'data',  'information',  'knowledge'  and 
'wisdom'  because  all  of  those  words  seem  to  constitute  a  kind  of  a  hierarchy, 
referring to the degree to which a certain meaning has been integrated with other 
meanings.  Alistair  Duff  brings  the following example:  raw data  is  obtained from 
space probes, packaged as a report (information), and set into the context of existing 
theories (knowledge), after which this new understanding can be put into a 'sensitive 
and timely' use (wisdom) (2000: 27). Meaning, on the other hand, seems to be more 
general and thus preferable,  referring to any kind of unit regardless its degree of 
contextualization.  So  meaning  can  be  a  unit  of  data,  information,  knowledge  or 
wisdom. Figure 5.1 integrates the category with Geels's actor–technology–rule triad.
The addition of meanings opens up six new relationships:
1) Actor → meaning—the actors create, modify and use existing meanings. An 
example would be the creation of a scientific study about the harmful effects 
of gasoline-based cars to the environment.
2) Meaning  →  actor—existing meanings can be seen as both enablement and 
constraint for the creation new ones. Following the above example, it would 
be very difficult for policy makers to reach a consensus about the extent of 
the problem and the activities to be undertaken unless the relation between 
cars and pollution had been established beyond reasonable doubt. 
3) Meaning  → rule—stocks of  knowledge can  lead  to  the  transformation  of 
rules.  The study on pollution can become the basis  of the introduction of 
higher taxes on gasoline and provision of subsidies for the development of 
alternative solutions. 
4) Rule  → meaning—rules can also guide the search for new meanings. The 
changed laws and new subsidies act as incentives for considering cars that 
run on electricity, solar power, biodiesel etc. 
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5) Meaning → technology—new technologies can be constructed and developed 
on the basis of existing meanings. Knowledge about the properties of various 
metal alloys, power sources, user habits and the like provides a basis for the 
development of novel car designs. 
6) Technology  → meaning—new  meanings  can  be  gained  from  practical 
experience and hands-on tinkering, as reflected by various phrases such as 
'learning  by  doing'  (Arrow  1962),  'learning  by  using'  (Rosenberg  1982), 
'learning  by  interacting'  (Lundvall  1988)  and  'learning  by  trying'  (Fleck 
1994). In this case the trial-and-error process of car construction reveals new 
information about the components, their durability, efficiency, expected cost 
of the product etc.
As it is difficult to imagine a rule being followed without the possibility of mental  
representation on the actor's part, it follows that rules are best characterized as an 
(important) sub-set of meanings. To put it simply: whereas rules are for something, 
meanings just  are.  In relation to a specific situation meanings do not prescribe a 
certain course of action; that is to say, they enable more interpretive flexibility than 
do rules. Otherwise they are quite similar: both make a difference to the outcome (the 
actor might disobey a given order or simply lack relevant knowledge—the computer 
would not be built in either case), both can be explicit or internalized and so on.
The category of meanings is quite easy to integrate with the rest of the metatheory. 
Meanings can be characterized as elements of socio-technical systems (e.g. technical 
knowledge)  or  systems  in  their  own  right  (e.g.  mathematics).  As  such  other 
postulates  proposed  in  chapter  1  also  apply:  systems  of  meanings  or  meanings 
integrated into socio-technical systems can be hierarchical (e.g. mathematics as one 
of the languages), they can interact (e.g. the use of mathematics in sociology, the use 
of sociological vocabulary in describing everyday behaviour) and they are elements 
of structure (e.g. accumulated expertise on microcomputing in an organization).
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Figure 5.1. The mutual shaping of actors, technologies, rules and meanings 
(adapted from Geels 2004: 903, extended by the author)
The same is true for co-evolution. Figure 5.2 outlines four possible outcomes of the 
interaction between technology and its meaning. A very simple example of a hammer 
illustrates each of them:
1) Traditional  use—the hammer is  used in  the way it  was  meant  to be used 
according to the pre-existing social conventions, that is for nailing. This is 
what actors do with their routine surrounding technologies every day; after 
all,  we use  countless  technologies  in  one  day while  taking  their  physical 
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2) Creative  use—the  actor  discovers  that  the  hammer  can  also  be  used  for 
straightening bent nails. In this case technology itself has not been changed: 
its physical structure remains the same while a new function has been added. 
Again, this is something creative actors do every day: the inventors usually do 
not foresee every possible use, which enables one to talk about 'unintended 
consequences'.
3) Instrumental  change—the  actor  notices  that  she  or  he  could  improve  the 
nailing process by making the hammer more comfortable, e.g. by balancing 
the handle a bit better. While technology itself is (slightly) renewed then, its 
purpose has remained just the same.
4) Co-evolution—the  actor  notices  that  since  it  is  only  one  side  of  the 
hammerhead  that  is  frequently  used,  the  other  end  could  be  modified  to 
remove misplaced nails from wood. As a result, both technology's physical 
structure and functionality change.
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C – Instrumental change
D – Co-evolution
5.2 Towards a typology of rules
Having made this tentative analytical distinction between meanings and rules, I will 
now take a  closer look at  the category of rules.  As I  have drawn extensively on 
critical realist sociology and the Multi-Level Perspective, I will start by probing how 
Elder-Vass and Geels have tackled the term. By identifying their respective strengths 
and weaknesses I will provide a synthesis that goes beyond each characterization. 
But note that in so doing the discussion of both authors will be highly selective and 
will omit much of the argument that is not directly relevant to the current topic.
In order to give an account of the role of norms and norm circles in the construction 
of  institutional  reality,  Elder-Vass  (2010b,  2012,  ch.  4)  has  drawn  on  Searle's 
distinction between constitutive and regulative rules (1995). The first type, defined as 
'X counts as Y (in context C)', creates opportunities for certain activities to occur. For 
example, in order to play chess the properties of the pieces need to be specified (e.g. 
what counts as a knight). Regulative rules coordinate “activities that could or would  
occur whether or not the rule concerned existed” (2010b: 6). For example, driving 
cars does not necessarily need a specification of the side of the road to be driven on.
Elder-Vass  takes  this  argument  further  by distinguishing  between  norms  that  are 
'indiscriminately indexical' and those that are not. That is to say, whether the norm 
applies to all actors who are part of the norm circle (e.g. 'hold the fork with your left  
hand') or only to a certain part of it. In the latter case the regulative norm requires a  
constitutive one (or an 'indexing norm' as Elder-Vass calls it) to specify the specific 
part of the norm circle in the first place. For example, in order to talk about the 
activities a goalkeeper is  allowed to undertake in a football  game, it  needs to be 
clarified who counts as a goalkeeper in the first place. It is the crux of Elder-Vass's 
argument  that  these types of norms are mutually constitutive:  the activities to  be 
regulated  require  the  specification  of  roles,  but  a  mere  definition  of  a  role  is 
meaningless  without  the  specification  of  corresponding  actions  this  role  enables. 
Simply calling one football player a goalkeeper does not make any sense unless some 
special rules regulating his or her activities follow.
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The distinctions used by Geels are borrowed from Scott's institutional theory (1995, 
especially pages 51–58),56 which proposes that there are 'three pillars' of institutions: 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. Geels defines each of them as follows: 
1)  “the  regulative  dimension  refers  to  explicit,  formal  rules,  which  constrain  
behaviour and regulate interactions, e.g. government regulations which structure the  
economic process. It is about rewards and punishments backed up with sanctions  
(e.g. police, courts)”; 2) “normative rules … confer values, norms, role expectations,  
duties, rights, responsibilities”; 3)  “cognitive rules constitute the nature of reality  
and the frames through which meaning or sense is made” (2004: 904).
At  first  sight  the  distinctions  made  by  Searle  and  Scott  seem  to  share  many 
commonalities. Constitutive rules resemble the cultural-cognitive pillar in that both 
seem to function as building blocks of other rules. Regulative rules and the regulative 
dimension both seem to be concerned with coordinating certain interactions. It also 
seems that Searle's notion of regulative rules at  least  partly covers the normative 
dimension, as it includes role expectations, duties and the like. So both classifications 
seem  to  identify  at  least  two  basic  types  of  rules,  with  Scott  going  further  by 
articulating Searle's regulative rules into two subsets. However, some problematic 
aspects remain in relation to the current discussion.
First, it needs to be made completely clear that Elder-Vass's argument of constitutive 
and regulative rules that strictly necessitate each other only applies to certain types of 
norms.  While  the  claim  is  valid  for  some  social  institutions  that  constitute  rule 
systems and do require both the role specification and the corresponding activities, 
Elder-Vass and Searle seem to hold that for indiscriminately indexical norms the 
regulative norms do not require constitutive ones at all, because the activities to be 
regulated could occur independently of the existence of the rule.
56 I  have  chosen  to  neglect  a  major  strand  of  STS  literature  which  explicitly  acknowledges 
institutions as one of the fundamental theoretical building blocks—Systems of Innovation. This  
choice is based on the comparison of MLP, Sectoral Systems of Innovation and Technological 
Systems  of  Innovation  conducted  by  Coenen  and  Díaz  López  (2010).  They find  that  MLP's 
conceptualization of rules is the richest of the three.
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However, this claim can be contested once we reflect on our propensity to exhibit 
recurring patterns of practice in everyday situations. Take the example of keeping a 
certain distance when queuing to use a cash machine. Now, it seems that none of the 
rule-followers are being specifically singled out, the rule applies to everyone: stand 
too close and people would give you a strange look, move away or even ask you to 
move. On the other hand, acts like this presume that one already has at least some 
preliminary notions of a queue, a cash machine, some sense of distance and so on. 
That is to say, every action requires at least minimal recognition of the features of the 
environment, and at least some of the particular features of the situation are taken to 
be  the  representatives  of  pre-existing  categories.  So  it  seems  that  it  would  be 
impossible to do away with constitutive rules. On the contrary, every action, however 
mundane, seems to rely on countless 'X counts as Y' type rules.
But this reliance is somewhat different from the cases described by Elder-Vass, in 
which one type of rule would not make sense without the other.  In this  case the 
notions  of  a  queue,  a  cash  machine  and  distance  do  not  become  automatically 
meaningless just  because they have not linked together into a rule about keeping 
distance. Their applicability extends well beyond a single regulative rule. In this way 
they  retain  their  meaning-like  quality:  although  relying  on  certain  lower-order 
classifications,  these do not  determine their  inter-linkage and thus  act  rather  like 
resources for higher-order rules.
Now  let  me  turn  to  the  distinction  between  cultural-cognitive,  regulative  and 
normative  dimensions.  More  specifically,  I  would  like  to  inspect  the  defining 
characteristics  of  each.  I  have  already  pointed  out  the  similarities  between  the 
cultural-cognitive  dimension  and  constitutive  rules.  The  problem  is  that  the 
definitions of regulative and normative rules are not mutually exclusive: both types 
'constrain behaviour and regulate interactions', creating mutual expectations that are 
quite evident considering that the category of normative rules indeed consists of 'role 
expectations', 'duties', 'responsibilities' and the like; and normative rules can also be 
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backed  by sanctions  or  rewards  (e.g.  a  company's  perceived  unethical  behaviour 
might lead to a boycott by its clients without necessarily involving the intervention of 
formal state bodies). Therefore, one should look for some other feature in order to 
justify the distinction.
In fact, I would argue that this typology actually conflates two different analytical 
dimensions.  Whereas  the  first  is  concerned  with  the  rule's  function,  the  second 
focuses on whether it is implicit or explicit, i.e. the first is about the type of rule and 
the second about its explicitness. It is quite easy to read the sequence of regulative–
normative–cognitive  as  one  of  decreasing  explicitness,  beginning  from  highly 
institutionalized laws and ending up with hidden and largely unconscious frames of 
reference.  With  the  essential  difference  between constitutive  and regulative  rules 
being pointed out above, the word 'values' in the definition of normative rules hints at 
the possibility of extending the classification to three different types.
These are as follows. First, constitutive rules are the ones defined as 'X counts as Y'.  
Second, instrumental rules specify the conduct of some activities. I have argued that 
these activities themselves always rely on constitutive rules. But there is also a sense 
in which some instrumental rules cannot always be considered to have a quality of 
being  'just'  (e.g.  instructions  of  starting  a  car)  but  some can  (e.g.  a  law against 
stealing). I have chosen to use the adjective 'moral' to highlight this third dimension. 
I would argue that in order for a rule system to persist for an extended duration, all 
three types need to be involved: constitutive rules specify certain roles, instrumental 
rules regulate interactions between them and moral rules give grounds to justify the 
regulation of interactions. In the case of a community or an enterprise, the often seen 
expression 'who we are,  what  we do, why we do it'  captures the essence of this 
constitutive–instrumental–moral system.
For the lack of a better term I have chosen 'implicit' to refer to the hidden dimension 
of rules—the ones that (seem to) underlie various patterns of practice (see below), 
but are not explicitly articulated by the actors concerned.  In distinction from the 
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implicit  rules,  informal  rules  might  be  linguistically  represented  but  not  be 
crystallized into explicitly codified sets of rules. These characteristics, in turn, define 
the formal dimension. The resulting typology, presented in table 5.1, brings all of 
these dimensions together with examples of each. I would suggest that the categories 
used are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e. there is no overlap in content and all 
possibilities have been accounted for.
Artificial  languages  and  legal  documents  provide  examples  of  constitutive  and 
formal rules. Whether one is trying to define an intellectual property or a patent, 
some distinguishing characteristics have to be outlined so that a certain X at a certain 
moment could be classified as Y. Programming language is a good example of how 
rule-following can be enforced by a machine. In this case the interpretive flexibility 
has been greatly diminished because the use of an incorrect command simply results 
in an error. Thus in order to program the user must follow the constitutive rules quite 
strictly. Another example would be the set of Soviet all-union standards—GOST—
specifying various characteristics for a wide range of products.
Table 5.1. Typology of rules
Constitutive Instrumental Moral






Informal Fools and jesters, 
identity of a community
Organizational routines, 
self-regulation
Offering elderly people a 
seat, exchanging gifts
Formal Mathematics, legal 
definitions
Traffic laws, government 
funding regulations
Codes of ethics, 
religious texts
In the case of the informal dimension, the role of a jester points to the social role of 
acceptable deviance, a 'necessary' outcast: while not taken seriously by the others, the 
ascribed  role  of  jesters  also  enables  them to  point  out  the  shortcomings  of  the 
community. In this case one can argue for the historical existence of such a role and 
possibly the acknowledgement of its  function,  yet  the role itself  is  informal.  The 
history of the Soviet Union often gives a splendid chance to reflect on informal roles 
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because of the large discrepancy between official rhetoric and everyday experience. 
To take the example of the Special Construction Bureau of Computing Technology of 
the Institute of Cybernetics in Soviet Estonia—the director of the organization was 
enacting at least two roles. The formal role was quite similar to any director in any 
organization, whereas the informal role was to provide as much freedom for talented 
employees  as  possible  (Leppik  interview).  This  included  not  only  financial  and 
technical  freedom,  but  also  the  management  of  relations  with  local  and  central 
authorities to avoid disrupting the flow of work by ideologically-motivated central 
decisions, often perceived as ignorant and arbitrary. As colourfully summarized by 
one of the interviewees—regretfully off the record—the informal task was to 'act as 
an umbrella against the shitstorm from above'.
Finally, leaving aside the textbooks, most of our utterances rely on internalized rules 
of grammar and meanings of words. And—to use Elder-Vass's example (2012, ch. 4)
—when playing chess we do not usually ponder on the definition of the pieces. One 
can probably make the same comment about experienced programmers who follow 
the  syntax  instinctively  rather  than  explicitly  considering  and  re-considering  the 
meaning of every command.
Speaking  of  formal  and  instrumental  rules,  various  laws  are  once  again  prime 
examples for they explicitly serve to guide and sanction interactions. Whether one is 
required not to cross the road at a red light or to submit certain documents to apply 
for funding, some activities are being brought in line. For example, the decree to start 
teaching  informatics  in  schools  played  an  important  role  in  the  emergence  and 
development of many PC projects in the Soviet Baltic countries.
As with informal constitutive rules, the informal instrumental rules in the USSR were 
often  in  conflict  with  the  formal  ones.  For  example,  although in  theory the  less 
significant organizations could write letters to factories and request components, in 
reality one needed to travel there in person, rely on communication skills and bribes 
to get them. The director of SCBCT managed to capture the underlying rule covering 
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all  informal  activities  in  one  sentence:  “Do  not  confront  the  prevailing  order  
publicly” (Leppik interview).
Lastly, there might be cases in which rules have been internalized to the extent that 
we  do  not  even  acknowledge  them:  the  way we  greet  people  sharing  the  same 
cultural community or the way we keep social distance are good examples. In the 
USSR a satirical term  Homo sovieticus  was used to refer to a set of cultural traits 
acquired and shared by most Soviet citizens that were manifest in various activities 
and  expectations  about  the  activities  of  others:  doublethink,  paternalism  and 
isolationism to name a few (The Economist 2011.10.12). It is sensible to presume 
that  these prescriptions  for  behaviour  were not  consciously acknowledged by the 
individuals most of the time, but rather, as (generally) useful guidelines in Soviet 
social context, automatic responses to various stimuli.
The most explicit manifestations of moral rules would be codes of ethics or religious 
texts. The Ten Commandments would be a good example of a set of rules conveying 
not only a code of conduct, but also reflecting the fundamental values of Judaism and 
Christianity. One could argue that in official rhetoric the development of the Soviet 
Union  was  guided  by an  explicit  overarching  utopian  moral  rule  that  postulated 
achieving an egalitarian social order as its ultimate aim.
Similarly to  constitutive  and instrumental  rules,  the  category of  moral  rules  also 
operates  on  an  informal  level—for  example,  it  is  commonly  expected  that  two 
friends might invite each other to their birthdays and exchange gifts. The violation of 
this  principle  would  probably  be  perceived  as  rude  and  unjust.  Concerning  the 
historical narratives: although the motives were usually mixed, many interviewees 
also expressed a perceived obligation to 'do something for the country' as one of the 
drivers for PC building (e.g. Enok, Jaaksoo, Matulionis interviews). This could be 
characterized as  an informal  moral  prescription that  complemented the  utilitarian 
reasoning with the feeling that the cause is noble.
276
The category of implicit moral rules provides the toughest test for the typology. On 
one hand, this possibility seems to be required by the logic of the categorization. On 
the  other,  one  may  well  wonder  whether  moral  evaluation  without  conscious 
reasoning is  even possible.  Would it  turn out  not  to  be,  the choice of  the above 
categories could be questioned. But if evidence of such phenomenon could be found, 
one  could  argue  that  the  typology  has  indeed  managed  to  build  on  prior 
classifications.
And  indeed,  over  the  past  decade  researchers  working  in  the  field  of  moral 
psychology have proposed that humans do possess sets of innate rules for behaving 
morally,  a  universal  moral  grammar,  operating  analogously  to  a  linguistic 
competence. In a review article, Mikhail (2007) presents some initial evidence from 
psychology, linguistics, anthropology and neuroscience to substantiate this claim: 1) 
developmental  psychologists  have  found that  even little  children  seem to  have  a 
certain moral code, e.g. they distinguish acts with a similar result on the basis of 
intent  or  purpose,  they  distinguish  moral  violations  from the  violation  of  social 
conventions (Mikhail uses theft vs. wearing pyjamas to school as an example) etc.; 2) 
every  natural  language  seems  to  distinguish  between  obligatory,  permissible  and 
forbidden acts; 3) certain prohibitions (rape, murder) and legal distinctions seem to 
be universally shared among different cultures; 4) some studies have located parts of 
the brain involved in moral cognition.
The theory of universal moral grammar goes further, however, in that it aims to test 
the hypothesis  directly.  In a series of studies (see Mikhail  2007 for more detail), 
people were asked to solve various dilemmas. One involved a situation in which the 
respondent sees a train storming towards five people. The respondent is standing next 
to the switch, which she or he can use to direct the train onto another track. As the 
driver has fainted, the respondent is the only one capable of influencing the situation. 
Unfortunately, there is also one man standing on the track to which the train could be 
diverted. The respondent is asked whether she or he would flick the switch or not. A 
variation of this dilemma suggests that the train could be sufficiently slowed down so 
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that five men could escape by pushing a large heavy object on its way. However, the 
only thing nearby that would qualify is a large man standing next to the respondent.  
The respondent is asked whether she or he would shove the man on the track to save 
the lives of the others.
It appears that despite the fact that the outcome would be exactly the same in each 
case—sacrificing one to save five—an overwhelming majority of people (roughly 
nine people out of ten, see Mikhail 2007) agree to flick the switch in the first case,  
but would not shove the man on the tracks in the second. In a comparative study, 
Hauser  et  al. (2007)  found  that  this  proportion  is  little  affected  by respondents' 
differences  in  gender,  age,  ethnicity,  nationality,  education  and  even  exposure  to 
moral philosophy. The same study also tried to determine whether the respondents 
can justify their choices. It turned out that out of 597 subjects, 267 could provide no 
justification at all, while roughly 70% of the justifications provided were insufficient 
in that they failed to point out a clear difference between the above scenarios. At least 
part of these incomplete justifications appealed to a 'gut feeling' (ibid.: 13–14). This 
seems  to  suggest  that  moral  rules  can  indeed  operate  without  explicit 
acknowledgement. Even  more—the  capability  to  behave  morally  might  be  a 
biological  feature  rather  than  something  learned  over  the  course  of  growing  up 
(which is not to deny the role of the environment in shaping whether and how this 
tendency is actualized).
Two such universal rules that underlie moral choices have been identified. One of 
those is the principle of double effect, which holds that  “it may be permissible to  
harm an individual for the greater good if the harm is not the necessary means to the  
greater good but, rather, merely a foreseen side effect” (Hauser et al. 2007: 3). In the 
first of the above scenarios, the death of a man could be perceived as a side effect—
he just happened to stand on the track and the respondent had no means of altering 
his position. In the second scenario the man had to be used by the respondent as the 
necessary means to an end, thus violating the above principle. Another rule is the 
prohibition of intentional battery, which “forbids purposefully or knowingly causing 
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harmful or offensive contact with another individual or otherwise invading another  
individual's physical integrity without his or her consent” (Mikhail 2007: 145).
Thus I  would  conclude  that  the  typology is  indeed a  step  in  the  right  direction, 
increasing the analytical clarity of the notion of rules and as such allowing a better 
understanding of the components of rule systems or regimes (see the conclusion). 
However, at this point a number of qualifications should also be made to show what 
kind of problems this typology does not solve (too well).
First, the typology is tentative. In fact, the foregoing discussion already implies that  
the  chosen  categories  can  be  further  refined.  For  example,  the  dimension  of 
implicitness  fails  to  make  a  clear  distinction  between  unconsciously enacted  but 
nevertheless  learned  rules  and  the  ones  that  are  already  part  of  our  biological 
inheritance and bias us towards certain behaviour.
Second,  the  typology  is  static.  This  means  that  it  does  not  include  various 
mechanisms of internalization, externalization, learning, diffusing and sanctioning. I 
do  agree  that  rules  can  be  learned  from pre-existing  texts,  by  rational  imitation 
(Hedström 1998), by explicit conditioning by others (Jones 2010) and so on—but 
(currently)  this  typology is  descriptive,  not  explanatory.  It  aims  to  offer  a  better 
classification, but does not attempt to hypothesize the mechanisms characteristic of 
one type or another.
Third, the analytical clarity of the categories can be questioned. The problem is that 
while the difference between constitutive and instrumental/moral rules is that of a 
type the difference between instrumental and moral ones could be seen as one of 
degree since the examples of both are partially about regulating actions (see table 
5.1). A preliminary solution might be to view moral rules as values which function to 
specify the desirable properties underpinning instrumental rules of behaviour. Take 
Gordon Gekko's famous 'greed is good' motto. On one hand this statement does not 
attempt to constitute neither the meaning of 'greed' nor 'good'. On the other hand it 
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does not specify any action either. However, (at least implicitly) it relies on some 
notions  of  'greed'  and  'good'  (thus  being  underpinned  by  constitutive  rules). 
Moreover,  it  can  also  be  taken  as  a  basis  for  deriving  more  specific  rules  for 
behaviour (e.g. while investing, only seek to maximize your own welfare). At first 
glance this seems to be a good way to deal with the problem of mutual exclusivity 
but more work remains to be done in order to see whether this is actually the case.
At this point it should also be noted that the typology largely excludes the problem of 
the hierarchy of rules and rule systems. That is, hypothetically one can deconstruct 
any type  of  rule  as  being  a  surface  expression  of  a  more  fundamental  one.  For 
example, instrumental traffic rules might be read as expressing an underlying moral 
rule that one should attempt to minimize the harm done to others. However, there are 
probably limits to the sensibility of the argument that every seemingly 'neutral' and 
'descriptive'  body of statements actually hides deep ideological commitments.  For 
example, if we knew about the existence of a culture only by one hammer, we could 
hardly learn more about their ideology apart from the assumption that they valued 
hitting  something.  Therefore,  while  acknowledging the  importance  of  the  issue  I 
would prefer to leave the question of the hierarchy of rules open to further empirical 
scrutiny.
Related to this is the problem of instrumental and causal sameness (Turner 1994, in 
Elder-Vass  2010b),  which  states  that  we cannot  derive  a  rule  of  behaviour  from 
observed patterns  of  practice  because we have  insufficient  information about  the 
actual internal  causes driving the actors.  In other words,  similar  behaviour  might 
result from different motivations. While I do agree with the argument content-wise, I 
would argue that depending on the purpose and level of aggregation of the research 
rules can continue to be used as conceptual simplifications. That is, if we observe a 
certain practice in a certain context and are interested in a higher-order phenomenon 
of which this pattern is only a part, we can simply assume the equivalence between 
instrumental  and causal  sameness.  The difference  would only become significant 
once the context is shifted and some actors suddenly change their behaviour, which 
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would  give grounds to  make additional  assumptions  about  the variety of  driving 
internal causes or the hierarchy of rules.
Returning to the example of chess, in order to observe the interaction of chess pieces 
on the board I can start from the fact that the actors behave as if they were following 
certain rules. I can then derive the rules they seem to follow from their practices, 
assume that they hold more generally and test the assumption elsewhere—this time 
before  the  practices  themselves  even  occur  (or  at  least  before  they  have  been 
observed).  If  the  postulated  rules  of  chess  still  seem to  hold,  it  means  that  the 
distinction between instrumental and causal sameness is irrelevant from the point of 
view  of  the  particular  research.  Moreover,  one  could  assume  that  despite  the 
differences in actor-internal causal configurations, in one way or another they are all 
aggregated into a very general mental representation, a belief that in a certain context 
something should be classified in a certain manner or a certain action should follow
—otherwise the patterns of practices would not follow and the observer would have 
no means to suspect the existence of any rules in the first place. But at the same time 
it does not mean that the rules so postulated would remain eternally immutable—
they continue  to  be challenged by new observations—it  only means a  pragmatic 
temporary trade-off is made to avoid dealing with hypothetical issues which might 
not even turn out to be relevant for the research.
For  this  reason  I  would  also  like  to  avoid  extended  discussion  on  extensional 
semantics and finitism (Barnes 1982). In principle, the distinction is important: one 
can indeed argue in favour of the stance that meanings are not absolutely fixed before 
usage,  that  every  act  of  rule-following  requires  decisions  whether  the  particular 
situation qualifies as one in which the rule should be applied,  and that rules and 
meanings are constituted through practice and always revisable. But if that does not 
mean complete interpretive anarchy then the sources of constraints eventually need 
to be located somewhere, e.g. in experience, habits and artefacts (MacKenzie 2008: 
103). And again, if one is not specifically interested in the theory of actor-internal 
causation  (e.g.  how  beliefs,  attitudes,  emotions  etc.  contribute  to  a  rule-like 
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behaviour)  then  this  distinction  can  once  again  be  ignored  for  certain  research 
purposes.
In sum: 1) if there are two competing explanations for a similar outcome and; 2) the  
researcher is interested in the interaction of outcomes rather than the emergence of 
the outcome itself and; 3) the implications of different lower-level explanations for 
the higher level are unclear or (seemingly) irrelevant for the current research; then 
for pragmatic purposes the first point can be neglected to avoid infinite regress and 
make the research manageable. Admittedly this is quite a complicated way to say that 
there are simply limits to what one can learn during one research effort and that at 
some point one should just acknowledge these limits and get on with it.
5.3 How do rules come to be and how do they diffuse? A tentative sketch
I  have  argued  that  the  above  typology  was  not  meant  to  solve  the  underlying 
mechanisms of rule evolution. As various qualifications testify, the problem is quite 
complex, even if only for the multiplicity of such mechanisms. However, I do think 
that various bits and pieces in the above discussion can be pulled together into a 
tentative descriptive model of different phases of rule creation and diffusion. This is 
represented in figure 5.3.
The  process  begins  with  the  occurrence  of  a  stimulus  of  some  kind  or  the 
expectations that the current practices of a society will eventually lead to one. This 
stimulus  has  the  quality  of  introducing  some new possibilities  or  hazards  to  the 
existing social  order—were this not the case the actors would have no reason or 
means to alter their actions at all. Note that this does not distinguish between external 
and internal stimuli.  Also,  this  is  not  meant to imply that the stimulus would be 
instantly and widely recognized by all potentially affected parties. In fact, one could 
speculate  that  this  process  is  rife  with  unintended  and  unforeseen consequences. 
Moreover, it can be hypothesized that the longer the duration of unequal perception 
the more severe the eventual conflict with existing institutions, since new practices 
have had more time to crystallize. This would explain, for example, why the struggle 
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between the defenders of the free flow of information on the internet and the holders 
of intellectual property rights only quite recently escalated into a full-scale debate 
about the extent to which the network could and should be regulated. Historically the 
internet had developed relatively autonomously from business interests—indeed the 
interest of the private sector was lukewarm for decades (Winston 1998, ch. 18). This 
probably  enabled  the  restriction-free  technical  infrastructure  and  the  culture  of 
information sharing to develop until  the problem of conflicting practices became 
blatantly manifest at the beginning of the 2000s with the introduction of new file-
sharing applications like Napster, Kazaa and BitTorrent.













ANTICIPATION OF  
CONSEQUENCES
Learning, imitating










Initially,  however, various individual responses remain local and varied in nature. 
Since it is uncertain which practices will prevail, it might not be clear how to react 
even if the stimulus is recognized early enough. However, some of the responses 
seem to take greater advantage of the stimulus or deal better with its consequences. 
As individuals begin to exchange information about their experiences by learning 
and imitating, eventually some patterns of practice become more prevalent.
At  this  point  many things  happen.  First,  expectations  emerge.  This  signifies  the 
acknowledgement of the actors themselves that the practices have crystallized into 
relatively predictable patterns manifested in certain situations. From an individual 
point of view one realizes that in a certain context most of the actors tend to exert  
certain  actions,  exhibiting  a  rule-like  behaviour,  and  adjusts  one's  own  actions 
accordingly in advance. Second, the question of whether these practices are wanted 
or  unwanted  arises.  Depending  on the  power  constellation  of  a  given society or 
community, certain practices might become verbalized into a code of behaviour or 
even  officially  legitimated,  further  consolidating  expectations  about  the  future 
behaviour of others. Alternatively, a counter-institution might be devised to negate 
the pattern. To turn back to the example of the internet: the ongoing debate about 
whether  to  mitigate  copyright  laws  or  to  enforce  even  harsher  punishments  for 
violations  illustrates  the  tension  between  accepting  and  legitimating  widespread 
patterns of practice and attempting to counter them with more intensive sanctioning.
Third, I hypothesize that in this phase something even more fundamental, what I  
would call rule specification, occurs. In previous phases the mechanism underlying 
the pattern of practice might have been purely imitative. That is, people might have 
followed a rather basic rule like 'in the conditions of limited information and great 
uncertainty,  follow  the  behaviour  of  others'.  With  verbalization  and 
institutionalization, the rule becomes much more context-specific, e.g. 'drive on the 
right-hand side of the road', and so do the corresponding sanctions.
In some cases, however, the stimulus can be or at least seem to be disruptive enough 
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to warrant proactive sanctioning. The regulation of nuclear weapons is an example of 
how institutionalization preceded the use of these weapons in warfare as standard 
practice in order to avoid severely detrimental consequences.
The time-scale of all of these phases is roughly from months to decades. The span of 
the next phase can extend from decades to centuries. Here the members of the society 
are socialized into 'correct' behaviour early on, so that many rules indeed become 
automatic prescriptions followed without any reflection. The process still involves 
learning  and  sanctioning,  but  the  reasons  for  the  existence  of  the  rule  might  be 
obscure for both those doing the socializing and those being socialized. This would 
explain why rules with quite practical origins continue to be followed long after the 
initial stimulus itself has disappeared. For example, a popular tale ties the original 
function  of  the  handshake  to  ancient  times  when  it  was  supposedly  used  to 
demonstrate that no weapons were being concealed. While most people have stopped 
carrying  swords  since  then,  the  handshake  itself  has  remained  as  a  gesture  of 
politeness.
As the above discussion of the universal moral grammar theory indicates, there may 
be yet another phase, the time-scale of which extends from thousands to millions of 
years. The underlying mechanisms are once again different.57 Working over a very 
long  time-span,  this  biological  selection  results  in  individuals  with  'in-built' 
propensities to behave in a certain manner in certain contexts.
I believe this rough-and-ready descriptive model enables the formulation of some 
testable propositions. However, since the level of abstraction is very high it remains 
57 I do not claim to have any substantial expertise in this area, and therefore would like to avoid 
extensive discussion of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology. I also wish to avoid the debate 
on the exact mechanisms of selection at work (e.g. individual or group-level). This phase has only 
been  included  for  the  purposes  of  completeness,  implied  by  the  above  discussion.  I  would, 
however, caution the reader not to discard this phase as entirely irrelevant from the sociological 
perspective  on  the  grounds  that  the  tempo  of  current  normative  change  is  so  fast  that  the 
environmental  stability  cannot  be  sustained  long  enough  for  biological  variation/selection 
mechanism to  be  realized.  It  may well  be  that  some very general  trends,  e.g.  the  increasing 
complexity of our world-system, will last long enough to have some (equally general) implications  
after all.
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to be seen whether more detailed narratives of historical institutions can be fitted to 
this model, and if so then at what cost. These problems remain to be solved in the 
future.  Before  concluding  this  chapter,  however,  I  will  briefly  turn  back  to  the 
question of the usefulness of (critical) realism as a general basis for more specific 
theories.
5.4 Justifying realism
In chapter 1, three critical realist principles—independence of (at least some aspects 
of)  reality  from  our  perceptions,  the  possibility  of  establishing  correspondence 
between our claims and this reality, and the potentially fallible nature of this process
—were  adopted.  The  choice  of  such  axioms  is  a  right  of  the  researcher  and  in 
principle needs no justification: after  all,  every axiom relies on an array of other 
unjustified claims. And if one aims to justify them all one simply ends up in a vicious 
spiral  of  infinite  regress.  Alternatively,  one  may  think  that  this  exercise  of 
justification is unnecessary—it may seem that as materiality is an integral part of 
STS most  of  the  proponents  are  'closet  realists'  anyway.  However,  at  least  some 
influential STS thinkers seem to challenge this view. So when arcane statements like 
“the world is not simply epistemologically complex. It is ontologically multiple too”  
(Law 2008: 367) or  “constructivist technology studies can be agnostic about this  
idealism-realism question” (Bijker 2010: 64) continue to be made, it's clear that there 
is  some disagreement  about  the  usefulness  of  realist  approach and that  the issue 
merits at least some justification, if not a full-scale debate.58 But I hesitate to tackle 
this question with the (in my opinion unnecessarily) complex language and obscure 
labels so infuriatingly characteristic of some of the approaches of STS. Instead I will 
proceed from a simple example related to research practice, gradually teasing out 
further implications. By focusing on why I would prefer to continue to speak about 
material  or  technical  causes,  I  will  also provide  an  answer  to  the  question:  why 
remain realist?
58 Because of space limitations the chapter devoted to an extensive analysis of ANT and SCOT had  
to be omitted. In the current chapter some problems are only briefly alluded to. See Kanger (2012)  
for more detail.
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Consider building PCs in the Soviet Union. It was claimed in chapter 4 that various 
limitations affected the design, e.g. faulty and unstable microprocessors, slow tape 
recorders with poor mechanics resulting in many reading and writing errors, strain on 
the eyes  due to  using TVs as  monitors  and so on.  All  of  these  limitations  were 
labelled 'technical'. But the use of this term could be contested in several ways:
1) One could ask 'faulty', 'slow' and 'poor' for whom, and for what purposes? In 
other words, all of these categories have been ascribed by the interviewees or 
the researcher. But if the purposes and the suitability of the technologies are 
firmly  human-defined,  does  it  not  make  the  category  of  'technical'  or 
'material' largely redundant?
2) At that time faster and more reliable components were being produced in the 
West. But restrictions on obtaining them seem to belong to the realm of social 
institutions,  so  the  issues  would  seem to  be  little  about  the  constraining 
capacities of the material.
3) As we have the benefit of hindsight we know now that many better computers 
have been built since. Are the constraints then not material, but rather more 
accurately  about  the  lack  of  proper  knowledge  instead?  After  all,  if  the 
engineers had known then what they know now, they would have been able to 
build better computers decades ago.
4) Try as we might, we can only know the world through our perceptions and 
linguistic  categories.  Does  it  not  then  make more  sense  to  stop  ascribing 
causality to  what  cannot  be known directly anyway,  and instead focus  on 
what  we  can  be  sure  of—that  is,  the  existence  and  interplay  of  various 
meanings?
The first claim can be answered in a number of ways. To begin with, if one adopts 
methodological relativism, one is able to acknowledge in theory that the material has 
an  impact  on  human  action—it  is  only  that  the  whole  process  of  technological 
development is analysed as if it does not. This is the position advocated by Bijker, 
who  fears  that  otherwise  researchers  might  too  easily  lapse  into  technological 
determinism (2010: 71). In my opinion this is a rather weak defence because it fails 
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to  solve  the  problem  of  how  the  exclusion  of  certain  causes  could  yield  a 
substantively more accurate, rather than merely more 'interesting',  result.  It is the 
weakness of the analyst, not the theory, if one confuses technological determinism 
with the causal significance of technology or the material.
The focus on the ascription of functions and meanings also excludes the possibility 
that  the  actors  are  simply  exhibiting  a  sour-grapes  syndrome,  i.e.  tailoring  their 
desires to what they believe can be achieved (Hedström 2008: 326–327). Moreover, 
the possibilities for 'social construction' might become considerably narrowed down 
once the non-negotiable properties of the material start to 'bite back'. As stated by 
Vincenti and demonstrated in his research on the technical constraints of Edison's 
electrical  lighting  system:  “...once  some  basic  elective  decision  has  been  made,  
possibly (even probably) on social grounds, a kind of technical logic can take over,  
leaving designers  and inventors  little  or  no choice  in  important  aspects  of  their  
engineering solution” (1995: 553–554).
One could, however, make a seemingly stronger defence than Bijker by insisting that 
although the material aspect of technology is indeed a logically necessary cause, it is 
simply  a  trivial  one.  In  other  words,  “it  is  always  (or  almost  always)  present,  
irrespective  of  the  outcome” (Mahoney  2008:  431).  Since  the  ascriptions  of 
functionality do not derive unambiguously from material properties, only the former 
make a  significant  difference  in  defining  the  'essence'  of  technology for  a  given 
social context. As such the exclusion is justified because the material does not add 
any explanatory power; after all, it can be interpreted in millions of possible ways.  
Thus claims Sismondo: “No matter how unmalleable a technology might look, there  
are always situations, some of them highly hypothetical, in which the technology can  
take on unusual uses or interpretations” (2010: 101).
But  the  careful  wording  of  this  statement  (note  the  words  'highly  hypothetical') 
already indicates some difficulties with deeming technology as a necessary but trivial 
cause. For in principle this requires the researcher to assume that at any point of time, 
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any material resource or a technological artefact is equally amenable to the ascription 
of any meaning or functionality, with an equal outcome. That is, one should assume a 
complete detachment of function from structure. Anything would be equally suitable 
for any purpose. But the fact that not many people—even after being liberated by 
decades  of anti-essentialist  research in  STS—are willing to devote huge sums to 
building jet planes from cheese illustrates that at least in practice this position seems 
to be untenable. There seem to be good reasons to hold on to a belief that there is 
some affinity between (some) properties of certain artefacts and their uses.
If  that  is  the  case  then  what  about  the  second claim,  which  argues  that  the  real 
determinant of the outcome is to be found in social institutions, since these limit  
access to material resources? In my opinion this type of criticism simply pushes the 
cause back one step. Yes, it is certainly true that historically all technologies are all 
constructed by humans for certain purposes. More specifically, it is also true that it 
was  the nature of the relationship between the USSR and Western countries  that 
hindered the influx of new technologies. But for a certain actor with a certain goal in 
a certain socio-technical context, this problem eventually materializes in the shape of 
the properties of available resources—either the microprocessors work reliably for an 
extended duration of time or they do not, for example.
Here  one  could  appeal  to  the  argument  that  the  property  of  such  socio-material 
entities is relational in each case,  “that elements in a system are significant—and  
indeed achieve  their  form and character—only  in  relation  to  one  another” (Law 
2008: 631). In other words, when we employ notions like 'affordance' (Gibson 1979, 
Hutchby 2001, Kirchhoff 2009) this already presumes both, material properties in 
association with a certain purpose. A material entity affords something in relation to 
its user's desires, and depending on the characteristics of the latter the affordances 
can  be  different.  A lake  can  be  a  living  environment  for  a  fish  or  a  source  of 
refreshment  for  a  weary  traveller.  From  that  perspective  the  'reliability'  of  the 
microprocessor can only be understood as a relation between its material properties 
and its ascribed function.
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In some ways  this  solution  is  better  than  the  previous  one  in  that  it  does  allow 
material properties to play some explanatory role. As a temporary solution (when one 
focuses on the interplay of different socio-technical entities with their relational—
which in this use is virtually identical to emergent—properties) it might be tenable. 
However,  from the  point  of  view of  critical  realism it  also  seems  to  encourage 
disinterest towards the question of analytical decomposition. To put it more simply, it 
does  not  attempt  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  the  influence  between  the 
ascription of function and material properties is asymmetrical, and if so then to what 
extent.  How  much  possibility  is  there  to  switch  the  configurations  of  material 
resources so that the criteria of functionality would remain the same? Moreover, so 
that they would remain the same in largely different contexts? In a society with a 15 
km/h speed limit a horse can indeed act as a functional substitute for a car, but what  
about longer distances or differences between the food or fuel required? Problems 
like this seem to suggest that there is at least a “hierarchy of real-world constraints” 
(Vincenti  1995:  566).  However,  the  treatment  of  all  configurations  as  relational 
simply excludes this issue by implicitly assuming the equality of the relevance of 
material properties and the ascription of function. Thus it is no wonder that to date 
little attention has been turned to the matter (Vincenti 1991 providing a welcome 
exception). A realist take on the matter might provide a way towards the solution, 
and I fully agree with Vincenti's proposal that “a taxonomy of real-world constraints  
might be useful to compile” (1995: 572). To summarize: I believe that relationality as 
a  simple  and  temporary  solution  has  actually  become  quite  permanent,  thus 
continuing to maintain the existence of certain analytical blind spots.
What about the claim—supported by retrospective proof!—that the real limitation is 
insufficient knowledge, not material properties? Like the previous critique, this one 
also shifts the driving cause. In principle it is claimed that one can never be certain 
whether  the  laws of  nature  restricted  the  actor's  fulfilment  of  his  or  her  goal  or 
whether the actor simply lacked relevant knowledge. But note that this distinction 
becomes relevant only in hindsight. Once again, for an actor at a certain point of time 
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in a certain socio-material context, his or her lack of knowledge manifests in the 
durability of the properties of material resources. For this reason I find it sensible to 
treat the cause as 'technical' or 'material' even if in retrospect the added knowledge 
would enable the observer to dispute this claim.
To see why this is so, let us remember that the observer (or researcher) is also largely 
limited to the pool of knowledge of his or her time. So the researcher could use the  
benefit of hindsight and demonstrate that at least some limits deemed to be material  
by the historical actors could be more accurately characterized as limits caused by 
insufficient knowledge in the light of the information now available. However, not 
all  causes  can  be  reduced  in  that  way:  using  Vincenti's  example  (1995:  565), 
perpetual motion is still deemed impossible by the current laws of physics. And here 
the nagging question emerges: how can the observer be sure that his  or her own 
attributions  really  stand  the  test  of  time?  Because  in  principle  the  observer's 
attributions of causality to the material properties can always turn out to be erroneous 
in the light of future scientific and technological developments, and thus one could 
infinitely extend the argument of insufficient knowledge as the real cause. In brief, 
the analytical distinction between the material and the knowledge-related could never 
arise.
This brings me to the final point:  why not let it  all go and extend this argument  
infinitely? Is it really a problem if one focuses on actors' own perceptions and does 
not evoke any external criteria? After all, it is only through these perceptions that we 
are able to obtain any information at all. Why not then analyse any socio-material  
processes simply as the interplay of 'social' and 'material' meanings? For example, if 
a microchip was ascribed a meaning that it is 'faulty' then this meaning itself makes a 
difference  to  the  construction  of  other  meanings  and  thus  helps  to  explain  the 
eventual result.
To me the main problem lies in the fact that increased scepticism also means fewer 
nuances. Because for a realist, idealism proposes an inconvenient question: why are 
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certain ideas more durable and resistant than others? An answer to this—adopting a 
position that  there are  some entities with causal  powers  independent  of our  own 
perceptions—brings an additional burden because the ascription of external causality 
needs to be justified somehow. Although critical realism also admits that there is no 
one-way train from conceptions to reality—our ascriptions may be simply wrong—
that itself does not resolve the issue. In fact, coupled with the acknowledgement that 
offering absolute proof is impossible, the realist position seems quite uncomfortable. 
But Sokal and Bricmont's argument—that “the mere fact that an idea is irrefutable  
does not imply that there is any reason to believe it is true” (2008: 176)—can be 
usefully turned around: it is possible have a reasonable belief, say, in a fact that it 
was a faulty microchip with independent causal powers that caused the computer to 
break down, not merely our belief.  By focusing solely on the meanings we once 
again  risk  analysing  socio-technical  processes  as  power  struggles  between social 
groups in which the properties of the artefacts or material resources themselves have 
no part to play. This, of course, evokes an array of troubles indicated above.
None of which is to say that critical realism is unproblematic. From the STS point of 
view much remains  to  be done,  whether  it  is  formulating a  sound conception of 
technological causality,  creating a taxonomy of material constraints, exploring the 
relation between physical, knowledge and normative boundaries or determining the 
extent to which socio-material reality can be constructed. But I would hold that the 
very basic tenets of realism, the possibility of attributing (partial but not determinate) 
causal efficacy to entities beyond our perception, is simply too powerful a weapon to 
be  discarded  easily.  Ultimately  it  offers  more  analytical  distinctions  than  the 
meaning-centred approach and thus enables attention to be paid to more interactions. 
So my short answer to the question of why one should remain realist is:  “It's an  
excellent hypothesis.”
In this chapter I have covered various metatheoretical and philosophical problems 
encountered during the course of my research journey.  It  is  now time to provide 
answers to the initial research questions, draw together the main contributions of the 
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dissertation,  discuss their significance, point to the shortcomings of the work and 
suggest potential opportunities for future research.
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Conclusions and discussion
The U-shaped curve depicting the logic of this thesis has been completed. In the first 
chapter I moved from the critical realist philosophical principles to socio-technical 
metatheory  to  the  synthesis  of  specific  substantive  theories—Multi-Level 
Perspective, Desires–Beliefs–Opportunities framework and (Technological) Systems 
of Innovation. I aimed to show how the frameworks of higher levels of abstraction 
structure the lower ones, enabling the researcher to remain logically coherent and 
aware of the alternatives not necessarily present or explicit in the data.
The  second  chapter  tackled  various  methodological  issues  related  to  building  a 
rigorous mechanismic process theory. The immediately practical problems pertaining 
to data collection, sources of evidence and possible biases were also discussed. The 
third  chapter  further  increased  the  complexity  by  providing  detailed  historical 
narratives about ten attempts to create, diffuse and use personal computers in the 
Soviet Baltic states, roughly between 1977 and 1992.
In the fourth chapter I gradually started making more general statements on the basis 
of the historical narratives. As a result, three different middle-range theories, each 
operating on a different level of aggregation, were constructed: one concerning the 
evolution  of  a  single  socio-technical  network  in  a  changing  environment,  one 
focusing on the interactions of these networks in creating and maintaining a local 
dominant design, and one explaining the transformation of local innovation systems 
in  the  face  of  an  increasing  openness  to  Western  influence.  Finally,  chapter  5 
reflected on the metatheoretical and philosophical  implications of different issues 
encountered during the whole research journey. The socio-technical metatheory was 
substantially clarified with regard to the conceptualization of rules and meanings. A 
justification for retaining critical realism as a useful starting point of enquiry was 
also provided.
In  the  following  section,  I  will  start  by  providing  answers  to  the  middle-range 
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research questions presented in chapter 1. I will  then move on to highlight other 
contributions  of  the  thesis  as  they  extend  beyond  the  construction  of  specific 
substantive  theories.  The  subsequent  section  will  relate  the  middle-range  and 
metatheoretical results to the existing state of knowledge, thus highlighting the wider 
significance of the thesis. The final section indicates the parts of the work that could 
be improved on and points to future research opportunities.
Main contributions of the study
The middle-range part of the thesis raised the following questions: 
1) What  explains  the  success  or  failure  of  each  PC  project?  What  are  the 
patterns  of  case  development?  What  are  the  respective  intra-case 
mechanisms?
2) How were the dominant lines of PCs established? What are the patterns of 
interaction  of  cases  in  each  country?  What  are  the  respective  inter-case 
mechanisms?
3) How did the Technological Systems of Innovation evolve in each country? 
What are the patterns of system-level development?
The theory-construction exercise in chapter 4 provided the following answers for 
different levels of aggregation: 
1) Intra-case level:
a) The success or failure of a PC project is dependent on a number of factors, 
the importance of which change over the course of the internal development 
of  the  socio-technical  network  and  its  environment.  Especially  in  the 
conditions of rapidly changing environmental conditions, there is unlikely to 
be a single model able to capture the whole sequence of network-internal and 
network-external processes. The process is likely to be better understood as a 
modular sequence of separately-theorized episodes.
b) The driving mechanisms of case evolution are the attempts at  network 
creation/expansion or the contraction/disintegration of the network that result 
from the changing desires, beliefs and opportunities of the participants.
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c) The realization of these mechanisms is affected by a number of background 
factors:  type  of  environmental  change,  phase  of  network  development, 
strength of the leader/network, strength of the vision, the extent to which the 
vision is shared, strength of the partner, the extent to which the functional 
niche  has  been  occupied  by other  players/networks,  the  presence  of  local 
actors not engaged in similar projects, expectations about the possibility to 
continue the project and prior experience of the performance of the network.
d)  Depending  on  the  timing  of  events,  the  interaction  of  environmental 
changes  and local  socio-technical  networks  results  in  different  patterns  of 
development. In the absence of particular environmental pressure, network-
formation is likely to be gradual and drawn-out; so is the phase-out of an 
existing network. Domain-related reform provides a strong stimulus and leads 
to  the emergence of clear  visions.  Strong committed networks are  created 
while existing weaker networks may attempt to change the usage function of 
their  PC (re-domaining).  The process is  relatively quick and has a clearly 
directed  nature.  Avalanche  change  speeds  up  the  processes  of  network-
formation and contraction even more. However, as uncertainty is high and the 
preferences  and  opportunities  in  constant  flux,  stable  networks  are  very 
difficult  to  maintain.  Networks,  even  if  created,  are  likely  to  be  weakly 
committed, with abrupt disintegration of existing networks a dominant trend. 
Finally, positive network-specific shocks accelerate the move from one stage 
of development to another (e.g. from prototype to mass production). Negative 
network-specific shocks retard development, leaving the network stuck in a 
drawn-out phase. Parallel environmental developments can subsequently lead 
the  participants  to  change  their  preferences  and  to  abandon  the  project 
altogether.
e)  It  is  possible  to  distinguish  between  opportunistic  and  vision-directed 
networks.  Opportunistic  networks  aim  to  act  quickly,  flexibly  and  often 
unofficially to make the best of various environmental opportunities. On the 
other hand, the ties between the participants are often weak, meaning that 
such networks are more susceptible to disintegration or moving on to other 
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activities as soon as negative environmental signals appear. Vision-directed 
networks are more strongly committed and persist longer, even when they 
have  experienced  some  negative  environmental  stimuli.  However,  their 
durability can become a weakness when blindness to alternatives sets in. The 
choice  between  an  opportunistic  or  vision-directed  strategy  is  likely 
significantly influenced by the  structural  position of  the participants,  with 
weaker  leaders/players  having  to  resort  to  an  opportunistic  strategy more 
often.
2) Inter-case level:
a) The emergence of local dominant designs can be understood as a sequence 
of  two  underlying  mechanisms:  opportunity  space  capture  and  resulting 
coping strategies. The first involves the focal network changing the beliefs of 
the decision-maker, whose backing then opens up the opportunity space for 
the focal network to realize its vision. It is hypothesized that the mechanism 
comes into play when decision-makers and producers are active,  but users 
remain divided in opinion or indifferent. Mobilized resistance from decision-
makers  or  users,  on  the  other  hand,  blocks  or  delays  the  realization  of 
opportunity space capture.
b) The successful opportunity space capture triggers the coping strategies of 
other networks. In the observed cases the networks' desire to fulfil the niche 
remained, but the beliefs about the best ways to do so changed. The strength 
of  the  network  capturing  the  opportunity  space  and  the  overall  shortage 
characteristic of the Soviet economy likely explain the choice for this strategy
—direct competition with the dominant network was out of the question, but 
the functional niche was insufficiently fulfilled (actually and expectedly) to 
warrant further attempts.
c) The crucial factor preceding the initiation of the opportunity space capture 
mechanism is the motivation to engage in network-building: the absence of 
this  motivation  explains  why  no  dominant  local  school  computer  design 
emerged  in  Latvia.  The  factor  that  made  a  difference  to  the  pattern  of 
emergence of the dominant design is the general unity of preferences in the 
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locality.  In  Estonia  the  preferences  were  proactively shaped,  leading  to  a 
broad consensual alliance in favour of the local design. In Lithuania the users 
remained  divided  or  insufficiently  informed  and  thus  the  decision-makers 
favoured the proposal of the strongest actor, leading to the 'domestication' of 
an external design.
3) System-level developments of each country could be captured with a single, 
four-phase model:
a)  Attempts  to  reform the  existing  system result  in  limited  environmental 
stimulation  from the  viewpoint  of  local  actors.  Since  the  stability  of  the 
system  is  not  compromised,  network-building  increases.  The  quantity  of 
Western  computers  remains  very low and limited  to  a  few top functional 
domains.
b) The intensity of the pressure gradually increases, opening up more and 
more opportunities. Domestic network-building continues and the quantity of 
Soviet computers continues to increase. Because of various limitations (e.g. 
price, accessibility of foreign currency), the proportion of Western computers 
may decrease, although their absolute numbers continues to climb.
c) A disruptive pressure escalates into an avalanche change, resulting in a 
frantic  search  for  marketable  products  by the  local  networks.  The official 
limits  to  the  flow  of  goods  start  to  diminish,  but  the  price  of  Western 
computers  remains  high.  Thus  the  local  network-building  attempts  may 
continue for some time, although expectations of their viability are low. Most 
of the new projects are soon abandoned and the existing ones ended as the 
preferences and the opportunities of the participants change quickly.
d) The innovation system, decoupled from the Soviet Union and reoriented to 
the Western world,  starts  to stabilize.  Decreasing prices  allow the gradual 
substitution of Soviet technology for Western PCs in a few years. A shift from 
domestic  hardware  design  and  production  to  assembly  from  foreign 
components and/or import takes place. Phase-out in user domains completes 
the overall transformation a few years later.
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These are the main middle-range theoretical results. However, the study also makes 
additional, wider contributions: 
1) Historical: so far systematic works on Soviet computing have been few and 
far between. Moreover, to my knowledge there is no extensive treatment of 
Soviet  personal  computing.  Therefore,  this  thesis  provides  substantively 
novel historical knowledge about a field that has been little studied to date.
2) Methodological: the analytical technique combining the intuition of multiple 
STS studies and the rigour of grounded theory is, to my knowledge, a novel 
contribution  to  generalization  from  historical  narratives.  The  technique, 
which starts  by making the most  basic  generalizations then proceeds with 
step-by-step addition of more theoretical nuances, enables the researcher to 
gradually add more detail to his or her emerging middle-range theories. The 
advantage is that the analysis can be stopped at any point, yet the analyst still 
has  a  theory  of  some  kind.  This  overcomes  two  problems—being 
overwhelmed by data and remaining content with simplistic generalizations
—the traps of grounded theory and STS, respectively.
3) Metatheoretical:
a)  The  theoretical  framework  operating  on  three  levels  of  abstraction  – 
philosophy,  metatheory  and  specific  substantive  theory –  where  the  more 
general levels guide and structure the more specific ones is a novel approach. 
It helps to ensure the logical coherency of one's theoretical synthesis, increase 
one's sensitivity to additional factors one's theory could take into account and 
makes the researcher's assumptions explicit to the reader. As such I would 
claim that this approach eases the translation of general issues into specific 
problems and vice versa (e.g. it  enhances one's capability to reflect on the 
metatheoretical or philosophical implications of one's research).
b)  The  basic  components  of  the  socio-technical  metatheory—actors, 
technologies,  rules—were  complemented  with  the  fourth  category  of 
meanings.  It was argued that rules could be conceptualized as a subset of 
meanings.
The distinction between different types of rules as offered by Searle (1995) 
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and  Scott  (1995)  was  demonstrated  to  be  neither  mutually  exclusive  nor 
exhaustive.  This  task  was  achieved by recategorizing  the  rules  along two 
different  axes:  constitutive–instrumental–moral  and  implicit–informal–
formal.
4) Philosophical: four defences derived from the research practice were offered 
to justify the realist position. Simultaneously an argument was put forth that 
the  meaning-centred  approach  threatens  to  lead  to  an  incomplete 
understanding of socio-technical processes and to maintain certain analytical 
blind spots.
Significance of the findings
It  is the challenge of every theory-construction exercise to link the results to the 
existing frameworks. Therefore, in this section I will focus on the following question: 
which domains of literature could benefit from this thesis? I will begin the discussion 
from specific substantive theories and the system-level analysis.
Although  by  identifying  some  mechanisms  not  found  elsewhere  in  the  DBO 
literature  and  making  some  minor  refinements  to  the  conceptualization  of 
environmental impacts not present in current writings on MLP, I think that the main 
contribution on the highest level of aggregation is made to the Systems of Innovation 
literature. That is, the four-phase model goes beyond noting the importance of the 
environment  for  the  internal  dynamics  of  the  system  and  actually  includes  the 
dynamics of both in a single framework. In that manner it overcomes the internalist 
tendencies of SI works that, even when embracing a dynamic perspective, still have 
little to say about the environment of the system (see also Högselius 2005: 297–301).
In this regard I would like to draw attention to the bulk of literature largely excluded 
from  this  thesis:  activities  of  innovation  systems.  Researchers  working  in  this 
direction have grouped the activities taking place in the system by seven different 
functions that  they  can  serve  (the  contribution  itself  can  be  positive,  neutral  or 
negative, see Hekkert  et al.  2007, Bergek et al. 2008). Examples of such functions 
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are  entrepreneurial  activities,  market  formation  and  knowledge  diffusion.  Recent 
work has focused on detecting the 'functional sequences' of innovation systems—for 
example,  innovative  activities  leading  to  knowledge  development  and  resource 
mobilization  (Hekkert  &  Negro  2009:  591).  The  authors  point  out  that  the 
importance of activities might differ depending on the phase of system evolution 
(Bergek  et al. 2008: 419), that a few recurrent sequences can be distinguished and 
that some functions are the 'key drivers' (Hekkert & Negro 2009: 591–592).
To me, however, these results illustrate perfectly the points made in chapter 4: that 
the theory can be too sophisticated in some aspects and too impoverished in others. 
In principle these functional sequences bear a strong resemblance to the key node 
sequences detected in the intra-case analysis—only that, in addition to operating on 
different  levels  of  abstraction,  these  sequences  were  made  up  of  properties,  not 
activities. As such most of the criticisms made for those key node sequences also 
apply for functional sequences: there is no distinction between network-internal and 
network-external events (meaning that this interaction remains underconceptualized), 
the groups underlying the sequences are obscured and the occurrence of sequences 
does  not  imply  causal  connection.  In  addition,  we  learn  little  about  the 
transformations of the system, i.e. the situations in which the properties of the system 
change decisively (e.g.  from formative to growth phase).  On the other  hand,  the 
vocabulary  that  does  exist  distinguishes  between  many  functions.  When  this  is 
coupled  with  an  analysis  in  which  multiple  parallel  events  are  categorized  as 
belonging to  at  least  one function (Hekkert  & Negro 2009) it  is  no wonder  that 
common and recurrent patterns are difficult if next to impossible to find. This, in 
turn, makes it hard to theorize the larger segments of system evolution. What follow 
once again are all-too-familiar  statements like  “the dynamics are complex and ...  
there is not one ideal way of how it can go” (ibid.: 591). Well, yes, but...
My  own  take  mainly  focused  on  the  interaction  of  changing  environmental 
conditions and the preferences of local actors. As a result it was possible to theorize 
the  whole  process  as  an  approximately  10-year-long  phase  of  system-internal 
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transformation of technologically underdeveloped countries involving the large-scale 
substitution  of Soviet  computers  for Western  ones,  the  end  of  local  hardware 
production  (industry)  and  an  accompanying  shift  in  entrepreneurial  activities.  In 
MLP terms  it  highlights  the  situation  in  which  the  avalanche  change  does  not 
necessarily lead to a transition from one socio-technical system to another, but rather 
stimulates a transformation within the system (after all, personal computers remained 
in use). Focusing on major trends in that manner enabled the teasing out of a longer-
term pattern that might have been obscured had I solely focused on counting and 
sequencing the system-internal activities.
This thesis started out by borrowing from MLP and SI. Therefore it was likely at the 
outset that it would contribute to discussions about the level of aggregation at which 
both of these frameworks operate. However, as the timeframe of the research allowed 
me to probe further and further in data analysis, it gradually became apparent that the 
results of the lower level of aggregation have the potential to speak to other strands 
of academic literature. This means, however, that the following discussion needs to 
break the general rule of not including any new material in the conclusion. Brief 
references to other fields of research have to be made to highlight the potential gaps 
and connections.
Whereas  large-scale  and long-term patterns  were  relatively undertheorized  at  the 
system  level,  the  situation  is  somewhat  different  for  the  inter-case  level.  I  am 
referring, among others, to general models for the emergence of dominant designs or 
the  diffusion  of  innovations.  Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992),  for  example,  have 
proposed a technology cycle model that consists  of four phases: 1) technological 
discontinuity;  2)  era  of ferment;  3)  dominant  design;  and 4)  incremental  change. 
Rogers (2003), on the other hand, has noted that the adoption of an innovation can be 
depicted as an S-curve: the users' uptake is slow in the first and the third phase, but  
rapid in the second. However, from the point of view of this thesis, these models 
remain  too  broad  as  they  focus  on  too  a  long  timeframe  and  on  the  aggregate 
outcomes  of  the  interactions  of  various  networks.  Moreover,  they  are  largely 
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internalist—that is, they do little to theorize the dependence of the progression of the 
cycle on environmental developments. As a result, one does not learn much about 
how innovations come to be established in different functional domains, how they 
are adapted for different domains and how the developments taking place in one 
domain impact the others.
In this sense my own approach resembles the 'biographical' take on the evolution of 
artefacts, which stresses the need “to follow [a technology] as it evolves, matures or  
crosses organizational boundaries” attempting to “trace the 'accumulated history' of  
[a technology] and show how it continues to influence the structures and practices of  
later adopters” (Pollock et al. 2003: 320). However, the ambitiousness of this goal—
to theorize the whole biography of an artefact, focusing on the multi-site and multi-
level  long-term  development  in  considerable  detail—means  that  proponents  still 
seem to  be devoting  much effort  to  outlining  the  theoretical  and methodological 
concepts and requirements to which such an approach should adhere (e.g. Williams 
&  Pollock  2012)  rather  than  putting  forth  a  set  of  middle-range  theoretical 
propositions and hypotheses.
The  contribution  of  this  thesis  is  far  more  modest  than  theorizing  the  whole 
biography of an artefact. Instead of attempting to (re)theorize the whole technology 
cycle, the aggregate pattern of diffusion or the biography of PCs, I have shown how a 
certain  line  of  computers  came  to  be  established  in  a  certain  functional  domain 
(school computing) and the subsequent implications of this event for other, similar 
socio-technical networks. It is true that this conceptualization omits quite a lot of 
complexity and focuses on explicit interactions and only some particular moments in 
the  lifecycles  of  each  PC.  On  the  other  hand,  this  strategy  allowed  increased 
precision  by  explicitly  distinguishing  between  basic  underlying  mechanisms  and 
some background factors, the combination of which, in turn, explained 1) whether 
and why the mechanism of opportunity space capture was realized; 2) what pattern 
this process took; 3) what the subsequent coping mechanisms were; 4) and why they 
realized. As such I arrived at clear and testable theoretical statements, albeit limited 
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in scope.
It  may well  be that  with such a strategy I  have stepped into the very same trap 
highlighted above—focusing on too much detail and failing to see the  big picture. 
After  all,  these episodes of network interaction do not  cover  every aspect  of  the 
overall  dynamics  of  each  network.  What  emerges  instead  is  a  rather  fragmented 
picture of different episodes in which the interaction was explicit.
At  this  point,  however,  the  choice  to  focus  simultaneously on multiple  levels  of 
aggregation justifies itself  once again by allowing one to grasp common patterns 
behind the specific interactions between networks. Not only does the system-level 
analysis  include  a  longer  timeframe,  it  also  encompasses  the  moments  when the 
cases  evolved in  parallel  niches.  As  such it  allows  attention  to  be  drawn to  the 
common pressures experienced by each PC project. That is to say, the multi-level 
aggregation strategy allows one to tease out the hierarchy of causes. For example, 
whereas  the  inter-case  analysis  illuminated  the  significance  of  the  unity  of 
preferences  and  the  motivation  to  engage  in  network-building  for  shaping  the 
realization (pattern) and the underlying mechanism (opportunity capture) of school 
computerization,  the  system-level  focus  illustrated  that  in  the  longer  term  these 
specific patterns failed to have a lasting impact, since rapid decoupling of the Baltic 
countries from the Soviet Union and re-coupling to the Western world enabled the 
actors in all three states to substitute the Soviet PCs, whether locally produced or not, 
with Western computers. In other words, in the longer term the end result did not 
depend much on the specific pattern by which the functional domains were initially 
filled. However, this is not to claim that the conceptualization of these patterns is 
entirely insignificant—it all depends on the research question. The inter-case focus 
brought attention to factors omitted or downplayed by the system-level analysis and 
vice versa. The different perspectives are thus complementary, not competitive.
Finally, there is the intra-case level at which the development of each socio-technical 
network was individually theorized. Again it seems that my own theory occupies a 
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niche  between  existing  frameworks.  For  example,  Actor–Network  Theory  has 
devoted  excessive  attention  to  single  networks  and  has  even  made  some  crude 
distinctions between networks that operate at different levels (local and global, see 
Law & Callon 1992). However, ANT has also continuously maintained a huge gap 
between  the  generality  of  the  theoretical  vocabulary and  the  complexity  of  case 
descriptions (Geels 2007b: 631–635). Moreover, one of the founding fathers of ANT 
has made an argument that there is actually no need to go beyond description at all 
(Latour  1988).  Therefore,  ANT  middle-range  theories  of  individual  network 
evolution are currently absent.
Extensive work, on the other hand, has been conducted in the field of management 
studies  under  the  rubric  of the  'innovation  journey'.  Longitudinal  case  studies  of 
different innovations undertaken in the 1980s demonstrated in a familiar manner that 
“none of the innovations developed in a simple linear sequence or stages or phases  
of activities over time. Instead, a much messier and more complex progression of  
events was observed in the development of each innovation” (Van de Ven et al. 1999: 
23). These studies also detected what the authors called 'patterns of commonality' for 
each  period  of  the  journey (initiation,  development,  implementation/termination). 
These are  essentially recurring events  such as  the rapid change in  the criteria  of 
success and failure of an innovative activity, the frequent occurrence of setbacks or 
the need to establish relations with other organizations that locks the innovation on a 
specific  path  (ibid.:  23–24).  From  the  viewpoint  of  my  own  study,  important 
shortcomings remain in the approach and results of Van de Ven and others: 1) the 
analytical focus of the framework is mainly on organization-internal processes, not 
on the network level; 2) although numerous findings on various specific aspects of 
the innovation journey have been presented, the picture of the overall development is 
still one of complexity and uncertainty—the whole journey is basically constituted 
by a sequence of three phases and some recurrent events in each; and 3) the role of 
the  environmental  conditions  in  impacting  the  course  of  the  innovation  journey 
remains undertheorized.
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My analysis has focused on the formation and contraction of networks of socio-
technical actors to explain the success and failure of each PC project. The multi-level 
perspective sensitized me to the issue that a single overarching model that captured 
each case is unlikely to be found—unless it is formulated in very general terms and 
therefore  somewhat  blandly—since  many  large-scale  environmental  disturbances 
were observed. However, it seems that exactly the same issue was also encountered 
by Van de Ven and others—and the social contexts of their cases did not experience 
such  major  disruptions.  In  other  words,  the  networks  seem to  fluctuate  even  in 
relatively stable macro-social conditions. I chose to overcome this analytical obstacle 
by dividing the overall lifecycle of each network into meaningful episodes, including 
both  network-external  and  network-internal  events,  and  theorizing  each  of  them 
separately.  This  strategy enabled  me to  formulate  theoretical  proposals  about  the 
patterns of network formation and network contraction depending on the state of the 
network  and  the  environmental  conditions.  As  such  it  seems  to  be  a  novel 
contribution to the field of STS, as I do not know of any other middle-range, multi-
level, co-evolutionary dynamic models aimed at explaining the success or failure of 
individual socio-technical networks.
Based on this experience of data analysis I would make the following proposal: if the 
chosen level of empirical specificity does not seem to allow for capturing the whole 
event sequence with a single middle-range model, yet the analyst wishes to avoid 
very  high-level  generalizations  (which  risk  being  banal)  or  giving  in  to  the 
complexity  and  abstaining  from  looking  for  common  patterns  altogether,  then 
configurational theory might be a good solution. That is, instead of summarizing the 
case with one model, certain potentially recurring modules could be identified, with 
each used to explain part of the sequence. The combination of these modules, in turn, 
would  explain  the  overall  event  sequence  observed  in  the  particular  case.  This 
strategy has two benefits. First, it enables the analyst to make more theoretical use of 
the rich data available. Second, it enables him or her to detach the modules from the 
particular case and to test their applicability elsewhere. For example, based on the 
findings of this thesis it would be possible to locate some instances of major societal 
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disruption  and  to  investigate  whether  socio-technical  network-formation  1)  takes 
place very rapidly (compared with instances where the pressure is more moderate); 
2) results mostly in networks with weak ties; and 3) exhibits a high rate of failure.
I  will  now turn to  a  brief  discussion of methatheoretical  contributions,  which by 
definition are much wider in their scope of applicability. As such it is justified to ask: 
how do these findings help us to conceptualize technological change better?
In chapter 1, raising the awareness of the researcher to possible alternatives and blind 
spots was identified as one of the advantages of thinking in metatheoretical terms. To 
take an example from the literature: after a careful discussion about the strengths and 
weaknesses  of  Multi-Level  Perspective  and  Systems of  Innovation,  Markard  and 
Truffer (2008) conclude that actors, institutions (rules) and technologies should all be 
counted as constituents of an innovation system. On the other hand, the typology of 
system  functions  tested  on  various  cases  (see  Hekkert  &  Negro  2009)  includes 
knowledge development and diffusion among the key activities (Hekkert et al. 2007, 
Bergek  et al.  2008). Therefore, the basic assumptions of the SI framework do not 
embrace the fact that in empirical practice the researchers have been focused on the 
cumulative feedback of actors, technologies, institutions and knowledge, not only the 
first three of these. The explicit inclusion of knowledge (meanings) would help to 
contextualize the middle-range research better by making researchers more reflexive 
about their own assumptions.
The ways  in  which  this  might  happen are  various,  because  of  the  high  level  of 
generality  of  these  assumptions.  I  will  bring  a  brief  example  from  my  own 
experience  when,  during  the  course  of  this  research  project,  I  developed  a  little 
hypothesis—unconnected to the main focus of this thesis—about the possible self-
reinforcing development of innovation systems. It began with an observation of a 
certain tension in SI literature: although the scholars acknowledged that the actors of 
the innovation system might not be thinking in systemic terms and claimed to have 
defined the functions 'analytically' (e.g. Bergek et al. 2008: 409), much attention was 
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also paid to the issue of 'enhancing the performance' of SIs (e.g. Bergek et al. 2008: 
419–422, van Alphen  et al.  2010: 406–407). The core of this tension became very 
clear,  however,  once  reformulated  in  metatheoretical  terms:  it  is  a  situation  of  a 
description becoming a prescription which, in turn, potentially feeds back to a future 
description of the system. That is, meanings shaping rules shaping meanings. With 
the problem made explicit, it became possible to search for literature connected to 
the issue, e.g. the performativity of economics (Callon 1998), distinctions between 
different types of performativity (MacKenzie 2006: 16–20), critical discussion on the 
rhetorical use of the SI framework (Miettinen 2002) and debates about whether the 
approach originated from academic or policy circles (Sharif 2006: 749–752). This in 
turn allowed me to formulate the hypothesis that the development of an innovation 
system may be described as a virtuous cycle: 1) scientific analytical description gives 
grounds for performance assessment including the specification of desirable goals of 
an innovation system and respective policy advice; 2) this normative advice, when 
taken up by politicians,  becomes implemented in certain policy measures;  3)  the 
creation  of  fertile  conditions  and  incentives  enhances  innovative  activities  and 
increases cooperation between local players, resulting in 4) a higher degree of actual 
systemicity when the same locality is  analysed in the future.  In other  words,  the 
initial analytical functionalism may be a causal factor moving the system towards 
substantive functionalism,  through the mediation of normative functionalism. The 
role of metatheory in enabling the initial abstraction and guiding the following re-
specification of the hypothesis is notable.
In a similar manner, the typology of rules provides a structuring map, an analytic 
umbrella for a number of middle-range propositions. I will briefly point out three 
possibilities of empirical specification:
1) Moving  from  descriptive  to  classificatory  typology,  e.g.  from conceptual 
definition to  assigning cases  to  types  (Elman 2009:  122).  For  example,  it 
would be possible to re-work Geels's (2004: 906) classification of different 
types of rules characteristic of different regimes (e.g. science, policy, users, 
markets and distribution networks).
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2) Moving from descriptive to explanatory theory, that is, making “predictions  
based on combinations of different values of a theory's variables” (Elman 
2009: 122). Following the discussion in chapter 5, if regulative and normative 
rules are better characterized as instrumental rules of differing explicitness 
then one could predict that the corresponding sanctioning mechanisms would 
be coercion for formal instrumental rules, normative pressure (e.g. shaming) 
for informal ones and imitation for constitutive ones (Scott 1995: 52, Geels 
2004).
3) Exploring  the  boundary  conditions  in  which  the  encoded  properties  of 
artefacts are perceived as moral or immoral. Here one could re-open Winner's 
(1999) famous, albeit contested (Joerges 1999b) narrative on the bridges of 
Long Island and imagine a case in which the low height of the bridges was 
merely an unintended consequence. Although the buses would still  not get 
through the overpasses, thus preventing poor and black people from entering 
certain areas, would we still call the design immoral? Would the principle of 
double effect (Hauser  et al. 2007) be applicable here,  considering that the 
architect could have chosen differently? Or, if  he really did not know any 
better at the time and could not foresee the full ramifications of such a design, 
what  restrictions  would  have  applied  to  reversing  this  choice  once  the 
overpasses had already been built? Is there a conflict between moral values? 
Is it a matter of power relations or one of convenience? Questions abound.
I have highlighted some ways in which the findings of chapter 5 could lead to a 
better  understanding of  technological  change.  However,  I  have  to  stress  that  the 
debate on this level of generalization should not be restricted to STS, but should also 
have an impact on mainstream sociology, which still largely continues to omit the 
material from and developments in STS. When Emirbayer (1997) comes up with a 
manifesto(!)  for  a  relational  sociology that  makes  only  one  passing  reference  to 
Latour;  when  Sibeon  aims  to  rewrite  the  whole  sociological  metatheory  and 
discusses 'materials' and 'material diffusion' at length, but uses these terms to denote 
“discourses, social practices and typifications” (2004: 167); or when Dant (2006) 
309
sets out to sketch a 'sociology of objects' and ends up spending far more space on 
Braudel and Elias than on the whole field of STS then I would say there is cause for 
concern. The social systems of the sociologists are not immaterial and do not float in 
the air independently from their material underpinnings—as the STS community has 
abundantly  demonstrated.  But  in  my  opinion,  much  remains  to  be  done  in 
communicating the implications of this proposition to mainstream sociologists more 
forcefully.
Shortcomings and opportunities
This thesis has made a number of criticisms of other frameworks. Therefore, at this 
point it is only fair redirect the critique to my own research. In the following section I 
will indicate seven weaknesses of the thesis and the means by which they might be 
overcome:
1) Although the thesis focused on the comparison of the Soviet Baltic states, I 
managed to interview fewer people in Latvia than in Estonia or Lithuania 
because of difficulties related to locating relevant sources. This shortcoming 
was  at  least  partially  alleviated  by  more  extensive  coverage  of  written 
material. However, more oral data would help to add detail to the narratives 
and strengthen the theoretical inferences.
2) Although I learned about many other cases during the course of my research, 
not all of them could be covered because of the timeframe of the project and 
difficulties  finding  knowledgeable  interviewees.  This  might  have  some 
implications on system-level inferences, since not all cases about which the 
generalizations are made have been covered. However, as far as I know no 
PC project survived the large-scale societal transition and therefore it is likely 
that the system-internal transformation model holds.
3) When it comes to the cases studied in depth, the people closely related to 
hardware and software design could generally be found. However, in some 
cases the people from the factory that mass produced the PC, especially the 
top management (notably Baltijets for Juku and Nuklonas for BK-0010Š), 
could not be contacted. The user side was covered for cases in which the 
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networks were more extensive. The dispersed and small circle of users made 
it difficult to find interviewees when dealing with small-scale, customized PC 
projects, however. More work remains to be done in this area.
4) Since the empirical terrain was mostly uncharted, the most effort was spent 
on assembling the local micro-narratives. This meant less stress on contextual 
factors, especially when it came to various macro-level statistics (e.g. product 
cycle length, product quality etc.). It is unclear at the moment, however, how 
much this shortcoming can be overcome at all, since a) often the information 
no longer exists; b) the information might exist, but its location is unknown; 
and  c)  even  if  the  information  exists  it  might  be  grossly  inaccurate  and 
misleading (e.g. the inflation rate continues to be very difficult to estimate).
5) The  middle-range  theoretical  concepts  were  defined  rather  loosely.  The 
category of vision is potentially problematic—although I attempted to tease 
out the underlying variables affecting the strength and match of the vision, 
the conceptualization is still  open to the accusation of tautology, i.e. if the 
network formation fails, one is  led to conclude that there must have been 
something  wrong  with  the  vision.  I  have  tried  to  avoid  this  threat  by 
indicating  as  accurately  as  possible  specific  features  that  influenced  the 
underlying processes of network formation and contraction for each episode. 
However, in case one aims to perform further quantitative analyses to detect 
the conditions in which these mechanisms are realized and in which they are 
not, the variables need to be specified more precisely.
6) All the analysed cases were part of a system different from that in the West 
(e.g.  in  terms  of  the  availability  of  resources,  the  barriers  to  getting  a 
prototype  into  mass  production  or  the  difficulties  with  beginning  another 
product cycle). However, the three middle-range theories aspire to be more 
universal, not merely theories of Soviet innovation.
7) All the cases involve the domain of computing, whereas the three middle-
range theories aspire to be more universal, not merely theories of innovation 
in this domain. Essentially points 6 and 7 are both concerned with a similar 
problem:  are  these  findings  applicable  beyond  the  particular  (narrow) 
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empirical domain? In reply I would repeat the point made in chapter 4—the 
choices made in the data analysis process define the theoretical population 
that the cases represent. I believe that in this case the analysis was stopped at 
the level of generality at which the differences between the Soviet and the 
Western  systems  did  not  play  a  considerable  role.  In  other  words,  it  is 
sensible  to  presume  that  the  same  underlying  mechanisms  of  network 
formation and contraction are  quite  general  in  nature,  that  the patterns  of 
innovative  activities  generally  depend  heavily  on  the  intensity  of 
environmental conditions, that the functional domains are frequently captured 
by  appealing  to  the  local  key  actors,  that  the  innovation  systems  do 
experience  internal  transformations  from time  to  time  and so  on.  Further 
testing  on new cases,  of  course,  would help  to  substantiate  or  refute  this 
belief.
In this research project I have tackled various issues on many fronts. I hope that in so 
doing I have managed to avoid the risk of superficiality. In many respects, however, 
many  promising  leads  were  opened  up  which  I  could  not  pursue  at  this  time. 
Categorized  by  different  domains,  some  possible  future  research  opportunities 
include:
1) Historical:  covering all  the cases in the Soviet Baltic states to assemble a 
comprehensive history of personal computing in the region. Another option 
would  be  to  widen the  empirical  scope and include  the  histories  of  large 
production unions mainly devoted to PC production elsewhere in the USSR 
(e.g.  Belarus  or  Kiev).  Finally,  the  macro-history  of  Soviet  personal 
computing (including the division of labour in the Communist Bloc) and a 
comparison with Western developments would also be an enticing endeavour. 
When it comes to the peculiarities of Soviet innovation, however, I would 
favour an in-depth look into the production of electronic musical instruments, 
as  my  hands-on  experience  with  some  of  them  immediately  makes  me 
wonder what the producers might have been contemplating to come up with 
such remarkably low-quality items.
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2) Middle-range theoretical: the most obvious way to continue would be to test 
each of the three theories on more recent cases from different socio-material 
contexts. On the other hand, to explore the extent of external validity it would 
also be interesting to take a look at cases from the more distant past instead 
(provided that they are sufficiently documented). The same goes for domains 
other  than computing.  In addition to  in-depth case studies  that  enable the 
detection  of  new  patterns  and  underlying  mechanisms,  large-scale 
quantitative  analysis  would  help  to  identify  the  boundary  conditions  of 
mechanism realization for each level.
3) Methodological:  the  current  analysis  can  be  substantially  refined.  For 
example, a typology of activities can be included to make the theorization 
more sensitive to the alternation between characteristic activities and forms 
(properties) of the networks (or the networks of such networks). More can 
also be done to embrace the parallel occurrence of events. It would also be 
interesting to integrate the most crucial factors observed at each level into a 
computer simulation and to see whether the dynamics between the networks 
would yield results similar to those actually observed. If not, there might be 
reasons  to  suspect  that  the  conceptualization  has  missed  some  relevant 
factors.
4) Metatheoretical: building on the foregoing discussion, one can probe into the 
question of the hierarchy of rules and meanings. More specifically—if every 
rule seems to rely on some meanings which,  in turn,  are the outcomes of 
more fundamental rule-following (constitutive rules), then what is the exact 
relation between the two? It would be tempting to develop a general model of 
the diffusion of rules able to theorize simultaneously short-term interactions, 
long-term institutionalization and very long-term evolutionary selection.  It 
might also be tempting to sidestep the familiar sociological and philosophical 
hypothetical pitfalls about the observer's inability to know whether his or her 
attribution of similar practices to a single underlying rule is actually valid or 
not, or the claim that rules are constituted anew with each practice, and turn 
to advances in neuropsychology instead. Findings in this domain may well 
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lead to a thorough rethinking of the notion of rules.
5) Philosophical:  as  far  as  I  know,  the  issue  of  technological  causality  still 
remains to be resolved in a satisfactory manner. On a very general level, the 
mutual shaping of technology and human activity is now generally accepted 
in the STS community. On the other hand, if the choices are still made by 
humans then how exactly does technology affect human action? What is the 
vocabulary  to  speak  about  the  impact  of  the  technical?  Also,  following 
Vincenti's call (1995) one can attempt to compile the taxonomy and hierarchy 
of material constraints. Thereby one may also arrive at an answer about the 
asymmetry between the material properties and the ascription of meanings. 
This, in turn, would constitute a part of the solution to the conundrum of the 
degree to which reality can be socially constructed.
This thesis set out to improve on some aspects of STS I found wanting. To avoid 
placing too much stress on data, the process of middle-range theorizing was taken 
very  seriously.  To  show  the  links  between  theoretical  categories  and  historical 
narratives, a suitable analytical technique was devised and put into practice. To avoid 
the  micro-trap,  middle-range  results  were  offered  on  three  different  levels  of 
aggregation. Stylistically,  I aimed to make the writing as clear as possible. I also 
suggested that the historical cases can be used to derive theories applicable to other 
spatial and temporal contexts. Finally, I argued that not only is it helpful to be aware 
of one's philosophical and metatheoretical groundings—the experience of the whole 
research journey also enables one to perfect them and provides a chance to link one's 
own research to wider sociological debates.
This  brings  me  to  the  overarching  theme  of  the  thesis:  it  is  beneficial,  not  just 
possible,  to  think  big,  even when researching small.  In  my opinion,  a  local  and 
complex empirical focus should never be used as an excuse to avoid either middle-
range or foundational issues. When sufficiently rigorous thinking is exercised, one's 
research  may  turn  out  to  have  various  implications  across  several  domains  of 
knowledge,  from history  to  theory,  from theory  to  methodology,  from micro  to 
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macro, and from specific to general. If this thesis has managed to convince the reader 
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Appendix A. Interviewees and their organizational 
affiliations
Ališauskas,  Ričardas  –  Computing  Centre  of  Vilnius  State  University  (Vilniaus 
Valstybinio  Universiteto  Skaičiavimo Centre),  later  Centre  of  Informatics  and 
Prognosis (Informatikos ir Prognozavimo Centre)
Balčytis, Vidmantas – Vilnius State University, later Lema
Bernotas,  Marijus  –  The  faculty  of  Kaunas  Polytechnical  Institute  (Kauno 
Politechnikos Institutas) in Šiauliai
Červinskis,  Jurijs  –  VEF  (Valsts  elektrotehniskā  fabrika),  Technical  Research 
Department
Dagienė,  Valentina  –  Vilnius  State  University,  Institute  of  Mathematics  and 
Cybernetics (Matematikos ir Kibernetikos Institutas)
Desiukevič, Aleksandr – Sigma
Dinda,  Albertas  –  Švenčionys  Zigmas  Žemaitis  High School  (Švenčionių  Zigmo 
Žemaičio vidurinė mokykla)
Drąsutis, Algimantas – Sigma
Eglājs,  Modris  –  Computing  Centre  of  Latvian  State  University  (Latvijas  Valsts 
universitātes  Skaitļošanas  centrs),  Laboratory  of  the  Problems  of  School 
Informatics (Skolu informātikas problēmu laboratorija)
Eller, Arvo – Institute of Cybernetics (Küberneetika Instituut), Special Construction 
Bureau of Computing Technology
Enok, Leo – Palivere Factory of Construction Materials (Palivere Ehitusmaterjalide 
Tehas), subsidiary electronics production unit
Grigas,  Gintautas  –  Vilnius  State  University,  Institute  of  Mathematics  and 
Cybernetics
Haavel, Rein* – Institute of Cybernetics, Special Construction Bureau of Computing 
Technology
Humal, Leo-Henn* – Tartu State University,  Laboratory of Electroluminescence and 
Semiconductors (Elektroluminestsentsi ja Pooljuhtide Laboratoorium)
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Jaaksoo, Ülo* – Institute of Cybernetics
Jelle,  Kaido  –  RET  (Punane  RET),  later  Institute  of  Cybernetics,  Special 
Construction Bureau of Computing Technology
Jürisson,  Tiina*  –  Republican  Supplementary  Training  Institute  of  Teachers 
(Vabariiklik Õpetajate Täiendusinstituut)
Kaklauskas, Liudvikas – The faculty of Kaunas Polytechnical Institute in Šiauliai
Kala, Ülo* – Kuusalu kolkhoz, subsidiary production enterprise Estron
Karčiauskas, Eimutis –  Kaunas Polytechnical Institute
Kazlauskas, Rimantas – Vilnius State University, later Lema
Kivimäe, Aarne – Nõo High School (Nõo Keskkool)
Krivchenkov, Aleksandr – VEF, Technical Research Department
Ļenskis, Igors – VEF, Computing Centre
Leppik,  Kalju*  –  Institute  of  Cybernetics,  Special  Construction  Bureau  of 
Computing Technology
Malsub, Jüri – Computing Centre of the Ministry of Communications, later Viko
Markevičius, Rolandas – Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
Märtin,  Kaarel*  –  Institute  of  Cybernetics,  Special  Construction  Bureau  of 
Computing Technology
Matelionis, Saulius – Kaunas Polytechnical Institute
Matulionis, Henrikas – Kaunas Radio Measurement Equipment Scientific Research 
Institute (Kauno radijo matavimų technikos mokslinių tyrimų institutas)
Paluoja, Rein* – Institute of Cybernetics, Special Construction Bureau of Computing 
Technology
Paulauskas, Evaldas – Sigma
Prekerienė,  Joana  –  Semiconductor  Physics  Institute  (Puslaidininkių  fizikos 
institutas)  of  the  Lithuanian  Academy  of  Sciences,  later   Kaunas  Radio 
Measurement Equipment Scientific Research Institute
Pungas, Toom** – RET, Special Construction Bureau
Rätsep, Ülo – Computing Centre of the Ministry of Communications, later Viko
Ruut, Raivo* – 1. Viljandi High School (Viljandi 1. Keskkool)
Sasnauskas,  Vitalis  –  The  faculty  of  Kaunas  Polytechnical  Institute  (Kauno 
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Politechnikos Institutas) in Šiauliai
Saul, Bruno – Council of Ministers of Soviet Estonia (ENSV Ministrite Nõukogu)
Tajur, Enn – Computing Centre of the Ministry of Communications
Telksnys,  Laimutis  –   Vilnius  State  University,  Institute  of  Mathematics  and 
Cybernetics
Tingas, Urmas – Palivere Factory of Construction Materials, subsidiary electronics 
production unit
Toom,  Olev** –  Tartu  State  University,   Laboratory of  Electroluminescence  and 
Semiconductors
Torn, Rain – Computing Centre of the Ministry of Communications, later Viko
Tõnso, Tõnu* – Tallinn Pedagogical Institute (Tallinna Pedagoogiline Institituut)
Tõnspoeg,  Tõnu*  –  Institute  of  Cybernetics,  Special  Construction  Bureau  of 
Computing Technology
Tõugu, Enn – Institute of Cybernetics
Tovba, Mikhail – VEF, Special Construction Bureau, later Computing Centre
Tüksammel, Tõnu – Kuusalu kolkhoz, subsidiary production enterprise Estron
Videnieks,  Pēteris  –  VEF,  Technical  Research  Department,  later  VEF  Scientific 
Research Institute (VEF Zinātniskās pētniecības institūts)
Vilgats, Heido – Palivere Factory of Construction Materials, subsidiary electronics 
production unit
Villems, Anne – Tartu State University, Faculty of Mathematics
Vītiņš,  Māris  –  Computing Centre of Latvian State  University,  Laboratory of the 
Problems of School Informatics
Võhandu, Leo* – Tallinn Polytechnical Institute (Tallinna Polütehniline Instituut)
Zalatorius, Juozas – Vilnius State University, later Baltic Amadeus
Židonis, Evaldas – Sigma, Scientific Research Institute of Computing Technology 
and Informatics (Skaičiavimo technikos ir informatikos mokslinio tyrimo 
institutas)
Žintelis, Gintautas – Kaunas Polytechnical Institute
Žuks,  Jānis – Latvian State University,  Institute of Solid State Physics (Cietvielu 
fizikas Institūts)
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Zlatkus, Giedrius – Computing Centre of Vilnius State University, later Centre of 
Informatics and Prognosis
* Interviewed for my Master's dissertation (Kanger 2009) and not re-interviewed for 
this thesis.
** Interviewed for my Master's dissertation and re-interviewed for this thesis.
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Appendix B. Key node sequence maps
SIGMA 8800
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